

Images of Rebirth

*Cognitive Poetics and Transformational
Soteriology in the Gospel of Philip
and the Exegesis on the Soul*

By **Hugo Lundhaug**

BRILL

Images of Rebirth

Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies

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VOLUME 73

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BRILL

LEIDEN • BOSTON
2010

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Lundhaug, Hugo. Images of rebirth : cognitive poetics and transformational soteriology in the Gospel of Philip and the Exegesis on the Soul / by Hugo Lundhaug.

p. cm. -- (Nag Hammadi and Manichaean studies ; v. 73) Revision of the author's thesis (doctoral)--University of Bergen, 2007.

Includes bibliographical references (p.) and index.

ISBN 978-90-04-18026-0 (hardback : alk. paper)

1. Gospel of Philip--Language, style. 2. Exegesis on the Soul--Language, style. 3. Gospel of Philip--Theology. 4. Exegesis on the Soul--Theolgy. 5. Salvation--Christianity--History of doctrines--Early church, ca. 30-600. I. Title. II. Series.

BS2860.P67L86 2010

229'.92049--dc22

2010018540

ISSN 0929-2470

ISBN 978 90 04 18026 0

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the following people and institutions for their contributions to the present study, which is a revised version of my University of Bergen doctoral dissertation, finished in July 2006 and defended in June 2007. Thanks are due first and foremost to my doctoral advisor, Ingvild Sælid Gilhus, who provided feedback, encouragement, inspiration, and support beyond the call of duty throughout the dissertation project. Without her, this study would not have been possible.

The dissertation was written as a part of the project *The Body and Processes of Life in Antiquity (LOKA)*, under the auspices of the Research Council of Norway (RCN). I am especially grateful to the RCN and LOKA for funding my doctoral studies. I would also like to thank the other members of the LOKA-project, Ingvild Sælid Gilhus, Turid Karlsen Seim, Gunhild Vidén, and Dag Øistein Endsjø, for stimulating discussions and generous and always helpful feedback on my work throughout the project.

Thanks are also due to the University of Bergen where I was employed during my doctoral studies, and I would like to thank my knowledgeable and supportive colleagues at the Institute of Classics, Russian, and the History of Religions, in particular Professors Ingvild Sælid Gilhus, Einar Thomassen, Jostein Børtnes, Thomas Hägg, Lisbeth Mikaelsson, Karstein Hopland, and Tor Hauken, and Research Fellows Jonas Bjørnebye, Liv Ingeborg Lied, Sissel Undheim, Gina Dahl, Karl Johan Skeidsvoll, Aslak Rostad, and Vebjørn Kirkesæther for discussions and feedback. Special thanks are due to Jostein Børtnes for his invaluable encouragement of my pursuits in developing the Cognitive Poetics methodology. At the University of Bergen, the Programme for the Study of Ancient Christianity (PROAK) and the Highways and Byways project also provided ample opportunity for presentation and discussion of the present work in its various phases, for which I am grateful. I am also grateful to Einar Thomassen for sharing with me some of his then unpublished and forthcoming work on the *Gospel of Philip* and other Nag Hammadi texts.

I would like to thank the Faculty of Theology at the University of Oslo for providing me with an office in Oslo during my doctoral studies.

Special thanks are due to Turid Karlsen Seim for making this possible. Fellow Research Fellow Jonas Bjørnebye, with whom I was fortunate to share office space in this period, deserves special thanks for always inspiring discussions and feedback and for enduring my many monologues on the intricacies of the Nag Hammadi texts and cognitive theory. Also at the Faculty of Theology, Stig Frøyshov, Vemund Blomkvist, Kirsten Marie Hartvigsen, David Hellholm, Marianne Bjelland Kartzow, Halvor Moxnes, Eivor Oftestad, and Reidar Aasgaard deserve thanks for their input on my research.

For a truly inspiring and fruitful year at Harvard University, 2004–2005, thanks are due to Karen King who served as my doctoral advisor during my stay there, who was always helpful and supportive, and who provided valuable feedback on my project. I would also like to thank François Bovon for taking an interest in my work and for generously taking the time to read and respond to various parts of it. For valuable feedback on my work I would also like to thank the participants of the Doctoral Dissertation Seminar at Harvard Divinity School. The stay at Harvard also provided the opportunity to delve deeper into the delights of the Coptic language, and thanks are due to Ariel Shisha-Halevy for his supremely inspiring Coptic classes and also for discussing with me the translation of certain passages of *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* Thanks are once again due to the RCN for providing the funding to enable my stay at Harvard.

The NordForsk-funded Nordic Nag Hammadi and Gnosticism Network (NNGN), under the leadership of Einar Thomassen, Antti Marjanen, and Nils Arne Pedersen, and its continuation organised by Tuomas Rasimus, has also provided a highly stimulating environment for discussion and inspiration, and I would like to express my sincere thanks to all the participants of the network for their generous sharing of ideas and insights.

For reading and commenting on substantial parts of this work in either its dissertation or revision phase I am greatly indebted to Jonas Bjørnebye, Ismo Dunderberg, René Falkenberg, Liv Ingeborg Lied, Antti Marjanen, and Stig Oppedal, as well as to the members of the LOKA-project, Ingvild Sælid Gilhus, Turid Karlsen Seim, Gunhild Vidén, and Dag Øistein Endsjø, and of course to the valuable feedback from the members of my doctoral committee and opponents at my doctoral defence, Luther H. Martin and Louis Painchaud, and the leader of the committee, Jostein Børtnes. During the revision process I am especially grateful to Stephen Emmel for his thorough feedback on my manuscript

as well as for highly fruitful discussions of the Coptic text of the *Gospel of Philip*, the *Exegesis on the Soul*, and Shenoute, and all things Coptological, and for facilitating a year's stimulating research stay at the University of Münster in 2008–2009 (funded by the RCN) during which time much revision work was done.

I am also grateful to the following people for reading and commenting on parts of this work at various stages throughout its evolution: George Aichele, Harold Attridge, Vemund Blomkvist, Jostein Børtnes, François Bovon, Istvan Czachesz, Gina Dahl, Ismo Dunderberg, Jorunn Økland, Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Philip Esler, Jesper Hyldahl, Karen King, Outi Lehtipuu, Petri Luomanen, Jörgen Magnusson, Antti Marjanen, Luther H. Martin, Halvor Moxnes, Samuel Rubenson, Nanna Liv Olsen, Louis Painchaud, Anne Pasquier, Nils Arne Pedersen, Tage Petersen, Tuomas Rasimus, Vernon Robbins, Els Rose, Karl Johan Skeidsvoll, Einar Thomassen, Sissel Undheim, and Risto Uro.

Special thanks are due to René Falkenberg for many long stimulating discussions of Coptic texts and translations, theology, and everything Nag Hammadi-related, as well as for his constant encouragement and ongoing interest. I would also like to thank Christian Askeland, Samuel Moawad, Alin Suciu, and David Tibet for generously sharing their work, ideas, research tools, and, not least, their inspiring enthusiasm for Coptology. Finally I would like to thank Anne Boud'hors for sharing a part of her ongoing work on White Monastery Codex XO, and Herbert Schmid for generously sharing his work, both published and unpublished.

Thanks are due to my employer for the past four years, the Faculty of Theology at the University of Oslo, as well as to the Centre for Advanced Study (CAS) in Oslo, where I spent the academic year 2006–2007. I would sincerely like to thank Turid Karlsen Seim, the leader of the research group *Metamorphoses: Resurrection, Taxonomies and Transformative Practices in Early Christianity* for recruiting me to this stimulating research group at CAS and I would like to thank all the members of the group for valuable discussions, and the staff at CAS for facilitating a stimulating and friendly cross-disciplinary research environment.

Last, but not least, I am eternally grateful to my wife Linn for her enduring patience and constant support, and to my son Walter for cheerful encouragement. This book is dedicated to them.

Oslo, March 1, 2010

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>1 Apoc. Jas.</i>	<i>The (First) Apocalypse of James</i>
ABD	Freedman, David Noel, ed. <i>Anchor Bible Dictionary</i> . 6 vols. New York: Doubleday, 1992.
ACW	Ancient Christian Writers
AJSR	<i>Association for Jewish Studies Review</i>
ALGHJ	Arbeiten zur Literatur und Geschichte des hellenistischen Judentums
ANF	<i>Ante-Nicene Fathers</i>
ANRW	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung</i>
APF	<i>Archiv für Papyrusforschung</i>
<i>Apoc. John</i>	<i>The Apocryphon of John</i>
ASNU	Acta Seminarii Neotestamentici Upsaliensis
ATDan	Acta Theologica Danica
A <i>Th</i> R	<i>Anglican Theological Review</i>
<i>Auth. Teach.</i>	<i>Authoritative Teaching</i>
BAG	Bauer, Walter, F. Wilbur Gingrich and Frederick W. Danker. <i>Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature</i> . 2d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979.
BASP	<i>Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists</i>
BCNH	Bibliothèque Copte de Nag Hammadi
BEHE	Bibliothèque de l'École Pratique des Hautes Études
BETL	Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium
<i>Bib</i>	<i>Biblica</i>
BSAC	<i>Bulletin de la Société d'archéologie copte</i>
BZ ^{NW}	Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft
CAH	Cambridge Ancient History
Crum	Crum, W.E. <i>A Coptic Dictionary</i> . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939.
CSCO	Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium
<i>Dial. Sav.</i>	<i>The Dialogue of the Savior</i>

EEC	Ferguson, Everett, ed. <i>Encyclopedia of Early Christianity</i> . 2d ed. New York: Garland, 1998.
<i>Exeg. Soul</i>	The <i>Exegesis on the Soul</i>
GCS	Die griechische christliche Schriftsteller der ersten [drei] Jahrhunderte
<i>Gos. Phil.</i>	The <i>Gospel of Philip</i>
<i>Gos. Thom.</i>	The <i>Gospel of Thomas</i>
<i>Gos. Truth</i>	The <i>Gospel of Truth</i>
<i>Great Pow.</i>	The <i>Concept of Our Great Power</i>
HR	<i>History of Religions</i>
HTR	<i>Harvard Theological Review</i>
<i>Hyp. Arch.</i>	The <i>Hypostasis of the Archons</i>
ICM	Idealized Cognitive Model
IFAO	Institut français d'archéologie orientale
JAC	<i>Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum</i>
JBL	<i>Journal of Biblical Literature</i>
JECS	<i>Journal of Early Christian Studies</i>
JRH	<i>Journal of Religious History</i>
JSJSup	Journal for the Study of Judaism in the Persian, Hellenistic, and Roman Periods: Supplement Series
JSNTSup	Journal for the Study of the New Testament: Supplement Series
JSPSup	Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha: Supplement Series
JTS	<i>Journal of Theological Studies</i>
KJV	King James Version
Lampe	Lampe, G.W.H. ed. <i>A Patristic Greek Lexicon</i> . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961.
LCL	Loeb Classical Library
LSJ	Liddell, H.G., H.S. Scott and H.S. Jones, eds. <i>Greek-English Lexicon</i> . 9th edition with revised supplement. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
LXX	The Septuagint
<i>Mus</i>	<i>Le Muséon: Revue d'études orientales</i>
NA ²⁷	<i>Novum Testamentum Graece</i> , Nestle-Aland, 27th ed.
NHC	Nag Hammadi Codex
NHS	Nag Hammadi Studies/Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies
<i>NovT</i>	<i>Novum Testamentum</i>
NTS	<i>New Testament Studies</i>

NTTS	New Testament Tools and Studies
OLA	Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta
OLP	<i>Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica</i>
OLZ	<i>Orientalistische Literaturzeitung</i>
OrChr	<i>Oriens Christianus</i>
OrChrAn	Orientalia Christiana Analecta
Orig. World	<i>On the Origin of the World</i>
PapyCast	Papyrologica Castrorotaviana
PG	Patrologia Graeca
PS	Patrologia Syriaca
PTS	Patristische Texte und Studien
RB	<i>Revue Biblique</i>
ResQ	<i>Restoration Quarterly</i>
RSV	Revised Standard Version
RTP	<i>Revue de théologie et de philosophie</i>
R&T	<i>Religion and Theology</i>
SA	Studia Anselmiana
SAC	Studies in Antiquity and Christianity
SBLDS	Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series
SBLEJL	Society of Biblical Literature Early Judaism and Its Literature
SBLSP	<i>Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers</i>
SBLSymS	Society of Biblical Literature Symposium Series
SBo	<i>The Bohairic Life of Pachomius</i>
SBT	Studies in Biblical Theology
SC	Sources Chrétiennes
SD	Studies and Documents
SecCent	<i>Second Century</i>
SHR	Studies in the History of Religions
SJTOP	Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional Papers
SR	Studies in Religion
StOr	Studies in Oriental Religions
StPatr	Studia Patristica
StPB	Studia Post-Biblica
Teach. Silv.	<i>The Teachings of Silvanus</i>
Thom. Cont.	<i>The Book of Thomas the Contender</i>
TLZ	<i>Theologische Literaturzeitung</i>
Treat. Res.	<i>The Treatise on the Resurrection</i>
Treat. Seth	<i>Second Treatise of the Great Seth</i>
Tri. Trac.	<i>The Tripartite Tractate</i>

TU	Texte und Untersuchungen
TUGAL	Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur
USQR	<i>Union Seminary Quarterly Review</i>
VC	<i>Vigiliae Christianae</i>
VCSup	Supplements to <i>Vigiliae Christianae</i>
WUNT	Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament
ZKT	<i>Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie</i>
ZNW	<i>Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche</i>
Zost.	<i>Zostrianos</i>

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

“Was ist also Wahrheit? Ein bewegliches Heer von Metaphern, Metonymien, Anthropomorphismen ...”¹

1. INTRODUCTION

οὐ̅νο̅υ̅χ̅πο̅ ἡ̅κε̅σο̅π̅ ὄ̅ρο̅π̅ ἡ̅ἡ̅νο̅υ̅χ̅ικ̅ων̅ ἡ̅χ̅πο̅ ἡ̅κε̅σο̅π̅ ὄ̅ψε̅ ἀ̅λη̅θ̅ω̅ς
ἀ̅τ̅ρο̅υ̅χ̅πο̅ο̅υ̅ ἡ̅κε̅σο̅π̅ χ̅ι̅τ̅ῆ̅τ̅χ̅ικ̅ων̅

There is a rebirth and an image of rebirth. It is truly necessary to be born again by means of the image! (Gos. Phil. 67.12–14)

ε̅σ̅ω̅δ̅ῶ̅ρ̅ῶ̅ρ̅ε̅ σ̅ε̅ σ̅να̅β̅ω̅κ̅ ε̅ρ̅α̅ῖ̅ ε̅σ̅σ̅μο̅υ̅ ε̅π̅ε̅ῖ̅ω̅τ̅ ἡ̅ἡ̅π̅ε̅σ̅σο̅ν̅ π̅α̅ε̅ ἡ̅τ̅α̅σ̅ο̅υ̅χ̅α̅ε̅
ε̅β̅ο̅λ̅ χ̅ι̅τ̅ο̅ο̅τ̅ῆ̅ τ̅α̅ε̅ ἡ̅ε̅ ἡ̅τ̅ῦ̅χ̅η̅ ε̅σ̅η̅α̅ο̅υ̅χ̅α̅ε̅ χ̅ι̅τ̅ῆ̅π̅ε̅χ̅πο̅ ἡ̅κε̅σο̅π̅

When she becomes renewed she will ascend, praising the Father and her brother, this one through whom she was saved. Thus the soul will be saved through the rebirth. (Exeg. Soul 134.25–29)

In both the above quoted excerpts taken from the Nag Hammadi treatises the *Gospel of Philip* (NHC II,3) and the *Exegesis on the Soul* (NHC II,6), salvation is presented as attainable only by means of a rebirth. But how are we to understand these references to rebirth? And are the two tractates referring to the same concept, or are they simply using similar terms? And what is the nature of the interpretive processes that come into play when we try to make sense of these statements?

2. BODILY BASED COGNITIVE MODELS

On a basic level the excerpts quoted above refer to biological procreative processes. At the same time it is quite clear that the imagery is not to be

¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, “Über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinn,” in *Werke in Sechs Bänden* (6 vols.; ed. Karl Schlechta; Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1980), 5:314.

understood literally. Rather, the references to rebirth in these texts must be understood, at least in part, as references to ritual processes, and they must be seen in connection with related imagery utilised in these two Nag Hammadi tractates. For these texts not only speak about rebirth, but also refer to a broad range of related concepts relating to procreation and kinship relations, like marriage, fornication and prostitution, fathers, sons, spouses, and siblings. All of these concepts play important roles in discourses that centre around questions of salvation and ritual practice, often in combination with other familiar concepts derived from embodied experience such as eating and seeing.

But how does such imagery function within the specific literary contexts of the two selected texts? Why and to what effect do these texts focus as they do on procreative and often sexually connotative imagery? How is bodily based imagery used to explicate important elements of the religious life, and how are we to know when and to what extent such references are to be understood metaphorically? In short, how are we to understand the vividly changing and allusive use of such concepts in these ancient texts?

3. ALLUSIONS AND INTERTEXTUALITY

In addition to the use and function of cognitive models derived from or related to embodied experience, however, there is also another important aspect of these texts that must be taken equally into consideration. Most studies on the Nag Hammadi tractates mention parallels, influences and borrowings from Scripture, but few have actually analysed the patterns and functions of such intertextual connections from a literary perspective. This is especially the case with regard to the use of allusions.² As Lowell Edmunds states it, “while philologists postulate lacunae, mark cruces that defy conjecture, and diagnose anomalies that defy exegesis, with profound calm they pass over undiscerned and undiscernible allusions.”³ The study of allusions is not without its methodological problems, however, for, as Earl Miner has perceptively put it, “the test for

² For a notable exception to this tendency, see Louis Painchaud, “The Use of Scripture in Gnostic Literature,” *J ECS* 4 (1996): 129–146.

³ Lowell Edmunds, *Intertextuality and the Reading of Roman Poetry* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 43. See chapter 2 for a theoretical discussion of allusions and intertextuality.

allusion is that it is a phenomenon that some reader or readers may fail to observe.⁴ In the passage from *Exeg. Soul* quoted above, for example, it is perfectly possible to read and make meaningful sense of the sentences without recognising any scriptural allusions, while the interpretive combination of texts that arises from seeing, for instance, an allusion to Titus 3:5 and / or 1 Tim 2:15 may significantly alter the interpretive process and hence the production of meaning prompted by a reading of this passage.⁵ I am therefore convinced that new insights may be gained from our texts by paying closer attention to the patterns of intertextuality on display in them, including the use of allusions.⁶

In both the selected texts, references to Scripture are pervasive, ranging from explicit quotations to the faintest of allusions. The importance of taking such references fully into account in our analysis of the meaning potential of the texts becomes especially clear in light of the practice of memorisation of Scripture in the cultural milieus where we may plausibly situate these tractates' intended audiences.⁷ As Jostein Børtnes rightly stresses with regard to the use of memorised Scripture in the authorial practices of late antiquity, "the emphasis on memorization does not mean that the texts stored in the memory were also to be reproduced *verbatim* in rhetorical or literary practice. On the contrary, in rhetoric the whole point was that memorized texts could be played around with, taken apart, and recombined into new patterns and new discourses."⁸ Exactly this kind of playful recombination and repatterning of texts in rhetoric is an

⁴ Earl Miner, "Allusion," in *The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics* (ed. Alex Preminger and T.V.F. Brogan; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 39.

⁵ See the analysis of this passage in chapter 3 of the present study.

⁶ As Claes Schaar puts it on a general basis, "The colossal mass of commentaries and annotations dealing with classical, medieval and Renaissance texts covers matter which, transformed to infracontextual patterns, might enrich the appreciation of the surface contexts by being incorporated in a large-scale semiotic system: 'absent structures' perhaps on the printed page, but very much present in attentive readers' minds. By merely providing 'parallels to' the edited textual material such stuff has little more than antiquarian interest and remains, unexplored, on display in museums: a great Prince in prison lies" (Claes Schaar, "Linear Sequence, Spatial Structure, Complex Sign, and Vertical Context System," *Poetics* 7 [1978]: 386–387).

⁷ See, e.g., Birger Gerhardsson, *Memory and Manuscript: Oral Tradition and Written Transmission in Rabbinic Judaism and Early Christianity* (ASNU 22; Lund: Gleerup, 1961).

⁸ Jostein Børtnes, "Rhetoric and Mental Images in Gregory," in *Gregory of Nazianzus: Images and Reflections* (ed. Jostein Børtnes and Thomas Hägg; Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2006), 48. Cf. also Mary J. Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400–1200* (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature 34; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 7–24.

important focus of the present study. *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* both thrive on combining allusions, paraphrases, and citations of different authoritative intertexts in their rhetorically highly ornamental and evocative discourses on central Christian tenets and practices. In the present study the main perspective will, however, be from the point of view of the reader, rather than the author. And as we shall see from the analyses in chapters 3 and 4, readers who had mnemonically internalised considerable portions of Scripture may indeed be regarded as the ideal readers of these two Nag Hammadi texts.

4. A NEW APPROACH

In this study we will see how rituals and Scripture are interpreted in reciprocal processes where concepts based on basic embodied experience are central. Methodologically the investigation is built around a two-pronged approach to the selected texts, namely an analysis of the interpretive combination of conceptual structures and of texts.

The way in which the above outlined questions are tackled in the present study constitutes in many ways a new approach to the study of the Nag Hammadi texts. Since my aim is to study the texts from the perspective of the reader, and since the experience of reading is dependent on the functions of the human mind in integrating new information with old, it would seem to be highly relevant to take into account new perspectives on the study of literature and reading developed within the cognitive sciences, that is, theories of reading that do not ignore newer perspectives from fields such as cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics, but which base the study of literature and interpretation on recent theories of basic mental processes such as memory, conceptualisation, and creativity. For, as Mary Carruthers has perceptively put it, “in order to create, in order to think at all, human beings require some mental tool or machine, and that ‘machine’ lives in the intricate networks of their own memory.”⁹ All creative thinking, including interpretation of texts, is thus intimately connected with the functions of memory and mental representations. The present study focuses on the process of interpretation from the perspective of how the human mind makes sense of a text by means of the creation and integration of multiple

⁹ Carruthers, *Craft of Thought*, 7.

mental representations, in a production of meaning that will always be in constant and crucial dependence on context, prior knowledge, individual idiosyncrasies, and social constraints.

The study is thus based on an analysis of *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* using recent theories developed within the multidisciplinary field of cognitive poetics.¹⁰ Instead of trying to get at the minds of the ancient authors and their intentions, the selected texts are here approached from the perspective of the potential patterns of thought prompted in a reading of these texts. In short, the question concerns how the selected texts trigger ways of thinking about important issues relating to the world, the self, reality, and salvation. By adapting to the analysis of allusions and intertextuality a cognitive theoretical perspective developed primarily with a view to the study of metaphor, metonymy and related phenomena, this study also constitutes an attempt to analyse these subjects from a unified methodological perspective grounded in the study of human cognition.

5. THE TEXTS: THE *EXEGESIS ON THE SOUL* AND THE *GOSPEL OF PHILIP*

Why, among the around fifty tractates that make up the contents of the Nag Hammadi Codices, choose specifically *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* as the subjects of the present inquiry? There are several reasons for this choice. For a start, these are two of the Nag Hammadi tractates that most clearly combine the use of scriptural allusions and citations with direct references to ritual actions, and in doing so they employ strikingly similar imagery based on embodied experience. Concepts like procreation and birth/rebirth, together with related concepts like marriage, prostitution, and fornication, are prominent in both texts. Moreover, both texts are among the few Nag Hammadi tractates that contain references to the much debated concept of the “bridal chamber.” Furthermore, both *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* eschew the kind of complicated mythological and cosmological systems we find in many of the other Nag Hammadi texts, such as for example the *Apocryphon of John* and the *Tripartite Tractate*, while focussing on the importance of transformation through ritual practice, using concepts taken from basic embodied experience, partly metaphorically and partly metonymically, in soteriologically charged

¹⁰ For a discussion and definition of cognitive poetics, see chapter 2.

discourses where familiar everyday concepts are referenced in order both to explicate and to establish realities on an ontologically higher level. Finally, the two texts are also united by the fact that they have come down to us as parts of the same codex, being the third and sixth tractates of Nag Hammadi Codex II. In sum, then, the texts were chosen on the basis of similarities of imagery and for their combination of scriptural exegesis and mystagogy.¹¹

For all their similarities, however, the two texts are also quite different. One of them, *Exeg. Soul*, is quite short and sports a relatively straightforward narrative framework, while the other, *Gos. Phil.*, is both considerably longer, highly complicated, and has no narrative framework. Due to these differences I have chosen to treat *Exeg. Soul* first, in chapter 3, and the more complicated *Gos. Phil.* after it, in chapter 4. In this way the usability of the methodological framework established in chapter 2 can be shown to be fruitfully employed on the shorter and simpler *Exeg. Soul* first, before it is then put to use on the more difficult *Gos. Phil.* Finally, in chapter 5, the two texts are compared from the perspective of the preceding analysis, highlighting similarities and differences between the two in their use of metaphors and Scripture, in their treatment of rituals, and in their overall theologies.

5.1. *The Manuscript: Nag Hammadi Codex II*

Exeg. Soul and *Gos. Phil.* are two of the seven tractates that make up the contents of Nag Hammadi Codex II, the other texts in this codex being the *Apocryphon of John* (NHC II,1), the *Gospel of Thomas* (NHC II,2), the *Hypostasis of the Archons* (NHC II,4), *On the Origin of the World* (NHC II,5), and the *Book of Thomas the Contender* (NHC II,7).¹²

¹¹ None of the other Nag Hammadi texts display all of the features enumerated above.

¹² For a detailed description of the codex, see Søren Giversen, *Apocryphon Johannis: The Coptic Text of the Apocryphon Johannis in the Nag Hammadi Codex II with Translation, Introduction and Commentary* (ATDan 5; Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1963), 19–40. For details on especially the palaeography, dialect and orthography of the Codex, see also Bentley Layton, “Introduction,” in *Gospel According to Thomas, Gospel According to Philip, Hypostasis of the Archons, and Indexes* (ed. Bentley Layton; vol. 1 of *Nag Hammadi Codex II, 2–7 Together with XIII, 2*, Brit. Lib. Or.4926(1), and P. Oxy. 1, 654, 655; NHS 20*; Leiden: Brill, 1989), 1–18. For details on the binding of the codex, see also Linda K. Ogden, “The Binding of Codex II,” in *Gospel According to Thomas, Gospel According to Philip, Hypostasis of the Archons, and Indexes* (ed. Bentley Layton; vol. 1 of *Nag Hammadi Codex II, 2–7 Together with XIII, 2*, Brit. Lib. Or.4926(1), and P. Oxy. 1, 654, 655; NHS 20*; Leiden: Brill, 1989), 19–25.

The most relevant comparative material for Codex II is of course the other Nag Hammadi Codices. The only one of these for which we have a firm *terminus post quem* is Codex VII, which contains a letter in the cartonnage dated to October 348, and hence Codex VII must have been manufactured later than this date.¹³ The *terminus ante quem* is more problematic, however, since it is pretty much impossible to know how much later this letter was put to use as cartonnage, and hence how much later the codex was manufactured. It could have been the same year, but it could also very well have been fifty or maybe even one hundred years later.¹⁴ Moreover, while there is datable material in the cartonnage of Codex VII, Codex II is one of the three Nag Hammadi codices that did not have any papyrus fragments at all as cartonnage. This codex must therefore be dated on purely palaeographical grounds and on the grounds of its similarity with the other Nag Hammadi codices, especially Codex VII, and other comparable codices of the period.¹⁵ On such grounds Codex II has been dated by some to the first half of the fourth century,¹⁶ and by others to the late fourth or early fifth century.¹⁷ The most detailed attempt at dating Codex II was made by Søren Giversen in his edition of *Apoc. John*. Giversen there dated the codex to between the years 330 and 340 on codicological and palaeographic grounds.¹⁸ These are, however, highly uncertain criteria when it comes to dating Coptic manuscripts.¹⁹ Moreover, Giversen's dating is based on a comparison of

¹³ See J.W.B. Barns, et al., *Nag Hammadi Codices: Greek and Coptic Papyri from the Cartonnage of the Covers* (NHS 16; Leiden: Brill, 1981), 5, 11; cf. also Stephen Emmel, "Religious Tradition, Textual Transmission, and the Nag Hammadi Codices," in *The Nag Hammadi Library After Fifty Years: Proceedings of the 1995 Society of Biblical Literature Commemoration* (ed. John D. Turner and Anne McGuire; NHS 44; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 35–36.

¹⁴ Cf. Stephen Emmel, "The Coptic Gnostic Texts as Witnesses to the Production and Transmission of Gnostic (and Other) Traditions," in *Das Thomasevangelium: Entstehung—Rezeption—Theologie* (ed. Jörg Frey, et al.; BZNW 157; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 38.

¹⁵ See Hans-Martin Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium (Nag Hammadi-Codex II,3): neu herausgegeben, übersetzt und erklärt* (TUGAL 143; Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1997), 2.

¹⁶ See, e.g., Schenke, *Philippus-Evangelium*, 2–3.

¹⁷ See, e.g., Wesley W. Isenberg, "The Coptic Gospel According to Philip" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1968), 10–23.

¹⁸ See Giversen, *Apocryphon Johannis*, 28–40, 45, 287; Søren Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet: Indledning, studier, oversættelse og noter* (Copenhagen: Gads, 1966), 11.

¹⁹ See, e.g., Frederik Wisse, "The Coptic Versions of the New Testament," in *The Text of the New Testament in Contemporary Research: Essays on the Status Quaestionis: A Volume in Honor of Bruce M. Metzger* (ed. Bart D. Ehrman and Michael W. Holmes; SD 46; Grand

Codex II with a very small number of other manuscripts, many of which are themselves of uncertain date, and on some questionable arguments.²⁰ These factors combine to make his dating decidedly less than certain. In summary, there does not seem to be any firm evidence that allows us to establish with any certainty either a *terminus post quem* or a *terminus ante quem* for Codex II. On the scant evidence available to us, then, even though the manuscript may conceivably have been manufactured as early as the first half of the fourth century it seems wise to allow for the possibility that the codex may actually have been manufactured as late as the fifth century.²¹

Despite the fact that it has often been assumed that the Nag Hammadi codices were buried as a result of Athanasius' festal letter of 367 or the anti-Origenist purge that followed the death of Evagrius Ponticus in 399,²² we actually have no firm indications with regard to the date of their burial.²³ The pottery bowl that was used to seal the jar containing the

Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1995), 133. Wisse urges "great caution" in dating early Coptic biblical papyri (ibid.), and points out that "dates are often assigned by papyrologists whose expertise is Greek rather than Coptic palaeography. It is telling that the late Paul E. Kahle, Jr., one of the few scholars with a broad knowledge of Coptic texts, generally preferred considerably later dates than those assigned by Greek papyrologists" (ibid., n. 10). Wisse states with regard to Greek palaeography that one "can normally only claim to be accurate within about 100 years. Some papyrologists venture to pinpoint dates within 25 years, but this is seldom warranted on palaeographical grounds alone, and would be totally inappropriate for Coptic MSS" (ibid., 131 n. 1). Emmel puts it in even stronger terms, stating that "I shudder to think of what uncertain ground we tread when considering Coptic paleography and codicology" (Emmel, "The Coptic Gnostic Texts," 38). On Coptic palaeography, cf. also Bentley Layton, "Towards a New Coptic Palaeography," in *Acts of the Second International Congress of Coptic Studies: Roma, 22–26 September 1980* (ed. Tito Orlandi and Frederik Wisse; Rome: C.I.M., 1985), 149–158.

²⁰ The lack of pagination is for instance taken as "a sign of primitiveness and age" (Giversen, *Apocryphon Johannis*, 37).

²¹ Cf. Emmel, "The Coptic Gnostic Texts," 38.

²² See, e.g., Armand Veilleux, "Monasticism and Gnosis in Egypt," in *The Roots of Egyptian Christianity* (ed. Birger A. Pearson and James E. Goehring; SAC; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 290.

²³ As Armand Veilleux puts it with regard to Athanasius' festal letter, "the connection between that letter and the burying of the Nag Hammadi library is one of those scientific hypotheses that are put forward without any real proof, and then are repeated by everyone as if they had been demonstrated" (Veilleux, "Monasticism and Gnosis in Egypt," 290–291; cf. also Aloys Grillmeier, *From the Council of Chalcedon [451] to Gregory the Great [590–604]: The Church of Alexandria with Nubia and Ethiopia After 451* [vol. 2, Part 4 of *Christ in Christian Tradition*; in collaboration with Theresia Hainthaler, trans. O.C. Dean, Jr.; London: Mowbray, 1996], 214). As for the related question of who manufactured, used, or commissioned the Nag Hammadi codices, the jury is still out. I will not discuss this question in the present study, but for the state of the question, see esp.

codices is typical of the fourth and fifth centuries,²⁴ but it is not possible to determine when the jar and the codices were actually buried.²⁵ There are indications that a burial shortly after Athanasius' festal letter of 367 might be too early, however, as it seems clear that such materials were in circulation in Upper Egypt around the middle of the fifth century.²⁶

5.2. *Issues of Translation and Transmission*

It is generally held that the Nag Hammadi texts are translations,²⁷ but what is the relationship between the preserved Coptic texts and their hypothetical originals? "Based on what we know generally of the development of written Coptic, it is most likely that the translations were made

Alexandr Khosroyev, *Die Bibliothek von Nag Hammadi: Einige Probleme des Christentums in Ägypten während der ersten Jahrhunderte* (Arbeiten zum spätantiken und koptischen Ägypten 7; Altenberge: Oros Verlag, 1995); James E. Goehring, "The Provenance of the Nag Hammadi Codices Once More," in *Ascetica, Gnostica, Liturgica, Orientalia: Papers Presented at the Thirteenth International Conference on Patristic Studies Held in Oxford 1999* (ed. Maurice F. Wiles and Edward Yarnold; StPatr 35; Leuven: Peeters, 2001), 234–253; Hugo Lundhaug, "Nag Hammadi-kodeksene og den tidlige monastiske tradisjon i Egypt," *Meddelanden Från Collegium Patristicum Lundense* 24 (2009): 33–59.

²⁴ On the pottery bowl used to seal the jar, see James E. Goehring, "An Early Roman Bowl from the Monastery of Pachomius at Pbow and the Milieu of the Nag Hammadi Codices," in *Coptica—Gnostica—Manichaica: Mélanges offerts à Wolf-Peter Funk* (ed. Louis Painchaud and Paul-Hubert Poirier; BCNH, Études 7; Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2006), 357–371. Such bowls were in use between ca. 350–550 CE (see *ibid.*, 362 n. 18; 366 n. 32).

²⁵ See Emmel, "Religious Tradition," 36.

²⁶ See, e.g., Dioscorus of Alexandria, *Epistula ad Sinuthium*; Shenoute, *I Am Amazed*; Tito Orlandi, "A Catechesis Against Apocryphal Texts by Shenute and the Gnostic Texts of Nag Hammadi," *HTR* 75:1 (1982): 85–95; Grillmeier, *The Church of Alexandria*, 169–214; Dwight W. Young, "The Milieu of Nag Hammadi: Some Historical Considerations," *VC* 24 (1970): 127–137; D.W. Johnson, "Coptic Reactions to Gnosticism and Manichaeism," *Mus* 100 (1987): 199–209; Jon F. Dechow, *Dogma and Mysticism in Early Christianity: Epiphanius of Cyprus and the Legacy of Origen* (North American Patristic Society Patristic Monograph Series 13; Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1988), 233–240; Elizabeth A. Clark, *The Origenist Controversy: The Cultural Construction of an Early Christian Debate* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 151–153. For the view that the Nag Hammadi codices were probably buried in the fifth century, see, e.g., Young, "The Milieu of Nag Hammadi," 137; Isenberg, "Coptic Gospel," 22.

²⁷ For *Exeg. Soul*, see, e.g., Peter Nagel, "Die Septuaginta-Zitate in der koptisch-gnostischen 'Exegese über die Seele' (Nag Hammadi Codex II)," *APF* 22 (1973): 249–269; Peter Nagel, "Die Septuaginta in den Nag Hammadi-Teksten," in *The Nag Hammadi Texts in the History of Religions: Proceedings of the International Conference at the Royal Academy of Sciences and Letters in Copenhagen, September 19–24, 1995, on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Nag Hammadi Discovery* (ed. Søren Giversen, et al.; Historisk-Filosofiske Skrifter 26; Copenhagen: The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences

sometime after the mid-to-late third century,” argues Stephen Emmel, but he adds the important caveat that “only for the works in Codices I, VII, and XI can we be relatively confident that they were already translated by the end of the fourth century.”²⁸ Michael Williams has pointed out that there has been a tendency among scholars of the Nag Hammadi tractates “to equate rather too facilely or thoughtlessly the ‘text’ of a given writing only with what is after all our own modern text-critical ‘guess-timate’ about the ‘original,’ skipping past on our way perfectly real, physical copies of that writing that someone did use.”²⁹ Emmel notes that scholars mostly “take it for granted that the Nag Hammadi tractates bear some more or less close relationship to a hypothetical original composition, and we move back and forth between the Coptic text we have and the original we would *like* to have.”³⁰ He rightly points out that this practice is tantamount to traversing a minefield, for “the Coptic phases of transmission pose nearly insurmountable barriers to recovering the translators’ *Vorlagen*. It is not yet clear to what extent we can even recover the original texts of the Coptic translations.”³¹ Analysing the preserved Coptic texts, translations or not, thus seems to be a much less hypothetical venture than trying to analyse their lost *Vorlagen*, not to mention the hypothetical originals. Despite this, however, “there is one obvious task that has not yet been carried out thoroughly and consistently,” Emmel points out, “that is, to read the Nag Hammadi Codices as a part of *Coptic literature*.”³² Such a task involves reading “the texts exactly as we have

and Letters, 2002), 164–182; Jean-Marie Sevrin, *L'Exégèse de l'âme (NH II, 6): Texte établi et présenté* (BCNH Section “Textes” 9; Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1983), 56; for *Gos. Phil.*, see, e.g., Eric Segelberg, “The Antiochene Background of the Gospel of Philip,” *BSAC* 18 (1966): 223; Wesley W. Isenberg, “The Gospel According to Philip: Introduction,” in *Gospel According to Thomas, Gospel According to Philip, Hypostasis of the Archons, and Indexes* (ed. Bentley Layton; vol. 1 of *Nag Hammadi Codex II, 2–7 Together with XIII, 2**, *Brit. Lib. Or. 4926(1)*, and *P. Oxy.* 1, 654, 655; NHS 20; Leiden: Brill, 1989), 131; Schenke, *Philippus-Evangelium*, 4; Walter C. Till, *Das Evangelium nach Philippos* (PTS 2; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1963), 6; Bentley Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures: A New Translation with Annotations and Introductions* (London: SCM Press, 1987), 325–327; Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 19–21; Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 12–13.

²⁸ Emmel, “Religious Tradition,” 37.

²⁹ Michael Allen Williams, “Response to the Papers of Karen King, Frederik Wisse, Michael Waldstein and Sergio La Porta,” in *The Nag Hammadi Library After Fifty Years: Proceedings of the 1995 Society of Biblical Literature Commemoration* (ed. John D. Turner and Anne McGuire; NHS 44; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 209.

³⁰ Emmel, “Religious Tradition,” 40–41, Emmel’s emphasis.

³¹ Emmel, “Religious Tradition,” 41.

³² Emmel, “Religious Tradition,” 42, Emmel’s emphasis.

them in the Nag Hammadi Codices in an effort to reconstruct the reading experience of whoever owned each of the Codices.”³³

Now, my aim in this study is not to reconstruct the experience of reading *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* by those who owned Codex II. Such an enterprise would also need to take fully into account the other five tractates of the codex and how all seven of them interact in a reading of the codex as a whole. This kind of approach is outside the scope of the present study, however, due to the expansive nature of such an undertaking. What I have tried to do is more modest, but still not far removed from Emmel’s suggestion, as I do aim to focus on the reading experience of the Coptic texts of *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul* as we find them in Nag Hammadi Codex II. I have tried to read the two selected tractates as much as possible on their own terms, both independently of each other and independently of the rest of the texts in Codex II and the other Nag Hammadi codices. But although I do not focus strictly on the manuscript as such, neither do I try to get back to any hypothetical originals or *Vorlagen*.

What are the implications of such an approach? My focus on the texts as we have them in the preserved manuscript means that, although it has been argued that our Coptic versions presuppose Greek originals, I will stick to an analysis of *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* from the point of view of how the texts function in their Coptic form. This choice is motivated firstly by the fact that for both *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* we have only this one single manuscript witness and we cannot possibly know the extent or nature of the changes that may have been made to the texts,³⁴ whether in

³³ Emmel, “Religious Tradition,” 42.

³⁴ As Bentley Layton has noted, “in the case of the Nag Hammadi manuscripts it is crucially important to observe that the original language (Greek) is precisely what we do *not* have.” I cannot, however, agree with Layton’s rather optimistic conclusion that “if we cannot reconstruct that lost Greek original on paper, still we can hope to approximate the ancient author’s own culture and thought through a recovery of its meaning in a sympathetic English translation keyed to a commentary oriented above all towards Greek usage. Conceivably the ancient Coptic version might be substituted for the English translation: but since ancientness in itself is no virtue, and since Coptic diction is notoriously nonphilosophical, modern ‘classicist’s English’ (provided that it is accurate) will probably be in closer touch with the ancient author’s Hellenistic thought than ancient Coptic, whose nuances of diction, philosophical or otherwise, are largely lost upon us and in any case are certainly not Greek” (Bentley Layton, “The Recovery of Gnosticism: The Philologist’s Task in the Investigation of Nag Hammadi,” *SecCent* 1 [1981]: 97). Robert McL. Wilson, however, argues for a rather different solution: “Is [the translator] to translate the Coptic as it stands, obscurities and all, or the Greek which he can more

their possible translation from Greek into Coptic or in their later Coptic phases of transmission.³⁵ Moreover, as Ariel Shisha-Halevy has pointed out,

no argument can be raised for a direct Greek-system influence on the choice of a distinctive form in Coptic, while the motivation for the Coptic translator's choice must yet stem from, be triggered by the Greek text in some way. The translator "improves" on the Greek, by necessity, since Coptic makes distinctions the Greek does not, and choice in the re-writing by the Coptic writer-translator must be made, by the exigencies of the Coptic system. This then often results in additional or different information being introduced into the text, and trying to comprehend or determine the function-meaning of the Coptic by the Greek as a simple point of reference is fundamentally wrong.³⁶

As Chris Reintges rightly notes, "where a Greek source is missing, the distinction between original and translated literature becomes a moot point," and, as he points out, "the originality of some work can generally not be determined on the basis of linguistic criteria alone."³⁷ I have thus deemed it to be the most sound approach to simply stick to the texts as they have actually been preserved, in the language in which they have been preserved, and not to try to analyse them on the basis of the Greek originals we think may lie behind the Coptic texts

Another reason for this approach is that there are good chances that the texts might have been substantially altered at one or more stages in their transmission. The simple fact that both *Exeg. Soul* and especially *Gos. Phil.* deal with the interpretation of liturgy makes such changes especially likely, since as Paul Bradshaw has persuasively argued, "documents dealing with liturgical matters are particularly prone to editorial corrections so as to give authoritative status to current worship practices."³⁸

or less confidently suspect to lie behind it? The answer must surely be "Translate the Coptic" (Robert McL. Wilson, "The Trials of a Translator: Some Translation Problems in the Nag Hammadi Texts," in *Les Textes de Nag Hammadi: Colloque du Centre d'Histoire des Religions [Strasbourg, 23–25 octobre 1974]* [ed. Jacques-É. Ménard; NHS 7; Leiden: Brill, 1975], 38). Cf. also Ariel Shisha-Halevy's sober assessment of the relationship between a Coptic translation and its Greek original, quoted below.

³⁵ Cf. Emmel, "Religious Tradition".

³⁶ Ariel Shisha-Halevy, "Future, Present, Narrative Past: A Triple Note on Oxyrhynchite *Tempuslehre*," *Hallesche Beiträge zur Orientwissenschaft* 35 (2003): 251–252.

³⁷ Chris H. Reintges, *Coptic Egyptian (Sahidic Dialect): A Learner's Grammar* (Afrikawissenschaftliche Lehrbücher 15; Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, 2004), 4.

³⁸ Paul F. Bradshaw, *The Search for the Origins of Christian Worship: Sources and Methods for the Study of Early Liturgy* (2nd rev. and enl. ed.; London: SPCK, 2002), 91.

This, he stresses, includes all phases of transmission, including the translation of works from one language to another.³⁹ Bradshaw refers to this as “living literature,” that is, “material which circulates within a community and forms a part of its heritage and tradition but which is constantly subject to revision and rewriting to reflect changing historical and cultural circumstances.”⁴⁰ Moreover, we know from the case of the first text of Codex II, *Apoc. John*, which is also known from three additional copies,⁴¹ that texts like the singularly attested *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul* may also have existed in very different versions. What Bradshaw terms “living literature” is “characterized by the existence of multiple recensions, sometimes exhibiting quantitative differences (i.e., longer and shorter versions) and sometimes qualitative differences (i.e., various ways of saying the same thing, often with no clear reflection of a single *Urtext*), and sometimes both.”⁴² These characteristics all fit with regard to *Apoc. John*, and there is no reason why *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul* should not be equally good examples of such “living literature.”

Unfortunately Nag Hammadi Codex II has come to us somewhat damaged. The codex has been marred by “a systematic worm” which in the case of *Gos. Phil.* “ate a broad path through the lower part of every page of this work,” as Kendrick Grobel puts it,⁴³ and although the situation is better with regard to *Exeg. Soul*, even here there are many instances of unrestorable damage to the text. I have chosen to adopt a conservative approach with regard to the restoration of the many lacunae in this manuscript. The fact that we do not have additional attestation for either *Gos. Phil.* or *Exeg. Soul* renders proper textual criticism practically impossible.⁴⁴ Moreover, in the case of *Gos. Phil.* the unpredictable and

³⁹ Bradshaw, *Search for the Origins*, 91.

⁴⁰ Bradshaw, *Search for the Origins*, 5. See also Paul F. Bradshaw, “Liturgy and ‘Living Literature,’” in *Liturgy in Dialogue: Essays in Memory of Ronald Jasper* (ed. Paul Bradshaw and Bryan Spinks; London: SPCK, 1993), 138–153.

⁴¹ In addition to the version preserved in Nag Hammadi Codex II, *Apoc. John* is also found in Codex III (NHC III,1), Codex IV (NHC IV,1), and in Codex Papyrus Berolinensis 8502 (BG 8502,2). All versions are conveniently published in the synoptic critical edition by Michael Waldstein and Frederik Wisse, eds., *The Apocryphon of John: Synopsis of Nag Hammadi Codices II,1; III,1; and IV,1 with BG 8502,2* (NHS 33; Leiden: Brill, 1995).

⁴² Bradshaw, *Search for the Origins*, 5.

⁴³ Kendrick Grobel, review of Robert McL. Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip: Translated from the Coptic Text, with an Introduction and Commentary*, *JBL* 83:3 (1964): 317.

⁴⁴ Cf. Emmel, “Religious Tradition,” 41.

seemingly disjointed nature of the text is such that only the most limited reconstructions may be made with any kind of certainty. Therefore, in order not to distort our actual source material, I will here rely as little as possible on reconstructions of lacunae or emendations of the preserved Coptic text, since such reconstructions are by necessity often of a highly conjectural nature.⁴⁵ The approach taken in the present study is thus in line with that of Søren Giversen in rejecting the kind of procedure adopted by, e.g., Hans-Martin Schenke, who has tried to reconstruct most of *Gos. Phil.*'s lacunae, and especially in rejecting a tendency among certain scholars to be somewhat too eager to emend parts of the text that have actually been preserved.⁴⁶

In summary, my focus is close to the approach Emmel terms a “Coptic reading” of the Nag Hammadi Codices, by being in effect a study of the Coptic texts in the phase of transmission that is as close to the actual manuscript as possible, without specifically reading the texts strictly as parts of that manuscript. While, as Emmel has pointed out, such a reading would tell us little about the hypothetical originals as such, “the results of this Coptic reading would probably contribute insights that would be valuable for the more hypothetical investigation of the composition phase.”⁴⁷ The “attraction” of such a reading, as Emmel puts it,

is that the codices are our primary data, and presumably they were read by someone—or at least they were laboriously created for that purpose. Hence such a “Coptic reading” takes us (in theory) the shortest distance into

⁴⁵ In the words of Bentley Layton, “Nag Hammadi editors have approached emendation in widely divergent ways. One extreme pole is occupied by a circle of scholars based in East Berlin,” whose style, according to Layton, “was characterized by severe emendation that sometimes went far beyond the stock-in-trade of homoeoteleuton, dittography, and metathesis,” (Layton, “Recovery of Gnosticism,” 93–94).

⁴⁶ As Giversen puts it, “Er formålet . . . at lade den foreliggende tekst komme til sin ret, således at den ikke siger mere, men heller ikke mindre end den dokumentariske bevidnelse i teksten og de slutninger, man med nødvendighed må drage ud fra det bevarede, berettiger til, da må der være tale om en ganske anderledes anvendelse af konjekture . . . De bevarede dele af en tekst må være grundlaget . . .” (Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 17, and cf. 20–21; cf. also Layton, “Recovery of Gnosticism,” 93: “Speculative restoration and restoration of unpredictable matters of fact have no value”). For Schenke’s approach, see esp. Hans-Martin Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus: Ein Evangelium der Valentinianer aus dem Funde von Nag-Hamadi,” *TLZ* 84:1 (1959): 1–26. With regard to *Gos. Phil.*, Schenke’s approach is even more questionable in light of his view of the text as a florilegium (see chapter 4 of the present study), due to the obvious fact that the textual reconstruction of a florilegium must of necessity be fraught with even more uncertainties than the reconstruction of a single coherent composition.

⁴⁷ Emmel, “Religious Tradition,” 42.

the minefield of the texts' complex history of transmission, and therefore should provide us with more certain—albeit quite different—results than other readings.⁴⁸

In line with a Coptic reading of *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.*, I have chosen throughout this study to quote the possible New Testament intertexts in Coptic rather than, or in addition to, the Greek, since these Coptic translations often show us more clearly the intertextual potential of a Coptic reading of the selected Nag Hammadi texts. Although these Nag Hammadi texts often do not seem to refer to the exact versions of the Coptic New Testament texts as we find them in preserved Coptic New Testament manuscripts,⁴⁹ neither is it possible to discern any specific underlying Greek text. In any case, I think that in many cases it should better capture the reading experience of *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* in their preserved Coptic versions to refer to Coptic versions of the scriptural intertexts.

A few words must also be said concerning the versions of the scriptural texts that are employed. The only (almost) complete edition of the Sahidic New Testament is that of George William Horner, published between 1911 and 1924.⁵⁰ Unfortunately Horner's edition of the Sahidic New Testament is, as Wisse puts it, "completely inadequate and out of date."⁵¹ Since the publication of Horner's edition many better and earlier manuscripts have come to light, and it has also become clear that Horner's treatment of the manuscripts to which he had access was often both incomplete and inaccurate.⁵² I have therefore mainly used Hans Quecke's excellent editions of Mark, Luke, and John from earlier and

⁴⁸ Emmel, "Religious Tradition," 42–43. For an almost exactly opposite approach, see Layton, "Recovery of Gnosticism," 97.

⁴⁹ Cf., e.g., Hans-Georg Gaffron, *Studien zum koptischen Philippusevangelium unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Sakramente* (Bonn: Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, 1969), 32–62.

⁵⁰ George William Horner, ed. and trans., *The Coptic Version of the New Testament in the Southern Dialect, Otherwise Called Sahidic and Thebaic, with Critical Apparatus, Literal English Translation, Register of Fragments and Estimate of the Version* (7 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911–1924).

⁵¹ Wisse, "The Coptic Versions," 138. See also Bruce M. Metzger, *The Early Versions of the New Testament: Their Origin, Transmission, and Limitations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 109.

⁵² See Metzger, *The Early Versions*, 109; Paul E. Kahle, ed., *Bala'izah: Coptic Texts from Deir el-Bala'izah in Upper Egypt* (2 vols.; London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 1:14. Horner's edition thus cannot give us a complete picture of the variants of late antique New Testament translations into Sahidic. A new critical edition of the Sahidic New Testament is therefore badly needed (see Metzger, *The Early Versions*, 109).

better manuscripts in the Palau-Ribes collection in Barcelona,⁵³ Gonzalo Aranda Perez' edition of Matthew from a manuscript in the Pierpont Morgan Library in New York,⁵⁴ Herbert Thompson's edition of Acts and the Pauline epistles from early manuscripts in the Chester Beatty Library in Dublin,⁵⁵ Karlheinz Schüssler's edition of the Catholic epistles,⁵⁶ and E.A. Wallis Budge's edition of Revelation.⁵⁷ Where not otherwise stated, these are the editions of the Coptic New Testament texts that are cited throughout this study.⁵⁸

Although a thorough comparative analysis of *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* in relation to other sources of the period is outside the scope of the present study, some forays into comparative territory are made, in line with the Coptic reading of the texts, focussing primarily on material of a later date than what is usually invoked in studies of these texts, and with a special eye to Coptic material.

6. THE NAG HAMMADI LIBRARY AND "GNOSTICISM"

As is the case with a majority of the Nag Hammadi tractates, *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* have usually been treated in relation to the category of "Gnosticism." Frederik Wisse argued already in the early eighties, however, that "the individual [Nag Hammadi] tractates can no longer be assumed to be Gnostic," and pointed out that "it is not enough to be able to claim that a writing can be read in a Gnostic way or that it seems to presuppose Gnostic ideas, for that can be said of many ancient writings

⁵³ Hans Quecke, *Das Markusevangelium säidisch: Text der Handschrift PPalau Rib. Inv.-Nr. 182 mit den Varianten der Handschrift M 569* (PapyCast 4; Rome/Barcelona: Papyrologica Castroctaviana, 1972); Hans Quecke, *Das Lukasevangelium säidisch: Text der Handschrift PPalau Rib. Inv.-Nr. 181 mit den Varianten der Handschrift M 569* (PapyCast 6; Rome/Barcelona: Papyrologica Castroctaviana, 1977); Hans Quecke, *Das Johannesevangelium säidisch: Text der Handschrift PPalau Rib. Inv.-Nr. 183 mit den Varianten der Handschriften 813 und 814 der Chester Beatty Library und der Handschrift M 569* (PapyCast 11; Rome/Barcelona: Papyrologica Castroctaviana, 1984).

⁵⁴ Gonzalo Aranda Perez, *El Evangelio de San Mateo en Copto Sahidico* (Textos y Estudios "Cardenal Cisneros" 35; Madrid: C.S.I.C., 1984).

⁵⁵ Herbert Thompson, ed., *The Coptic Version of the Acts of the Apostles and the Pauline Epistles in the Sahidic Dialect* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932).

⁵⁶ Karlheinz Schüssler, *Die katolischen Briefe in der koptischen (sahidischen) Version* (2 vols.; CSCO 528–529, *Scriptores Coptici* 45–46; Leuven: Peeters, 1991).

⁵⁷ E.A. Wallis Budge, ed., *Coptic Biblical Texts in the Dialect of Upper Egypt* (London: British Museum, 1912).

⁵⁸ The quotations from these editions have been orthographically normalised. All translations are my own.

which are clearly not Gnostic in origin.”⁵⁹ While Wisse only critiqued the categorisation of Nag Hammadi tractates as “gnostic,” and not the category of “Gnosticism” as such,⁶⁰ a direct challenge of the category itself followed a little over a decade later. In his important book *Rethinking “Gnosticism”: An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category*, Michael Williams mounted the first extended case against the use of the category in the study of the Nag Hammadi texts. He here delineated two main approaches to the definition of “Gnosticism” among modern scholars.⁶¹ The first approach, according to Williams, has been to ground the category in the self-definition, or at least self-designation, of certain figures and groups in antiquity,⁶² while the second approach has been to define “Gnosticism” typologically.⁶³ Williams challenged the validity of the results of both of these approaches. Following partly in the footsteps of Morton Smith,⁶⁴ Williams showed self-definition to be an inadequate criterion on the grounds that there is in fact scant evidence in the sources for its actual use among the groups or texts it has customarily been used to label. Moreover, as Morton Smith had already pointed out in an important paper at the Yale conference on “Gnosticism” in 1978, the sources where the use of *gnostikos* as a self-definition is actually attested are those which are *not* usually classified as “Gnostic,” but are instead Platonic sources and Christian sources usually considered to belong to the Christian “mainstream,” the writings of Clement of Alexandria being the prime example.⁶⁵ As for the typological definition, Williams systematically challenged the various constituent parts of the typological construct

⁵⁹ Frederik Wisse, “Prolegomena to the Study of the New Testament and Gnosis,” in *The New Testament and Gnosis: Essays in Honour of Robert McL. Wilson* (ed. A.H.B. Logan and A.J.M. Wedderburn; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1983), 138.

⁶⁰ Wisse argued that “apart from the Hermetic tractates in Codex VI, none of the tractates fits comfortably into the sect descriptions of the heresiologists. For those which have affinities with the ancient reports of the teachings of the Valentinians one would have to assume that they represent a previously unknown branch or sect” (Wisse, “Prolegomena,” 141).

⁶¹ See Michael Allen Williams, *Rethinking “Gnosticism”: An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 29–53.

⁶² See Williams, *Rethinking “Gnosticism”*, esp. 29, 31–43.

⁶³ See Williams, *Rethinking “Gnosticism”*, esp. 29–31, 43–50.

⁶⁴ See Morton Smith, review of Ugo Bianchi, *The Origins of Gnosticism*, *JBL* 89 (1970): 82–84; Morton Smith, “The History of the Term Gnostikos,” in *Sethian Gnosticism* (ed. Bentley Layton; vol. 2 of *The Rediscovery of Gnosticism: Proceedings of the International Conference on Gnosticism at Yale, New Haven, Connecticut, March 28–31, 1978*; SHR 41; Leiden: Brill, 1981), 796–807.

⁶⁵ See M. Smith, “History of the Term Gnostikos.”

of “Gnosticism” throughout his *Rethinking “Gnosticism”*, and showed the net result to be a category which is untenable as a heuristic device with regard to our late antique sources, demonstrating how the frequently contradictory cognitive models embodied in the category of “Gnosticism” have distorted interpretation of the actual texts that have usually been regarded as primary sources of the category, most prominently those of the Nag Hammadi Codices.⁶⁶ More recently, Karen King has extended Williams’ critique by showing convincingly how modern scholars in their use of the category have often mistaken the early Christian heresiologists’ rhetoric for facts, and have thus persistently reinscribed the church fathers’ agendas, perpetuating their caricatured descriptions of their opponents and their delineations of orthodoxy and heresy.⁶⁷ In summary, the studies of Williams and King supplement each other well and combine to render problematic any further scholarly use of “Gnosticism” as a category, especially in relation to texts like those contained in the Nag Hammadi codices.

In the history of scholarship the use of the category of “Gnosticism” has over the years contributed to the production of an abundance of perceptive and interesting interpretations of the Nag Hammadi texts and other late antique sources. However, the category has also blocked from view a great number of alternative interpretations of the same material, interpretations that may be brought to light by bringing other categories and interpretive frameworks to bear on the sources.⁶⁸ Moreover, it is crucial not only to question the way in which “Gnosticism” has been employed

⁶⁶ See Williams, *Rethinking “Gnosticism”*; Michael Allen Williams, “Was There a Gnostic Religion? Strategies for a Clearer Analysis,” in *Was There a Gnostic Religion?* (ed. Antti Marjanen; Publications of the Finnish Exegetical Society 87; Helsinki: Finnish Exegetical Society, 2005), 55–79. Cf. also Michel R. Desjardins, “Rethinking the Study of Gnosticism,” *R&T* 12:3/4 (2005): 370–384; Hugo Lundhaug, “‘Gnostisisme’ og ‘Valentinianisme’: To problematiske kategorier i studiet av Nag Hammadi-biblioteket og tidlig kristendom,” *Chaos* 36 (2001): 27–43.

⁶⁷ See esp. Karen L. King, *What is Gnosticism?* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 2003); Karen L. King, “The Origins of Gnosticism and the Identity of Christianity,” in *Was There a Gnostic Religion?* (ed. Antti Marjanen; Publications of the Finnish Exegetical Society 87; Helsinki: Finnish Exegetical Society, 2005), 103–120. The patristic texts in question are in particular Irenaeus, *Adversus haereses*, Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* and *Excerpta ex Theodoto*, Hippolytus, *Refutatio omnium haeresium*, Tertullian, *Adversus Valentinianos* and *De praescriptione haereticorum*, Origen, *Commentarii in evangelium Joannis*, Epiphanius, *Panarion*.

⁶⁸ Viewed in this light, it may be argued that it is not so much the “Gnosticism” category as such that is the problem, as its hegemonic position as *the* category of analysis with regard to a selection of late antique sources, most notably the Nag Hammadi tractates.

as a heuristic device for the purpose of understanding individual texts, but also to question the way in which it has been used to organise our late antique sources. Interpretations of the sources are intimately connected with their classification, and the classification of a majority of Nag Hammadi tractates as “Gnostic” has tended to set these sources apart from other early Christian sources, leading to their being interpreted in opposition to the latter rather than as parts of broadly the same category.

In her book on *Apoc. John*, Karen King summarises the situation well when she states that the Nag Hammadi texts

have challenged and continue to challenge what we thought we knew was the theological nature of Gnosticism. So now that we have pulled back from our preconceptions and begun to ask, what is Gnosticism? It seems clear that the term carries so much intellectual baggage that it must be set aside in order to begin to examine the texts afresh.⁶⁹

As King argues, rather than generalise concerning the beliefs of “Gnostics” and “Sethians” (and I would here add “Valentinians” as another category that is ripe for deconstruction)⁷⁰ we should instead “talk about particular texts. The goal is not to create the perfect category (an impossibility in any case), but to make these texts available for critical and constructive work, whether in historical reconstruction or theology.”⁷¹ This is exactly the aim of the present study, to read *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* as examples of early Christianity in a broad sense, rather than reading them in terms of their “deviance from the posited purity of Christian origins,” as King puts it.⁷² In order to escape the problems convincingly presented in such detail by Williams and King, I have in the present study chosen to abandon not only the term, but also the category of “Gnosticism” altogether.⁷³ In doing so I hope to show more clearly, on the selected Nag Hammadi tractates’ own terms, how these Christian texts interpret Scripture and ritual practice in conjunction, and how in this process they employ conceptual blends⁷⁴ based on embodied experience in their reasoning and rhetoric.

⁶⁹ Karen L. King, *The Secret Revelation of John* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), ix.

⁷⁰ Cf. Lundhaug, “‘Gnosticisme’ og ‘Valentinianisme.’”

⁷¹ King, *Secret Revelation of John*, ix.

⁷² King, *Secret Revelation of John*, ix.

⁷³ This approach has also recently been argued by Desjardins, “Rethinking the Study of Gnosticism”. See also Lundhaug, “‘Gnosticisme’ og ‘Valentinianisme.’”

⁷⁴ This term is discussed in chapter 2.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

“Reading entails an immense labor of imaginative construction.”¹

1. CONCEPTUAL AND INTERTEXTUAL BLENDING

While reading texts from the Nag Hammadi corpus, one is frequently confronted with densely allusive and seemingly incoherent passages saturated with opaque symbolism and strange imagery, creating interpretive knots that are notoriously difficult to untie. The problems caused by such passages, and the very complexity of texts like *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul.*, have prompted me to search for new interpretive tools that may help us confront them.

“The best place to begin analyzing discourses,” Philip Eubanks suggests, “is often with its salient metaphors and metonymies. One important advantage of this approach is that it helps us to locate a discourse’s principal and most rhetorically potent ideas.”² However, as Eubanks emphasises, it is not enough just to identify key metaphors and metonymies. What is needed is a thorough analysis of the function of such devices in discourse.³ This chapter constitutes an attempt to outline a common theoretical framework for analysing the interlinking functions of metaphors, intertextuality and related phenomena in the texts under scrutiny. My aim is to show how such a theoretical framework may prove to be a valuable tool in the interpretation of these and other texts from Antiquity, and how it may also provide the basis for a unified approach to theorising about their broader contexts.

¹ Elaine Scarry, “On Vivacity: The Difference Between Daydreaming and Imagining-Under-Authorial-Instruction,” *Representations* 52 (1995): 21.

² Philip Eubanks, “Globalization, ‘Corporate Rule,’ and Blended Worlds: A Conceptual-Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Conceptual Blending,” *Metaphor and Symbol* 20:3 (2005): 195.

³ See Eubanks, “Globalization,” 195.

The approach that is outlined in the present chapter is very much inspired by the steadily increasing body of research into metaphor and related subjects within the cognitive sciences. More specifically it may be said to fall within the boundaries of the emerging multi-disciplinary field that may be referred to as cognitive poetics, i.e., the application of the cognitive sciences to the study of literature.⁴ As Keith Oatley defines it,

cognitive science is about knowledge, conscious and unconscious, about how it is represented, how it is used by human and artificial minds, and how it may be organised for particular purposes. It is interdisciplinary and multi-methodological. Cognitive poetics shares the same commitments to be broad rather than narrow. It derives from psychology, linguistics, and literary theory. Its field is literature, including texts that are read, movies and plays that are seen, poetry that is heard.⁵

Although it is texts from the Nag Hammadi Codices that are the focus of the present study, the methodology that will presently be outlined should be applicable to the study of any text, literary or otherwise.

⁴ For the notion of cognitive poetics I am using here, see, e.g., Peter Stockwell, *Cognitive Poetics: An Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2002); Joanna Gavins and Gerard Steen, eds., *Cognitive Poetics in Practice* (London: Routledge, 2003). Note that this is a much broader understanding of cognitive poetics than that of Reuven Tsur who first coined the term (see e.g., Reuven Tsur, "Aspects of Cognitive Poetics," in *Cognitive Stylistics: Language and Cognition in Text Analysis* [ed. Elena Semino and Jonathan Culpeper; Linguistic Approaches to Literature 1; Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2002], 279–318; cf. Margaret H. Freeman, "Poetry and the Scope of Metaphor: Toward a Cognitive Theory of Literature," in *Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroads: A Cognitive Perspective* [ed. Antonio Barcelona; Topics in English Linguistics 30; Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2000], 253–254, 278 n. 3). For the relationship between cognitive poetics and literary theory on the one hand and the cognitive sciences on the other, see esp. Gerard Steen and Joanna Gavins, "Contextualising Cognitive Poetics," in *Cognitive Poetics in Practice* (ed. Joanna Gavins and Gerard Steen; London: Routledge, 2003), 1–12; Alan Richardson, "Studies in Literature and Cognition: A Field Map," in *The Work of Fiction: Cognition, Culture, and Complexity* (ed. Alan Richardson and Ellen Spolsky; Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 1–29; H. Porter Abbott, "Cognitive Literary Studies: The 'Second Generation,'" *Poetics Today* 27:4 (2006): 711–722; Margaret H. Freeman, "The Fall of the Wall Between Literary Studies and Linguistics: Cognitive Poetics," in *Cognitive Linguistics: Current Applications and Future Perspectives* (ed. Gitte Kristiansen, et al.; Applications of Cognitive Linguistics 1; Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2006), 403–428.

⁵ Keith Oatley, "Writing and reading: The Future of Cognitive Poetics," in *Cognitive Poetics in Practice* (ed. Joanna Gavins and Gerard Steen; London: Routledge, 2003), 161–162. See also Freeman, "Poetry," 253–254.

1.1. *Metaphor*

The study of metaphor underwent a major shift with the publication of Lakoff and Johnson's *Metaphors We Live By* in 1980.⁶ As Gerard Steen humorously puts it, "in the beginning was Aristotle. Then there were the Dark Ages, which lasted until 1980. And then there was Lakoff . . ." ⁷ This is of course a gross simplification of the history of metaphor theory,⁸ but it is nevertheless an apt illustration of the substantial impact of the cognitive linguistic approach to metaphor in the wake of Lakoff and Johnson's seminal work. Before giving a short overview of the basic tenets of the cognitive theory of metaphor as formulated by Lakoff and Johnson and their followers, however, a few words should be said concerning what we may call the "traditional" view of metaphor, the pre-Lakoffian one prevalent in Steen's metaphorical "Dark Ages."

1.1.1. *Traditional Theories of Metaphor*

According to the traditional view, metaphor is basically a mode of expression, a linguistic element pertaining merely to style and ornamentation, simply a figure of speech,⁹ and is regarded as something fundamentally different from literal language. Indeed, as Seana Coulson and Teenie Matlock have put it using a zoological metaphor, "in traditional linguistic theory, literal and nonliteral meanings are seen as two different beasts, only one of which is well behaved."¹⁰ In his recent overview of cognitive theories of metaphor, Zoltán Kövecses lists five main features of the

⁶ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

⁷ Gerard Steen, "Metaphor and Language and Literature: A Cognitive Perspective," *Language and Literature* 9:3 (2000): 261.

⁸ For a more balanced view, and an overview of some of the philosophical precursors of the cognitive theory of metaphor, see Olaf Jäkel, "Kant, Blumenberg, Weinrich: Some Forgotten Contributions to the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor," in *Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics: Selected Papers from the Fifth International Cognitive Linguistics Conference: Amsterdam, July 1997* (ed. Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. and Gerard J. Steen; Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science—Current Issues in Linguistic Theory 175; Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1999), 9–27.

⁹ See, e.g., Doreen Innes, "Metaphor, Simile, and Allegory as Ornaments of Style," in *Metaphor, Allegory, and the Classical Tradition: Ancient Thought and Modern Revisions* (ed. G.R. Boys-Stones; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 7–27, esp. 12.

¹⁰ Seana Coulson and Teenie Matlock, "Metaphor and the Space Structuring Model," *Metaphor and Symbol* 16:3 / 4 (2001): 295.

traditional view: (1) Metaphor is a “linguistic phenomenon,” which is used consciously or deliberately by talented authors or speakers (2) “for some artistic or rhetorical purpose.” (3) It is based on principles of similarity, and (4) requires special talent and conscious use. In sum, (5) metaphor is held to be merely a figure of speech which we can manage very well without.¹¹ Moreover, from the traditional point of view only new metaphors are regarded as real metaphors, while entrenched, conventional ones are often labelled as “dead metaphors.”¹²

1.1.2. *Cognitive Theories of Metaphor*

In 1980, Lakoff and Johnson challenged the traditional view of metaphor on all points in a book which, in their own words, “revealed the need to rethink some of the most fundamental ideas in the study of mind: meaning, truth, the nature of thought, and the role of the body in the shaping of mind.”¹³ Lakoff and Johnson’s self-congratulatory tone aside, *Metaphors We Live By* ushered in a new theory of metaphor, a cognitive linguistic theory whose basic theoretical manifestation is conventionally referred to as Conceptual Metaphor Theory.¹⁴ This name stems from the fact that, in contrast to the traditional view, the cognitive linguistic theory of metaphor asserts that metaphor is primarily a means of conceptualisation.¹⁵ This means that it is basically a mode of thinking, and metaphorical expressions in language are from this perspective only secondary manifestations of more fundamental conceptual patterns of thought.¹⁶ It follows from this basic premise that metaphor is

¹¹ Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor: A Practical Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), vii–viii.

¹² See, e.g., Peter Crisp, “Conceptual Metaphor and Its Expressions,” in *Cognitive Poetics in Practice* (ed. Joanna Gavins and Gerard Steen; London: Routledge, 2003), 101.

¹³ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, “Afterword, 2003,” in *Metaphors We Live By: With a New Afterword* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 243.

¹⁴ For a convenient overview of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, see George Lakoff, “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor,” in *Metaphor and Thought* (2nd ed.; ed. Andrew Ortony; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 202–251; Kövecses, *Metaphor*; Vyvyan Evans and Melanie Green, *Cognitive Linguistics: An Introduction* (Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2006), 296–304; Joseph Grady, “Metaphor,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics* (ed. Dirk Geeraerts and Hubert Cuyckens; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 188–198.

¹⁵ See, e.g., Masako K. Hiraga, *Metaphor and Iconicity: A Cognitive Approach to Analysing Texts* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 25.

¹⁶ See, e.g., Evans and Green, *Cognitive Linguistics*, 294–295.

not the sole property of people with a special talent. Metaphor is on the contrary regarded as being essential to the way we think in our everyday lives and does not in principle require any extra mental effort.¹⁷ Furthermore, from the cognitive linguistic perspective, metaphor is not even necessarily based on similarity, but instead on rather different processes of thought.¹⁸ Finally, metaphors that have become conventionalised have, from this perspective, done so because they have proved their worth as important cognitive devices and thus, far from being “dead,” they are often very much alive in everyday thought.¹⁹ Metaphor is thus “one of the main muscles of thought,” as Keith Oatley puts it with a striking metaphor.²⁰

It must be emphasised that there is an important distinction in the cognitive linguistic theory of metaphor between metaphorical linguistic expressions on the one hand, and the conceptual metaphors of which they are manifestations on the other. For example, the expression “he was at a crossroads in life” is regarded as an expression of the underlying conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY. From this perspective a single conceptual metaphor may therefore underlie, and motivate, many different metaphorical linguistic expressions. The conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY can, for example, also engender metaphorical expressions like “her life lacked direction” or “they were heading towards unhappiness.”

¹⁷ On the latter point, see also Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., “Psycholinguistic Comments on Metaphor Identification,” *Language and Literature* 11:1 (2002): 79.

¹⁸ For a summary of these points, see, e.g., Kövecses, *Metaphor*, viii.

¹⁹ Cf., e.g., Crisp, “Conceptual Metaphor,” 101. As DesCamp and Sweetser point out, the view that some metaphors are “dead” is a fallacy based on the common misconception that ordinary language is literal (Mary Therese DesCamp and Eve E. Sweetser, “Metaphors for God: Why and How Do Our Choices Matter for Humans? The Application of Contemporary Cognitive Linguistics Research to the Debate on God and Metaphor,” *Pastoral Psychology* 53:3 [2005]: 224). Raymond Gibbs, Paula Lenz Costa Lima, and Edson Francozo state that conventional metaphorical expressions, which are often labelled as dead metaphors, “reflect enduring conceptual mappings” and are thus far from being dead. They reserve the notion of “dead metaphors” for those metaphors that “express metaphorical relations that are opaque to contemporary speakers” (Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., et al., “Metaphor is Grounded in Embodied Experience,” *Journal of Pragmatics* 36 [2004]: 1191).

²⁰ Oatley, “Writingandreading,” 166.

1.1.3. *Conceptual Metaphor Theory*

At the heart of Conceptual Metaphor Theory²¹ lies the concept of mappings between domains.²² More specifically, Conceptual Metaphor Theory posits the mappings of counterpart relations between conceptual domains in such a way that conceptual structure from a source domain is projected onto the target domain it is being used to understand, according to the formula A IS B. In the case of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY example, elements and structure are projected from the source domain of JOURNEY onto the target domain of LIFE with the intent of conceptualising the latter by means of the former. Thus, in our example of the metaphorical linguistic expression “he was at a crossroads in life,” the image of the crossroads and the structure of travelling on a road is taken from the domain of JOURNEY and projected onto the domain of LIFE in order to conceptualise an important stage within the life of the person in question. We use the domain of JOURNEY in order to better understand LIFE, that is, we use conceptual structure from a more concrete domain (JOURNEY) in order to make sense of a more abstract one (LIFE). In the same way, the concept of FATHER may be used to conceptualise GOD, in the conceptual metaphor GOD IS A FATHER, and DEATH may be conceptualised as SLEEP in DEATH IS SLEEP. It is indeed an important general principle of Conceptual Metaphor Theory that structure is projected in one direction from a more concrete source domain in order to make sense of a more abstract target domain, and not vice versa. This general rule is known as the principle of unidirectionality,²³ which is an important part of Lakoff and Turner’s Invariance Hypothesis.²⁴

It should also be noted that from the perspective of cognitive poetics, phenomena that used to be treated separately from metaphor by the traditional theory can instead be regarded within the framework of

²¹ For a very clear presentation of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, see Kövecses, *Metaphor*; Lakoff, “Contemporary Theory.” For a convenient overview of a large selection of conventional conceptual metaphors, see George Lakoff and Mark Turner, *More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).

²² See, e.g., Hiraga, *Metaphor and Iconicity*, 25–26.

²³ See, e.g., Kövecses, *Metaphor*, 6, 25.

²⁴ See Lakoff and Turner, *More Than Cool Reason*; George Lakoff, “The Invariance Hypothesis: Is Abstract Reason Based on Image-Schemas?” *Cognitive Linguistics* 1:1 (1990): 39–74; Mark Turner, “Aspects of the Invariance Hypothesis,” *Cognitive Linguistics* 1:2 (1990): 247–255. But see the important critique of this principle in Peter Stockwell, “The Inflexibility of Invariance,” *Language and Literature* 8:2 (1999): 125–142, and the discussion below.

Conceptual Metaphor Theory as different expressions of the same phenomenon of cross-space mapping, such as, for example, simile (understood as explicit metaphor) and allegory (understood as sustained or extended metaphor).²⁵ These may now be seen as basically the same kind of beast—well behaved or not—relying on essentially the same cognitive processes.

1.1.4. *The Scope of the Source and the Range of the Target*

Conceptual metaphors are employed as powerful cognitive tools enabling the readers or listeners to think about abstract and difficult theological concepts in terms of more concrete and familiar concepts and imagery. Since a source domain will always highlight only certain aspects of the target, however, several different source domains are often utilised in order to make sense of a single target. We thus find that different conceptual metaphors, that may even be mutually contradictory, are often used to highlight different aspects of a given target domain. LIFE may be a JOURNEY, but it may also, for instance, be a DAY, as in the expression “in the evening of life.” Similarly, DEATH may also be conceived of in terms of DEPARTURE rather than SLEEP,²⁶ and GOD may be, for example, a SHEPHERD, a KING, or a FORTRESS. As Raymond Gibbs puts it, “conceptual metaphors may be used to access different knowledge on different occasions as people immediately conceptualise some abstract target domain given a particular task.”²⁷ A related phenomenon is the use of the same source to illuminate several different targets. LOVE is a JOURNEY, but an ARGUMENT may also be a JOURNEY, and DEATH may be a JOURNEY. Zoltán Kövecses refers to these phenomena as the “range of the target” and the

²⁵ Peter Crisp, for example, defines an extended metaphor as a metaphor extending over several clauses, and an allegory as a superextended metaphor, by which he means an extended metaphor with no direct references to the metaphorical target (see Peter Crisp, “Allegory, Blending, and Possible Situations,” *Metaphor and Symbol* 20:2 [2005]: 115–131).

²⁶ For an analysis of the interplay between various conceptual metaphors for death in the Nag Hammadi tractate *Treat. Res.*, see Hugo Lundhaug, “‘These Are the Symbols and Likenesses of the Resurrection’: Conceptualizations of Death and Transformation in the *Treatise on the Resurrection* (NHC I,4),” in *Metamorphoses: Resurrection, Body and Transformative Practices in Early Christianity* (ed. Turid Karlsen Seim and Jorunn Økland; Ekstasis: Religious Experience from Antiquity to the Middle Ages 1; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), 187–205.

²⁷ Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., “Prototypes in Dynamic Meaning Construal,” in *Cognitive Poetics in Practice* (ed. Joanna Gavins and Gerard Steen; London: Routledge, 2003), 33.

“scope of the source” respectively,²⁸ and, as we shall see in the following chapters, both of these phenomena are frequently and effectively utilised as literary devices in the Nag Hammadi texts.

1.2. *Metonymy*

Having dealt at some length with metaphor, we should also briefly consider how another related phenomenon, that of metonymy, relates to Conceptual Metaphor Theory.²⁹ What we may refer to as Conceptual Metonymy Theory is, not surprisingly, closely related to Conceptual Metaphor Theory, but while Conceptual Metaphor Theory works on the basis of an A IS B formula, Conceptual Metonymy Theory works instead according to the formula A FOR B. In Kövecses and Radden’s definition, “Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same domain, or ICM.”³⁰ One thing, A, referred to as the vehicle entity, is thus seen to stand for another, B, referred to as the target entity.³¹ An example of this is the common AUTHOR FOR WORK metonymy as in the expression “he was reading Shakespeare.” Metonymy is distinguished from metaphor mainly by the fact that A and B are associated within a single domain or domain matrix, and by the fact that A and

²⁸ For Zoltán Kövecses’ concepts of the scope of the source and range of the target in metaphorical relations, see Zoltán Kövecses, “The Scope of Metaphor,” in *Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroads: A Cognitive Perspective* (ed. Antonio Barcelona; Topics in English Linguistics 30; Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2000), 79–92; Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor in Culture: Universality and Variation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 70–79, 121–123.

²⁹ As with conceptual metaphors it should be remembered that in recent work within cognitive linguistics the term metonymy has a significantly extended meaning in relation to what we may be used to from more traditional theories. Most recent treatments regard, e.g., what has traditionally been referred to as synecdoche simply as one type of metonymic relation among many (for an argument in favor of keeping metonymy and synecdoche as separate concepts within cognitive linguistics, however, see Ken-ichi Seto, “Distinguishing Metonymy from Synecdoche,” in *Metonymy in Language and Thought* [ed. Klaus-Uwe Panther and Günter Radden; Human Cognitive Processing 4; Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1999], 91–120).

³⁰ Zoltán Kövecses and Günter Radden, “Metonymy: Developing a Cognitive Linguistic View,” *Cognitive Linguistics* 9:1 (1998): 39. They contrast this definition with the traditional view of metonymy as “a figure of speech in which the name of one thing is used in place of that of another associated with or suggested by it” (*ibid.*, 37). The acronym ICM refers to George Lakoff’s concept of Idealized Cognitive Models (see George Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987] and the discussion below).

³¹ See Kövecses, *Metaphor*, 145.

B are not blended.³² However, metaphor and metonymy also interact in interesting ways, as will become clear throughout the present study.³³ In some cases, as when baptism is described in terms of washing, metaphors have a metonymic basis. In other cases there are important metonymic connections to either of the input spaces that are indispensable to the meaning production and rhetoric of the texts under scrutiny.

1.3. *Blending Theory*

Conceptual Metaphor Theory is a useful theory when it comes to the analysis of simple metaphorical relations. However, there are instances where it fails to account for the complexity of the material. According to the way metaphorical relations are conceptualised within the framework of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, structure is projected from a source domain to a single target domain. Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, however, have come up with a new theory that tackles more complex cases of metaphorical and non-metaphorical projection. This is known variously as the theory of Conceptual Integration, Mental Binding, Conceptual Blending, or simply Blending Theory.³⁴ In a recent paper, Turner

³² William Croft and D. Alan Cruse, *Cognitive Linguistics* (Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 216. Croft and Cruse also add the characteristic that “any correspondences (in the Lakoffian sense) between A and B are coincidental and not relevant to the message” (ibid.), but this does not always seem to be the case, as we will see in the analyses in the following chapters. For the notion of blending referred to here, see below.

³³ See, e.g., Croft and Cruse, *Cognitive Linguistics*, 217–219.

³⁴ For a concise and comprehensive account of Blending Theory see esp. Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, “Conceptual Integration Networks,” *Cognitive Science* 22:2 (1998): 133–187; but see also Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, *The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities* (New York: Basic Books, 2002); Mark Turner, *The Literary Mind: The Origins of Thought and Language* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Seana Coulson and Todd Oakley, “Blending Basics,” *Cognitive Linguistics* 11:3/4 (2000): 175–196; Coulson and Matlock, “Metaphor”; Seana Coulson, *Semantic Leaps: Frame-Shifting and Conceptual Blending in Meaning Construction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Joseph Grady, “Cognitive Mechanisms of Conceptual Integration,” *Cognitive Linguistics* 11:3/4 (2000): 335–345; Joseph Grady, et al., “Blending and Metaphor,” in *Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics: Selected Papers from the Fifth International Cognitive Linguistics Conference: Amsterdam, July 1997* (ed. Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. and Gerard J. Steen; Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science—Current Issues in Linguistic Theory 175; Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1999), 101–124; Kövecses, *Metaphor*, 227–238; Crisp, “Conceptual Metaphor,” 109–111; Evans and Green, *Cognitive Linguistics*, 400–444; Grady, “Metaphor,” 198–201; Mark Turner, “Conceptual Integration,” in *The Oxford Handbook of*

describes the basic idea of conceptual blending as “the mental operation of combining two mental packets of meaning ... selectively and under constraints to create a third mental packet of meaning that has new, emergent meaning.”³⁵ The way in which this works is a bit more complicated, however. Blending Theory is in part inspired by Conceptual Metaphor Theory, but it also depends crucially upon Fauconnier’s previous research on mental spaces,³⁶ and on his theory of cross-space mappings between such mental spaces.³⁷ These mental spaces are, in Fau-

Cognitive Linguistics (ed. Dirk Geeraerts and Hubert Cuyckens; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 377–393. For a treatment of some special cases of blending, see Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, “Metonymy and Conceptual Integration,” in *Metonymy in Language and Thought* (ed. Klaus-Uwe Panther and Günther Radden; Human Cognitive Processing 4; Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1999), 77–90; Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, “Polysemy and Conceptual Blending,” in *Polysemy: Flexible Patterns of Meaning in Mind and Language* (ed. Brigitte Nerlich, et al.; Trends in Linguistics: Studies and Monographs 142; Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2003), 79–94. For examples of the application of Blending Theory to some specific issues, see Gilles Fauconnier, “Methods and Generalizations,” in *Cognitive Linguistics: Foundations, Scope, and Methodology* (ed. Theo Janssen and Gisela Redeker; Cognitive Linguistics Research 15; Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1999), 95–127; Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, “Compression and Global Insight,” *Cognitive Linguistics* 11:3 / 4 (2000): 283–304; Eve Sweetser, “Compositionality and Blending: Semantic Composition in a Cognitively Realistic Framework,” in *Cognitive Linguistics: Foundations, Scope, and Methodology* (ed. Theo Janssen and Gisela Redeker; Cognitive Linguistics Research 15; Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1999), 129–162; Eve Sweetser, “Blended Spaces and Performativity,” *Cognitive Linguistics* 11:3 / 4 (2000): 305–333. For a positive evaluation of Blending Theory from the point of view of cognitive psychology, see Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., “Making Good Psychology Out of Blending Theory,” *Cognitive Linguistics* 11:3 / 4 (2000): 347–358. For a positive evaluation of the computational feasibility of Blending Theory, see Tony Veale and Diarmuid O’Donoghue, “Computation and Blending,” *Cognitive Linguistics* 11:3 / 4 (2000): 253–281. For an overview of some historical predecessors of Blending Theory, see Brigitte Nerlich and David D. Clarke, “Blending the Past and the Present: Conceptual and Linguistic Integration, 1800–2000,” in *Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison and Contrast* (ed. René Dirven and Ralf Pörings; Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2003), 555–593.

³⁵ Mark Turner, “The Cognitive Study of Art, Language, and Literature,” *Poetics Today* 23:1 (2002): 10.

³⁶ Gilles Fauconnier, *Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

³⁷ See Gilles Fauconnier, *Mappings in Thought and Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). For more on mental space theory, see Eve Sweetser and Gilles Fauconnier, “Cognitive Links and Domains: Basic Aspects of Mental Space Theory,” in *Spaces, Worlds, and Grammar* (ed. Gilles Fauconnier and Eve Sweetser; Cognitive Theory of Language and Culture; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 1–28. For the applicability of mental space theory to the analysis of literature, see Elena Semino, “Possible Worlds and Mental Spaces in Hemingway’s ‘A Very Short Story,’” in *Cognitive Poetics in Practice* (ed. Joanna Gavins and Gerard Steen; London: Routledge, 2003), 83–98.

connier and Turner's definition, "small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action."³⁸ Such mental spaces are specific short term cognitive constructs that depend on other more stable longer term knowledge structures such as domains,³⁹ and are "structured by frames and cognitive models."⁴⁰ A mental space is thus not the same as a domain, although it is often structured by one or more domains. Mental spaces also include additional contextual, cultural, and other background structure in addition to specifically domain-derived information.⁴¹ In short, the theory of mental spaces is a general model for the description of "interconnections between parts of complex conceptual structures."⁴² "The crucial characteristic of a mental space," as Eve Sweetser puts it, "is that there can be systematic cognitive mappings between it and other mental spaces, with consequences for (inter alia) reference."⁴³

While Conceptual Metaphor Theory reckons with just two domains, the source and the target, and the mappings between them, Blending Theory operates with a minimum of four mental spaces in a so-called Conceptual Integration Network.⁴⁴ In such a network there is a minimum of two Input spaces, plus a so-called Generic space that contains what is common to the two input spaces, and a Blended space made up of elements and structure projected from the two input spaces as well as elements and structure emerging from within the blend itself (see fig. 1).⁴⁵ The number of possible input spaces is not limited to just

³⁸ Fauconnier and Turner, "Conceptual Integration Networks," 137; Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 40, 102; Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, "Blending as a Central Process of Grammar," in *Conceptual Structure, Discourse and Language* (ed. Adele E. Goldberg; Stanford: CSLI Publications, 1996), 113. Cf. Grady, et al., "Blending and Metaphor," 102.

³⁹ See Grady, et al., "Blending and Metaphor," 102; Kövecses, *Metaphor*, 227–228.

⁴⁰ Fauconnier and Turner, "Conceptual Integration Networks," 137; Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 102; see also Fauconnier, *Mappings*, 39; Sweetser, "Compositionality and Blending," 135.

⁴¹ See Hiraga, *Metaphor and Iconicity*, 37.

⁴² Sweetser, "Compositionality and Blending," 134–135.

⁴³ Sweetser, "Compositionality and Blending," 135.

⁴⁴ For a concise description of the Conceptual Integration Network model, see Fauconnier and Turner, "Conceptual Integration Networks," 142–144.

⁴⁵ This figure is based on the one found in Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 46. The four circles represent mental spaces, the black dots represent the elements of the mental spaces, the white dots represent emergent elements, the solid lines represent counterpart mappings, the dotted lines represent cross-space projections, and the square

two, however; they are potentially infinite. Moreover, while Conceptual Metaphor Theory sees the mappings between its two domains as being unidirectional, with transfer of conceptual structure from the source domain to the target, but not the other way around, Blending Theory conceives of its cross-space projections as being able in principle to move in both directions. Blending Theory also covers all kinds of conceptual blending, not just metaphorical relations. In sum, Blending Theory is a theory of considerably greater complexity and scope than Conceptual Metaphor Theory.

The process of blending operates according to certain “structural and dynamic principles.”⁴⁶ Take for instance the interpretation of the eucharistic elements as the body and blood of Christ. In this Conceptual Integration Network (see fig. 2) the eucharistic elements constitute one of the input spaces, while the other is constituted by the body and blood of Christ. A conceptual blend depends on cross-space mappings of counterpart relations between the input spaces, and selective projection of elements and structure from these into the blended space. In this example, there are counterpart mappings between the bread and wine in Input space 1 with, respectively, the body and blood of Christ in Input space 2. The common features emerging from the counterpart mappings between these elements in the two input spaces make up the generic space, in this case, for example, the abstract generic feature of “solid” is common to the bread and the body, while “liquid” as well as “red colour” are common to the blood and the wine. Finally, selected elements and structure of both input spaces are projected into the blended space,⁴⁷ where the eucharistic elements are identified as the body and blood of Christ. In this particular Conceptual Integration Network it is also of note that the eucharistic bread and wine serve as material anchors for the blend.⁴⁸

represents a structuring frame. Veale and O'Donoghue add a fifth “constructor space” to this basic four-space model of conceptual blending in order to make it even more useful for computational purposes (Veale and O'Donoghue, “Computation and Blending,” esp. 274–279).

⁴⁶ See Fauconnier and Turner, “Conceptual Integration Networks,” 133.

⁴⁷ In the figure (fig. 2) I have included only the elements that are actually projected.

⁴⁸ For the concept of material anchors, see Edwin Hutchins, “Material Anchors for Conceptual Blends,” *Journal of Pragmatics* 37:10 (2005): 1555–1577. For a Blending Theory analysis of rituals, including the Eucharist, see Sweetser, “Blended Spaces and Performativity.”

In addition to dealing with such projections between mental spaces, Blending Theory also accounts for so-called emergent structure, that is, structure and elements emerging in the blend that have no counterparts in the input spaces. According to Fauconnier and Turner, the principle of emergent structure works in the following way.⁴⁹ First, in what they call “composition,” the blend is created by the elements selectively projected from the input spaces putting elements from each of the input spaces in new relations to each other. This process of composition often, but not always, entails fusion in the blend of some of the elements projected into it. Then, through the process of “completion,” patterns in the blend that have come into being through the process of “composition” evoke information in long-term memory that is used to fill in the blend around the already composed elements. And finally, in the third stage, the stage of “elaboration,” the event in the blended space is simulated mentally (this is often referred to as the “running of the blend”). In this process the blend may be elaborated upon in ways that are in principle limitless.

In the Eucharist example, it is only in the blend that the bread and wine become identified with the body and blood of Christ, and therefore it is only in the blend that the consumption of the bread and the wine is understood as the consumption of the body and blood of Christ. Indeed, consuming the body and blood of Christ is only possible in the blended space, since only here is it possible to regard his body and blood as food and drink, which are the exclusive properties of the first input space and projected to the blend from there. Also, only in the blend does the eating and drinking of the bread and wine come to imply such entailments as the unification with Christ. We may thus say that the ritual of the Eucharist is dependent on the blend depicted here, and that the eucharistic elements are its material anchors.

The blend resulting from a Conceptual Integration Network often contains events and imagery that may be impossible in the real world, but which may still be of great cognitive value. For example, the concept of the Grim Reaper, a hooded skeleton with a scythe representing death, is patently absurd and implausible in the real world, but that does not detract from the usefulness of the blend as a cognitive model.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ For a concise account of this process, see Fauconnier and Turner, “Conceptual Integration Networks.”

⁵⁰ For a Blending Theory analysis of the concept of the Grim Reaper, see, e.g., Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 291–295.

In this blend, specific aspects of death are “brought to life” in a manner that is both vivid and easy to remember, which thus illustrates the common phenomenon that “productive inference ... can arise from implausible blends constructed in mental spaces,” as Seana Coulson puts it.⁵¹

It should be noted that once a Conceptual Integration Network has been established we do not do our mental work exclusively within the blended space, but we use the network as a whole. In the words of Fauconnier and Turner, “we know the connection of the blend to the input spaces, and the way that structure or inferences developed in the blend translates back to the input spaces. We work over all four spaces simultaneously, but the blend gives us structure, integration, and efficiency not available in the other spaces.”⁵² It is also important to note that structure and elements from the blend may in turn be projected backwards to the input spaces, which may create yet new inferences and modify the input spaces in the process.⁵³ Depending on the discursive and situational context, the same Conceptual Integration Network may thus give rise to quite different and complex results in the blended space. Moreover, the process of running the blend may also call up new input spaces, recruit new structure, elements, and frames, and contribute to the creation of new blends. Indeed, the blended space itself may become an input space in another Conceptual Integration Network.⁵⁴

The functions of the fourth space in the network, the generic space, also need to be mentioned. What is common to the input spaces, often abstract structure, constitutes the generic space, which maps onto the counterparts.⁵⁵ The primary function of the generic space is thus one of cohesion, contributing towards keeping the network together, but, in addition, this space may also facilitate the recruitment of further input spaces to the blend. In the words of Seana Coulson, “the ability to reframe something at a higher level of abstraction (as in a representation evoked in the generic space of a frame network) may serve as a retrieval cue

⁵¹ Seana Coulson, “Semantic Leaps: The Role of Frame-Shifting and Conceptual Blending in Meaning Construction” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, San Diego, 1997), 290.

⁵² Fauconnier and Turner, “Blending,” 113.

⁵³ For backward projection, see Fauconnier and Turner, “Conceptual Integration Networks,” 178, 182.

⁵⁴ See, e.g., Evans and Green, *Cognitive Linguistics*, 431.

⁵⁵ See, e.g., Fauconnier and Turner, “Conceptual Integration Networks,” 137–138, 143.

for frames which would have been otherwise unavailable.”⁵⁶ It should be noted, however, that in more complex Conceptual Integration Networks, with more than two input spaces, the latter need not all share the same generic space,⁵⁷ but having a shared generic space makes the network as a whole more cohesive.

1.3.1. *Vital Relations*

Looking more closely at the cross-space mappings of counterpart relations between input spaces, the so-called “outer-space” links, and the “inner-space” links between elements within a single mental space, Fauconnier and Turner enumerate fifteen different types of links, termed “vital relations” between elements mapped in this way. These links range from such properties as Analogy, Representation, and Similarity, to Time and Space.⁵⁸ It is a major feature of blending that outer-space vital relations tend to be scaled down, strengthened, and compressed to inner-space relations in the blend.⁵⁹ For example, in the Eucharist-blend, described above, there are outer-space vital relations of similarity and representation between, respectively, wine and blood, and bread and body, that are compressed to identity in the blend.

What governs the compression of vital relations is first of all the overarching goal, postulated by Fauconnier and Turner, to “achieve human scale” in the blend. Among the most notable subgoals of this process is to “strengthen vital relations,” “compress what is diffuse,” and to “obtain global insight.”⁶⁰ What this means in less technical terms is that the

⁵⁶ Coulson, “Semantic Leaps,” 298. Coulson is here discussing a so-called frame network, but the principle holds true for any kind of network. As we shall see below, the notion of the generic space plays an important part in conceptualising the functions of a canon in interpretation from the perspective of Blending Theory.

⁵⁷ See Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 279.

⁵⁸ For a description and list of the fifteen different vital relations, see Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 93–102. The fifteen vital relations are as follows: Change, Identity, Time, Space, Cause-Effect, Part-Whole, Representation, Role, Analogy, Disanalogy, Property, Similarity, Category, Intentionality, and Uniqueness. Joseph Grady argues convincingly for the addition of Correlation to this list (see Joseph Grady, “Primary Metaphors as Inputs to Conceptual Blends,” *Journal of Pragmatics* 37:10 [2005]: 1595–1614).

⁵⁹ “Blends systematically scale down relations, compress relations into others, and even create new relations” (Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 107).

⁶⁰ See, e.g., Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 322–323. Recently Carl Bache and Anders Hougard have argued convincingly in favour of balancing Fauconnier and Turner’s focus on conceptual integration and compression by also introducing the idea

purpose of blending is to compress and simplify complex mental structures to a scale at which they become more easily manageable to the human mind, making it possible to think in terms of familiar objects, actions, and situations.⁶¹ Examples of this are when the entire history of evolution is thought of in terms of the time-scale of a single day, making it possible to state that while the dinosaurs appeared on the scene at 10 pm, humans only showed up at the stroke of midnight,⁶² or when we reduce the sun and the planets to the size of melons, oranges, and other fruits in order to enable us to grasp more easily their relative sizes and the vast distances between them in the solar system. Similarly, the concept of GOD is reduced to human scale when conceptualised in terms of the familiar concepts of FATHER or KING.⁶³

1.3.2. *A Taxonomy of Blends*

We have seen that Conceptual Metaphor Theory accounts only for unidirectional projection between two domains. Blending Theory, which is a much more versatile and dynamic model of meaning production, accounts for the kind of unidirectional metaphorical projection that is handled by Conceptual Metaphor Theory by treating it as one kind of Conceptual Integration Network among many, the type Fauconnier and Turner would call a one-sided shared topology network. This network has two input spaces, corresponding to the source and the target domains, and the usual generic and blended spaces, but the blended space in this kind of network recruits its frame structure exclusively from one of the input spaces—from that which corresponds to the source domain.⁶⁴

of conceptual disintegration. They have emphasised that the goal of achieving “human scale” is often reached through splitting, disintegration and expansion rather than by compression and integration (see Carl Bache, “Constraining Conceptual Integration Theory: Levels of Blending and Disintegration,” *Journal of Pragmatics* 37:10 [2005]: 1615–1635; Anders Hougaard, “Conceptual Disintegration and Blending in Interactional Sequences: A Discussion of New Phenomena, Processes vs. Products, and Methodology,” *Journal of Pragmatics* 37:10 [2005]: 1653–1685).

⁶¹ See Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 312; Evans and Green, *Cognitive Linguistics*, 418–419.

⁶² For this example, see Evans and Green, *Cognitive Linguistics*, 418–419.

⁶³ For an analysis of these and other metaphors for God using Blending Theory, see DesCamp and Sweetser, “Metaphors for God”.

⁶⁴ See Fauconnier and Turner, “Conceptual Integration Networks,” 165–166. For an in-depth treatment of metaphorical blends, see Grady, “Primary Metaphors as Inputs”.

Blending operations may be simple or complex,⁶⁵ but the type of network that Turner has especially emphasised is the so-called “double-scope” network.⁶⁶ Such networks have “inputs with different (and often clashing) organizing frames and an organizing frame for the blend that includes parts of each of those organizing frames and has emergent structure of its own.”⁶⁷ The central feature of such blends is the fact that the differences in the projected organising frames, both of which contribute to the blend, “offer the possibility of rich clashes,” as Turner puts it.⁶⁸ “Far from blocking the construction of the network, such clashes offer challenges to the imagination and the resulting blends can turn out to be highly creative.”⁶⁹ Blends of the kind I will be analysing in the following chapters fall more often than not into the category of double-scope, or even multiple-scope.

1.3.3. *Blending Theory vs. Conceptual Metaphor Theory*

We have seen here that Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Blending Theory are quite different. However, the two theoretical approaches may be regarded as complementary, rather than contradictory.⁷⁰ While Conceptual Metaphor Theory deals mostly with stable knowledge structures in long-term memory, and is useful when dealing with relatively stable and simple conceptual structures, it is on-line meaning production that is the focus of Blending Theory, which is also considerably more helpful when it comes to the analysis of more complex and creative conceptual blends, not to mention the analysis of emergent structure. As we have seen, one of the central motivations for Blending Theory is that it accounts for so-called “emergent structure” resulting from cross-space mappings, i.e., structure that does not derive from either input space, but nevertheless emerges in the conceptual blend. However, it should be noted that

⁶⁵ For the complete typology of blends, see Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*.

⁶⁶ See esp. Mark Turner, “Double-Scope Stories,” in *Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences* (ed. David Herman; CSLI Lecture Notes 158; Stanford: CSLI, 2003), 117–142.

⁶⁷ Mark Turner, “The Origin of Selkies,” *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 11:5–6 (2004): 92.

⁶⁸ M. Turner, “Origin of Selkies,” 92.

⁶⁹ M. Turner, “Origin of Selkies,” 92.

⁷⁰ See Grady, et al., “Blending and Metaphor,” esp. 120–122. See also Lakoff and Johnson, “Afterword, 2003,” 261–264.

emergent structure is not a precondition for the application of Blending Theory. The basic mechanisms of the theory apply regardless of whether new structure emerges from the blending or not.⁷¹

Another strength of Blending Theory is that it accounts for the kinds of phenomena that the Invariance Hypothesis excludes by default, most notably cross-space projection of elements and structure in more than one direction.⁷² Blending Theory's ability to handle the interanimation of mental spaces, and ultimately of the cognitive models or texts they derive from, is a precondition for the usefulness of the theory in handling the majority of the conceptual blends that are analysed in the following chapters, and also for its applicability to the analysis of allusions and other intertextual relations.

1.3.4. *Blending, Cognitive Architecture, and Memory*

In terms of cognitive architecture, Fauconnier and Turner claim that "mental spaces operate in working memory," and that "elements in mental spaces correspond to activated neuronal assemblies and linking between elements corresponds to some kind of neurobiological binding, such as co-activation."⁷³ This means that Blending Theory finds itself somewhere between a connectionist and a representationalist cognitive architecture while the connection to either of them is kept rather vague.⁷⁴ Since it stays on a level of abstraction that, as Patrick Colm Hogan has pointed out, is neutral with regard to cognitive architecture,⁷⁵ Blending

⁷¹ See Coulson, *Semantic Leaps*, 161.

⁷² See Peter Stockwell's devastating critique of the Invariance Hypothesis in Stockwell, "The Inflexibility of Invariance". In the words of Stockwell, "The Invariance Hypothesis curtails the perception of metaphor as creative. It limits our understanding, condemning us to see things only in the way that we have always seen them. It would prevent us from seeing how we could possibly genuinely perceive anything new or challenging. It cannot explain the capacity of language for reference to a new sense beyond source and target" (ibid., 140). Blending Theory, on the other hand, is inherently a far more dynamic model and steers well clear of the problems described by Stockwell.

⁷³ Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 102.

⁷⁴ For an account of the differences between connectionist and representationalist theories of mind, see Patrick Colm Hogan, *Cognitive Science, Literature, and the Arts: A Guide for Humanists* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 29–58.

⁷⁵ See Hogan, *Cognitive Science*, 109. Hogan argues that Blending Theory would benefit from being more specified in terms of representationalist architecture (see ibid., 109–113), while David Ritchie has argued for a reformulation in terms of connectionist architecture (see L. David Ritchie, "Lost in 'Conceptual Space,'" *Metaphor and Symbol* 19:1 [2004]: 31–50).

Theory provides analytical tools for modelling processes of thought without being married to any specific theory of how the mind works on the level of architecture.

An important notion of memory research that may supplement Blending Theory, however, is that of “priming.” Bob Snyder defines priming as “a process whereby the recall of a particular memory causes the low-level activation of other associated memories (a context), without this process necessarily becoming conscious.”⁷⁶ Another way of putting this is that priming is about preparing pieces of long-term memory for activation by making them more easily available. As Hogan puts it, “primed items are, in effect, brought out of long-term memory, though they are not accessed directly in consciousness.”⁷⁷ Such items thus come to be “in a different mental state from either the conscious / rehearsal material or the material stored in long-term memory.”⁷⁸ We may think of the status of primed memories as having been “placed temporarily in a sort of buffer between long-term memory and consciousness.”⁷⁹ For my purposes here, the most important feature of the notion of priming is the insight that the activation of one memory primes related memories, which consequently “makes it more likely that some of those semiactivated memories will also be recalled.”⁸⁰ In this sense, priming helps us to understand the way in which mental spaces are called up to processes of blending in working memory. This is highly relevant with regard to allusions. If, for instance, we have detected an allusion to First Corinthians at one point in our

⁷⁶ Bob Snyder, *Music and Memory: An Introduction* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), 262.

⁷⁷ Patrick Colm Hogan, *The Mind and Its Stories: Narrative Universals and Human Emotion* (Studies in Emotion and Social Interaction; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 56.

⁷⁸ Hogan, *The Mind and Its Stories*, 56–57.

⁷⁹ Hogan, *The Mind and Its Stories*, 57.

⁸⁰ Snyder, *Music and Memory*, 262. On the concept of priming, see also Hogan, *Cognitive Science*; Endel Tulving and Daniel L. Schacter, “Priming and Human Memory Systems,” *Science* 247:4940 (1990): 301–306; Christian D. Schunn and Kevin Dunbar, “Priming, Analogy, and Awareness in Complex Reasoning,” *Memory & Cognition* 24:3 (1996): 271–284; Joseph LeDoux, *Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are* (New York: Viking, 2002), 101–102; Barbara Knowlton, “Declarative and Nondeclarative Knowledge: Insights from Cognitive Neuroscience,” in *Knowledge, Concepts, and Categories* (ed. Koen Lamberts and David Shanks; Studies in Cognition; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), 222–228. On the concept of priming within the context of the broader topic of implicit memory, see the articles in Jeffrey S. Bowers and Chad J. Marsolek, eds., *Rethinking Implicit Memory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

reading of *Exeg. Soul*, we are consequently more likely to detect further allusions to the same text in subsequent parts, or subsequent readings, of *Exeg. Soul*.

1.4. Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs)

Another important concept that will be used in the present work is George Lakoff's notion of Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs).⁸¹ An ICM is, in the clear formulation of Raymond Gibbs,

a prototypical "folk" theory or cultural model that people create to organize their knowledge. . . . ICMs are idealized and don't fit actual situations in a one-to-one correspondence but relate many concepts that are inferentially connected to one another in a single conceptual structure that is experientially meaningful as a whole.⁸²

The elements of an ICM are very often structured by conceptual metaphors, since metaphors help organise the elements of the ICM by means of their entailments.⁸³ As Zoltán Kövecses puts it, "metaphor is primarily used to understand a whole system of entities in terms of another system."⁸⁴ Take for instance the ICM for SOCIETY. Here the conceptual metaphor SOCIETY IS A FAMILY is especially productive, leading to the conceptualisation of society in terms of the concept of family. Often, however, cognitive models are defined by a set of metaphors, each highlighting different aspects of the ICM.⁸⁵ The cognitive model for society is for instance also structured by the metaphors SOCIETY IS A PERSON and SOCIETY IS A MACHINE.⁸⁶ At the same time, FAMILY and MACHINE are themselves ICMs. Still, even though a concept is defined by a cluster of cognitive models, it is psychologically easier to grasp as a single concept, rather than as the sum of its constituents.⁸⁷

The elements and structure that make up an ICM become closely linked in experience, and thus in people's memory, and this facilitates the priming and activation of related elements of the ICM once one element

⁸¹ For the theory of Idealized Cognitive Models, see Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*.

⁸² Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., *The Poetics of Mind: Figurative Thought, Language, and Understanding* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 58.

⁸³ See, e.g., Gibbs, *Poetics of Mind*, 203.

⁸⁴ Kövecses, *Metaphor*, 160.

⁸⁵ Lakoff refers to this as ICM clustering (Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*, 74–76, 203).

⁸⁶ For these conceptual metaphors, see Kövecses, *Metaphor*.

⁸⁷ See Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*, 74, 203.

has been activated. However, the level of priming and activation follows from the prototype effects pertaining to ICMs. In most cases, not all of the constituents of an ICM are of equal importance. ICMs are usually radial or graded in one or more ways, and this causes prototype effects.⁸⁸ When, for example, an ICM is brought to mind in a general sense, one is likely to think of it differently than when it is activated in a specific context. One might say that the features that are central to the ICM are more easily activated in a general activation of the cognitive model than the less central ones, while the latter may be more easily brought to mind in specific contexts.⁸⁹

In terms of Blending Theory, ICMs may be encountered as providers of input spaces to Conceptual Integration Networks. In this sense they are equivalent to domains, but the element of structure is to a greater degree inherent in the concept of an ICM than in that of a domain, thus making the former term more useful for our purposes than the latter. At times, an ICM may also be regarded as the cognitive model that provides the category structure for the whole blending network as well as for the individual spaces in the network. Blending Theory may in turn be used to model the internal workings of an ICM, the combination of ICMs or expansion of ICMs.⁹⁰

Following Raymond Gibbs, I would like to stress the inherently dynamic nature of ICMs and their functions in metaphorical meaning construction. As Gibbs has argued,

understanding literary texts, similar to any act of meaning construal, is not a matter of accessing highly structured knowledge, in the form of abstract prototypes, from long-term memory. Instead, text understanding is a dynamic activity that relies on concrete, often embodied information, which people creatively compose in the moment of reading.⁹¹

This means that when the reader encounters in a text, for example, the metaphorical source ICM of *MACHINE* in the conceptual metaphor *THE MIND IS A MACHINE*, he or she draws on concrete knowledge of

⁸⁸ See, e.g., Stockwell, "The Inflexibility of Invariance," 125.

⁸⁹ On prototypes and prototype effects, see, e.g., Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*; Eleanor H. Rosch, "Natural Categories," *Cognitive Psychology* 4 (1973): 328–350; Eleanor Rosch, et al., "Basic Objects in Natural Categories," *Cognitive Psychology* 8 (1976): 382–439; Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, "Polysemy, Prototypes, and Radial Categories," in *The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics* (ed. Dirk Geeraerts and Hubert Cuyckens; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 139–169; Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., "Prototypes".

⁹⁰ Cf. Kövecses, *Metaphor*, 227.

⁹¹ Gibbs, "Prototypes," 29.

specific parts of that ICM, depending on the context and depending on the reader's prior "real-world" and textual knowledge and experience. As Gibbs has pointed out, concepts and categories are highly flexible,⁹² and a cognitive model, such as the MACHINE ICM is not an abstraction based on concrete instances, but rather a cluster of information and structure that may be activated in various ways in different contexts. "Instead of assuming that language activates fixed prototypical conceptual representations, language serves," claims Gibbs, "as an immediate pointer to encyclopaedic knowledge from which conceptual meanings are created 'on the fly', or as an *ad-hoc* comprehension process."⁹³ ICMs, then, that are made up of different, sometimes contradictory, elements, should be viewed "not as fixed, static structures, but as temporary representations that are dynamic and context-dependent."⁹⁴ They should be regarded as "temporary constructions in working memory constructed on the spot from generic and episodic information in long-term memory, rather than as stable structures stored in long-term memory."⁹⁵

1.5. *Intertextuality*

Let us now turn from the interpretation of metaphors and other conceptual blends for a moment to consider the related phenomenon of the interpretation of allusions and citations, and the broader phenomenon of intertextuality. Traditionally, intertextuality and metaphor have been viewed as separate phenomena and treated within different theoretical frameworks and largely within different scholarly fields and traditions. However, there are important points of contact between them which suggest the possibility that they might fruitfully be treated within a unified theoretical framework. Such an overarching framework, I want to suggest, may be found in an adaptation of Blending Theory. Peter Stockwell has recently pointed out that

taking "the cognitive turn" seriously ... means a thorough re-evaluation of all of the categories with which we understand literary reading and analysis. In doing this, however, we do not have to throw away all of the insights from literary criticism and linguistic analysis that have been drawn out in the past. Many of those patterns of understanding form very useful

⁹² Gibbs, "Prototypes," 31–32.

⁹³ Gibbs, "Prototypes," 38.

⁹⁴ Gibbs, "Prototypes," 33.

⁹⁵ Gibbs, "Prototypes," 32.

starting points for cognitive poetic investigation. Some of them require only a little reorientation to offer a new way of looking at literary reading. Occasionally, this might seem to be no more than recasting old ideas with new labels. I would argue (along cognitive linguistic lines) that new labels force us to conceptualise things differently.⁹⁶

I fully share Stockwell's sentiment and would argue that one field of literary theoretical investigation that needs only a little reorientation in order to be adapted for a cognitive poetic methodology is that of the study of intertextuality.⁹⁷

Similarities between the phenomena of metaphor and allusion have indeed been noted by several scholars of classics and literature. Gian Biagio Conte, for instance, has treated allusion as a rhetorical trope on the same level as metaphor. According to Conte, "allusion works in just the same way, and in the same semantic area, as a rhetorical figure."⁹⁸ Although Conte here presupposes the traditional view of metaphor as a rhetorical figure, his observation of the similarities between metaphor and allusion is useful when seen within the cognitive poetic framework, outlined above. From this perspective, Conte's description of the similarities between allusions and tropes is highly suggestive. "In both allusion and the trope," writes Conte, "the poetic dimension is created by the simultaneous presence of two different realities whose competition with one another produces a single more complex reality. Such literary allusion produces the simultaneous coexistence of both a denotative and

⁹⁶ Stockwell, *Cognitive Poetics*, 6.

⁹⁷ For a recent overview of the theoretical concept of intertextuality, see Graham Allen, *Intertextuality* (The New Critical Idiom; London: Routledge, 2000). For a comprehensive bibliography of studies on or within the framework of intertextuality up until the late eighties, see Udo J. Hebel, comp., *Intertextuality, Allusion, and Quotation: An International Bibliography of Critical Studies* (Bibliographies and Indexes in World Literature 18; New York: Greenwood Press, 1989); and see also Hans-Peter Mai, "Intertextual Theory—A Bibliography," in *Intertextuality* (ed. Heinrich F. Plett; Research in Text Theory 15; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991), 237–250. For an excellent treatment of intertextuality in relation to the analysis of texts from antiquity, see Edmunds, *Intertextuality*. See also Ulrich Luz, "Intertexts in the Gospel of Matthew," *HTR* 97:2 (2004): 119–137 for a brief and informative overview of theories of intertextuality and a subsequent application to the Gospel of Matthew. Note, however, that "there does not exist anything like a coherent theory of intertextuality" (Mai, "Intertextual Theory," 237).

⁹⁸ Gian Biagio Conte, *The Rhetoric of Imitation: Genre and Poetic Memory in Virgil and Other Latin Poets* (Cornell Studies in Classical Philology 44; Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), 38. Cf. also Joseph Pucci, *The Full-Knowing Reader: Allusion and the Power of the Reader in the Western Literary Tradition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), xv, 9.

a connotative semiotic.”⁹⁹ By reformulating Conte’s “different realities” into different mental spaces, it is apparent how adaptable such a view is to the theoretical framework of Blending Theory.

Other literary theorists have also come close to the current positions within cognitive poetics outlined above. Indeed, Ziva Ben-Porat’s highly evocative theory of the poetics of allusion, outlined in her important 1976 article “The Poetics of Literary Allusion,”¹⁰⁰ may now serve as a useful link between traditional literary approaches to allusion and current views within cognitive poetics. Ben-Porat’s definition of allusion provides an apt illustration:

The literary allusion is a device for the simultaneous activation of two texts. The activation is achieved through the manipulation of a special signal: a sign (simple or complex) in a given text characterized by an additional larger “referent.” This referent is always an independent text. The simultaneous activation of the two texts thus connected results in the formation of intertextual patterns whose nature cannot be predetermined.¹⁰¹

In a similar vein, Ellen van Wolde stated in 1989 that intertextual relations are “a part of the reader’s general semiotic actualization process,” a process focussed on the reader, “because the reader achieves intertextual *semiosis* through logical and analogical reasoning in interaction with the text.”¹⁰² She claimed further that these intertextual relationships “do not concern the similarity between text and referent but the ability of the reader to conceive of the worlds of the text as possible or to reconstruct them, or, in other words, to give them contents by relating them to his own living- and reading-experiences.”¹⁰³ According to van Wolde, the reader thus “turns the possible worlds of the text into realities.”¹⁰⁴

The notion that the intertextual connections between sign-systems amount to the creation of entirely new systems of signification has also been emphasised by the scholar who coined the term intertextuality in

⁹⁹ Conte, *Rhetoric of Imitation*, 24. Note, however, that within cognitive linguistics the differences between denotation and connotation have been all but erased (see Tomasz P. Krzeszowski, “Connotation and Denotation,” in *Reference in Multidisciplinary Perspective: Philosophical Object, Cognitive Subject, Intersubjective Process* [ed. Richard A. Geiger; Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1995], 363–373).

¹⁰⁰ Ziva Ben-Porat, “The Poetics of Literary Allusion,” *PTL: A Journal for Descriptive Poetics and Theory of Literature* 1 (1976): 105–128.

¹⁰¹ Ben-Porat, “Poetics of Literary Allusion,” 108.

¹⁰² Ellen van Wolde, “Trendy Intertextuality?” in *Intertextuality in Biblical Writings: Essays in Honour of Bas van Iersel* (ed. Sipke Draisma; Kampen: Kok, 1989), 48.

¹⁰³ Wolde, “Trendy Intertextuality?” 48.

¹⁰⁴ Wolde, “Trendy Intertextuality?” 48.

the first place, namely Julia Kristeva. It is not her original definition of the term that is of most interest in the present context,¹⁰⁵ however, but her later reformulation of it at a time when she herself expressed the need to abandon the term “intertextuality” in favour of “transposition,” because she felt that the former term had “often been understood in the banal sense of ‘study of sources.’”¹⁰⁶ According to her reformulation of the concept in *Revolution in Poetic Language*, intertextuality should rather be understood as the “transposition of one (or several) sign system(s) into another,”¹⁰⁷ in a way that “implies the abandonment of a former sign system, the passage to a second via an instinctual intermediary common to the two systems, and the articulation of the new system with its new representability.”¹⁰⁸

However, while Kristeva’s notion of intertextuality sticks to the level of the “sign-systems” and does not allow for the importance of either authorial or readerly interpretation,¹⁰⁹ those theories of intertextuality that come closest to the concerns of current cognitive theory are those which focus on the reader. As Joseph Pucci points out, a theory like that of Ben-Porat amounts to “a strong claim for an empowered reader.”¹¹⁰ In such approaches, the process of intertextuality is located in readers’

¹⁰⁵ For Kristeva’s original formulation of intertextuality, see Julia Kristeva, “Le mot, le dialogue et le roman,” in *Σημειωτική: Recherches pour une sémanalyse* (Paris: Seuil, 1969), 143–173, or the English translation, “Word, Dialogue, and Novel,” in *Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art* (ed. Leon S. Roudiez; trans. Thomas Gora, et al.; New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 64–91.

¹⁰⁶ Julia Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language* (trans. Margaret Waller; New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 60. Despite Kristeva’s change of term, however, the term intertextuality “remains, nearly a quarter of a century later, an important part of the fabric of contemporary terminology, used indiscriminately by students of allusion of every stripe and critical inclination,” as Joseph Pucci puts it (Pucci, *Full-Knowing Reader*, 15).

¹⁰⁷ Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language*, 59–60.

¹⁰⁸ Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language*, 60. The number of different terms that have been employed to describe similar notions of transfer between and combination of textual and extra-textual sign systems is quite bewildering. Claes Schaar, for instance, launched a highly complicated theory of vertical context systems (Schaar, “Linear Sequence,” 377–388), while Udo Hebel has preferred the metaphor of text archaeology in order to describe his notion of the scholarly interpretation of allusions (Udo J. Hebel, “Towards a Descriptive Poetics of *Allusion*,” in *Intertextuality* [ed. Heinrich F. Plett; Research in Text Theory 15; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991], 135–164). Among the multitude of other terms are hypertextuality, metatextuality, paratextuality and transtextuality. A convenient glossary can be found in Allen, *Intertextuality*, 210–221.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. the critique in Børtnes, “Rhetoric and Mental Images,” 46–47.

¹¹⁰ Pucci, *Full-Knowing Reader*, 17.

minds, where production of meaning is regarded as a result of a dialogical interplay between two or more texts. “Meaning arises when two or more texts are brought together in the understanding of a reader,” as George Aichele puts it,¹¹¹ and meaning produced in this way can never be pre-determined and will always be subject to change. Pucci himself comes particularly close to the perspective of the present study in his own study of allusion. In Pucci’s words, “It is at the point of mental connection that the allusion is created—and only at this point. To claim otherwise is, in my view, to replace an essentially autonomous creative act on the part of the reader with a paradigm in which that act is distorted, hidden, or subsumed.”¹¹²

1.5.1. *Intertextual Blending*

By now it should be apparent that the abovementioned notions of intertextuality lend themselves easily to be rephrased and restated within a cognitive poetics framework. We have seen how Ziva Ben-Porat in the mid-seventies conceived of the intertextual patterns created by means of literary allusions, and also how van Wolde’s concept of the actualisation of intertextual relationships comes very close to Blending Theory’s notion of the blending of mental spaces.¹¹³ Van Wolde’s view of intertextuality in the late eighties thus seems especially close to contemporary views within cognitive poetics.¹¹⁴ The same may also be said of Conte’s

¹¹¹ George Aichele, *The Control of Biblical Meaning: Canon as Semiotic Mechanism* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press, 2001), 18.

¹¹² Pucci, *Full-Knowing Reader*, 36. Pucci even refers to an “allusive space,” which he describes as a “mental place where the allusion is made to mean,” a concept that turns out to be rather similar to Blending Theory’s notion of the blended space. As Pucci describes it, the “allusive space” “exists apart from the referential and significative control of the language that gives rise to it. So, too, are the meanings that arise in it unique, because they result from an interpretive free-play on the part of the reader, as the dissonances of two discrete works are mediated in the give and take of a mental, interpretive dialogue. As it turns out, that dialogue may extend to places and topics that have nothing at all to do with the two works that constitute the allusion, whose language nonetheless occasions their articulation, if only momentarily. This dialogue ensures that the reader assumes complete interpretive power over the allusive moment—and at the expense of the author, whose power evanesces” (ibid., 43).

¹¹³ For the relationship between possible worlds theory and mental space theory, see Semino, “Possible Worlds”.

¹¹⁴ It is worthy of note that she has recently edited a book on the use of cognitive perspectives in scriptural exegesis, Ellen van Wolde, ed., *Job 28: Cognition in Context* (Biblical Interpretation 64; Leiden: Brill, 2003).

emphasis on the centrality of the evocation of thoughts for the function of both allusions and metaphors.¹¹⁵

Ziva Ben-Porat conceived of the interplay that is established between texts through the use of allusions in terms of the dialogical relationship between two independent spaces. Using terminology borrowed from Conceptual Metaphor Theory we may refer to each of the texts in this relationship as the source and the target texts respectively, each representing its own domain. However, since, as Ben-Porat noted in her article, the intertextual relationship works both ways,¹¹⁶ causing a reinterpretation of both the alluding (target) text and the evoked (source) text, Conceptual Metaphor Theory is structurally too simple to be suited to conceptualise this kind of relationship. Blending Theory, on the other hand, is ideally suited to model what Ben-Porat described in terms of intertextual patterning, and the unpredictable production of meaning that arises from it.¹¹⁷ Conte's assertion that in both metaphor and allusion, "the poetry lies in the simultaneous presence of two different realities that try to indicate a single reality,"¹¹⁸ is clearly in line with the focus and interests of Blending Theory.

We have seen that Blending Theory may prove to be a powerful tool in the interpretation of conceptual blends, whether they be metaphorical, counterfactual, or otherwise. It is thus all the more surprising that Blending Theory has so far hardly been applied to the analysis of allusions or other kinds of intertextual relations. Peter Stockwell and Eve Sweetser have indeed suggested the possibility of doing so, but few have so far answered the call.¹¹⁹

Where Blending Theory usually operates with mental spaces that arise on the basis of domains or ICMs, which may thus aptly be termed *conceptual* blending, I suggest that we may also regard memories of texts

¹¹⁵ See Conte, *Rhetoric of Imitation*, 38.

¹¹⁶ Ben-Porat, "Poetics of Literary Allusion," 114 n. 9.

¹¹⁷ In addition, it also fits well with the fact that, in her theory as well, although she uses different terms, the blended space may recruit structure from the intertextual input spaces that lie outside of the actual allusive device or signal used to activate them.

¹¹⁸ Conte, *Rhetoric of Imitation*, 38.

¹¹⁹ See Stockwell, *Cognitive Poetics*, 126–127; Eve Sweetser, "Whose Rhyme is Whose Reason? Sound and Sense in *Cyrano de Bergerac*," *Language and Literature* 15:1 (2006): 29–54. A notable step in this direction is constituted by Michael Burke, "Literature as Parable," in *Cognitive Poetics in Practice* (ed. Joanna Gavins and Gerard Steen; London: Routledge, 2003), 115–128. Building mainly on M. Turner, *The Literary Mind*, Burke prefers the term "parabolic projection" and does not operationalise his notion of intertextuality in terms of a fully developed Blending Theory.

that are brought to the mind of a reader as mental spaces and that we may use the methodological framework of Blending Theory to model the mental connections and integration that takes place between such mental spaces in the act of interpretation. I will refer to such interpretive processes involving the combination and connection between memories of texts as *intertextual* blending. With both conceptual and intertextual blending what we are modelling are the mental interpretive processes of combining and creating connections between mental spaces that become active in working memory, cued by sensory input derived from reading or hearing the texts under scrutiny. In both cases we may have integration networks that are single-, double-, or multiple-scope, with a potentially infinite number of input spaces. Moreover, since they are all mental spaces, we may also have hybrid integration networks that include both conceptual and intertextual input spaces. Intertextuality, then, will here be modelled as the recollection, construction,¹²⁰ and combination of memories of large and small pieces of texts and discourses—memories that when called upon constitute mental input spaces that are recruited to integration networks and blended in the process of interpretation.

Complex intertextual relations, such as those represented by the phenomenon of composite allusions, seem to be especially suited to be subjected to a blending analysis, given Blending Theory's provision for analyses of complex blends with multiple input spaces. These intertextual input spaces may, as I conceive it, be cued by literary and non-literary texts alike¹²¹—the latter including actions and performances such as rituals and ritual processes. Allusions and metaphorical expressions may then be regarded as triggers that facilitate the recruitment of mental spaces based on memories and knowledge of texts and concepts alike to an integration network and a process of blending.

As I have tried to show here, Blending Theory seems ideally suited to be used as an analytical tool with regard to intertextual relations as well as to metaphors and other instances of conceptual blending. The kind of wide-ranging and detailed application of Blending Theory to the analysis of intertextuality proposed here, which I will refer to as *intertextual blending*, has, to my knowledge, not previously been attempted.

¹²⁰ For the interpretive and constructive aspects of memory recall, see, e.g., Daniel L. Schacter, *Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the Past* (New York: Basic Books, 1996); Antonio R. Damasio, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York: Putnam, 1994).

¹²¹ Cf. Ben-Porat, "Poetics of Literary Allusion," 108 n. 5.

An important advantage of a Blending Theory approach to intertextuality over many traditional approaches is its synchronous rather than diachronous focus. This means that it places itself far from the kind of “source criticism approach” that compelled Kristeva to abandon the term “intertextuality” in favour of “transposition.” Approached from the perspective of Blending Theory, inferences are not unidirectional, from an earlier text to a later one, but they are rather synchronous in the interpretation of a reader.

1.6. *Conclusion*

In the Nag Hammadi texts we often encounter highly complex conceptual blends, and we frequently witness how such blends are shifted and turned on their heads, so to speak, as similar Conceptual Integration Networks, with shifting contextual frames or different emphases, are juxtaposed or integrated with one another. At other times, new input spaces are added to existing networks while others fade into the background, often to reappear and become foregrounded again at a later stage in the text.¹²²

Such complex interpretive problems seem to justify the need for a flexible and comprehensive overarching theory of interpretation in order to tackle the challenges posed by such complex literary creations. Blending Theory promises to provide us with such a framework.¹²³ Not only may theories of allusion and intertextuality, and cognitive theories of metaphor be incorporated rather smoothly within the framework of Blending Theory, but the latter may also contribute substantially to the former theories with its added flexibility and theoretical sophistication. In my view, Blending Theory clearly has much to offer in terms of greater theoretical specificity and clarity in cases of complex metaphors and composite intertextual allusions, features that are so common in the literary works from the Nag Hammadi Codices.

¹²² For an application of notions of foregrounding, or “figure” and “ground,” in cognitive poetic analysis, see Peter Stockwell, “Surreal Figures,” in *Cognitive Poetics in Practice* (ed. Joanna Gavins and Gerard Steen; London: Routledge, 2003), 13–25.

¹²³ In the words of Todd Oakley, “what makes conceptual blending so promising as a general model of cognitive framing is its ability to handle metadiscourse structures as well as discourse, sentential, lexical, and referential structures” (Todd V. Oakley, “Conceptual Blending, Narrative Discourse, and Rhetoric,” *Cognitive Linguistics* 9:4 [1998]: 334).

The problems of knowing the extent to which different mental spaces are utilised in any one (person's) interpretation of a text stem from the impossibility of knowing the mental constitution of other people, and especially those far removed from ourselves in time, space, language, and culture. We therefore have to deal with probabilities at best, and often with mere possibilities. I suggest, however, that we may use Blending Theory as an analytical tool with which we may experiment with different input spaces in modelling possible interpretations of the texts in question. The results may then be evaluated according to the degree to which they provide us with overall interpretations that seem plausible on the basis of relevant criteria. So, while it may be necessary to abandon any hopes of reaching definitive answers, we have at least an analytical tool that enables us to outline interpretive possibilities. It is the mapping of such potential interpretations in the two selected tractates from the Nag Hammadi Codices that is the focus of the following chapters.

With regard to the integration network diagrams that are used throughout this study it is important to keep in mind what they are and what they are not. The diagrams should be seen as analytical tools and as a supplement to the verbal exposition of the texts. They are definitely not to be regarded as self-sufficient, or as providing a complete picture of any process of blending. Rather, they must be regarded as being akin to snapshots of mental processes of blending that focus on certain aspects and disregard others. Such a diagram can never capture such a process in its entirety and is not to be understood on its own apart from the verbal exposition. The necessity of using such diagrams as analytical tools, and of showing explicitly the Conceptual Integration Networks in the analyses of *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.*, stems from the fact that we as modern scholars do not have the same frames of reference, the same concepts or intertexts present in our heads (in memory) when reading these Nag Hammadi texts as those who read them in antiquity did. It therefore proves helpful in our analysis and exposition of the texts to make explicit the possible blends that may have been automatically triggered when the texts were read by various ancient readers.

2. INTERPRETIVE CONTEXTS AND COMMUNITIES

“It is a commonplace of literary criticism,” Margaret Freeman points out, “that one of the defining characteristics of literature is its ability

to generate multiple meanings and interpretations.”¹²⁴ Although literary critics, and, I might add, interpreters of the Nag Hammadi texts, “are adept at producing such readings, readings which are often insightful and illuminating,” Freeman rightly notes that they “tend to assume rather than explore the principles and the processes by which such multiplicity occurs.”¹²⁵ Blending Theory, however, not only shows us that a multiplicity of possible meanings is an inevitable outcome of interpretive processes, but it also shows us how and why this is the case. The fact that it goes unnoticed most of the time is “a function of the availability of certain frames through defaults, contexts, or culture,” as Fauconnier and Turner put it.¹²⁶ Now, what are the constraints and influences that guide such interpretive processes?

2.1. *Authorial Intention and the Role of the Reader*

In the words of Margaret Freeman, “literary texts are the products of cognizing minds and their interpretations the products of other cognizing minds in the context of the physical and sociocultural worlds in which they have been created and read.”¹²⁷ It should not be necessary to point out that there are differences between these various minds and their respective contexts. Surprisingly, however, Fauconnier and Turner do not address the question of where the process of blending is actually considered to occur. Is it in the author, the reader, or in the text itself? In Fauconnier and Turner’s work this is kept rather vague, but most often they seem to assume that the blends simply exist in the texts or artworks that they analyse. However, as literary theorists have repeatedly stressed, questions regarding the relationship between author, text, and reader are neither easy nor trivial.

For one thing, there is the old thorny question of authorial intention. Are the Conceptual Integration Networks we identify to be regarded as the intended products of empirical authors, or do we regard them as arising from the “texts themselves,” or as products of the reader(s), and if so, which reader(s)?

¹²⁴ Freeman, “Poetry,” 253.

¹²⁵ Freeman, “Poetry,” 253.

¹²⁶ Fauconnier and Turner, “Polysemy and Conceptual Blending,” 83.

¹²⁷ Freeman, “Poetry,” 253.

Recognising this shortcoming in the theories of Fauconnier & Turner and others, Tim Rohrer addresses the question in a recent article.¹²⁸ Rohrer suggests that we ought to operate with different Conceptual Integration Networks for the author and the reader. Arguing convincingly for the need among blending theorists to “make explicit the contents of precisely whose head or heads they are claiming to model,” Rohrer presents a model of “space-swapping” between the authorial and the interpretive networks. Basically, what he suggests is that what counts as a blended space from the author’s perspective should be regarded as an input space from the perspective of the reader. It follows from this approach that, although we may speculate as much as we want, as interpreters we will never be able to ascertain the extent and nature of the authorial blending process, but will only ever have access to the interpretive side of things. The only authorial intention we can speak of, the only intentionality that is reachable to any reader, will be the one created in a reader’s mind in order to make sense of the text as it is read, which may or may not correspond to the intentions of the empirical author.

The notion of authorial intentionality still has an important role to play, however. Not only may we speculate as to the possible nature of the authorial blending network, but the hypothetical authorial intention that is constructed in the mind of the reader should also be regarded as a powerful cognitive model that is used in the interpretation of the text. Raymond Gibbs points out the centrality of this, stating that

the meaning of a text is generated by hypothesizing intentions authors might have had, given the context of creation, rather than relying on or trying to seek out the author’s subjective intentions. Readers’ interpretations of texts depend on their inferences about a hypothetical author founded in the linguistic conventions and artistic practices at the time the author wrote the work, as well as in publicly available knowledge of how the text was created. A work might display a multiplicity of meanings given the large set of intentions readers can hypothesize about an author and the conditions under which a work was written. This multiplicity of meanings is perfectly appropriate to propose, even if the actual author intended only a single interpretation for a text.¹²⁹

¹²⁸ Tim Rohrer, “Mimesis, Artistic Inspiration and the Blends We Live By,” *Journal of Pragmatics* 37:10 (2005): 1686–1716.

¹²⁹ Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., *Intentions in the Experience of Meaning* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 262. See Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., “Authorial Intentions in Text Understanding,” *Discourse Processes* 32:1 (2001): 76 for a virtually identical statement.

Thus, some kind of intentionality—whether we refer to it as that of the author, real or implied, or as that of the “text itself” in one version or another—will always be constructed by the reader of a text in order to make sense of it. This readerly constructed intentionality is, of course, subject to change in the course of the process of reading and re-reading the text, for no interpretation will ever be stable, as contexts may change and new input spaces may always be introduced, causing our mental blended spaces to shift in ways that will always to some extent be less than predictable.

2.2. *The Function and Effects of Context*

How do we recognise a metaphor when we see one? Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Blending Theory are powerful theories of metaphor interpretation, but they do not explain how metaphorical expressions, or other kinds of figurative language, may actually be identified as such. Indeed, several scholars have challenged the notion that we should, or even can, distinguish between metaphorical and literal statements or utterances at all. The “commonsense dichotomy between ‘literal’ and ‘figurative’ is a psychological illusion,”¹³⁰ states Mark Turner. Patrick Colm Hogan has recently argued in favour of the dismissal of the dichotomy, stating that

cognitive principles indicate that this is a misguided question. In a cognitive framework, there is nothing about a sentence, divorced from human minds, that would make it literal or metaphorical, or meaningful in any way. Meaning is just a function of cognitive processing, whether that of a speaker, a listener, a writer, or a reader. Put differently, there is no such thing as a metaphorical—or, for that matter, literal—statement *per se*. Rather, there are only literal and metaphorical intents and literal and metaphorical interpretations or, more technically, literal and metaphorical generative processes and literal and metaphorical interpretive processes.¹³¹

Hogan distinguishes between what he calls a demarcation criterion and a decision criterion when it comes to metaphor identification. The former of these two is a criterion for distinguishing between literal and metaphorical statements, and the latter is a criterion for determining

¹³⁰ Mark Turner, “Figure,” in *Figurative Language and Thought* (ed. Albert N. Katz, et al.; Counterpoints: Cognition, Memory, and Language; New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 60.

¹³¹ Hogan, *Cognitive Science*, 91.

when to interpret an expression metaphorically or literally. He concludes that what distinguishes literal from metaphorical interpretation is “not a matter of the terms themselves, nor of any specific part of their lexical structure or properties, nor of the relations between these structures or properties. Rather, it is a matter of our presumption regarding the transfer of source properties to the target.”¹³² From this demarcation criterion Hogan deduces that a “decision criterion” does not exist. He notes that many theorists have mistaken their demarcation criteria for decision criteria, and points out that his own proposed demarcation criterion “cannot serve as a decision criterion, because it concerns interpretive assumptions, not objective properties of or objective relations between the source and the target.”¹³³

So, if we grant that the decision on whether to understand a statement metaphorically or literally depends on the reader, we need to take a look at what guides the reader’s interpretation. According to Hogan, “you can’t tell a metaphor by looking at it.”¹³⁴ Instead, “we choose a metaphorical or literal interpretation on the basis of a wide range of empirical factors—knowledge of the speaker, of the situation, of common usage, et cetera—in connection with general concerns for logical consistency and explanatory simplicity.”¹³⁵ This is true even with regard to statements that seem to be obviously metaphorical, since even these “may be intended literally in a relevant context.”¹³⁶ Context is thus of primary importance. According to Seana Coulson,

context-free expression meaning is an illusion based on the use of defaults. Instead, understanding language utterances involves integrating linguistic, contextual, and background knowledge to yield cognitive models with which to incorporate the content of expressions and their implications for the interpretation of the larger speech activity.¹³⁷

So, context is of central importance in any decision on whether language should be regarded as metaphorical or not. Often, however, it is not a case of an either/or situation. Put in terms of Blending Theory, “the

¹³² Hogan, *Cognitive Science*, 91.

¹³³ Hogan, *Cognitive Science*, 92.

¹³⁴ Hogan, *Cognitive Science*, 92.

¹³⁵ Hogan, *Cognitive Science*, 92.

¹³⁶ Hogan, *Cognitive Science*, 92.

¹³⁷ Coulson, “Semantic Leaps,” 294. More recently, this concern with the importance of context has resulted in Coulson and Oakley incorporating a separate “grounding box” in their conceptual integration diagrams (see Seana Coulson and Todd Oakley, “Blending and Coded Meaning: Literal and Figurative Meaning in Cognitive Semantics,” *Journal of Pragmatics* 37:10 [2005]: 1510–1536).

unpacking possibilities offered by the blended space will depend on what is already active in the context of communication.”¹³⁸ A linguistic expression, according to Fauconnier,

does not have a meaning in itself; rather, it has a *meaning potential*, and it is only within a complete discourse and in context that meaning will actually be produced. The unfolding of discourse brings into play complex cognitive constructions. They include the setting up of internally structured domains linked to each other by connectors; this is effected on the basis of linguistic, contextual, and situational clues. Grammatical clues, although crucial to the building process, are in themselves insufficient to determine it.¹³⁹

One of the main obstacles facing us in the interpretation of historical documents like those of the Nag Hammadi Codices, however, lies in the fact that we have no certain knowledge of their historical context(s). For us, the Nag Hammadi tractates must be regarded as utterances that have been removed from their original contexts. However, no interpretation is ever context-free. Coulson, as we saw, calls it an illusion, and as Eve Sweetser points out, “we can only actually interpret complex linguistic forms by constructing some possible use or uses of those forms to convey meaning.”¹⁴⁰ This observation holds true not only with regard to small-scale lexical units, but with regard to any kind of interpretation. When context is lacking, we, as readers, automatically provide it, consciously and subconsciously, in the process of interpretation, for “in reading, we assimilate what we read to the schemata of what we already know. The more we know the more we understand, and we project what we know to construct a world suggested by the text,”¹⁴¹ in Keith Oatley’s apt formulation.

2.2.1. *The Identification and Interpretation of Allusions*

As already mentioned, an allusion is “a phenomenon that some reader or readers may fail to observe.”¹⁴² In terms of cognitive theory this means that, in the same way as a metaphor may also be interpreted strictly literally, by interpreting the source input without blending it with a target, a potential intertextual trigger in a text may or may not be activated and

¹³⁸ Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 333.

¹³⁹ Fauconnier, *Mappings*, 37–38.

¹⁴⁰ Sweetser, “Compositionality and Blending,” 137.

¹⁴¹ Oatley, “Writing and reading,” 166.

¹⁴² Miner, “Allusion,” 39.

call up the intertextual input space of an evoked text to an integration network where it is blended with the alluding text in a reading and understanding of the latter.¹⁴³

Another issue that concerns the interpretation of both metaphors and allusions is the question of “how far the meaning of a text goes,” to quote Leo Noordman.¹⁴⁴ “How minimalistic or maximalistic does one conceive the linguistic meaning to be; how much inferences are part of the meaning of a text ...?”¹⁴⁵ How do we evaluate the existence and relevance of allusions, and the extent to which we should utilise the intertext in our interpretation of the alluding text? And how do we know whether to understand a potentially metaphorical expression metaphorically or not, and on what levels to interpret it?

From the perspective of the model proposed here, it seems evident that no clear-cut answers to these questions may ever be given. Meaning is produced in the mind of the reader, who draws on his or her own knowledge and memories in a production of meaning that relies fundamentally upon the reader’s own, often subconscious, recruitment of mental spaces. “The writer offers a kit of parts, or a set of cues. The reader does the construction,” as Keith Oatley puts it.¹⁴⁶

2.3. *Canon and Interpretation*

In Early Christian controversies over orthodoxy and heresy, disagreement over interpretation was a central point of contention, as proper belief and practice were intimately connected with correct interpretation of Scripture. Although there was no agreement on the exact delineation of the corpus of texts to be regarded as authoritative, more often than not controversy revolved around different meanings produced by different readers reading the same texts. Manlio Simonetti argues that “the study of Holy Scripture was the real foundation of Christian culture in the Church of the earliest centuries.”¹⁴⁷ However, Scripture is, as Simon-

¹⁴³ See Ben-Porat, “Poetics of Literary Allusion,” 114–115. See also Carmela Perri, “On Alluding,” *Poetics* 7 (1978): 295, 300.

¹⁴⁴ Leo Noordman, “Some Reflections on the Relation Between Cognitive Linguistics and Exegesis,” in *Job 28: Cognition in Context* (ed. Ellen van Wolde; Biblical Interpretation 64; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 332.

¹⁴⁵ Noordman, “Some Reflections,” 332.

¹⁴⁶ Oatley, “Writingandreading,” 166.

¹⁴⁷ Manlio Simonetti, *Biblical Interpretation in the Early Church: An Historical Introduction to Patristic Exegesis* (trans. John A. Hughes; ed. Anders Bergquist and Markus Bockmuehl; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 2.

etti points out, “a complex of writings diverse in subject matter, form, and date, and sometimes inaccessible for various reasons, so that the effective knowledge and use of them by Christians was not obvious, but required a notably complex effort of interpretation.”¹⁴⁸

In these interpretive processes the function of the concept of canon was crucial. I here understand canon, with George Aichele, as “a collection or list of authoritative writings, as accepted by some group of readers.”¹⁴⁹ A canon, Aichele argues, “arises from the need to control the understanding of written texts,” Scripture being an especially pertinent example.¹⁵⁰ Once established, a canon tends to obscure the individual canonical texts’ aspects of incoherence and open-endedness, thus mutually strengthening their apparent completeness.¹⁵¹ According to Lee Martin McDonald, an important feature of writings that were regarded as authoritative Scripture in early Christianity was that they were “believed to be *internally self-consistent* and not self-contradictory,”¹⁵² a point that is illustrated well by Justin Martyr, stating in his debate with Trypho the Jew that if someone showed him a Scripture that seemed to contradict another,

since I am entirely convinced that no scripture contradicts another, I shall admit rather that I do not understand what is recorded, and shall strive to persuade those who imagine that the scriptures are contradictory to be rather of the same opinion as myself. (Justin, *Dial.* 65, ANF 1:230)

This passage says a great deal about the presuppositions guiding Justin’s interpretation of Scripture. In Justin’s mind, Scripture, by its very nature,

¹⁴⁸ Simonetti, *Biblical Interpretation*, 1.

¹⁴⁹ George Aichele, *Sign, Text, Scripture: Semiotics and the Bible* (Interventions 1; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 127. However much some texts try to present themselves as being self-evidently authoritative (see, e.g., Rev 22:6–10, 18–19), canonical status is not an intrinsic quality of a text, but a status bestowed upon it by a community of interpreters (see Aichele, *Sign, Text, Scripture*, 128; Aichele, *The Control of Biblical Meaning*, 2, 7–9, 15). For the concept of interpretive communities, see Stanley Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980) and the discussion below.

¹⁵⁰ Aichele, *Sign, Text, Scripture*, 127–128.

¹⁵¹ See Aichele, *Sign, Text, Scripture*, 129.

¹⁵² Lee Martin McDonald, “Identifying Scripture and Canon in the Early Church: The Criteria Question,” in *The Canon Debate* (ed. Lee Martin McDonald and James A. Sanders; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2002), 421; the emphasis is that of McDonald. See also John Barton, *Holy Writings, Sacred Text: The Canon in Early Christianity* (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 154–155; Joseph T. Lienhard, “2001 NAPS Presidential Address: The Christian Reception of the Pentateuch: Patristic Commentaries on the Books of Moses,” *J ECS* 10:3 (2002): 387.

cannot be self-contradictory, and therefore can, and must, be brought into harmony through exegesis. What consequences does such a view of Scripture have for the exegesis of Scriptural texts?

If it is held that no canonical text contradicts another, then it follows that each constituent text in the canon can legitimately be drawn upon in the reading of any of the others, to fill in gaps and to resolve apparent contradictions. The canonisation of a group of texts thus not only defines a corpus of authoritative texts, but in so doing also delineates a group of legitimate intertexts that are sanctioned to mutually reinforce each other and through which any of its constituent texts are supposed to be understood.¹⁵³ Since the canonised texts are believed to contain basically the same message, readers are consequently encouraged to play the canonical texts against each other, and in this way canon limits interpretive creativity and stimulates it at the same time.¹⁵⁴ However, considering the great diversity of scope, style, and content, even among the texts that were accepted as authoritative by a majority of early Christian communities, each individual text could not carry equal weight. We therefore find that interpreters operated, at least implicitly, with a concept of a “canon within the canon,” facilitating the use of more authoritative texts as hermeneutical keys for the explication of less authoritative ones within the canonical corpus.¹⁵⁵

A canon thus controls which texts are legitimately to be considered as authoritative Scripture, sanctioning authoritative intertexts to the reading and interpretation of each of the texts incorporated within it, estab-

¹⁵³ Cf. Aichele, *The Control of Biblical Meaning*, 2.

¹⁵⁴ See Aichele, *Sign, Text, Scripture*, 132; Aichele, *The Control of Biblical Meaning*, 12.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. e.g., Origen, who explicitly utilised passages from other canonical writings as “midwives” to bring forth what he considered to be the correct meaning of difficult Scriptural passages. For Origen’s techniques of scriptural interpretation, see, e.g., Mark Julian Edwards, *Origen Against Plato* (Ashgate Studies in Philosophy and Theology in Late Antiquity; Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 123–158; John J. O’Keefe, “Scriptural Interpretation,” in *The Westminster Handbook to Origen* (ed. John Anthony McGuckin; Westminster Handbooks to Christian Theology; Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 193–197; Mark Sheridan, “Scripture,” in *The Westminster Handbook to Origen* (ed. John Anthony McGuckin; Westminster Handbooks to Christian Theology; Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 197–201; Karen Jo Torjesen, “‘Body,’ ‘Soul,’ and ‘Spirit’ in Origen’s Theory of Exegesis,” *ATHR* 67:1 (1985): 17–30; Morwenna Ludlow, “Theology and Allegory: Origen and Gregory of Nyssa on the Unity and Diversity of Scripture,” *International Journal of Systematic Theology* 4:1 (2002): 45–66; Henri de Lubac, *History and Spirit: The Understanding of Scripture According to Origen* (trans. Anne Englund Nash; San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007).

lishing “an intertextual network that provides a reading context through which any of its component texts can be understood correctly.”¹⁵⁶ It is important to note, however, that this effect does not rely on a *fixed* canon. All that is required is an at least implicit understanding within a given interpretive community of a group of texts being individually and collectively authoritative.

It should thus be evident that we may describe the functions of the concept of a canon in processes of interpretation in terms of how it influences the mechanics of intertextual blending. A good example of this is constituted by how very different narratives of the nativity of Christ in Matthew and Luke have been commonly interpreted in Christian tradition. As Raymond Brown has remarked, “commentators of times past have harmonized these different details into a consecutive narrative, so that the ordinary Christian is often not even aware of a difficulty when Lucan shepherds and Matthean magi fraternize in the Christmas crib scene.”¹⁵⁷ Since both accounts are part of the biblical canon, and thus share the generic property of canonicity, they are regarded by default as equally true, and there is consequently a certain pressure upon the reader to harmonise or integrate the two accounts with each other. Rather than interpreting the differences between them as contradictions, the two stories are understood together, being blended in readers’ minds, and the resulting blend eventually becomes entrenched in the collective memory of the community.¹⁵⁸

The description of the basic mechanics of this intertextual blend is valid with regard to the analysis of any interpretation within a canonical framework, where elements of two or more texts are brought together and blended in the act of interpretation. This means anything from isolated elements of one canonical text being brought to bear on elements of another, to more wide-ranging megablends. We will see this amply illustrated when we turn to the analysis of *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* in chapters 3 and 4.

¹⁵⁶ Aichele, *The Control of Biblical Meaning*, 2.

¹⁵⁷ Raymond E. Brown, *The Birth of the Messiah: A Commentary on the Infancy Narratives in Matthew and Luke* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1977), 35. See Matt 2:1–12; Luke 2:1–20.

¹⁵⁸ See fig. 3 for this intertextual integration network. For a complete Blending Theory analysis of the traditional harmonised reading of the nativity accounts of Matthew and Luke, see Hugo Lundhaug, “Canon and Interpretation: A Cognitive Perspective,” in *Canon and Canonicity: The Formation and Use of Scripture* (ed. Einar Thomassen; Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanums Forlag, 2010), 67–90.

In light of Blending Theory, the function of the concept of a canon in the interpretation of a given text can be conceived of as one of restricting the number of available intertexts as sources for the projection of input spaces to an interpretive blend, shutting out those texts that are explicitly rejected as heretical, while at the same time rendering the canonical texts salient. One might say that the canonical texts will be predisposed for priming and subsequent activation in any reading of a canonical text, since any two canonical texts will share this generic category structure.¹⁵⁹

The fact that the elements and structure that make up the canon become closely linked in experience, and thus in people's memory, facilitates the priming and activation of related elements of the canon once one has been activated. References to the nativity story in Matthew, for example, thus give easy mental access to the one in Luke. The Christian canon of Scripture is without doubt a graded and in many ways radial concept (albeit with complex internal links and structures). As we have seen, not all of its constituent texts are of equal importance, and some texts are more closely linked than others. The level of priming and activation displays certain prototype effects. When the canon is brought to mind in a general sense, one is not likely to think first and foremost of a text like Jude or Second Peter, but rather of the Gospels or central Pauline texts like Romans or First Corinthians, and of Genesis and Isaiah rather than the minor prophets. In this sense, canon functions as an ICM. Thus, the texts that are most central to the canon are more easily primed by a general activation of the cognitive model than the less central ones. There are, as we have seen, canons within the canon.

2.4. *The Function of Creeds and Rules of Faith in Interpretation*

The reader who accepts the canonical status of a text and reads it within the canonical framework will inevitably regard all the texts belonging to the canon as intentional expressions of the same overall meaning. As mentioned above, no interpretation will ever be stable, however, as new input spaces may always be introduced and the cross-space projections altered, with often less than predictable results. The process is inherently dynamic and, in a broad sense, context dependent.

¹⁵⁹ As mentioned above, canonicity is an important component of the generic space in such an integration network, and this feature of the generic space facilitates the recruitment of further texts having the same generic structure, i.e., other canonical texts, as input spaces in the network.

Aichele argues that a “community’s desire for a canon is desire for a text that conveys truly an essential, authoritative message and that controls the interpretation of that message.”¹⁶⁰ This, however, is a desire that will never be satisfied. No matter how firm the canonical delineation of authoritative texts becomes, interpretation will never be guided solely by the texts on the inside of the canon, or solely by the canon as meta-text, for it is clear that the canonical texts can be interpreted in a wide variety of ways by people who share the same, or broadly the same, canon. Thus, in order to control the interpretation of Scripture, additional measures are needed, and it is evident that Christian communities felt the need from a very early stage, long before the eventual closure of the canon, to establish certain extra-canonical checks and balances in order to safeguard acceptable interpretation. Doctrinal statements of varying complexity were accordingly codified in increasingly important creeds and rules of faith.¹⁶¹ In terms of Blending Theory, such doctrinal checks and balances may be conceived of as additional interpretive frames that exclude certain readings and facilitate others, but, importantly, they may also be regarded as authoritative input spaces in their own right, that increasingly projected major elements of their own to the interpretive blends arising from the reading of Scriptural texts. Thus we also see how rules of faith or creeds cannot any more than the canon, or its individual constituent texts, interpret themselves, that is, control their own interpretation, since interpretation will always be a dynamic practice performed by human beings in particular contexts. And accordingly we may observe that the creeds themselves increasingly became subjects of commentary and interpretation.¹⁶² Viewed as new authoritative input spaces, then, it becomes clear that the establishment of such authoritative doctrinal formulations can only limit interpretation to a certain extent. Interpreters will be able to interpret Scripture in an infinite variety of ways, even while being in accordance with authoritative credal formulations.

¹⁶⁰ Aichele, *The Control of Biblical Meaning*, 2.

¹⁶¹ For the history of early Christian creeds, see J.N.D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds* (3rd ed.; London: Longman, 1972).

¹⁶² See, e.g., J.N.D. Kelly, *Rufinus: A Commentary on the Apostles’ Creed* (ACW 20; London: Longmans, 1955); Alphonse Mingana, *Commentary of Theodore of Mopsuestia on the Nicene Creed* (Woodbrooke Studies 5; Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, 1932).

2.5. *Interpretive Communities*

How can one then ultimately distinguish between right and wrong, or rather acceptable and unacceptable, readings? As Stanley Fish has pointed out, “while there are always mechanisms for ruling out readings, their source is not the text but the presently recognized interpretive strategies for producing the text.”¹⁶³ Fish’s focus on the function of interpretive communities as the locus of a text’s meaning thus provides us with an important corrective to a focus on the individual autonomous reader, and a promising point of departure for further inquiries into the social constraints upon interpretation, the function of institutional power structures, and the impact of struggles between various interpretive communities over the acceptable range of scriptural interpretation in early Christianity. As Fish has argued, “the fact of agreement, rather than being a proof of the stability of objects, is a testimony to the power of an interpretive community to constitute the objects upon which its members . . . can then agree.”¹⁶⁴ From this it follows, argues Fish, that “disagreements are not settled by the facts, but are the means by which the facts are settled. Of course, no such settling is final, and in the (almost certain) event that the dispute is opened again, the category of the facts ‘as they really are’ will be reconstituted in still another shape.”¹⁶⁵

Early Christian interpreters of Scripture were no exceptions to this rule. The understanding of texts were shaped by the needs and constraints of the individual interpreter’s social context. So, although there were mechanisms for ruling out readings, such as canons, creeds, and rules of faith, discussed above, these mechanisms were not grounded in the texts themselves, but in “the presently recognized interpretive strategies” for producing them.¹⁶⁶ As Bart Ehrman formulates it, following Fish,

to be sure, few readers realize that they are *generating* meanings from a text, that is, that they are employing culturally conditioned interpretive strategies to make sense of the words on a page. Interpretive strategies, according to the common assumption, are necessary only for ideologically slanted (i.e., biased) interpretations, not for understanding a text’s “common-sensical” or “obvious” meaning. But in point of fact, even com-

¹⁶³ Stanley Fish, “What Makes an Interpretation Acceptable?” in *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 347.

¹⁶⁴ Fish, “What Makes an Interpretation Acceptable?” 338.

¹⁶⁵ Fish, “What Makes an Interpretation Acceptable?” 338–339.

¹⁶⁶ See Fish, “What Makes an Interpretation Acceptable?” 347.

mon sense requires (by definition) a community of like-minded readers, a group of interpreters who share basic assumptions both about the world and about the process of understanding.¹⁶⁷

And in early Christianity there was, of course, not just a single interpretive community, but rather a great number of such communities and sub-communities, and from one or more of these communities stem the texts that are the focus of the present study, *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.*

2.6. Embodiment and Culture

A central idea of cognitive linguistics is the assumption that “conceptual organisation within the human mind is a function of the way our species-specific bodies interact with the environment we inhabit,” as Vyvyan Evans and Melanie Green put it.¹⁶⁸ The dominating perspective within the field is that human cognition is embodied, which means that there is a fundamental awareness of the fact that the way we perceive, think, and communicate is fundamentally grounded in embodied experience.¹⁶⁹ For, as Evans and Green point out, “we can only talk about what we can perceive and conceive, and the things that we can perceive and conceive derive from embodied experience.”¹⁷⁰ But what about the cultural side of things? Although the human body may be said to be basically universal in its constitution across cultures, this, of course, does not mean that the way the body and its processes are interpreted, or the way it is used, are universal.¹⁷¹ While “it is our embodied interaction with the world

¹⁶⁷ Bart D. Ehrman, *The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture: The Effect of Early Christological Controversies on the Text of the New Testament* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 30. See also Stanley Fish, “Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes Without Saying, and Other Special Cases,” in *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 268–292.

¹⁶⁸ Evans and Green, *Cognitive Linguistics*, 50.

¹⁶⁹ For the embodied view of cognition in cognitive linguistics, see, esp., Mark Johnson, *The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Mark Johnson and George Lakoff, “Why Cognitive Linguistics Requires Embodied Realism,” *Cognitive Linguistics* 13:3 (2002): 245–263; Gibbs et al., “Embodied Experience”.

¹⁷⁰ Evans and Green, *Cognitive Linguistics*, 46.

¹⁷¹ See Kövecses, *Metaphor in Culture*, 285. Kövecses argues that “it is simplistic to suggest that *universal aspects of the body necessarily lead to universal conceptualization*, and it is equally simplistic to suggest that *variation in culture excludes the possibility of universal conceptualization*” (ibid., 294; Kövecses’ emphasis).

that provides the basic shape of experiences, and our cognitive abilities that further abstract and schematize those basic shapes,” as Michele Emanatian puts it, these are, “of course, filtered through the culture we are part of.”¹⁷² By extension we may say that while the basic cognitive processes are universal, their applications are not.¹⁷³ That is to say that while the mechanics of thought are fundamentally human and embodied and the same across cultures, this does not mean that people think the same regardless of culture and context—far from it. Acknowledging the universal underlying mechanics of thought may, however, enable us to analyse the intellectual products and patterns of thought of peoples and cultures far removed from our own with an adequate degree of methodological clarity.

2.7. Conclusion

Cognitive poetics provides us with a means of analysis that, in the words of Margaret Freeman, “opens up the cognitive layers upon which a literary text is built and, in doing so, provides a reading that reveals the frame and structure of meaning that is endemic and central to the text itself. It makes explicit the cognitive skills we apply implicitly when we analyze literary texts.”¹⁷⁴ It is thus hoped that the use of the methodology outlined in this chapter will facilitate the exposition of the interpretive possibilities that are opened in a reading of the texts under scrutiny, and help illustrate the ways in which readers may produce meaning in their encounters with them. My intention in this study is not so much to find answers, as to highlight interpretive possibilities that may enable us to pose new questions. I would also like to stress the hypothetical nature of the quest to grasp the ways in which these texts were actually understood at the time when they were produced and read in antiquity, not to mention the intentions behind them, for as Stanley Fish has pointed out, “we are never not in the act of interpreting.”¹⁷⁵

¹⁷² Michele Emanatian, “Everyday Metaphors of Lust and Sex in Chagga,” *Ethos* 24:2 (1996): 224.

¹⁷³ See Kövecses, *Metaphor in Culture*, 286.

¹⁷⁴ Freeman, “Poetry,” 277.

¹⁷⁵ Fish, “Normal Circumstances,” 276.

CHAPTER THREE

“IN HER NATURE SHE IS A WOMAN”: THE FEMINISATION OF THE SOUL IN THE *EXEGESIS ON THE SOUL*

ΔΕΚΑΣ ΖΙΤῆΝΑΙ ΕΤΕΤΝΕΩΩΠΕ ἸΚΟΙΝΩΝΟΣ
ἸΠΤΕΦΥΣΙΣ ΕΤΟΥΔΑΒ ΕΑΤΕῆΠΩΤ ΕΒΟΛ
ἸΠΤΕΠΘΥΜΙΑ ἸΠΤΑΚΟ ΕΤῆΠΚΟΣΜΟΣ

(2 Pet 1:4)¹

1. INTRODUCTION

With a confidence now rarely found among scholars of Antiquity, Robert McL. Wilson could state in 1975 that “we today have no doubt of the original intention of Hosea, and of the meaning of his prophesies. Coming to the *Exegesis on the Soul* with that knowledge we are bound to regard it as something of an exegetical curiosity.”² It is this “exegetical curiosity,” the sixth tractate of Nag Hammadi Codex II, entitled the *Exegesis on the Soul* (τεζηγησις ετβετϣυχη),³ which is the subject of the present chapter. Using the theoretical framework outlined in chapter 2, I will here analyse *Exeg. Soul’s* interpretation and use of Scripture while making no claims with regard to the original intention of either the authors of the Scriptural texts or that of *Exeg. Soul*. itself.

¹ Horner, *Sahidic New Testament*.

² Robert McL. Wilson, “Old Testament Exegesis in the Gnostic *Exegesis on the Soul*,” in *Essays on the Nag Hammadi Texts: In Honour of Pahor Labib* (ed. Martin Krause; NHS 6; Leiden: Brill, 1975), 224.

³ *Exeg. Soul* is located between the tractates *Orig. World* and *Thom. Cont.* on pages 127.18–137.28 in Nag Hammadi Codex II. It is one of eight Nag Hammadi tractates to have a title at both its beginning and its end (see Jean-Daniel Dubois, “Les titres du Codex I [Jung] de Nag Hammadi,” in *La formation des canons scripturaires* [ed. Michel Tardieu; Patrimoines; Paris: Cerf, 1993], 221).

1.1. *Outline of the Narrative*

Exeg. Soul is in several ways a unique text among the Nag Hammadi tractates, especially with regard to its literary structure and composition, but also when it comes to its contents. It is a self-proclaimed exegesis,⁴ but one which is not presented in a straightforward manner. Instead we are treated to an allegorical⁵ exposition presented in the form of a mythical narrative interspersed with commentary, quotations, and more or less oblique allusions. The story focuses on the fallen soul, personified as a woman, and her repentance and redemption. In summary, the storyline

⁴ Cf. Martin Krause, “Die Sakramente in der ‘Exegese über die Seele,’” in *Les textes de Nag Hammadi: Colloque du Centre d’Histoire des Religions (Strasbourg, 23–25 octobre 1974)* (ed. Jacques-É. Ménard; NHS 7; Leiden: Brill, 1975), 49; Hans-Martin Schenke, “Sprachliche und exegetische Probleme in den beiden letzten Schriften des Codex II von Nag Hammadi,” *OLZ* 70:1 (1975): 5; Christina-Maria Franke, “Die Erzählung über die Seele (NHC II,6),” in *Nag Hammadi Deutsch* (2 vols.; ed. Hans-Martin Schenke, et al.; GCS, Neue Folge 8, 12, Koptisch-Gnostische Schriften II–III; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001–2003), 1:264. Rodolphe Kasser, however, has argued that the word εὐρησις should here not be rendered as “exegesis,” but rather as “story,” and suggests that the title should therefore be translated as *L’Histoire de l’Âme* and proposes “et son *exégèse* à conclusion parénétiq̄ue” as an explanatory subtitle (see Rodolphe Kasser, “*L’Eksêgêsis etbe tpsukhê* [NH II, 6]: Histoire de l’âme puis *exégèse* parénétiq̄ue de ce mythe gnostique,” *Apocrypha* 8 [1997]: 71–80). Kasser is right to point out this important sense of the Greek term ἐξήγησις and its appropriateness in this context, but I think the sense of ἐξήγησις as exegesis, i.e., as an expository interpretation, is an equally apt one in the title of this tractate and I have therefore opted to translate it accordingly, while acknowledging that the denotation of “story” may also be in play here since the exposition is partly written in the form of a narrative. The use of the term εὐρησις in Coptic to denote an expository text is, e.g., attested by Shenoute who refers to his discursive anti-heretical work known as *I Am Amazed* by the term εὐρησις (Shenoute, *I Am Amazed*, DS 221; Stephen Emmel, “Theophilus’s Festal Letter of 401 as Quoted by Shenoute,” in *Divitiae Aegypti: Koptologische und verwandte Studien zu Ehren von Martin Krause* [ed. Cécilia Fluck, et al.; Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1995], 95). The title used in Layton and Robinson’s edition of *Exeg. Soul*, “The Expository Treatise on the Soul,” is thus an apt one (see Bentley Layton, ed., William C. Robinson, Jr., trans., “The Expository Treatise on the Soul,” in *On the Origin of the World, Expository Treatise on the Soul, Book of Thomas the Contender* [ed. Bentley Layton; vol. 2 of *Nag Hammadi Codex II, 2–7 Together with XIII, 2**, *Brit. Lib. Or.4926(1), and P. Oxy. 1, 654, 655; NHS 21; Leiden: Brill, 1989], 144–169). The phrase ⲉⲧⲃⲉⲧⲢⲤⲬⲏ corresponds to the Greek περί ψυχῆς (see Sevrin, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 84).*

⁵ Allegory is here understood as an extended metaphor (i.e., a metaphor extending over several clauses), akin to Peter Crisp’s notion of allegory as a “superextended metaphor,” i.e., an extended metaphor with no direct references to the metaphorical target. *Exeg. Soul* does have some direct references to the metaphorical target, but still largely functions in the way described by Crisp (see Crisp, “Allegory,” 115–131).

describes the soul's life of prostitution (πορνεία)⁶ after her fall from heaven into a material body, and her repentance once she realises her predicament. Regretting a life of prostitution, the soul weeps and prays to her Father in heaven, with whom, it turns out, she lived in her original existence. Now, upon hearing the soul's repenting cries for help and pleas for forgiveness, the Father takes pity on her and provides her with salvation in the form of a husband. *Exeg. Soul* informs us early on that the soul's original existence was "male-female," and we later learn that the union between the soul and her saviour-husband re-establishes this original pair and leads to the soul's ascent back into heaven. Such is the main structure of the mythical narrative. It should be mentioned, however, that the text becomes increasingly homiletic as it progresses, with the mythical narrative proper ending three manuscript pages before the end of the tractate.⁷

1.2. Purpose and Problems

While, on the face of it, the narrative is rather simple, the way it is presented is not. It is especially the text's intricate and often implicit prompting of conceptual and intertextual blends that creates interpretive problems. The tractate contains interpretive twists and turns that may indeed baffle the modern reader, often making it difficult to discern the principles at work in its scriptural exegesis. It should be noted at the outset, however, that *Exeg. Soul* is not merely concerned with exegeting the explicitly quoted scriptural passages, but also ones that are only alluded to, and not only written sources, but ritual practice as well. In the present chapter I will delve into the poetics of *Exeg. Soul* and investigate the methods of exegesis employed and the materials they are applied to. In particular I will investigate the function of metaphor, metonymy and intertextuality in the tractate's understanding of ritual, a theme that plays a crucial role throughout.

⁶ The term πορνεία may be taken to refer to any kind of illicit sexual intercourse, including adultery and fornication as well as prostitution (cf. Joseph Jensen, "Does Porneia Mean Fornication? A Critique of Bruce Malina," *NovT* 20:3 [1978]: 161-184). I have translated the term throughout as prostitution, but it should be noted that since the underlying term is πορνεία it also carries the aforementioned connotations and not simply what we would strictly regard as prostitution. It should also be noted that the way πορνεία is used in *Exeg. Soul* is dependent on its use in the New Testament and in the Septuagint.

⁷ For a convenient overview of the structure of the text, see the tables in Kasser, "L'Eksêgêsis," 76, 79.

As argued by Raymond Gibbs, and discussed in chapter 2, the nature of human conceptualisation facilitates the use of multiple metaphors to access different aspects of one's knowledge of a concept so that it may be conceptualised differently at different instances and in different contexts.⁸ In *Exeg. Soul*, we will see that the scope of the source and the range of the target in metaphorical relations are exploited rhetorically in diverse and interesting ways. In what follows we will take a closer look at some of the most important metaphorical blends that function throughout this tractate and how they interrelate with each other and with the tractate's many scriptural quotations and allusions. In other words, we will be looking at the way in which the tractate prompts for the construction of metaphorical and intertextual blends and how they interact.

2. TEXTUAL AND REDACTIONAL ISSUES

Despite its unique features, scholars have shown only moderate interest in *Exeg. Soul*. Apart from Maddalena Scopello's study, the critical editions by Jean-Marie Sevrin and Cornelia Kulawik are the only book-length treatments of it.⁹ The main focus so far has been a philological one, and there have appeared several critical editions of the Coptic text with accompanying translations and commentary. In addition to Sevrin's French and Kulawik's German critical editions there is also the important English edition by Bentley Layton, with introduction and translation by William C. Robinson, Jr., as well as the early German edition by Martin Krause.¹⁰ In addition, several important articles dealing

⁸ Gibbs, "Prototypes," 33.

⁹ Sevrin, *L'Exégèse de l'âme*; Cornelia Kulawik, *Die Erzählung über die Seele (Nag-Hammadi-Codex II,6): Neu herausgegeben, übersetzt und erklärt* (TUGAL 155; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2006); Maddalena Scopello, *L'Exégèse de l'âme: Nag Hammadi Codex II,6: Introduction, traduction et commentaire* (NHS 25; Leiden: Brill, 1985).

¹⁰ Layton and Robinson, "Expository Treatise"; Martin Krause and Pahor Labib, eds., *Gnostische und hermetische Schriften aus Codex II und Codex VI* (Abhandlungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts Kairo, Koptische Reihe 2; Glückstadt: J.J. Augustin, 1971), 68–87. I have here mainly used the Coptic text of Layton and Robinson, "Expository Treatise", supplemented by Krause and Labib, *Gnostische und hermetische Schriften*, 68–87; Kulawik, *Die Erzählung*; Sevrin, *L'Exégèse de l'âme*, but always with *The Facsimile Edition of the Nag Hammadi Codices: Codex II* (Leiden: Brill, 1974) as the ultimate authority (supplemented by Stephen Emmel, "Unique Photographic Evidence for Nag Hammadi Texts: CG II 2–7, III 5 and XIII 2*," *BASP* 14 [1977]: 109–121). All translations

primarily with issues of the reconstruction and translation of the Coptic text have been published.¹¹

2.1. *Scriptural Intertextuality*

One of the most conspicuous features of *Exeg. Soul* is its use of scriptural quotations. But how do they function in the text's overall rhetoric? The exegetical method of *Exeg. Soul* was described in 1975 as "proof-text method" by Wilson, who did not hold it in high regard:

From the point of view of the modern scholar, the document reveals the weaknesses of the proof-text method, and of allegory. The quotations are simply lifted out of context, without regard for their original setting or their original meaning. For us of course this involves an exegetical misdemeanour, but our principles and methods are different.¹²

As will be shown in what follows, however, this is hardly an adequate description of the way in which Scripture is used in this tractate.¹³ The scriptural references in *Exeg. Soul* range from direct quotations and phrases to allusions. With regard to the first two categories, the texts are

from the Coptic are my own. See appendix A for complete Coptic text and translation, where all divergences in the Coptic text from the critical editions of Krause, Kulawik, Layton, and Sevrin are noted.

¹¹ See esp. Bentley Layton, "Editorial Notes on the 'Expository Treatise Concerning the Soul' (Tractate II 6 from Nag Hammadi)," *BASP* 14:2 (1977): 65–73; Bentley Layton, "The Soul as a Dirty Garment: (Nag Hammadi Codex II, Tractate 6, 131:27–34)," *Mus* 91 (1978): 155–169; Frederik Wisse, "On Exegeting 'The Exegesis on the Soul,'" in *Les Textes de Nag Hammadi: Colloque du Centre d'Histoire des Religions (Strasbourg, 23–25 octobre 1974)* (ed. Jacques-É. Ménard; NHS 7; Leiden: Brill, 1975), 68–81; Schenke, "Sprachliche und exegetische Probleme"; Nagel, "Die Septuaginta-Zitate"; Gerald M. Browne, "Textual Notes on the Exegesis on the Soul," *BASP* 12 (1975): 1–8; Hedda Bethge, "Die Exegese über die Seele: Die sechste Schrift aus Nag-Hammadi-Codex II: Eingeleitet und übersetzt vom Berliner Arbeitskreis für koptisch-gnostische Schriften," *TLZ* 101:2 (1976): 93–104; Rodolphe Kasser, "L'Histoire de l'Âme (ou Exégèse de l'Âme, NH II, 6) en langue copte saïdique: passage controversé (132,27–35) soumis à un nouvel examen," *Göttinger Miszellen: Beiträge zur ägyptologischen Diskussion* 147 (1995): 71–78; Rodolphe Kasser, "La gnose en roman mélodramatique: *L'Histoire de l'Âme* (NH II, 6). Bibliothèque gnostique XI," *RTP* 128 (1996): 25–47.

¹² Wilson, "Old Testament Exegesis," 223.

¹³ My use of the term Scripture does not presuppose a closed canon. The term is used here to refer to a corpus of texts that was considered by early Christian communities to be authoritative. The evidence of *Exeg. Soul* indicates that for the individual or community behind this tractate such a corpus of texts seems to have corresponded broadly to the texts which eventually came to be included in the Old and New Testament canons. However, the way in which *Exeg. Soul* refers to Homer may indicate that a rather open and loosely defined concept of Scripture is operative. For the relationship between Scripture and

either explicitly identified or employed anonymously. Indeed, one of the features that make *Exeg. Soul* unique among the Nag Hammadi texts is its extensive use of direct scriptural quotations.¹⁴ The tractate quotes directly from Jeremiah, Hosea, Ezekiel, Psalms, and First Corinthians, and even identifies these texts with introductory phrases. The quotation of 1 Cor 5:9–10, for instance, is introduced by the phrase, “therefore Paul, writing to the Corinthians, said:” (ΔΙΑ ΤΟΥΤΟ ΠΑΥΛΟΣ ΕΓΡΕΞΑΪ ΝΗΚΟΡΙΘΙΟΥ ΠΕΧΑΦ ΧΕ).¹⁵ In addition, passages from Ephesians, Genesis, Isaiah, and John are also quoted directly, but anonymously. The introductory statements are in these cases more vague.¹⁶ The quotation of John 6:44 is for example introduced with the statement “therefore the Saviour cries out:” (ΔΙΑ ΤΟΥΤΟ Φ[Α]ΥΚΑΚ ΕΒΟΛ ΝΒΙΠΩΤΗΡ ΧΕ).¹⁷ *Exeg. Soul* also introduces as quotations what seem to be paraphrases of passages from Genesis, Matthew, Luke, Acts, First Thessalonians, First Corinthians, Second Corinthians, and Ephesians. In these cases, introductory phrases like “as it is written” (ΚΑΤΑΘΕ ΕΥΦΩΧΗ ΧΕ)¹⁸ belie the fact that they, as far as we know given the current manuscript evidence, do not introduce exact quotations. Nevertheless, the fact that they are presented as such underscores the scriptural basis, and thereby also the implicit scriptural authority, of these paraphrases.

The majority of *Exeg. Soul*'s direct quotations are taken from the Old Testament, namely Genesis, Psalms, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and

canon, see e.g. Aichele, *Sign, Text, Scripture*, 133. For thorough discussions of questions regarding Scripture and canon, see e.g., Lee Martin McDonald and James A. Sanders, eds., *The Canon Debate* (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2002) and the discussion in chapter 2 of the present study.

¹⁴ See Rodolphe Kasser, “Citations des grands prophètes bibliques dans les textes gnostiques coptes,” in *Essays on the Nag Hammadi Texts: In Honour of Pahor Labib* (ed. Martin Krause; NHS 6; Leiden: Brill, 1975), 56–64; Christopher M. Tuckett, *Nag Hammadi and the Gospel Tradition: Synoptic Tradition in the Nag Hammadi Library* (ed. John Riches; Studies in the New Testament and Its World; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1986), 51–52, 158–159. Cf. also PHEME PERKINS, “Gnosticism and the Christian Bible,” in *The Canon Debate* (ed. Lee Martin McDonald and James A. Sanders; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2002), 365 n. 68.

¹⁵ *Exeg. Soul* 131.2–3.

¹⁶ As Ulrich Luz points out, “The difference between allusion and quotation is fluid. The absence of an introductory quotation formula should not be a factor in evaluating a putative quotation; many quotations, particularly in Hellenistic literature, are not introduced by such a formula” (Luz, “Intertexts,” 135).

¹⁷ *Exeg. Soul* 134.34–135.1.

¹⁸ *Exeg. Soul* 133.9, introducing a paraphrase based on Gen 3:16; 1 Cor 7:4; 11:3; Eph 5:23.

Hosea,¹⁹ while only three New Testament texts, John, First Corinthians, and Ephesians, are quoted directly. Of the latter, First Corinthians is the only one explicitly identified by the text, while for instance, as we have seen, John 6:44 is referred to simply as the words of the Saviour. In addition to the outright New Testament quotations, however, there are several close paraphrases and an abundance of allusions.

A seemingly curious feature of *Exeg. Soul* is the fact that it also quotes Homer's *Odyssey* three times, in much the same manner as it quotes Scripture,²⁰ introduced the first time with the statement "therefore it is written in the poet" (ΔΙΑ ΤΟΥΤΟ ΓΗΡ ΖΗΠΟΙΗΤΗΣ ΔΕ).²¹ Moreover, in addition to quotations from texts that eventually became part of the biblical canon, *Exeg. Soul* also quotes at least one extra-canonical text besides the abovementioned quotations from the *Odyssey*. Introduced as the words of the Father, speaking through the Prophet (ΔΙΑ ΤΟΥΤΟ ΠΕΧΑΦ ΖΗΤΗΠΕΠΝΑ ΜΠΕΡΟΦ[ΗΓ]ΗΣ ΔΕ "Therefore he said through the Spirit in the Prophet"),²² *Exeg. Soul* follows closely what *First Clement* presents as a scriptural quotation,²³ but which may be from a hypothetical text known as *Apocryphal Ezekiel*.²⁴ Here it is difficult to decide whether *Exeg. Soul* quotes the same text as *First Clement* or whether it is simply quoting

¹⁹ Gen 2:24 (*Exeg. Soul* 133.3); 12:1 (*Exeg. Soul* 133.29–31); Ps 6:7–10 LXX (*Exeg. Soul* 137.16–22); 44:11–12 LXX (*Exeg. Soul* 133.16–20); 102:1–5 LXX (*Exeg. Soul* 134.16–25); Isa 30:15 (*Exeg. Soul* 136.4–8); 30:19–20 (136.9–16); Jer 3:1–4 (*Exeg. Soul* 129.8–22); Ezek 16:23–26 (*Exeg. Soul* 130.11–20); Hos 2:2–7 (*Exeg. Soul* 129.23–130.11). For *Exeg. Soul*'s use of Old Testament quotations, see Nagel, "Die Septuaginta-Zitate"; Martin Krause, "Aussagen über das Alte Testament in z.T. bisher unveröffentlichten gnostischen Texten aus Nag Hammadi," in *Ex orbe religionum: Studia Geo Widengren, XXIV mense Aprili MCMLXXII quo die lustra tredecim feliciter explevit oblata ab collegis, discipulis, amicis, collegae magistro amico congratulantibus* (ed. C.J. Bleeker, et al.; SHR 21; Leiden: Brill, 1972), 449–456; Kasser, "Citations des grands prophètes".

²⁰ Cf. Birger A. Pearson, "Use, Authority and Exegesis of Mikra in Gnostic Literature," in *Mikra: Text, Translation, Reading & Interpretation of the Hebrew Bible in Ancient Judaism & Early Christianity* (ed. Martin Jan Mulder and Harry Sysling; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2004), 642.

²¹ *Exeg. Soul* 136.27–28. For a discussion of the Homeric quotations in *Exeg. Soul*, see Maddalena Scopello, "Les citations d'Homère dans le traité de *L'Exégèse de l'âme*," in *Gnosis and Gnosticism: Papers Read at the Seventh International Congress on Patristic Studies (Oxford, September 8th–13th 1975)* (ed. Martin Krause; NHS 8; Leiden: Brill, 1977), 3–12; Arthur J. Droge, "Homeric Exegesis Among the Gnostics," in *Historia, Theologica, Gnostica, Biblica et Apocrypha: Papers Presented to the Tenth International Conference on Patristic Studies Held in Oxford 1987* (ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone; StPatr 19; Leuven: Peeters, 1989), 313–321.

²² *Exeg. Soul* 135.29–31.

²³ *1 Clem.* 8.3.

²⁴ *Exeg. Soul* 135.31–136.4.

1 *Clem.* 8.3.²⁵ The fact that both texts end their quotations at the same place and both go on in a similar fashion to quote from Isaiah,²⁶ indicates that the latter may well be the case.²⁷ It should be noted, however, that Clement of Alexandria also quotes part of the same passage, presenting it simply as a quotation from Ezekiel,²⁸ and agrees with *Exeg. Soul* in using the word ψῦχή (“soul”) rather than καρδία (“heart”) as the oldest manuscripts of *First Clement* would have it.²⁹ Antoine Guillaumont has concluded that *Exeg. Soul* “sans aucun doute” quotes *Apocryphal Ezekiel* directly and not through *First Clement*,³⁰ while Scopello and Sevrin have both argued that *Exeg. Soul* quotes the apocryphon from an anthology, that is, from a thematic collection of excerpts from different sources.³¹ Boudewijn Dehandschutter, on the other hand, argues that the very existence of *Apocryphal Ezekiel* itself is not well enough attested to sustain such a conclusion. In his view *First Clement*, Clement of Alexandria, and

²⁵ For an exhaustive overview of the question, see James R. Mueller, *The Five Fragments of the Apocryphon of Ezekiel: A Critical Study* (JSPSup 5; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994), 54–60, 111–120.

²⁶ *Exeg. Soul* goes on to quote Isa 30.15 and Isa 30.19–20, while *First Clement* quotes Isa 1:16–20.

²⁷ Frederik Wisse argues, on the basis of how the quotation from Isa 1:16–20 follows the possible *Apocryphal Ezekiel* quotation in *First Clement*, that in quoting 1 *Clem.* 8.3, the author of *Exeg. Soul* believed that he was in fact quoting Isaiah. Wisse argues that this is indicated by the fact that *Exeg. Soul* introduces its own following quotations of Isaiah with the phrases πάλιν κεῖμα (“again, in another place”) and πάλιν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἵκεμα (“again he said in another place”) (see Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 77). However, the latter argument overlooks the fact that *Exeg. Soul* introduces the quotation of 1 *Clem.* 8.3 / *Apocryphal Ezekiel* as the words of the Father speaking through the spirit in the prophet (see *Exeg. Soul* 135.26–31), and thus the introductory phrases πάλιν κεῖμα and πάλιν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἵκεμα may simply signify that these are to be understood as further words of the Father, rather than further words of the same prophet.

²⁸ Clement of Alexandria, *Paed.* 1.91.2.

²⁹ Here the manuscripts of *First Clement* differ, however. While the fifth-century Greek Codex Alexandrinus and two Coptic codices, one from the fourth century and the other possibly from the fifth, agree in having καρδίας, the eleventh-century Greek Codex Hierosolymitanus, an eleventh-century Latin manuscript, and a twelfth-century Syriac manuscript have ψυχῆς or its equivalent (see Bart D. Ehrman, ed. and trans., *The Apostolic Fathers* [2 vols.; LCL 24–25; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003], 1:48–49).

³⁰ See Antoine Guillaumont, “Une citation de l’Apocryphe d’Ézéchiël dans l’Exégèse au sujet de l’âme (Nag Hammadi II,6),” in *Essays on the Nag Hammadi Texts: In Honour of Pahor Labib* (ed. Martin Krause; NHS 6; Leiden: Brill, 1975), 35–39, esp. 38. This assessment has been supported by Birger Pearson (see Pearson, “Mikra in Gnostic Literature,” 642).

³¹ See Scopello, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*; Jean-Marie Sevrin, “La rédaction de l’Exégèse de l’âme (Nag Hammadi II,6),” *Mus* 92 (1979): 237–271; Sevrin, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*.

Exeg. Soul might well all be quoting a variant of canonical Ezekiel.³² In any case, whether *Exeg. Soul* quotes *Apocryphal Ezekiel*, *First Clement*, a variant of canonical Ezekiel, or some other source, what is relevant to the present study is that *Exeg. Soul* presents this quotation as a quotation from one of the prophetic writings, on par with its other quotations of Old Testament Scripture, and that it functions on an equal footing with them within this text.

Although *Exeg. Soul* quotes texts from the Old Testament to a much greater extent than it does New Testament ones, which may give the impression that the former texts are more important to *Exeg. Soul* than the latter, the picture is significantly altered when we also consider allusions. The tractate does not limit itself to allusions to texts that are also quoted, but utilises a broad spectrum of Old and, especially, New Testament texts. In the following analysis, we will see that there is no reason to privilege the texts or passages that are explicitly quoted over those that are “only” alluded to. In fact, we will see that some of the most interesting intertextual connections in this text, as in many others, are made by way of allusions.³³ Since the Old Testament quotations in *Exeg. Soul* have already been studied extensively,³⁴ here I will focus primarily on the New Testament quotations and allusions.

2.2. *The Question of Redaction*

Given *Exeg. Soul*'s liberal use of quotations it should come as no surprise that this feature of the text has been one of the main areas of scholarly interest. The presence and function of the quotations have been given varying interpretations, but a primary focus has been on what they may or may not tell us concerning the tractate's redaction history. Some have suggested that the quotations are mere additions to what was already a

³² See Boudewijn Dehandschutter, “L'Apocryphe d'Ézéchiel: Source de l'Exégèse sur l'âme, p. 135,31–136,4?” *OLP* 10 (1979): 227–235. Against this conclusion, see Michael E. Stone, et al., *The Apocryphal Ezekiel* (SBLEJL 18; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2000), 19, where it is argued that the quoted saying “confidently can be considered to derive from an *Apocryphon of Ezekiel*.” For another positive evaluation of the existence of this text, see Mueller, *The Five Fragments*.

³³ Cf. Painchaud, “The Use of Scripture,” 131–132 where this point is made in a general sense.

³⁴ See, e.g., Wilson, “Old Testament Exegesis”; Krause, “Aussagen über das Alte Testament”; Nagel, “Die Septuaginta-Zitate”; Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 80–81; Kasser, “Citations des grands prophètes”; Sevrin, “La rédaction”.

self-contained mythological narrative of the fall of the soul into the material world and its subsequent salvation and ascent. Characterising the quotations as “eclectic glosses and references,” Jean Doresse was the first to advance such a theory, suggesting that the quotations were inserted into the narrative at the latest possible stage, by the compiler of Nag Hammadi Codex II.³⁵ Some years later, William C. Robinson presented a more moderate articulation of this theory, arguing that it was the redactor of the hypothetical Greek original who inserted the scriptural quotations and references as proof-texts into an already existing mythological narrative, and argued that the latter did not itself depend upon the quotations.³⁶ Robinson’s main argument was that the quotations may be removed from the text without significant loss of meaning, leaving the mythological narrative fundamentally intact. According to Robinson, the quotations “were added to the story and so are not the narrative’s source,” they just “sanction its interpretation.”³⁷ Other scholars have argued in favour of the integrity of the text as it stands, however, and held that not only are the quotations essential ingredients of the tractate as a whole, but they are in fact crucial components of the mythological narrative itself.³⁸ Finally, Sevrin and Scopello have both argued that the tractate is the coherent work of an author using several sources, with the mythological narrative being one of these sources, and that the majority of the Old Testament quotations were taken from an anthology, rather than directly from the various Old Testament texts.³⁹

³⁵ Jean Doresse, *The Secret Books of the Egyptian Gnostics: An Introduction to the Gnostic Coptic Manuscripts Discovered at Chenoboskion: With an English Translation and Critical Evaluation of the Gospel According to Thomas* (trans. Leonard Johnston; London: Hollis & Carter, 1960), 190–191.

³⁶ See William C. Robinson, Jr., “The Exegesis on the Soul,” *NovT* 12:2 (1970): 102–117; William C. Robinson, Jr., “The Expository Treatise on the Soul: Introduction,” in *On the Origin of the World, Expository Treatise on the Soul, Book of Thomas the Contender* (ed. Bentley Layton; vol. 2 of *Nag Hammadi Codex II, 2–7 Together with XIII, 2**, *Brit. Lib. Or.4926(1)*, and *P. Oxy. 1, 654, 655; NHS 21*; Leiden: Brill, 1989), 136–141; William C. Robinson, Jr., “Exegesis on the Soul,” *ABD* 2: 688–689. See also Nagel, “Die Septuaginta-Zitate,” 249.

³⁷ Robinson, “Exegesis on the Soul,” 689.

³⁸ See Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 80–81; Krause, “Die Sakramente,” 49; Wilson, “Old Testament Exegesis,” 217–224; Layton, “Dirty Garment,” 163–164.

³⁹ See Sevrin, “La rédaction”; Sevrin, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 2–26; Scopello, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 17–44. Against the conclusion that *Exeg. Soul* used a florilegium of Old Testament excerpts, see Robinson, “Introduction,” 138; Kulawik, *Die Erzählung*, 125. With regard to the New Testament, however, Scopello concludes that the author had a good and direct knowledge of these texts (see Scopello, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 44).

The approach taken in the present study is in line with the view that *Exeg. Soul* as it is preserved in Nag Hammadi Codex II should be regarded as a coherent and consistent whole,⁴⁰ and for the purposes of the following analysis I will refrain from entering into speculations regarding the tractate's possible redaction history.

3. ANALYSIS OF MAJOR BLENDS

Throughout *Exeg. Soul* there are certain key conceptual blends that underlie and guide the rhetoric of the tractate. An analysis of these blends is the focus of the present section.

3.1. *The Soul is a Woman*

Perhaps the single most important premise for the rhetoric of *Exeg. Soul* is the fact that the soul is presented as a woman. This is referred to in various ways throughout the tractate and is introduced in its very first lines in etymological and anatomical terms:

ΑΝΣΟΦΟΣ ΕΤΩΘΟΠ ΖΙΤῆΝΕΖΗ ΑΥΤΟΝΟΜΑCΙΑ ΕΤΥΓΧΗ ἩΝΟΥΡΑΝ ἩCΖΙΜΕ ΟΝΤΩC
ΟΝ ΖῆΤΕCΦΥCΙC ΟΥCΖΙΜΕ ΤΕ ΟΥῆΤΑC ἩΜΑΥ ΖΩΩC ἩΤΕCΜΗΤΡΑ

The wise who lived before us named the soul with a feminine name. Indeed, in her nature she is a woman. She even has her womb.

(*Exeg. Soul* 127.19–22)

In identifying the soul as a woman, *Exeg. Soul* creates a metaphorical blend of the concept of soul with the concept of woman. In terms of Blending Theory we may speak of this as a single-scope network where a framing (source) input taken from the Idealized Cognitive Model (ICM)⁴¹ of WOMAN provides organising structure to the focus (target) input of THE SOUL (see fig. 4). The structure of the framing input (woman) becomes the structure of the blend (soul-as-woman) which in turn creates inferences that are projected back onto the focus input (soul), altering our understanding of the latter, inducing a “feeling of global insight” as Fauconnier and Turner would put it.⁴²

⁴⁰ Cf. Sevrin, “La rédaction,” 270; Sevrin, *L'Exégèse de l'âme*, 25; Kulawik, *Die Erzählung*, 4.

⁴¹ See chapter 2 for an introduction to the concept of Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs) as it is used in the present study.

⁴² See, e.g., Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 129.

This opening statement is thus the first expression in *Exeg. Soul* of arguably the most significant blend that runs through the entire text, namely THE SOUL IS A WOMAN. As we shall see, this metaphor serves as the rhetorical backbone of the text, helping its readers to conceptualise the rather abstract topic of the internal life and struggles of the soul in terms of more concrete biological and cultural knowledge of women. One of the possible entailments that follow from this particular conceptual integration network is specifically highlighted in the passage quoted above, namely the detail that the soul has a womb. The highlighting of this particular metaphorical entailment serves a dual purpose. It is used as a description of the soul's femaleness and thus supplements the etymological argument, but more importantly it also sets the stage for the further rhetorical exploitation of this very aspect of the metaphorical blend at a later stage in the narrative.⁴³

The ICM WOMAN is a cluster model, which means that it consists of a cluster of cognitive models.⁴⁴ Throughout the tractate the basic metaphorical blend THE SOUL IS A WOMAN draws on different aspects of this source ICM to create a number of lower-level metaphorical blends like THE SOUL IS A PROSTITUTE, THE SOUL IS A BRIDE, THE SOUL IS A WIFE, THE SOUL IS A SISTER, THE SOUL IS A MOTHER and THE SOUL IS A DAUGHTER, as the WOMAN ICM is drawn upon to supply different mental framing inputs, at different points in the narrative, corresponding to these different stereotypical female roles. Elements and structure from each of these inputs are thus at different times blended with elements from the focus input THE SOUL. Of course, like most ICMs the contents of the "woman" ICM is culturally contingent, which means that the exact composition of this ICM in its late antique *Sitz im Leben* is impossible for us to retrieve, and, consequently, so are also many of the metaphorical entailments of the blends involving this ICM. However, since not only common embodied experience, but also intra- and intertextual connections point us in certain directions, this does not leave us totally in the dark. As we shall see, a good number of metaphorical entailments may be discerned from the texts cited or alluded to by *Exeg. Soul*.⁴⁵

The attribution of different female roles to the soul at different stages of the narrative functions as a major plot development device in *Exeg. Soul*. As we now take a closer look at the function of the various blends that

⁴³ Cf. Sevrin, *L'Exégèse de l'âme*, 84–85.

⁴⁴ See Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*, esp. 74.

⁴⁵ For the cultural contingency of ICMs, see chapter 2.

are related to the overarching conceptual blend THE SOUL IS A WOMAN, we will consider them in the order in which they appear in the narrative development of *Exeg. Soul*, starting with the soul's original state.

3.1.1. *The Soul Is a Daughter and a Virgin*

Exeg. Soul describes the original unfallen state of the soul using the two female ICMs of VIRGIN and DAUGHTER:

ῤΕΩΔ ΗΝ ΕΩΩΟΠ ΟΥΔΑΤῚ ῤῤῤΤῚΠΕΙΩΤ ΟΥΠΑΡΘΕΝΟϢ ΤΕ

While being alone with the Father she was a virgin ...

(*Exeg. Soul* 127.22–24)

The soul is a virgin (παρθένος), and since she is “with the father” she is of course *ipso facto* his daughter. The ICMs of VIRGIN and DAUGHTER both supply important metaphorical entailments for the interpretation of the soul's original state. An important entailment of the latter is that as a daughter, it is proper for the soul to be obedient to her father. The THE SOUL IS A DAUGHTER metaphor thus serves to introduce the theme of hierarchy and power relations relative to the soul, as well as *Exeg. Soul*'s persistent rhetoric of obedience and submission.

It is a major point in *Exeg. Soul* that as long as the soul obeys her father, she exists in a pure state of virginity. This equation of obedience with purity is significant. As soon as the daughter-soul is disobedient and leaves her place, however, she falls into prostitution and loses her virginity. There is no middle ground. The soul's original state of being, as an obedient daughter and virgin, thus serves as an important contrast to the soul's subsequent tribulations in the material body. The description of this original state becomes all the more significant by the fact that this state is also that to which the soul should ideally return, since whichever way we interpret the original state of the soul, it will have profound implications for how we view the nature of the soul's plight in her fallen state and the nature of her salvation.

3.1.2. *The Soul as Male-Female*

In its original state the soul is not only a daughter and a virgin, but is also described as “a male-female”:⁴⁶

⁴⁶ The most common translation of the Coptic term ῤΟΥΤϢΗῤΕ is “androgynē.” In order to show more clearly the rhetorical function of the term in *Exeg. Soul*, however, I have here

ΑΥΩ ΟΥΡΟΥΤΣΙΜΕ ΤΕ ΕΨΠΕΣΙΝΕ

... and she was male-female in her likeness.⁴⁷ (*Exeg. Soul* 127.24–25)

The latter characteristic serves not only as a contrast to her later existence in the world, on par with the two former characteristics in importance, but it is also a more complex one. In order to understand the rhetorical function of the term “male-female” (ρουτςιμε) in *Exeg. Soul* we have to look into the scriptural basis for the way it is used here. This means that in order to understand the conceptual blend, we need to consider the implications of the intertextual blending that is operative here involving the account of the creation of man in Gen 1:26–27 and that of the creation of woman in Gen 2:21–24.

There was a widespread interpretive tradition in antiquity, based on the peculiar juxtaposition of these two passages in Genesis, which held that the “man” (ἄνθρωπος) which is described in Gen 1:26–27 as being created according to the image (κατ’ εἰκόνα) of God, was an androgynous, male-female, being.⁴⁸ Not only is the wording in Gen 1:26–27 ambiguous with regard to grammatical number, but in Gen 2:21–24 Eve is described as being created from Adam, thus indicating to several exegetes that Eve had to have been originally contained within the original “man” (ἄνθρωπος) referred to in 1:26–27. From this perspective, the first creation was that of a male-female entity, an Adam that also included Eve. This interpretation is supported by the Alexandrian text of the Septuagint which at Gen 5:2, after having referred to Adam as the man created “according to the image” (κατ’ εἰκόνα) at 5:1, states that God made them male and female and that he called *their* name, rather than *his* name, Adam (καὶ ἐπωνόμασεν τὸ ὄνομα αὐτῶν Ἀδὰμ).

chosen to translate it, as literally as possible, as “male-female.” Although “androgynous” is the literal rendering of “male-female” in Greek, it carries connotations in its English usage that may be different from those that are highlighted in the rhetoric of *Exeg. Soul*. Another possible translation, “hermaphrodite,” carries the same sort of problems as “androgynous.”

⁴⁷ Robinson’s translation of εμε as “form,” in “she was virgin and in form androgynous,” (Layton and Robinson, “Expository Treatise,” 145) is too restrictive and obscures the intertextual connection to Genesis, where the word εμε, translating the Greek ὁμοίωσις, is crucial.

⁴⁸ See, e.g., James L. Kugel, *Traditions of the Bible: A Guide to the Bible as It Was at the Start of the Common Era* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 84–85; Wayne A. Meeks, “The Image of the Androgynous: Some Uses of a Symbol in Earliest Christianity,” *HR* 13 (1974): 165–208; William Loader, *The Septuagint, Sexuality, and the New Testament: Case Studies on the Impact of the LXX in Philo and the New Testament* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2004), 29–30, 50–51.

In *Exeg. Soul* the identity of the male part of the original male-female pair is also made clear later on, where he is identified as the soul's brother and husband:

ΝΕΥΖΟΤῙ ΓΑΡ ΕΝΟΥΕΡΗΥ ἸΟΥΟΡΙ ΖΑΖῚΠΠΕΙΩΤ ΕΜΠΑΤΕΤΣΖΙΜΕ ΣΩΡΜ ἸΦΟΟΥΤ
 ΕΤΕΠΕΣΣΟΝ ΠΕ

For they were at first united with each other beside the Father, before the woman lost⁴⁹ the husband who is her brother. (*Exeg. Soul* 133.3–6)

A reading of *Exeg. Soul* 127.22–25 and 133.3–6 with Gen 1:26–27 in mind may thus produce the intertextual blend shown in fig. 5. *Exeg. Soul* 127.22–25 should on its own be enough to evoke Gen 1:26–27, but together with *Exeg. Soul* 133.3–6, at a point where Genesis 1 has already been quoted and alluded to several times, and thus very likely to be primed in the reader's mind, it is readily evoked.⁵⁰ As we can see, there are counterpart relations between the descriptions of the original state of the soul and the original ἄνθρωπος of Genesis 1, with vital identity relations between Adam in the Genesis input and the male part of the soul's male-female pair in the *Exeg. Soul* inputs. And as Adam and Eve in the Genesis account may be said to be both spouses and siblings, the Genesis passage easily blends with the description of the soul's partner as her husband and brother in *Exeg. Soul*. Consequently the same applies to the identity relations between the soul and Eve. Furthermore, the generic male-female relation and the proximity of this pair to the Father are features that are projected to the generic space. In the blend, there is a compression to uniqueness of vital identity relations which results in an equation of the original state of the soul with the relationship between Adam and Eve in Genesis.⁵¹

With this blend in mind we may now consider the blend related to the soul's fall. The separation of the soul from her consort is, in addition to the passage at *Exeg. Soul* 133.3–6, quoted above, also referred to in 127.25–26 and 132.20–21:

⁴⁹ I have chosen to understand the Coptic ΣΩΡΜ Ἰ- as "lost" (cf. Crum 355a), but the term may also be translated as "led astray" (see Layton and Robinson, "Expository Treatise," 157). See below for discussion.

⁵⁰ On subsequent readings of the tractate this is of course even more the case.

⁵¹ Cf. Elaine H. Pagels, "Adam and Eve and the Serpent in Genesis 1–3," in *Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism* (ed. Karen L. King; SAC; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 414–415.

ῤΟΤΑΝ ΔΕ ΕΣΩΔΑΝῤΑΕΙΕ ΕΠΙΤῚ ἘΣΩΜΑ ἸΝΙ ΕΠΕΒΙΒΙΟC

but when she fell down to a body and came to this life

(*Exeg. Soul* 127.25–26)

ΧΙΜΠΟΥΟΕΙΩ ἸῤΑCῤΕ ΕΒΟΛ ῤῖΠΗΕΙ ἸΠΕCΕΙΩῤ

since the time she fell from the house of her Father

(*Exeg. Soul* 132.20–21)

The latter two passages state that the soul falls from the house of her Father and into a body. The nature of the separation from her partner is described only in 133.3–6, however, where the ambiguous Coptic word *σωρμ* is used. The phrase *τῤεμῤε σωρμ Ἰφοογῤ* may be understood in conflicting ways. The woman either lost her husband or led him astray. The latter does not really fit into the overall narrative of *Exeg. Soul*, however, where the soul's tribulations are shown to be caused by the fact that she left her husband and “the house of her father” and “fell” (*ῤε/ῤαῤε*) into a body. Her husband does not seem to do anything wrong, however. On the contrary, he comes to save her later on. On these grounds, the rendering “lost” seems more correct, retaining the culpability of the soul while keeping her husband and Saviour suitably spotless.⁵² This is also more in line with *Exeg. Soul's* commentary on its quotations of the *Odyssey* towards the end of the tractate, where it refers to the soul leaving (*κω Ἰκα*) her true husband.⁵³ The separation of the soul from her partner also recalls the splitting of the original *ἄνθρωπος*, which in Genesis happens with the creation of woman in Gen 2:21–24. *Exeg. Soul* evokes both that account and the fall from grace and banishment from paradise in Gen 3, which produces an interesting interpretive blend, where the separation of the soul from her partner is equated with the account of the creation of woman in Gen 2:21–24, while the fall of the soul from heaven is equated with the fall from grace in Gen 3. There is here a common generic space for the three inputs as well as one for inputs 1 and 2, and for 2 and 3 respectively. Note also that

⁵² This is also the solution chosen by Kulawik, who translates “bevor die Frau den Mann verlor” (Kulawik, *Die Erzählung*, 47). The translation “led astray,” which is the one chosen by Robinson (see Layton and Robinson, “Expository Treatise,” 157), may be supported by seeing here an allusion to Eve making Adam eat the forbidden fruit (cf. Rose Horman Arthur, *The Wisdom Goddess: Feminine Motifs in Eight Nag Hammadi Documents* [Lanham: University Press of America, 1984], 42), but such an allusion does not fit well within the overall rhetoric of *Exeg. Soul*.

⁵³ *Exeg. Soul* 137.6–7.

there is only a partial projection of the two Genesis input spaces into the blended space. Only select features of these inputs are utilised, as shown in fig. 6.

Whether this means that the soul herself constitutes the *entire* male-female entity in her original state, i.e., the entire original ἄνθρωπος, or just the female part of it, is left ambiguous in the passage from *Exeg. Soul* quoted above, but, as we shall see, the latter interpretation seems the most probable in light of the overall rhetoric of the text. It is clear that the motif of the ideal male-female pair is rhetorically highly important in *Exeg. Soul* and represents the ideal paradisaical state and salvation's ultimate goal, as well as the means of bringing it about. It is consequently also the ideal with which the undesirable conduct and fallen states of the soul are contrasted. A literal rendering of the term ζΟΥΤΕΖΙΜΕ makes clear the important contrast between the soul's original existence in a male-female pair, and her subsequent existence as a lone female (ΣΖΙΜΕ) without her male partner, her true husband, in her fallen state. Leaving her true male (ΖΟΥΤ) partner, the female (ΣΖΙΜΕ) ends up consorting with false ones. Salvation, as we shall see, consequently entails reunification with her natural and true male (ΖΟΥΤ) partner.

Some modern commentators have taken the account of the soul's original state in *Exeg. Soul* to imply a state of negated sexuality, that is, a state of being *neither* male *nor* female. William C. Robinson, for example, characterises the original state of the soul as an "asexual state (virginity and androgyny)," in contrast to a fallen state, "characterized by sexual identity (female or male)."⁵⁴ This interpretation misses a highly important aspect of *Exeg. Soul's* overall rhetoric, however, namely the contrast between the soul as a lone female vs. the soul as the female part of a male-female pair, together with the important contrast between her one true spouse and her many untrue husbands or adulterers. Importantly, in both cases the soul is female. Robinson even claims that "the narrative revels in condemning sex."⁵⁵ He argues that asexuality is the salient characteristic of the soul's original state, and that it is "sexuality in itself" that is "the soul's plight."⁵⁶ He draws from this the conclusion that "deliverance would entail restoration of the original state of

⁵⁴ Robinson, "Introduction," 137.

⁵⁵ Robinson, "Exegesis on the Soul," 105.

⁵⁶ Robinson, "Expository Treatise," 137; see also Robinson, "Exegesis on the Soul," 114.

asexuality.”⁵⁷ But should we, as Robinson does, take the actions of the soul to refer directly to human actions in the “real” world? And is it sexuality as such that *Exeg. Soul* takes issue with? We will take a closer look at these questions when we now turn to investigate *Exeg. Soul*’s description of the sexual escapades of the soul in her fallen state.

3.1.3. *The Soul Is a Prostitute*

Exeg. Soul combines two separate but related themes in its account of the soul’s fallen state, namely, on the one hand the story of the lost daughter, and on the other that of the unfaithful wife.⁵⁸ As just mentioned, the soul’s status as an obedient daughter and virgin changes dramatically with her fall:

ῥΟΤΑΝ ΔΕ ΕΣΩΔΗΖΑΕΙΕ ΕΠΙΤῆ ΕΣΩΜΑ Ν̄CΙ ΕΠΕΕΙΒΙΟC ΤΟΤΕ ΑCΖΑΕΙΕ
ΑΤΟΟΤΟΥ Ν̄ΖΑΖ Ν̄ΛΗCΤΗC ΑΥΩ Ν̄ΖΥΒ[ΡΙ]CΤΗC ΑΥΝΟΧC ΕΤΟΟΤΟΥ Ν̄ΝΟΥΕΡΗΥ
ΑΥ[.]ΟC ΖΟΕΙΝΕ ΜΕΝ ΑΥΧΡΩ ΝΑC Ζ[Ν̄ΝΟΥΒΙ]Δ ΖῆΚΟΟΥΕ ΔΕ
ΕΥΠΕΙΘΕ Ν̄ΜΟC Ζῆ[Ο]ΥΔΑΠΑΤΗ Ν̄ΔΩΡ[Ο]Ν ΖΑΠΔΖ ΖΑΠΛΩC ΑΥΧΟΖΜ̄C ΑC[. . . .
ΤΕCΜῆ]Τ̄ΠΑΡΘΕΝΟC ΑΥΩ ΑCΠΟΡΝΕΥΕ ΖῆΠΕCΣΩΜΑ ΑΥΩ ΑCΤΑΔC Ν̄ΤΟΟΤΥ ΟΥΟΝ
ΝΙΜ ΑΥΩ ΠΕΤCΑCΘΟΛΧ̄C Ν̄ΜΟΥ ΕCΜΕΕΥΕ ΧΕΠΕCΖΑΕΙ ΠΕ

But when she fell down to a body and came to this life, then she fell into the hands of many robbers, and the wanton men tossed her into each other’s hands, and they [. . .]. Some used her [by force], while others persuaded her by deception with a gift. In short, they defiled her, and she [. . . her] virgin[ity], and she prostituted herself in her body, and she gave herself to everyone, and whomever she would embrace she considered to be her husband.
(*Exeg. Soul* 127.25–128.4)

The soul’s fallen state is in this account contrasted in important ways with her original state, and the contrasts could hardly have been greater. At this stage the soul is no longer described as a virgin, but instead as a prostitute and a victim of abuse. The soul is defiled against her will by “robbers” (ληcτηc) and “wanton men” (ζυβριcτηc) who abuse her, but she also prostitutes herself willingly, considering anyone she might come across to be her husband. The earthly adulterers are described as both

⁵⁷ Robinson, “Expository Treatise,” 137. Robinson qualifies this statement, however, by limiting it to “the second part of the narrative.” In the first part he sees “sexual violation” as the plight of the soul (*ibid.*); See also *ibid.*, 138. Cf. also Robinson, “Exegesis on the Soul,” 111, 114.

⁵⁸ See H. Bethge, “Die Exegese,” 95. Bethge attributes this observation to Frederik Wisse.

seducing and forcing her, and making her be a slave for them as if it were they who were her faithful husbands and true masters:

ΠΑΛΙΝ ΕΣΩΔΑΝΚΤΕΠΕΣΕΩ ΕΒΟΛ ἸΝΗΕΙΜΟΙΧΟΣ ΨΑΠΩΤ ΕΞΟΥΝ ΕΞἸΚΟΟΥΕ
 ἸΣΕΡΑΝΑΓΚΑΖΕ ἸΜΟΣ ΑΓΡΕΣΩΠΕ ΝἸΜΑΥ ἸΣΡΕΜἸἸΛ ΝΑΥ ἸΘΕ ἸἸΧΟΕΙC
 ΖΙΧἸΠΟΥΜΑ ἸΓΚΟΤΚ ΕΒΟΛ ΔΕ ἸΠΩΠΠΕ ΟΥΚΕΤΙ ΜΑΣΤΟΛΜΑ ΕΚΑΔΥ ἸΣΩC ἸΤΟΟΥ
 ΔΕ ΨΑΥΑΠΑΤΑ ἸΜΟΣ ἸΝΟΥΝΟC ἸΧΡΟΝΟC ἸΘΕ ἸΝΙΖΑΕΙ ΕΤἸΖΟΤ ἸΡἸΜἸΜΕ ΖΩC
 ΕΨΧΕ ΕΥΤΙΜΑ ἸΜΟC ΕΜΑΤΕ ΑΥΩ ΘΖΑΗ ἸΝΑΕΙ ΤΗΡΟΥ ΨΑΥΚΑΑC ἸΣΩΟΥ ἸΣΕΒΩΚ

Again, when she turns her face from these adulterers she runs to others and they force her to sleep with them and to slave for them upon their bed as if they are the masters, but out of shame she no longer dares to leave them. And as for them, they deceive her for a long time as if they are true trustworthy husbands, as if valuing her greatly. And at the end of all these things they leave her behind and go. (*Exeg. Soul* 128.7–17)

Both aspects are important for the further development of the narrative and for the soteriological points that are made. First, her many false husbands at this stage of the narrative stand in direct opposition to the one who is later referred to as “her perfect husband” (πεσεραῖ Ἰτελειουc)⁵⁹ and “the true bridegroom” (πἸρωελεετ Ἰμε).⁶⁰ Secondly, the victimisation of the soul at the hands of “robbers” (ληστηc) and “wanton men” (ζηυβριστηc) shows her vulnerability apart from the safety provided by her father and her brother/husband. The description of the “robbers” and “wanton men” as pretending to be trustworthy true husbands is significant, and it is worth noting that the soul serves them as if they were her masters. The terms “husband” (ραει) and “master” (χοειc) are here intimately linked and thus strengthen the aspect of power and submission inherent in the MARRIAGE ICM, which, as we shall see, is made even more explicit when *Exeg. Soul* later alludes to Gen 3:16 / 1 Cor 7:4; 11:3 / Eph 5:23 stating that “the master of the woman is her husband” (πχοειc γαρ Ἰτεσεριμε πε πεσεραῖ).⁶¹ While the adulterers are “masters”—albeit not rightfully so—the soul, for her part, is correspondingly a “servant” or “slave” (ρηεραῖ). Significantly, the term χοειc, (“lord/master”), is also, alongside σωτηρ (“saviour”), the main christological title used in *Exeg. Soul*.

What, then, are the metaphorical entailments of the tractate’s description of the soul as fornicating and prostituting herself? And how are we to understand *Exeg. Soul*’s sexual references? When answering these

⁵⁹ *Exeg. Soul* 137.6–7.

⁶⁰ *Exeg. Soul* 132.15.

⁶¹ *Exeg. Soul* 133.9–10.

questions, we should keep in mind that the soul is explicitly stated to be female. Robinson's description of the earthly state of the soul as being "characterized by sexual identity (female or male)"⁶² underestimates the significance of this fact, making the actual gender of the soul irrelevant. However, the soul's specifically female identity is in fact essential to the overall rhetoric of *Exeg. Soul*, since this is the only gendering that fits the narrative, and since the metaphorical entailments of describing the soul as male would be quite different, and certainly not compatible with *Exeg. Soul's* narrative and general rhetorical structure.⁶³

So, what are the entailments of describing the soul in terms of the conceptual metaphor THE SOUL IS A WOMAN, and how does this metaphor function within the overall rhetoric of *Exeg. Soul*? We should keep in mind that although the actions of the soul are described in terms of the actions of a woman, it is not to be regarded as a complete human being. Before we start looking into the possibility of a significant metonymic relationship between the soul and the complete human being of which it is a part, we need to consider the metaphorical entailments. More often than not these analytical dimensions have been mixed, however, so that the descriptions of the prostitution and sexual abuse of the soul have been taken to indicate that sexuality is the main problem not only of the soul's life in the body, but also, by way of an implicit PART FOR WHOLE metonymy, of the complete human being.⁶⁴ Moreover, when the soul is described in terms of sexually connotative imagery, we need to analyse in each case how the relevant framing input functions in relation to its possible focus input(s), and consider the potential implications of the resulting blends.

It should be noted that even on its surface, i.e., on the level of the metaphorical source, *Exeg. Soul* does not directly condemn sexuality per se, but only illicit sexuality—that which amounts to πορνεία. The important question is thus whether πορνεία is used as a metonymy for sexuality in general, or whether it should rather be interpreted as a metaphor for something else. Much of what *Exeg. Soul* has to say concerning the infidelity and repentance of the soul is based upon Old

⁶² Robinson, "Introduction," 137.

⁶³ This aspect is overlooked by Rose Horman Arthur, who claims that "the soul could have been allegorized as a male who fell from his feminine counterpart had not the normative hermeneutic of Genesis made Eve the cause of Adam's sinning" (Arthur, *Wisdom Goddess*, 42).

⁶⁴ Cf. Robinson, "Introduction," 137.

Testament quotations taken from texts that deal first and foremost with Israel's infidelity in relation to God.⁶⁵ The way these Old Testament intertexts are understood within the context of *Exeg. Soul*, however, is substantially shaped by the New Testament. In making the point that its πορνεία imagery does not refer primarily to bodily prostitution or fornication, but rather, by way of metaphor, to the soul's relationship to the material world, actual sexual immorality being one of its bodily manifestations, *Exeg. Soul* refers to texts from the New Testament:

ΤΡΕΙΠΟΡΝΙΑ ΔΕ ΑΝΑΠΟΣΤΟΛΟΣ ἸΗΣΟΥΣ ΠΑΡΑΓΓΕΙΛΕ ΞΕΑΡΕΞ ΕΡΩΤῆ ΕΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΒΕΤΗΓῆ ΕΡΟΣ ΕΥΦΑΔΕ ΕΤΠΟΡΝΙΑ ΟΥΔΑΔΣ ΑΝ ἸΗΣΟΥΣ ΑΛΛΑ ΤΑΤΥΧΗ ΝΕΡΟΥ ΕΤ[ΒΕΠ]ΔΕΙ ΝΑΠΟΣΤΟΛΟΣ ΕΥΣΕ[ΔΙ ΝΗΕΚΚΛΗΣΙΑ] ἸΠΠΟΥΤΕ ΟΥΝΑ ΞΕΝΕ[ΡΒΗΥ]Ε ἸΤΕΕΙΜ[Ι]ΝΕ ΟΥΠΕ ΡΡΑΙ ΝΕΗΤ[Ν] ΑΛΛΑ ΠΝΟΣ [ΝΑΓΩΝ ΕΦΩ]ΟΟΠ ΕΤΒΕΤΠΟΡΝΙΑ ἸΤΥΧΗ ΕΒΟΛ ΝΕΗΤΕ ΟΥΑΡΕΤΠΟΡΝΙΑ ἸΠΚΕΣΩΜΑ ΟΥΠΕ

But concerning this prostitution the apostles of the Saviour commanded: "Guard yourselves against it! Cleanse yourselves of it!"⁶⁶ speaking not only of the prostitution of the body, but especially that of the soul. Therefore the apostles [write to the churches] of God, so that [things] like this may not happen among us, but the great [struggle] concerns the prostitution of the soul. From it comes the prostitution of the body too.⁶⁷

(*Exeg. Soul* 130.28–131.2)

The πορνεία of the body is thus explicitly contrasted with the πορνεία of the soul. The two are indeed linked, the one being presented as the cause of the other, but they are also clearly distinguished. It should also be noted that it is specifically the πορνεία of the body that is linked to the πορνεία of the soul. Nowhere does *Exeg. Soul* equate πορνεία with sexuality in general. Whatever its underlying views concerning bodily sexuality may be, *Exeg. Soul* emphasises that it is making an argument that relates specifically to the soul, and supports its case by arguing that the apostles

⁶⁵ Cf., e.g., Simone Pétrement, *A Separate God: The Christian Origins of Gnosticism* (trans. Carol Harrison; San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1990), 501 n. 43. Carl B. Smith, however, takes *Exeg. Soul's* quotation of Isa 30:19–20 (*Exeg. Soul* 136.8–16) to refer literally to Jerusalem, rather than to the soul (Carl B. Smith, *No Longer Jews: The Search for Gnostic Origins* [Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2004], 210). Cf. also Kathy L. Gaca, *The Making of Fornication: Eros, Ethics, and Political Reform in Greek Philosophy and Early Christianity* (Hellenistic Culture and Society 40; Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 160–189.

⁶⁶ Cf. Acts 15:20, 29; 21:25; 1 Thess 4:3; 1 Cor 6:18; 2 Cor 7:1.

⁶⁷ This passage follows a quotation and interpretation of the phrase "the sons of Egypt, the ones great of flesh" (ΝΩΗΡΕ ΝΚΗΜΕ ΝΑΝΝΟΣ ΝΣΑΡΞ) (*Exeg. Soul* 130.21) in Ezek 16:23–26 as signifying "the fleshly and the perceptible and the things of the earth" (ΝΣΑΡΚΙΚΟΝ ΑΥΘ ΝΑΙΣΘΗΤΟΝ ΜΗΝΕΡΒΗΥΕ ἸΠΚΑΞ) (*Exeg. Soul* 130.22–23).

in fact also made such a distinction, as evidenced in Scripture. The point is further strengthened when *Exeg. Soul* proceeds to quote 1 Cor 5:9–10 together with Eph 6:12,⁶⁸ explaining that “Paul” is “speaking spiritually”:

ΔΙΑ ΤΟΥΤΟ ΠΑΥΛΟΣ ΕΦΕΡΑΪ ΝΗΚΟΡΙΘΙΟΣ ΠΕΧΑΥ ΧΕΑΙΕΙΣΕΡΑΪ ΝΗΤΗ ΖΗΤΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΗ
 ΧΕΪΠΡΓΩΡ ΝΗΠΟΡΝΟΣ ΟΥ ΠΑΝΤΩΣ ΝΗΡΝΟΣ ΝΗΠΕΙΚΟΣΜΟΣ Η ΠΛΕΟΝΡΕΚΤΗΣ Η
 ΝΡΕΦΤΩΡΠ Η ΝΡΕΦΩΝΩΒΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ ΕΠΕΙ ΑΡΑ ΤΕΤΗΝΠ ΕΙ ΕΒΟΛ ΖΗΠΚΟΣΜΟΣ ΤΑΕΙ
 ΤΕ ΘΕ ΕΦΩΧΕ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΩΣ ΧΕΠΗΑΓΩΝ ΩΡΟΠ ΠΑΝ ΑΝ ΟΥΒΕΣΑΡΞ ΖΙΣΝΟΥ
 ΚΑΤΑ ΘΕ ΕΝΤΑΥΧΟΟΣ ΑΛΛΑ ΟΥΒΕΪΚΟΣΜΟΚΡΑΤΩΡ ΝΗΠΕΙΚΑΚΕ ΗΝΗΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΟΝ
 ΝΤΠΟΝΗΡΙΑ

Therefore Paul, writing to the Corinthians, said: “I wrote to you in the letter: ‘Do not mix with prostitutes,’ by no means (meaning) the prostitutes of this world or the greedy or the robbers or the idolators, since then you would have to leave the world.”⁶⁹ Thus he is speaking *spiritually*, “for our struggle is for us not against flesh and blood,”⁷⁰ as he said, “but against the world rulers of this darkness and the spirits of wickedness.”⁷¹

(*Exeg. Soul* 131.2–13)

According to *Exeg. Soul*, then, “Paul” should not be taken to refer primarily to bodily prostitution in 1 Cor 5:9–10, but rather to the prostitution of the soul.⁷² We are thus specifically invited to read the imagery metaphorically.⁷³ This gives us the metaphor ASSOCIATING WITH WORLDLY THINGS IS AN ILLICIT SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP. But the soul can choose to associate either with worldly matters, understood as πορνεία, or with the Saviour.

⁶⁸ *Exeg. Soul* 131.4–13.

⁶⁹ 1 Cor 5:9–10.

⁷⁰ Eph 6:12. This inversion of the sequence of “flesh” and “blood” is quite common (see Scopello, *L'Exégèse de l'âme*, 37).

⁷¹ Eph 6:12.

⁷² Similarly, Origen states in his *Commentarius in Canticum*, “We must realize also that, just as an illicit and unlawful love may happen to the outer man—as that, for instance, he should love a harlot or adulteress instead of his bride or his wife; so also may the inner man, that is to say, the soul, come to attach its love not to its lawful Bridegroom, who is the Word of God, but to some seducer or adulterer” (*Comm. Cant.*, Prologue, 2; R.P. Lawson, trans., *Origen: The Song of Songs: Commentary and Homilies* [ACW 26; London: Longmans, 1957], 30). In the same vein, Gregory of Nyssa, in his *Sixth Homily on the Song of Songs*, explicitly interprets the marriage bed of Cant 3:7–8 as representing the union between the soul and Christ (see Verna E.F. Harrison, “Gender, Generation, and Virginitly in Cappadocian Theology,” *JTS* 47 [1996]: 65).

⁷³ Frederik Wisse has rightly noted that these quotations of First Corinthians and Ephesians are essential to the rhetoric of *Exeg. Soul*. As Wisse puts it, “this passage is crucial to the whole tractate. It gives apostolic sanction to the whole exegetical enterprise of ExSoul. It legitimates taking the references to πορνεία in Scripture to refer to the spiritual pollution of the soul. Without 1 Cor 5:9 f. and Eph 6:12, the pneumatic-allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament passages on fornication would lose its basis” (Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 72).

In contrast to the former, the latter is understood by means of the related conceptual blend ASSOCIATING WITH CHRIST IS A LEGITIMATE SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP. The latter is, as we shall see, connected to the overarching blend CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A MARRIAGE WITH CHRIST, which is fundamental to the theology of the tractate.

A feature of some significance for the interpretation of *Exeg. Soul's* metaphorical account of both the infidelity and marriage of the soul, especially with regard to the evocation of Scripture and ritual, is the use of the term *κοινωνία* and its cognates. In the literature of antiquity *κοινωνία* generally denotes close fellowship, participation, or union between persons or entities, as well as the marital relationship between human beings, including but not limited to its sexual aspect.⁷⁴ In early Christian literature, the term is frequently used to denote the communion with God and/or Christ, above all in the Eucharist.⁷⁵ It is worth bearing in mind this inherent polysemy in our interpretation of the use of this term in *Exeg. Soul.*, for it may be somewhat misleading to render *κοινωνεῖν* and *κοινωνία* in *Exeg. Soul* simply as sexual intercourse,⁷⁶ since such a translation obscures a range of other relevant connotations. In order to preserve the ambiguity and range of the Greek term, which has an important rhetorical function in this text, I have thus chosen to translate it consistently as “communion.” It is significant that *Exeg. Soul* uses the term *κοινωνία* rather than other more direct terms related to sexual activity. The use of *κοινωνία* in the specific sense of “sexual intercourse” is relatively rare in our late antique sources, indicating that, depending on context, its non-sexual connotations should be easily activated alongside the possible sexual ones. Due to the narrative context in which it

⁷⁴ LSJ, 970a. Interestingly the neoplatonist Iamblichus also uses the term *κοινωνεῖν* to describe the soul's (harmful) relationship with the body, see e.g. Iamblichus, *De mysteriis* 200,7–8; Gregory Shaw, *Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus* (Hermeneutics: Studies in the History of Religions; University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 39. The verb *κοινωνεῖν* was also used to describe participation or initiation in the mysteries (See LSJ, 969b–970a).

⁷⁵ See, e.g., Andrew Louth, “Pagan Theurgy and Christian Sacramentalism in Denys the Areopagite,” *JTS* 37 (1986): 432–438, esp. 436–438. For the use of the term in the Bible, see, e.g., John Reumann, “Koinonia in Scripture: Survey of Biblical Texts,” in *On the Way to Fuller Koinonia: Official Report of the Fifth World Conference on Faith and Order* (ed. Thomas F. Best and Günther Gassmann; Faith and Order Paper 166; Geneva: WCC Publications, 1994), 37–69; J.Y. Campbell, “KOINΩNIA and its Cognates in the New Testament,” *JBL* 51 (1932): 352–380.

⁷⁶ This is what Robinson does (see Layton and Robinson, “Expository Treatise”). See also Krause, who uses the corresponding German term “geschlechtlichen Umgang” (Krause, “Die Sakramente,” 53).

appears, the sexual connotations of the term as it is used in *Exeg. Soul* are nevertheless highly significant. The way *κοινωνία* is used here within a discourse that is heavily reliant on imagery related to marriage and adultery, with an important focus on the womb of the soul and other procreational imagery, clearly evokes sexual connotations and thus causes the activation in readers' minds of metaphorical relations where sexual intercourse is an important aspect of the framing input space. Nevertheless, due to the common, and important, Christian usage of the term to denote communion with Christ in a general sense and especially in connection with the Eucharist, and considering the Christian subject matter of this text, such non-sexual connotations are also primed and easily called upon as input spaces in these interpretive blends. In any case, the communion with Christ is a central concern in *Exeg. Soul* and is, at least partly, expressed metaphorically in terms of a sexual relationship.

Let us now consider the interaction between some of the mental spaces that may be primed and activated by the use of the term *κοινωνία* and its cognates in *Exeg. Soul*. The biblical intertext most likely to be brought to mind is First Corinthians, a text that *Exeg. Soul* also quotes directly. First Corinthians 10:16 and 20 are here especially relevant: "The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not a communion (*κοινωνία*) in the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not a communion (*κοινωνία*) in the body of Christ?" (1 Cor 10:16),⁷⁷ and: "I do not want you to be partners (*κοινωνός*) with demons" (1 Cor 10:20).⁷⁸ Of course, the context in which these passages, and by extension the rest of 1 Cor 10, is brought to mind in a reading of *Exeg. Soul* is quite different from their context within First Corinthians. Yet at the same time, once the input spaces have been called up and connections have been made between *Exeg. Soul* and First Corinthians, new entailments may materialise and elaborations be made that put both texts in a new light. We will presently take a look at some of the inference-patterns that are created once we pay attention to the interaction between *Exeg. Soul* and First Corinthians.

⁷⁷ Τὸ ποτήριον τῆς εὐλογίας ὃ εὐλογοῦμεν, οὐχὶ κοινωνία ἐστὶν τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ; τὸν ἄρτον ὃν κλῶμεν, οὐχὶ κοινωνία τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐστὶν / παποτ ἴπεσμογ εωδανσμογ ερωκ μη ἴτκοινωνια δν πε ἴπεσνογ ἴπεχῶ ποεικ εωδανποωῖ μη ἴτκοινωνια δν πε ἴπεσμα ἴπεχῶ; cf. Elaine H. Pagels, *Beyond Belief: The Secret Gospel of Thomas* (New York: Random House, 2003), 196 n. 69.

⁷⁸ οὐ θέλω δε ὑμᾶς κοινωνοῦς τῶν δαιμονίων γίνεσθαι / ἴφογωω δε δν ετρετῆρκοινωνος ἴἴδδαιμονιον.

With First Corinthians already primed through direct reference and quotation elsewhere in *Exeg. Soul*, the use of the term *κοινωνία* easily calls to mind 1 Cor 10, where Paul juxtaposes idolatry and the eating of food offered to idols with the Eucharist using the terms *κοινωνία* and *κοινωνός*. Blending 1 Cor 10 with the *Exeg. Soul* input creates counterpart mappings between the Pauline juxtaposition of the communion in the flesh and blood of Christ and the communion with demons made in 1 Cor 10 and the corresponding dichotomy between the soul's communion with the Saviour and her communion with the adulterers in *Exeg. Soul*. Counterpart connections are thus created between the communion of the soul with the Saviour-Christ in *Exeg. Soul* and the communion in the flesh and blood of Christ in 1 Cor 10:16, while the soul's infidelity with the adulterers is mapped onto the partnership with demons mentioned in 1 Cor 10:20 (see fig. 7).⁷⁹

In the resulting integration network we also notice several other interesting correspondences of terminology and structure between *Exeg. Soul* and First Corinthians. In these blends, references to prostitutes and fornication in First Corinthians easily merge with descriptions of the prostitution of the soul in *Exeg. Soul*. As a result, Paul's comments on prostitution and prostitutes in 1 Cor 10 may be taken as references to the prostitution of the soul. Further, the admonition to flee from *πορνεία* (*πῶρ εβολ ἡτπορνια / Φεύγετε τὴν πορνείαν*) in 1 Cor 6:18 together with the juxtaposition of joining with Christ and joining with a prostitute in 1 Cor 6:16–17 also blend well with *Exeg. Soul*. Moreover, the use of the word *μοιχός* to denote the adulterers with which the soul prostitutes herself throughout *Exeg. Soul* also contributes to the recall of this part of First Corinthians at this point,⁸⁰ and the way this word is used in 1 Cor 6:9 fits well with its use in *Exeg. Soul* and serves to strengthen the priming of

⁷⁹ As we can see from fig. 8, 1 Cor 10 is already the product of a complicated blend. This figure only shows some of the most central counterpart relations, and I have left the blended space open since the possible relevant blends are too numerous to fit into the available graphic space of a single figure.

⁸⁰ Aside from 1 Cor 6:9, this term is only used once in Luke (Luke 18:11) and once in Hebrews (Heb 13:4) in the whole of the New Testament. Reading it as an allusion to the latter text also creates interesting and enlightening intertextual patterns, especially taken together with a reading in relation to First Corinthians. In the LXX the term is found in Job 24:15, Ps 49:18 LXX Pro 6:32, and Isa 57:3, the passages in Psalms and Isaiah being especially relevant with regard to *Exeg. Soul*. In the Sahidic New Testament the Coptic equivalent *νοεκ* is used instead of the Greek *μοιχός* (see Michel Wilmet, *Concordance du Nouveau Testament Sahidique: II. Les mots autochtones* [3 vols. CSCO 173, 183, 185, Subsidia 11, 13, 15; Leuven: Peeters, 1957–1959], 1:484).

First Corinthians as a supplier of intertextual input spaces in the reading of *Exeg. Soul*. Later, as we shall see, the quotation of Gen 2:24 at 1 Cor 6:16 also contributes to direct attention to this passage when the former is quoted by *Exeg. Soul*.⁸¹

As we shall see, the restoration of the soul to its original state is described in terms of a return to a state of perpetual union with “her perfect husband” (περζαῖ ἡτελειος).⁸² On the level of the metaphorical source, at least, that is, on the level of the narrative, this does not seem to entail a restoration to asexuality. The claim that *Exeg. Soul* is primarily concerned with condemning sexuality requires the identification (based on an unstated metonymy) of illicit sex, i.e., πορνεία and μοιχεία, with sex in general in the rhetoric of *Exeg. Soul*. But there does not seem to be any compelling reasons for doing so.⁸³ To take what the tractate says about the prostitution and adultery of the soul to signify simply the sinfulness of sex seems, on the contrary, to go against the gist of the passages quoted above, which seem to speak against precisely such a reading.

This brings us to the importance of analysing the role of the Saviour in *Exeg. Soul*. But first we need to look closer at the soul’s necessary preparations for her marriage with him, and the way in which these preparations are connected to the soul’s metaphorical femininity.

3.1.4. *The Womb of the Soul*

Perhaps the single most curious feature of *Exeg. Soul* is the way it describes important aspects of the soul’s fallen state and the nature of redemption by way of the imagery of the womb of the soul. The notion that the soul has a womb is in itself not unique to this tractate. In the *Legum allegoriae* of Philo of Alexandria we find the idea that the soul has a womb in which God may “implant virtues,” making it “bring forth what is good.”⁸⁴ *Exeg. Soul* develops the metaphor in a similar direction, but

⁸¹ See *Exeg. Soul* 133.3.

⁸² *Exeg. Soul* 137.6–7.

⁸³ The one passage in the text that may possibly be interpreted in this way is 137.5–9, where it is “the treachery of Aphrodite” (ταπατη ἡαφροδετη) that is said to be luring the soul away from her perfect husband. There are, however, several possible ways to interpret this passage.

⁸⁴ *Leg.* 3:180: θεοῦ ... τοῦ μόνου δυναμένου τὰς ψυχῶν μήτρας ἀνοιγνύναι καὶ σπείρειν ἐν αὐταῖς ἀρετὰς καὶ ποιεῖν ἐγκύμονας καὶ τικτούσας τὰ καλὰ / “God, who alone is able to open the womb of the soul, and to implant virtues in it and to cause it to be pregnant, and to bring forth what is good” (Leopold Cohn, *Philonis Alexandrini opera*

also significantly extends its usage and exploits its entailments in novel ways. When the tractate contrasts the state of the womb of the fallen soul with that of a proper woman, the anatomical imagery takes a turn towards the surreal:

ΜΗΝΤΡΑ ΓΑΡ ΜΨΩΜΑ ΕΥΩΟΠ ΜΨΟΥΝ ΜΨΩΜΑ ΝΘΕ ΝΓΚΕΜΑΖΤ ΤΜΗΤΡΑ ΗΤΟΥ
 ΝΤΨΥΧΗ ΕΣΚΩΤΕ ΜΨΑ ΝΒΟΛ ΝΘΕ ΝΨΨΥΣΙΚΟΝ ΜΨΟΟΥΤ ΕΥΩΟΠ ΜΨΒΟΛ

for the womb of the body is on the inside of the body like the other internal organs, but the womb of the soul is turned outside like the genitals of the male which are on the outside. (*Exeg. Soul* 131.23–27)

This is an important rhetorical move, for by describing the womb of the fallen soul as resembling male genitalia, *Exeg. Soul* infers male characteristics to the soul in her fallen state.⁸⁵ It should be noted that certain medical theories in antiquity presented the male and female genitals as being analogous, the one being like the other, only turned inside out. Thus, as *Exeg. Soul* points out, when turned the wrong way out the womb resembles male genitalia.⁸⁶ This allows for the presentation of the soul not only as an immoral woman, but also as having transgressed gender-boundaries. As Richard Smith and Maddalena Scopello have argued, the way in which the narrative also portrays the soul as actively seeking out partners herself is in many ways in the manner of a male.⁸⁷ This makes for an interesting mix of gender imagery, where we find that the metaphor

quae supersunt, vol. 1 [Berlin: Reimer, 1896], 61–169; C.D. Yonge, trans., *The Works of Philo: Complete and Unabridged* [new updated ed.; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1993], 70–71). This parallel is noted by Krause, “Die Sakramente,” 49 n. 23.

⁸⁵ See Scopello, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 83, 134. Wisse does not see the inverted womb as signifying any maleness on the part of the soul, but interprets it as “indecent exposure” (Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 73), while Scopello, on the other hand, sees an element of exhibitionism in the soul’s maleness (see Scopello, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 133–134). Rose Horman Arthur thinks this imagery is due to a redactor whom she terms “a literal-minded male reader,” who “took exception to the strong feminine imagery, and corrected it by adding the explanation that the soul’s womb was formed like a male” (Arthur, *Wisdom Goddess*, 49).

⁸⁶ For similarities between *Exeg. Soul* and Galen’s descriptions of male and female genitalia, see e.g. Mary R. Lefkowitz and Maureen B. Fant, comps., *Women’s Life in Greece & Rome: A Source Book in Translation* (2d ed.; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 243–246; Richard Smith, “Sex Education in Gnostic Schools,” in *Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism* (ed. Karen L. King; SAC; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 354–355. The fall of the soul from her original marital unity to her status as a single “manly” woman may also be compared with ancient theories of the wandering womb (for a short account of this and other parallels between Nag Hammadi-texts and ancient medical discourse see R. Smith, “Sex Education”).

⁸⁷ See R. Smith, “Sex Education,” 354; Scopello, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 133–134.

of the soul as a woman, with the connected aspects of prostitution and submission, is blended with male characteristics of activity, autonomy, and external genitalia. The image of the soul's external male genitalia-like womb serves to highlight the male aspects of this behaviour, while simultaneously presenting it as an inherently unnatural type of behaviour for the soul. After all, the womb is not supposed to be on the outside resembling male genitals. The result is that both the soul's actions and her physiology violate category boundaries, and in the final analysis the soul has paradoxically both male and female characteristics in her fallen state, being in a sense both a female prostitute and a male fornicator. The imagery of the inverted womb reinforces this blend by representing male and female genitalia simultaneously.

There is a pervasive rhetoric of naturalness in *Exeg. Soul*, and its use of the terms φύσις and φυσικός is significant. We need only recall the opening lines of the tractate, where it is pointed out that the soul is female “in her nature” (ἐντρεφύσις),⁸⁸ which is further explicated by the fact that the soul possesses a womb.⁸⁹ The phrase that is later used to denote “the genitals of the male” is ἄφύσικον ἄφοογτ,⁹⁰ and in her baptismal purification the soul will again receive “her original nature” (πεφύσικον ἄφοογτ).⁹¹ This terminology is also echoed later on when the soul's rightful husband and saviour is twice referred to as “her natural master” (πεφύσικος ἄλοε).⁹² In this way, the proper conduct on the part of the soul is linked metaphorically to physical characteristics and natural dispositions. Thus, from *Exeg. Soul's* perspective it is in accordance with the natural order of things for the metaphorically female soul to submit to her “natural” master, and to him alone. While she has her womb on the outside resembling a male, however, it is not only her actions that are wrong, but also her physical characteristics, which are presented vividly as being in a state that is contrary to nature,⁹³ thus making an even more forceful statement concerning the depravity of the soul in her fallen state.

Moreover, the way this is presented recalls the description in Rom 1:26 of the women who “changed the work of their nature to one against their nature” (ἀγώβη ἄπερὸν ἄτεφύσις ἐπαρτεφύσις) with regard to the

⁸⁸ *Exeg. Soul* 127.21.

⁸⁹ *Exeg. Soul* 127.21–22.

⁹⁰ *Exeg. Soul* 131.26.

⁹¹ *Exeg. Soul* 132.1.

⁹² *Exeg. Soul* 133.8–9, 24–25.

⁹³ Cf. Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 73.

soul's fallen state, and potentially also 2 Pet 1:4, which describes the salvific goal of becoming partakers of the divine nature (ὡσπερ ἡκοινωνος ἡτεφύσις ετοῦλαβ) after having escaped the lust and corruption of the world (πῶτ εβολ ἡτεπιθῆμα ἡπτακο ετῆῖπκοςμος).

3.1.5. *Baptism is Washing*

The turning point in the narrative comes when the soul realises the gravity of her situation and repents:

ὡαρῶν μεν εφοῦ ετῆχῆ πητ ἡσα εσα εσκοινωνι ἡῖπετςνατῶμτ εροϋ
 εεχῶρμ εῶοοπ ραπασχα ἡνετςῖπῶα ετρεσχιτοῦ ροτῶν δε εεῶαῖαιεῶανε
 ἡῖμοκρῆ ετςῖρητοῦ αῦω ἡριμε εῖραῖ επειῶτ ἡμετανοει τοτε φηνα
 ναε ἡῖπειῶτ ἡῖκτο ἡτεσμητρα εβολ ρῖναπσα νβολ παλιν ἡῖκτος εῖοῦν
 ἡτετῆχῆ χι ἡπεσερικον

As long as the soul runs around and has communion with whomever she may meet, becoming defiled, she suffers what she deserves, but when she becomes aware of the afflictions she is in and weeps to the Father and repents, then the Father will have mercy on her and turn her womb from the outside and he will again turn it inside, and the soul will receive her particular nature.⁹⁴ (*Exeg. Soul* 131.13–22)

The motif of repentance which is on display here is pervasive throughout *Exeg. Soul*.⁹⁵ True repentance is the only way to salvation, but it is not sufficient in itself. For unless repentance is followed by purification and marriage with the Saviour salvation cannot be attained. So, following repentance, the next step on the way to the soul's salvation is her purification—the washing away of her sins in baptism. *Exeg. Soul* connects repentance and the baptismal washing away of sins by citing Acts 13:24, where John the Baptist's "baptism of repentance" is presented as a necessary precursor to the salvation brought about by the arrival of Christ:

⁹⁴ It is difficult to decide the exact meaning of the term ἡερικον in this context. The suggestions have been many, including "disposition propre" (Sevrin, *L'Exégèse de l'âme*, 71), "proper character" (Layton and Robinson, "Expository Treatise," 155), "ursprüngliche Beschaffenheit" (Kulawik, *Die Erzählung*, 43), "Eigentlichkeit" (H. Bethge, "Die Exegese," 100; Franke, "Die Erzählung," 272), "Individualität" (Krause and Labib, *Gnostische und hermetische Schriften*, 75).

⁹⁵ It has been argued that this is the main theme of the tractate (see Wisse, "On Exegesis," 68–81, esp. 75; see also PHEME PERKINS, *Gnosticism and the New Testament* [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993], 171–177).

ΤΑΡΧΗ ΓΑΡ ἸΠΟΥΧΔΔΕΙ ΠΕ ΤΜΕΤΑΝΟΙΑ ΔΙΑ ΤΟΥΤΟ ΖΑΓΕΡΗ ἸΤΠΑΡΟΥΣΙΑ ἸΠΕΧΡῸ
 ΔΑΙ ἸΝῸΩΖΑΝΝΗΝ [ΕΥ]ΚΗΡΥΣΣΕ ἸΠΒΑΠΤΙΣΜΑ ἸΤΜΕΤΑΝΟΙΑ ΤΜΕΤΑΝΟΙΑ ΔΕ
 ΟΥΔΑΩΠΕ ΖἸΝΟΥΛΥΠΗ ἸΝῸΥἸΚΑΖ ἸΖΗΤ

For the beginning of salvation is repentance. Therefore, “before the arrival of Christ, John came, preach[ing] the baptism of repentance.”⁹⁶ And repentance comes about in pain and grief. (*Exeg. Soul* 135.21–26)

We shall later return to the intertextual implications of *Exeg. Soul*'s comment that repentance involves pain and grief, a theme that is especially pervasive in the homiletic part towards the end of the tractate and which here recalls both 2 Cor 7:10 and John 16:20–22,⁹⁷ but first we shall consider *Exeg. Soul*'s interpretation of baptism.

Exeg. Soul introduces baptism in a rather unique way, utilising the womb imagery that is such an integral part of the conceptual blend THE SOUL IS A WOMAN as it is employed in this text:

ΕΡΩΔΑΓΜΗΤΡΑ ΘΕ ἸΤΥΧΗ ΤΚΤΟΣ ΖἸΠΟΥΩΩ ἸΠΕΙΩΤ ΕΠΣΑ ΝΕΟΥΝ
 ΟΥΑΡΕΡΒΑΠΤΙΖΕ ΑΥΩ ἸΤΟΥΝΟΥ ΟΥΔΑΤΟΥΒΟ ΕΠΔΩΖἸ ἸΠΣΑ ΝΒΟ[Λ] ΠΑΕΙ
 ΕΝΤΑΥΑΒΥ ΕΧΩΣ ἸΘΕ ἸΝῸΩ[ΤΗΝ ΕΥ]ΟΥΔ[Λ]ΩΩΜ ΟΥΑΥΤΕΛΟΥ ΕΠ[ΜΟΥ ΑΥΩ
 ἸΕ]ΕΚΤΟΥ⁹⁸ ΟΥΑΝΤΟΥἸΤΟΥΛΑΔΑΜ[Ε ΕΒΟΛ] ΑΥΩ ἸΣΕΤΟΥΒΟ ΠΤΟΥΒΟ ΔΕ ἸΤΥΧΗ
 ΠΕ ΔΙΤΕΣΜἸ[Β]Ἰ[Ρ]Ε ΟἸ ἸΠΕΣΦΥΣΙΚΟΝ ἸΟΥΡΠ ἸΚΤΟΣ ἸΚΕΟΠ ΠΑΕΙ ΠΕ
 ΠΕΣΒΑΠΤΙΣΜΑ

So, when the womb of the soul turns itself, by the will of the Father, to the inside, she is baptised and immediately she is cleansed of the defilement of the outside, this which was pressed upon her, like [garments when they are filthy] are lifted into the [water and] are turned⁹⁹ until their dirt [is] brought [out] and they are cleansed, but the cleansing of the soul is to receive again her newness of her original nature and to turn herself again, this is her baptism. (*Exeg. Soul* 131.27–132.2)

The soul is here described as being washed like a garment in the waters of baptism. The cleansing of the soul is thus connected to the ritual act of baptism by means of the metaphorical blend BAPTISM IS WASHING

⁹⁶ Cf. Acts 13:24.

⁹⁷ Cf. also Acts 2:38 for another connection between repentance and baptism.

⁹⁸ I follow here Layton's reconstruction (for the rationale behind it, see Layton, “Dirty Garment”). Frederik Wisse, on the other hand, proposes the following reconstruction: ΟΥ[ΤΗΝ ΕΥ]ΟΥΔ[Λ]ΩΩΜ ΟΥΑΥΤΕΛΟΥ ΕΠ[ΩΝΕ (?) ΑΥΩ ἸΕ]ΕΚΤΟΥ, which he translates as: “Just as a [garment, when it is] dirty, is set upon a [stone (?) and] turned until its dirtiness is brought out and it is clean” (Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 73).

⁹⁹ Layton's translation of ἸΣΕΤΟΥΒΟ as “made to go about” (Layton, “Dirty Garment”) here obscures *Exeg. Soul*'s important rhetoric of turning.

in a metonymically motivated metaphorical blend (see fig. 8), where water serves as a material anchor.¹⁰⁰ In this conceptual integration network, water, cleansing, and immersion, which are found in both inputs, are fused in the blend, and there are mappings of counterpart relations between soul and garment and between sins and dirt. There are here several kinds of outer-space vital relations, both analogy, identity, and part-whole, between the input spaces. Importantly, two of the counterpart-relations are also identical with two conventional metaphors that were widely used in early Christianity, namely *SIN IS DIRT* and *THE SOUL IS A GARMENT*.¹⁰¹ In the blend, it is the concrete relationship between the elements in the washing input, i.e., the garment, the dirt, and the cleansing action in water, that structures the relationship between the ritual act of baptism and the effect this has upon the soul, and thus also, by way of backwards projection, the understanding of the effects of baptism on the soul in the baptism input. Thus, in baptism, sins are removed from the soul like dirt, and the soul is washed like a garment.

This use of the *BAPTISM IS WASHING* blend also primes the reader's memory of other well-known uses of the motif of the soul as a garment, and has the potential to bring to mind the richness of the garment-metaphor with its wider implications and its diverse use in early Christian literature, particularly in connection with baptism.¹⁰² The existence and

¹⁰⁰ For the metonymic motivation of metaphors, see, e.g., Günter Radden, "How Metonymic Are Metaphors?" in *Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison and Contrast* (ed. René Dirven and Ralf Pörings; Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2003), 407–434; Antonio Barcelona, "On the Plausibility of Claiming a Metonymic Motivation for Conceptual Metaphor," in *Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroads: A Cognitive Perspective* (ed. Antonio Barcelona; Topics in English Linguistics 30; Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2000), 1–28.

¹⁰¹ The only direct use of the garment-metaphor in *Exeg. Soul* appears here in connection with baptism. Unfortunately the manuscript has lacunae at critical points in this passage. The actual word for garment, *οὐτήν*, has had to be reconstructed, but in this case the reconstruction seems quite safe (see Layton, "Dirty Garment," 155 n. 2). For a rationale for Layton's reconstruction of this passage and an account of the washing practices of the period, see Layton, "Dirty Garment."

¹⁰² On the garment metaphor, see e.g. Layton, "Dirty Garment"; Nils Alstrup Dahl and David Hellholm, "Garment-Metaphors: The Old and the New Human Being," in *Antiquity and Humanity: Essays on Ancient Religion and Philosophy: Presented to Hans Dieter Betz on His 70th Birthday* (ed. Adela Yarbro Collins and Margaret M. Mitchell; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 139–158; Jonathan Z. Smith, "The Garments of Shame," *HR* 5 (1966): 217–238; Sebastian P. Brock, "Clothing Metaphors as a Means of Theological Expression in

popularity of the image of the soul as a garment and its frequent use in baptismal contexts could thus be said to contribute to the effectiveness of the, to our knowledge, relatively unconventional way it is used in *Exeg. Soul*, on the one hand making it easier to grasp the basic metaphor underlying it, while contributing to the impact of its unusual aspect on the other.

The washing action in the framing washing input includes the information that the garment is turned. This is an aspect of some significance. In the BAPTISM IS WASHING blend, the soul is metaphorically a garment. However, the soul is not just a garment, but first and foremost a woman. This range of the target ICM—the fact that the target ICM is blended with different source ICMs—is exploited to interesting effect.¹⁰³ In *Exeg. Soul*'s description of baptism, this double metaphorical identification of the soul as both a woman and a garment is blended within the overall BAPTISM IS WASHING blend (see fig. 9 for this blend-within-the-blend). This is facilitated by a metonymic tightening¹⁰⁴ of the projection from the source ICM of WOMAN which causes a shift from THE SOUL IS A WOMAN, to THE SOUL IS A WOMB.¹⁰⁵ The subsequent blending of the latter with THE SOUL IS A GARMENT creates a temporary fusion in the blend of the image of the womb and that of the garment, a fusion which exists only in the blended space.¹⁰⁶ This blended space can further be conceived of as existing within the washing input space of the BAPTISM IS WASHING

Syriac Tradition,” in *Typus, Symbol, Allegorie bei den östlichen Vätern und ihren Parallelen im Mittelalter* (ed. Margot Schmidt; Eichstätter Beiträge 4; Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1982), 11–38.

¹⁰³ See chapter 2 for a discussion of Zoltán Kövecses' concepts of the scope of the source and range of the target in metaphorical relations.

¹⁰⁴ For the concept of metonymic tightening, see Grady, et al., “Blending and Metaphor,” 108; Fauconnier and Turner, “Conceptual Integration Networks,” 171; Coulson and Oakley, “Blending Basics,” 186–188; Mark Turner and Gilles Fauconnier, “Metaphor, Metonymy, and Binding,” in *Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroads: A Cognitive Perspective* (ed. Antonio Barcelona; Topics in English Linguistics 30; Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2000), 133–145.

¹⁰⁵ This happens by way of the metonymy THE WOMB FOR THE WOMAN.

¹⁰⁶ John D. Turner, however, draws the conclusion that the womb of the soul is actually “the vehicle of the soul” which surrounds it “as a dirty and polluted garment” (John D. Turner, “Ritual in Gnosticism,” in *Gnosticism and Later Platonism: Themes, Figures, and Texts* [ed. John D. Turner and Ruth Majercik; SBLSymS 12; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2000], 104). This does not seem to be the case, however, for the identification of the womb with the garment seems rather to be a temporary mental representation cued by *Exeg. Soul* in order to highlight, by way of metaphor, certain aspects of the soul's baptism.

blend as it is constructed in *Exeg. Soul*. The resulting blend is significantly altered by the fact that the soul is already a product of several stages of blending, making the present baptismal network a complex multiple-scope one (see fig. 10).¹⁰⁷

In this larger blend, the turning of the garments in washing is fused with the turning of the womb of the soul in baptism. Interpreted within the contextual framework of the real world knowledge of the ICM of WASHING, more specifically the knowledge that in the washing of garments, the garments are often turned inside out, the implication is that the baptism of the soul involves the washing of the, now mentally fused, womb/garment in water, an action which then *ipso facto* involves the turning of the womb/garment inside-out.¹⁰⁸ We thus see how the basic metaphor BAPTISM IS WASHING, when it also involves the two metaphors THE SOUL IS A GARMENT and THE SOUL IS A WOMAN, can produce, by elaboration in the process of blending, such creative imagery as the turning inside-out of the womb of the soul in baptism.¹⁰⁹ This is facilitated by the exploitation of certain potential entailments of one of the basic metaphors underlying *Exeg. Soul*., namely THE SOUL IS A WOMAN, in a surreal but suggestive blend that constitutes a creative elaboration which is subsequently utilised in the unfolding narrative.

The agent of the effects of the washing/baptism is the Father. We saw from the passage quoted above that the soul is turned in accordance with “the will of the Father” (πογῶν ἡπειῶν),¹¹⁰ and in another passage the Father is referred to directly as the one who effects this turning, when it is stated that, “then the Father will have mercy on her and turn her womb from the outside, and he will again turn it inside.”¹¹¹

The image of the turning of the womb serves several purposes.¹¹² We have seen that it is a striking way to describe the transformation

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 279–308.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 73.

¹⁰⁹ Robinson admits that he does “not understand this figure of speech, of itself and in the present context.” According to Robinson, “the chief difficulty is that at this point in ExSoul one expects the sexual individuality to be nullified by restoration of the original androgynous union” (Robinson, “Exegesis on the Soul,” 115). Wisse calls it “a difficult and perhaps not entirely successful metaphor” (Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 73).

¹¹⁰ *Exeg. Soul* 131.27–29.

¹¹¹ *Exeg. Soul* 131.19–21.

¹¹² Scopello suggests that *Exeg. Soul* is here interpreting Gen 29:31 (Scopello, *L'Exégèse de l'âme*, 134).

of the characteristics of the soul from male into female, but an equally significant aspect of the womb-imagery is the way it functions to highlight certain aspects of the rhetorically important inside-versus-outside dichotomy. In *Exeg. Soul*, the outside has a negative valuation and is connected with things like matter, pollution, deception, and unimportance. The inside, on the other hand, is connected with positive things like spirit, purity, truth, and importance. Moreover, inside and outside are also associated with the directions up and down respectively.¹¹³ The womb of the soul is a central point of reference in showing “the outside” as bad and “the inside” as good and is also used to illustrate the change from the former to the latter condition.

The aspect of the opposition between the outside and the inside that is most closely connected to the specific metaphorical source input of THE WOMB, however, has to do with the soul’s receptivity of good seed and her procreative ability. While it is on the outside, the womb of the soul is polluted, receives bad seed, and bears children that are weak and stupid. Only after she is cleansed and her womb is turned toward the inside can the soul receive good seed and produce good children. The cleansing and turning of the womb in baptism are thus necessary preconditions for the soul’s unification with the Saviour and set the stage for further metaphors of salvation later on in the narrative. Thus, the outside-inside dichotomy also plays an important part in the imagery of turning that is of such great significance in the tractate’s rhetoric of conversion and redemption.

Exeg. Soul’s account of baptism follows its description of the soul’s life of sin and precedes her marriage with the Saviour. There is a logical transition in the text from the soul’s life of sin, via her baptismal purification, to her wedding, as baptism effects the necessary transition from the defilements of the soul in her former life to her new life with the Saviour. The process of baptism, including the turning of the womb, has the important function of setting the stage for this new marriage. Not only is the soul cleansed of her sins and turned into a proper female in this process, but the process is also described as a renewal, and

¹¹³ This alignment corresponds to the general conceptual metaphors GOOD THINGS ARE UP and BAD THINGS ARE DOWN (see Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture, and Body in Human Feeling* [Studies in Emotion and Social Interaction, Second Series; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000], 44; Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 14–21).

being renewed she is also turned into a virgin again,¹¹⁴ thus making her into a proper bride for the upcoming wedding.¹¹⁵

3.2. *Marriage and Procreation*

“The Nag Hammadi texts have reminded us,” Wayne Meeks observes, “of the extent to which the unification of opposites, and especially the opposite sexes, served in early Christianity as a prime symbol of salvation.”¹¹⁶ *Exeg. Soul* is certainly no exception in this regard, for in our tractate the soul becomes the bride, and subsequently wife, of Christ, who is correspondingly the bridegroom and husband. The relationship between the soul and Christ is thus described primarily using framing inputs taken from the ICM of marriage.¹¹⁷ An understanding of *Exeg. Soul’s* account of the relationship between the soul and Christ thus relies on the recruitment of inputs from the MARRIAGE ICM and related ICMs, as well as intertextual inputs from Scripture evoked by the recruitment of these ICMs within the context of *Exeg. Soul’s* narrative of the soul’s salvation. Recruitment of inputs from marriage-related ICMs contributes,

¹¹⁴ Cf. Scopello, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 83. In Philo we find the closely related notion that God’s intercourse with the soul renews its virginity (see *Cher.* 50; Richard A. Baer, *Philo’s Use of the Categories Male and Female* [ALGH] 3; Leiden: Brill, 1970), 51–53, 75; see also Verna E.F. Harrison, “The Allegorization of Gender: Plato and Philo on Spiritual Childbearing,” in *Asceticism* [ed. Vincent L. Wimbush and Richard Valantasis; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995], 520–534).

¹¹⁵ William Robinson has argued that the cleansing of the soul has nothing to do with the sins of the soul described in the narrative prior to her purification, claiming that it is only connected to the marriage symbolism. Robinson holds that “instead of being set in motion by the preceding narrative, the wedding story seems to originate in theory,” a theory which according to Robinson is “the doctrine of deficiency as the mark of this earthly life” (see Robinson, “Introduction,” 138). There does not seem to be any necessary contradiction between such a theory and the function of the wedding story within the total narrative context of *Exeg. Soul*, however, and it seems unnecessary to create a rift between the preceding account of the soul’s life of sin and the following description of baptismal cleansing followed by marriage. Madeleine Scopello holds that the turning of the womb protects the soul from being polluted by her lovers (see Madeleine Scopello, “Jewish and Greek Heroines in the Nag Hammadi Library,” in *Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism* [ed. Karen L. King; SAC; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988], 73; Maddalena Scopello, “The Exegesis on the Soul [II,6]: Introduction,” in *The Nag Hammadi Library in English* [3rd revised ed.; ed. James M. Robinson; San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1990], 190), but it seems reasonably clear from the overall narrative that it is not the turning of the womb in itself that protects the soul, but rather her new husband.

¹¹⁶ Meeks, “Image of the Androgyne,” 165–166.

¹¹⁷ This ICM itself comprises the ICMs of wedding, procreation, etc.

for instance, a great deal to one of the main underlying themes of the tractate, mentioned above, namely the theme of the soul's subordination to male power. By way of the marriage ICM the inference is made that the soul should submit to the authority of Christ in a manner analogous to the way a wife should submit to her husband. The soul without Christ is, on the contrary, described metaphorically as a prostitute and as an adulterous, fornicating, dysfunctional and category-transgressing woman. We will now take a closer look at the marriage-related blends in *Exeg. Soul*.

The main overarching blend in this regard is the single-scope, metaphorical blend CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A MARRIAGE WITH CHRIST (see fig. 11). Now, what does this blend tell us concerning *Exeg. Soul's* views on salvation and Christian life? As we shall see, this blend especially highlights aspects of power and hierarchical complementarity. Let us take a closer look at what the marriage with Christ implies for the soul. First we will look at the nature of the union between the soul and the Saviour. *Exeg. Soul* describes this relationship in interesting ways that rely on intertextual connections with a broad range of both Old and New Testament texts. The descriptions of the soul's bridegroom and spouse are important, and he is identified in seemingly contradictory terms. We have seen that the soul's original spouse is not only identified as her husband, but also as her brother.¹¹⁸ This fact is also explicitly stated with regard to her "new" husband:

απειωτ τῆνναγ ἡας εβολ εἰτῆε ἡπεεζοογτ ετεπεεσον πε πωορη ἡνισε

the Father sent her from heaven her husband who is her brother, the firstborn. (Exeg. Soul 132.7–9)

Later, this husband/brother is also directly identified as the Saviour:

εεσαρβῆρε σε σναβωκ εεραῖ εεεμογ επειωτ ἡἡπεεσον παει ἡτασογχαει εβολ ειτοοτῆ

So, when she becomes renewed she will ascend, praising the Father and her brother, this one by whom she was saved. (Exeg. Soul 134.25–28)

These references to the Saviour and bridegroom as the soul's brother serve to connect the soul's redeemed, married state with her original state together with the Father as a virginal daughter existing in a male-female pair. In this way, her new husband, the Saviour, is identified with her

¹¹⁸ See *Exeg. Soul* 133.3–6.

original brother and husband whom she left in the beginning. This means that the Saviour is identified with Adam, and it is the reunion with him in marriage that brings about the salvation of the soul:

ΠΑΛΙΝ ΟΝ ΑΠΕΕΓΓΑΜΟΣ ΣΟΥΓΖΟΥ ΕΞΟΥΝ ΕΝΟΥΕΡΗΥ ΑΥΩ ΔΤΨΥΧΗ ΖΩΤΡ̄ ΕΞΟΥΝ
 ΕΠΕΣΜΕΡΕΙΤ ΝΑΜΕ ΠΕΣΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ ἸΔΟΕΙΣ ΚΑΤΑΘΕ ΕΤΥΧΗΖ ΔΕΠΙΧΟΕΙΣ ΓΑΡ ἸΤΕΣΖΙΜΕ
 ΠΕ ΠΕΣΖΑΪ

Again this marriage has brought them together and the soul has united with her true love, her natural master, as it is written, “for the master of the woman is her husband.”¹¹⁹ (*Exeg. Soul* 133.6–10)

The further identification of this Adam, who is the soul’s saviour, brother, and husband, with Christ is never explicitly made in *Exeg. Soul*. Indeed, the name Christ (π̄αχρ̄) is mentioned just once in this tractate.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, the identification of the Saviour (π̄ωτηρ) with Christ is evident throughout the text. *Exeg. Soul* introduces its quotations of Jesus’ words in John 6:44¹²¹ and a paraphrase of his words in Matt 5:4, 6 and Luke 14:26¹²² by identifying them as the words of the Saviour, and also uses the phrase “the apostles of the Saviour” (ἡποστολος ἡπ̄ωτηρ) in its introduction of a New Testament paraphrase at *Exeg. Soul* 130.28–29,¹²³ all of which support the identification of *Exeg. Soul*’s Saviour with Christ.¹²⁴

Exeg. Soul’s account of the bridegroom who saves the bride, and the statement that “the master of the woman is her husband,” brings to mind several scriptural passages, chief among them Genesis 3:16, 1 Cor 7:4 and 11:3, and Eph 5:22–24, which, when taken together, both strengthen the theme of submission and the Adam-Christ connection. All these passages stress the subordination and submission of woman to man, the Genesis passage and the two New Testament ones treating Adam and Christ respectively in the role of the superordinate part. *Exeg. Soul*’s point

¹¹⁹ Cf. Gen 3:16; 1 Cor 7:4; 11:3; Eph 5:23.

¹²⁰ See *Exeg. Soul* 135.23.

¹²¹ See *Exeg. Soul* 134.34–135.4; cf. Majella Franzmann, *Jesus in the Nag Hammadi Writings* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 110.

¹²² See *Exeg. Soul* 135.16–21.

¹²³ The paraphrase in question, at *Exeg. Soul* 130.30, is of any of the following texts: Acts 15:20, 29; 21:25; 1 Thess 4:3; 1 Cor 6:18; 2 Cor 7:1.

¹²⁴ Sevrin, however, holds these quotations to be the work of a later redactor and claims that “seul le dossier d’attestations scripturaires contient des éléments explicitement chrétiens. En aucun cas le frère-époux n’est, même allusivement, rapproché du Christ” (Sevrin, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 30; and cf. *ibid.*, 58).

concerning the soul's need to submit to the authority of Christ in his role as husband and identified with Adam thus makes profound sense in light of these passages.¹²⁵

The motif of the bridegroom as the brother of the bride is found also in the Song of Songs, where the bridegroom addresses the bride as his sister (ἀδελφή),¹²⁶ while the motif of the bridegroom as the Saviour of the bride recalls Ephesians 5.¹²⁷ With Ephesians already primed from earlier references,¹²⁸ once the identification of the bridegroom as the soul's brother has been made, whether through the intertextual blend between *Exeg. Soul* and Genesis that furnishes the identification of Christ with Adam and the soul with Eve, or through the Song of Songs, the passage in Ephesians 5 about Christ the bridegroom is readily brought to mind and interpreted in light of this blend.¹²⁹

By means of intertextual connections to Genesis and First Corinthians, the pair constituted by the soul and Christ is effectively identified with the original pair of Adam and Eve, and Christ as Saviour is implicitly presented as a second Adam, simultaneously as, and intimately connected with, the identification of the soul with Eve. As it is presented in *Exeg. Soul*, the fall is thus not mapped onto the eating from the tree of knowledge,¹³⁰ but instead onto Eve's separation from Adam.¹³¹ Consequently, the soul's marriage with the bridegroom becomes a return to paradise, and to the situation before the fall, i.e., before Eve was separated from the original ἄνθρωπος. To sum up, the soul's original state entails existence in a male-female pair together with Adam, while the soul in her fallen state exists as a lone female who, contrary to her nature, has male characteristics, fornicating and prostituting herself with a multi-

¹²⁵ Cf. Elaine H. Pagels, "Adam and Eve, Christ and the Church: A Survey of Second Century Controversies Concerning Marriage," in *The New Testament and Gnosis: Essays in Honour of Robert McL. Wilson* (ed. A.H.B. Logan and A.J.M. Wedderburn; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1983), 159.

¹²⁶ Cant 4:9, 12; 5:1–2 (cf. Scopello, *L'Exégèse de l'âme*, 136).

¹²⁷ For the contrary view that this motif in *Exeg. Soul* is independent of Ephesians, see Robinson, "Introduction," 140.

¹²⁸ Cf. *Exeg. Soul* 131.9–13.

¹²⁹ In light of this important Adam-Christ rhetoric in *Exeg. Soul*, I take all the references to the soul's brother to refer to both her original brother and husband, Adam, and Christ, the Saviour, bridegroom and second Adam. I thus disagree with Wilson who thinks that the reference to the soul's brother (πρῶτον) in 134.27, which he mistakenly reads as "her brothers" in plural, "derives from the gnostic myth of the fall of Sophia" (Wilson, "Old Testament Exegesis," 223).

¹³⁰ Cf., however, Arthur, *Wisdom Goddess*, 42, who argues that this is in fact the case.

¹³¹ I.e., the creation of woman in Gen 2:21–23.

tude of adulterers. The redeemed soul, on the other hand, is once again the female part of a male-female pair, this time together with Christ, the second Adam.

We saw above that the Genesis accounts of the creation of woman and of Eve's transgression are blended in the interpretation of *Exeg. Soul*. In addition, the punishment of Eve in Gen 3:16 may be recalled in *Exeg. Soul's* description of the soul's troublesome childbirth:

ΤΟΤΕ ΣΝΑΡΑΡΧΕΙ ΝΒΩΛΚ ΕΡΟΣ ΟΥΔΑΤῚ ΝΘΕ ΝΝΕΤΩΔΑΥΜΙΣΕ ΝΤΕΥΝΟΥ
ΕΥΩΔ.ΧΠΕΠΩΗΡΕ ΩΑΥΚΟΤΟΥ ΕΡΟΟΥ ΟΥΔΑΥ ΖΝΝΟΥΒΛΚΕ

Then she will start to rage at herself like those who give birth. Immediately when they give birth to the child they turn upon themselves in anger.

(*Exeg. Soul* 132.2–5)

According to Gen 3:16, God's punishment of Eve involved travail in childbirth, desire for her husband, and submission to his rule. The first of these punishments is echoed in *Exeg. Soul* 132.2–5, quoted above, and the latter two are, as we have seen, important themes throughout the tractate.¹³²

When it comes to the nature of the relationship between the soul and Christ, we may note once again the contrast between the way the soul is treated by the adulterers and by her true husband. The former are described as uncaring and even violent, while the latter is described as a wise and loving husband. Correspondingly, while the soul is driven by passions and lust with the adulterers, she is driven by love and repentance together with the Saviour. It is small wonder, then, that the soul henceforth does her best to make the bridegroom stay with her. As *Exeg. Soul* puts it,

ΑΚΚΟΣΜΕΙ ΜΜΟΣ ΝΖΟΥΟ ΩΙΝΑ ΕΣΝΑΡΕΝΑΥ ΝῚΩ ΖΑΤΟΟΤῚ

she greatly adorned herself so that it might please him to stay with her.

(*Exeg. Soul* 133.14–15)

This effort to make the bridegroom stay also mirrors the preparations for the soul's wedding, and the wedding itself, which may be regarded as a significant entailment of the CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A MARRIAGE WITH CHRIST blend, is important.

¹³² The passage might also conceivably bring to mind Ps 4:5 LXX and Hos 7:14. For a discussion of these verses, see Michael L. Barré, "Hearts, Beds, and Repentance in Psalm 4:5 and Hosea 7:14," *Bib* 76 (1995): 53–62.

3.2.1. *Wedding Feast and Bridal Chamber*

The metaphorical CHRISTIAN INITIATION IS A WEDDING blend (see fig. 12) can be regarded as a blend within the overarching CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A MARRIAGE WITH CHRIST network. Metaphors relying on framing inputs from marriage and wedding ICMs are indeed central to *Exeg. Soul*, and in relation to the soul's wedding the tractate also describes her wedding preparations. In an intriguing passage *Exeg. Soul* tells us that:

ΔΑΚΩ ΜΕΝ ΝΩΣ ΝΤΕΣΠΟΡΝΙΑ ΝΩΡΠ ΔΑΤΟΥΒΟΣ ΔΑΔΩΡΜ̄ ΝΝΗΘΕΙΚ ΔΑΡΒΡΡΕ
 ΔΕ ΔΥΜΝΤΩΔΕΕΤ ΔΑΤΟΥΒΟΣ ΖΗΜΑ ΝΩΔΕΕΤ ΔΑΜΑΡΥ ΝΑΤΝΟΥΦΕ ΔΑΖΜΟΟΣ
 ΝΖΟΥΝ ΝΖΗΤῆ ΕΣΩΩΤ ΕΒΟΛ ΖΗΤῆ ΜΠΡΜΩΔΕΕΤ ΜΜΕ ΟΥΚΕΤΙ ΣΠΗΤ ΖΗΤΑΓΟΡΑ
 ΕΣΚΟΙΩΝΕΙ ΜΠΕΤῆΟΥΩΥ

She abandoned her former prostitution, and she cleansed herself of the defilements of the adulterers, and she became renewed to be suitable as a bride.¹³³ She cleansed herself in the place of marriage, filled it with perfume, and sat within it waiting for the true bridegroom. No longer does she run around in the marketplace¹³⁴ having communion with whomever she wants
 (*Exeg. Soul* 132.10–17)

The soul is then cleansed and renewed in baptism, as we have seen, but the bridegroom, whom she can no longer remember, she only receives after having waited a while for him in fearful anticipation, and after having dreamed of him:

ΔΑΩ ΕΣΩΩΤ ΕΒΟΛ ΖΗΤῆ ΔΕΑΩ ΝΖΟΥ ΕΦΝΗΝΥ ΕΑΡῆΟΤΕ ΖΗΤῆ ΝΕΣΣΟΟΥΝ ΓΑΡ
 ΔΑ ΜΠΕΦΕΙΝΕ

She continued waiting for him, “When is he coming?” fearing him, for she did not know what he looked like.
 (*Exeg. Soul* 132.17–19)

This description may serve to recruit intertextual input spaces from the parable of the Ten Virgins (Matt 25:1–13) and Ephesians. First of all it recalls Matt 25:13 with its exhortation to the ten virgins to watch for the coming of the bridegroom on the grounds that “you know neither the day nor the hour” (ΝΤΕΤΝΩΟΟΥΝ ΔΑ ΜΠΕΖΟΥ ΟΥΤΕ ΤΕΥΝΟΥ). This connection between *Exeg. Soul* and the parable is strengthened further through subsequent intertextual blends. Another New Testament passage that is easily evoked here and elsewhere in *Exeg. Soul* is Eph 5:22–33 concerning wives and husbands. In this particular case it is Eph 5:33, with its admo-

¹³³ The text literally states that “she became renewed to brideness.”

¹³⁴ Note the possible allusion to Cant 3:2.

nition that a woman should “fear her husband” (ῤῥοτε ρητῆ ἡπερδαῖ), that is called up through *Exeg. Soul*’s reference to the soul fearing the bridegroom. Eph 5:33 itself follows on the heels of the description of the relationship between man and woman and their becoming “a single flesh” (οὐσαρῆ ἡογωτ) as a great “mystery” (μυστηριον) that also refers to the relationship between Christ and the church,¹³⁵ a passage that is also evoked elsewhere in *Exeg. Soul*.

Finally, after much tribulation, the soul receives her bridegroom and saviour. His coming down to the soul is an event that is described in quite puzzling terms:

τοτε σε πῤῥωλεετ καταπογωω ἡπειωτ αχει επιτῆ ωαροσ ερουν επιμα
ἡωλεετ ετσετωτ αφοσμη δε ἡπηνιμφων

So then, according to the will of the Father, the bridegroom came down to her into the place of marriage which was prepared, and he adorned the bridal chamber.
(*Exeg. Soul* 132.23–27)

The interpretation of this passage is complicated by the fact that the text uses two different terms, one Coptic and one Greek, μα ἡωλεετ and νυμφων (νυμφών) respectively, which may both be translated as “bridal chamber.” But should we treat the two terms as they are used in *Exeg. Soul* as synonyms,¹³⁶ or should we rather construe them as having different referents or functions? If the terms have different referents, then what might they be? And if they are to be interpreted as synonyms, then why does *Exeg. Soul* use both terms in the same passage? Since the text does in fact employ different terms, we should at least consider the possibility of differences in meaning, which is why I have chosen to distinguish the two in my translation by rendering μα ἡωλεετ as “place of marriage,” and reserving the term “bridal chamber” for νυμφων.

¹³⁵ See Eph 5:31–32.

¹³⁶ This is what, e.g., Robinson, Scopello, Sevrin, Krause, and Bethge do. Robinson translates both terms as “bridal chamber,” (Layton and Robinson, “Expository Treatise,” 157), Krause and Bethge translate both as “Brautgemach” (Krause, “Die Sakramente,” 55; H. Bethge, “Die Exegese,” 100), while Scopello, Sevrin, and Kasser use the French equivalent, “chambre nuptiale” (Scopello, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 107–108; Sevrin, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 73; Kasser, “La gnose,” 39). Franke, however, translates μα ἡωλεετ as “Brautgemach,” while rendering νυμφων as “Hochzeitssaal” (see Franke, “Die Erzählung,” 273), and Kulawik translates “Brautgemach” and “Hochzeitgemach” respectively (see Kulawik, *Die Erzählung*, 45). In comparison, *Gos. Phil.* employs three different Greek terms that are usually translated by scholars as “bridal chamber,” namely κοιτών, νυμφών, and παστός, but the Coptic term μα ἡωλεετ is not found there. In *Auth. Teach.* we do find μα ἡωλεετ, but none of the Greek terms.

It is of course possible that the variation in terms is due to stylistic reasons, simply in order to vary the language and avoid unnecessary repetition of the term μα ἡμελεετ, but before we jump to this conclusion we should give due consideration to the possible differences in meaning in the way the two terms are employed in the current context. The Coptic word μελεετ in itself means both “bride” and “marriage” and can be used, as evidenced in the Sahidic New Testament, to translate the Greek words γάμος, νύμφη, and γυνή.¹³⁷ The phrase μα ἡμελεετ literally means “place of marriage” and can be used as a translation of the Greek terms νυμφών and παστός, but it too can be used to translate the Greek γάμος.¹³⁸ Moreover, the Greek phrase ἔνδυμα γάμου, “wedding garments” (Matt 22:11,12), is rendered ρβσω ἡμα ἡμελεετ in the Sahidic New Testament, which, in addition to “wedding garment,” may thus also conceivably be understood as “garment of the place of marriage” or “garment of the bridal chamber.”

An intertextual analysis may help us discover a possible rationale for the use of the two terms νυμφών and μα ἡμελεετ in the passage in question. Looking at the parable of the Wedding Feast (Matt 22:1–14), what is rendered as γάμος in verses 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 in the Greek version of the New Testament is translated as μα ἡμελεετ in the Sahidic version. As for νυμφών, a term *Exeg. Soul* uses just once, at 132.26–27, quoted above, it is used in neither the Septuagint nor the Sahidic New Testament.¹³⁹ In the Greek New Testament, however, we find it in a textual variant of Matt 22:10, where it is used instead of γάμος.¹⁴⁰ In other words, both terms seem to point us in the direction of the parable of the Wedding Feast in Matthew 22:1–14. Let us therefore consider the possible implications of reading our passage in *Exeg. Soul* intertextually with Matt 22:1–14.

Exeg. Soul does not seem to be interested in the broader context of the parable of the Wedding Feast, but seems content merely to refer to the

¹³⁷ See Wilmet, *Concordance*, 3:1196–1197.

¹³⁸ See Crum 560b–561a; Wilmet, *Concordance*, 3:1197.

¹³⁹ It is, however, attested at Matt 9:15 in the Codex Schøyen version of Matthew in the Middle Egyptian (M) dialect of Coptic (see Hans-Martin Schenke, *Das Matthäus-Evangelium im mittelägyptischen Dialekt des Koptischen [Codex Schøyen]* [Manuscripts in the Schøyen Collection 2, Coptic Papyri 1; Oslo: Hermes, 2001], 50). The Middle Egyptian dialect is also referred to by some as Oxyrhynchite (see Ariel Shisha-Halevy, “Future, Present, Narrative Past”).

¹⁴⁰ See NA²⁷. It is also found in the three parallel passages Matt 9:15, Mark 2:19 and Luke 5:34, but these passages do not seem to be relevant for an intertextual understanding of the use of the term νυμφών in *Exeg. Soul*.

general idea of God holding a wedding feast for his son, the preparation of the place of marriage and the importance of the wedding garments. I will split the *Exeg. Soul* passage in two and analyse them one part at a time:

ΤΟΤΕ ΘΕ ΠΡῪΦΕΛΕΕΤ ΚΑΤΑΠΟΥΩΩ ἩΠΕΙΩΤ ΔΧΕΙ ΕΠΙΤῪ ΦΑΡΟΣ ΕΞΟΥΝ ΕΠΜΑ
ἩΦΕΛΕΕΤ ΕΤΣῪΤΩΤ

So then, according to the will of the Father, the bridegroom came down to her into the place of marriage which was prepared.

(*Exeg. Soul* 132.23–26)

The most obvious intertext to this passage is Matt 22:8: πμα ἩΦΕΛΕΕΤ ΜΕΝ ΣῪΤΩΤ, “the place of marriage is prepared.”¹⁴¹ In addition, *Exeg. Soul* may here once again evoke the parable of the Ten Virgins (Matt 25:1–13), which should already have been primed by the direct activation of Matt 25:13 in the above mentioned blend with *Exeg. Soul* 132.17–19. In this context it is especially Matt 25:10, “the bridegroom came and those who were prepared went in with him to the place of marriage” (ΔΧΕΙ ἩΣΙΠΑΤΦΕΛΕΕΤ ΔΧΩ ΝΕΤΣῪΤΩΤ ΔΧΒΩΚ ΕΞΟΥΝ ἩἸΜΑΔ ΕΠΜΑ ἩΦΕΛΕΕΤ), that is recalled, and which may thus set up an intertextual multiple-scope blend (see fig. 13) that also serves to strengthen the mental connections already established between *Exeg. Soul* and the parable of the Ten Virgins.

In the second part of our *Exeg. Soul* passage we encounter the term ΝΥΜΦΩΝ:

ΔΧΚΟΣΜΕΙ ΔΕ ἩΠΝΥΜΦΩΝ

And he adorned the bridal chamber.

(*Exeg. Soul* 132.26–27)

As mentioned above, a variant of Matt 22:10 has “the bridal chamber (νυμφών) was filled with guests.” Based on this variant reading of the parable of the Wedding Feast (Matt 22:1–14), which uses both γάμος and νυμφών, we could read μα ἩΦΕΛΕΕΤ in *Exeg. Soul* as a translation of γάμος, and we might further regard μα ἩΦΕΛΕΕΤ as being a more general term in relation to the more specific term νυμφών. The reference to both ΝΥΜΦΩΝ and ΚΟΣΜΕΙ in *Exeg. Soul* 132.26–27 may thus in this context serve as a cue for bringing to mind the discussion in Matt 22:10–14 concerning the man who lacks wedding garments. In this scriptural

¹⁴¹ The Greek has ὁ μὲν γάμος ἕτοιμός ἐστιν. Cf. also Matt 22:4: πάντα ἕτοιμα δεῦτε εἰς τοὺς γάμους / “everything is ready; come to the marriage feast”. The Sahidic version of this is ἡκα ἡν σῪΤΩΤ ΔΗΝΙΤῪ ΕΤΦΕΛΕΕΤ, which may be understood as either “everything is prepared, come to the marriage (or: marriage feast),” or “everything is ready, come to the bride.”

passage it is made clear that it is a very serious offence indeed not to wear wedding garments at the wedding feast, for it results in being thrown “into the outer darkness” (Matt 22:13). By having the Saviour come down to the soul in the $\mu\alpha \bar{\nu}\omega\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\epsilon\tau$ and adorning (i.e., dressing) the $\nu\gamma\mu\phi\omega\mu$, *Exeg. Soul* directs attention to the Matthean parable and attributes the Saviour with acting to prevent such a fate—which again recalls the inside-outside dichotomy discussed above—by virtue of his dressing activity. However, the fact that *Exeg. Soul* has the Saviour adorn / dress the bridal chamber ($\pi\eta\gamma\mu\phi\omega\mu$), rather than the bride ($\tau\eta\gamma\mu\phi\eta$), is still puzzling.¹⁴² This could conceivably be due to an error in the transmission of the text,¹⁴³ and if we emend $\pi\eta\gamma\mu\phi\omega\mu$ to $\tau\eta\gamma\mu\phi\eta$, this would give us a straightforward reference to the soul as the bride of Christ the Saviour, and the latter dressing the former. Without evidence to the contrary, however, I think we should primarily trust the manuscript and work from the assumption that this is not an error. Retaining the reading $\pi\eta\gamma\mu\phi\omega\mu$ we may still understand the passage in much the same way as if we emend it, but with a twist, as this reading has the potential to provoke additional reflection on the part of the reader. For if the Saviour adorns not simply the soul as bride, but rather the bridal chamber, then how are we to understand the nature and identity of the bridal chamber?

When trying to be more specific concerning the target referents for $\mu\alpha \bar{\nu}\omega\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\epsilon\tau$ and $\nu\gamma\mu\phi\omega\mu$, we are, however, venturing into more speculative territory. Some possibilities may nevertheless be outlined. Since the bridal chamber is here described as being adorned / dressed, it would seem to be possible to understand the bridal chamber ($\pi\eta\gamma\mu\phi\omega\mu$) as the body within which the soul unites with Christ,¹⁴⁴ and consequently that

¹⁴² As Wisse notes, “It is peculiar to read in 132,26 f. that the groom decorated the bridal chamber ($\nu\gamma\mu\phi\omega\mu$) after it had been stated in the preceding sentence that he came down to the ready (!) bridal chamber ($\mu\alpha \bar{\nu}\omega\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\epsilon\tau$)” (Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 74).

¹⁴³ If the use of $\pi\eta\gamma\mu\phi\omega\mu$ in *Exeg. Soul* is an error, it is more likely to have been made by the translator, rather than the scribe of Nag Hammadi Codex II, since the difference between the two Greek terms when rendered in Coptic also involves a difference in grammatical gender.

¹⁴⁴ If we are right to identify the bridal chamber with the body, such use of the term would then be similar to what we find in the Syriac tradition, not least in Ephrem, who, with clear Eucharistic connotations, refers to the human body as the bridal chamber where the soul mingles with Christ the Bridegroom (see Thomas Koonamakkal, “Ephrem’s Polemics on the Human Body,” in *Ascetica, Gnostica, Liturgica, Orientalia: Papers Presented at the Thirteenth International Conference on Patristic Studies Held in Oxford 1999* [ed. Maurice F. Wiles and Edward Yarnold; StPatr 35; Leuven: Peeters, 2001], 432).

the dressing of the bridal chamber may refer to an adorning/dressing of the body. Understood in this way, and considering the clear connection in *Exeg. Soul* between the marriage preparations and baptism, it is possible to understand this adorning/dressing of the bridal chamber to refer to a postbaptismal dressing in white garments as attested in numerous early Christian sources. While this interpretation does not depend upon seeing μα νῶελεετ and νῦμφων as having different referents, μα νῶελεετ might in such a context be regarded as a reference to the place of the marriage in a wider sense, and perhaps as a reference to the place where baptism and the marriage with the Saviour take place. It would, for example, make sense to interpret the μα νῶελεετ as a church building or baptistery where the soul is baptised, cleansed, and wedded to Christ in the complete Christian rites of initiation, and united with him, above all in the Eucharist. It may also, on similar grounds, denote the Christian rites of initiation as a whole.¹⁴⁵

3.2.2. *The (Re)union*

The significance of the marriage (γάμος) between the soul and the Saviour is repeatedly stressed throughout *Exeg. Soul*. The tractate states that the soul will become one in a lasting union with her true bridegroom, which constitutes a return to the original male-female state, and emphasises that they will be satisfied in their communion with each other:

εΠΓΑΜΟC ΓΑΡ ΕΤῆΜΑΥ ΕΦΩΟΡΠ ΑΝ ἸΘΕ ἸΠΓΑΜΟC ἸCΑΡΚΙΚΟC ΝΕΤΑΡΚΟΙΝΩΝΕΙ
 ΜῆΝΟΓΕΡΗΥ ΦΑΥCΙ ἸΤΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ ΕΤῆΜΑΥ ΑΥΩ ἸΘΕ ἸΝΙΕΤΠΩ ΦΑΥΚΩ ἸCΩΟΥ
 ἸΤΕΝΩΧΛΗCΙC [Ἰ]ΤΕΠΘΥΜΕΙΑ ΑΥΩ ἸCΕΤΚ[ΤΟ] Ἰ[ΝΟΥCΟ ΕΒ]ΟΛ ἸΝΟΓΕΡΗΥ ΑΛΛΑ
 ΠΕΕΙ[. . . .] . [Α]Ν ΠΕ ΠΕΕΙΓΑΜΟC ΑΛΛΑ ΕΥΦΑΝ[Π]ῚἸῚΩΤῚ ἈΝ[Ο]Υ[ΕΡΗ]Υ
 ΦΑΥΦΩΠΕ ΑΥΩΝῚ ΟΥΩΤ ΕΤΒΕΠΑΕΙ ΠΕΧΑΥ ἸΒΙΠΕΠΡΟΦΗΤΗC ΕΤΒΕΠΩΟΡΠ
 ῚῚΩΜΕ ΜῆΤΩΟΡΠ ἸCῚΙΜΕ ΧΕCΕΝΑΦΩΠΕ ΑΥCΑΡῚ ΟΥΩΤ ΝΕΥῚΟΤῚ ΓΑΡ ΕΝΟΓΕΡΗΥ
 ἸΦΩΟΡΠ ῚῚΤῚΠΕΙΩΤ ΕΜΠΑΤΕΤCῚΙΜΕ CΩΡΜ ἸΦΟΟΥΤ ΕΤΕΠΕCΟΝ ΠΕ

For that marriage is not like the fleshly marriage. (In the fleshly marriage,) those who will have communion with each other have enough of that (fleshly) communion and like burdens they leave behind them the annoyance [of] the desire and they [turn their faces from] each other, but this [...] is [not] this marriage, but when they unite with [each other] they become a single life. Therefore the prophet says concerning the first man

¹⁴⁵ See, e.g., (Ps-) Theophilus of Alexandria, *Letter to Horsiesios*, 39, 44 (W.E. Crum, ed. and trans., *Der Papyruscodex saec. VI–VII der Philippusbibliothek in Cheltenham* [Schriften der Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft in Straßburg 18; Straßburg: Karl J. Trübner, 1915], 12, 13).

and the first woman: “They shall become a single flesh.”¹⁴⁶ For they were at first united with each other beside the Father, before the woman lost the husband who is her brother. (*Exeg. Soul* 132.27–133.6)

The marriage (γάμος)¹⁴⁷ with the Saviour is described as being far superior to the soul’s former communion with adulterers and “wanton men,” against which it is compared at length, but it also compares favourably to “the fleshly marriage” (γάμος ἡσαρκικός). The use of this term in this context calls specifically to mind the source ICM of the metaphorical blend CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A MARRIAGE WITH CHRIST, pointing out some important differences between it and the target concept while stressing the metaphoricality of the blend.

Damage to the manuscript makes the quoted passage a difficult one to interpret. Frederik Wisse’s reconstruction of 132.32 as ἡσεται[πρωχοϋ εβ]ολ (“they do not [separate from]”)¹⁴⁸ makes good sense in conjunction with the text’s subsequent quotation of Gen 2:24 at 133.1–3: “they shall become a single flesh” (σεναωωπε αχαραϋ οϋωτ). The problem with this reconstruction is that it is impossible to reconcile with the presence of a faint trace of a superlinear stroke near the middle of the lacuna. The reconstruction in Layton’s edition of the text, which was suggested by Stephen Emmel, ἡσεται[το] ἡ[νογηο εβ]ολ, takes this fact into account,¹⁴⁹ but Robinson’s accompanying translation of the passage, where he understands τκοινωνια ετῆμαϋ (“that communion”) at 132.29–30 as a reference to the marriage between the soul and the Saviour,¹⁵⁰ does not make sense of the Genesis quotation, nor does it fit in with the overall rhetoric of *Exeg. Soul*. However, if we regard τκοινωνια ετῆμαϋ at 132.29–30 as

¹⁴⁶ Gen 2:24; cf. Matt 19:5; Mark 10:8; 1 Cor 6:16; Eph 5:31.

¹⁴⁷ In the Sahidic New Testament the Greek term γάμος is found only at Heb 13:4 and Rev 19:7 (see L.-Th. Lefort, *Concordance du Nouveau Testament Sahidique: I. Les mots d’origine Grecque* [CSCO 124, Subsidia 1; Leuven: Peeters, 1950], 54). Rev 19:7, which concerns the marriage of the lamb, fits well into the context of *Exeg. Soul*: “the marriage of the lamb has come and his bride has prepared herself” (αχει ἡσπγαμος ἡπεριεβ αϋω τεφωλεετ ασσοβτε ἡμος), while Heb 13:4 is notable for its condemnation of the fornicators and adulterers: “The marriage is honoured in all things and the bed pure, for God will judge the fornicators and the adulterers” (πγαμος ταῖηϋ ρῆζωβ νη αϋω πηα ἡῖκοτῆ τῆβηϋ ἡπορνος γαρ ἡῖῖνοῖκ νετερεππογτε ηακρῖνε ἡμοου).

¹⁴⁸ Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 75 n. 21; also followed by Sevrin, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 72 who has ἡσεται[πρωχοϋ εβ]ολ.

¹⁴⁹ Layton and Robinson, “Expository Treatise,” 156. For a survey of the different proposals for reconstructing this lacuna, see Kasser, “L’Histoire de l’Âme.” Kasser himself suggests αϋω ἡσεται[θ]ἡ[κο σε εβ]ολ ἡνογηρηϋ, which he translates “et (désormais) ils ne sont [plus tourmentés] l’un par l’autre” (*ibid.*, 75).

¹⁵⁰ See Layton and Robinson, “Expository Treatise,” 157.

a reference to “the fleshly marriage” (πῤαμος ἄσαρκικος), what we get is a contrast between “the fleshly marriage,” where the married couple tire of each other, and the marriage with Christ, where he and the soul become “a single life.” We thus see that this passage also provides us with a suitable contrast to 128.7–11, where the soul’s relationship with the adulterers is described using the imagery of turning. The imagery of turning is indeed pervasive throughout *Exeg. Soul*.¹⁵¹ As we have seen, the womb of the soul is turned, the soul turns her face, first from her original husband and then from successive fornicators, while the latter turn away from her after having had their way with her. In contrast to the soul and the adulterers, and in contrast to “the fleshly marriage,” the soul and her true husband, Christ, do not turn away from each other once they have been (re)united.¹⁵² Rather than tiring of each other like those who are united in “the fleshly marriage,” the soul and Christ truly become “a single life.” In contrast, Robinson’s interpretation reverses the meaning of the passage and hence does not fit the argument *Exeg. Soul* seems to be making here. Why would the soul and Christ turn their faces from each other? Granted, in this communion the soul renounces desire, but it does not seem appropriate for her to renounce the metaphorical intercourse with her true husband or desire for him. What the soul renounces is her desire to seek new lovers, since she is now fully satisfied with her communion with Christ, her true husband. Instead it is the common human couple who will eventually have enough of the desire for fleshly communion with each other, and who will therefore turn away from each other.

The contrast between the soul’s original and fallen states is thus not one between an original state of asexuality and a fallen state characterised by sexuality, but rather a contrast between the ideal γάμος and πορνεία, i.e., between a state of legitimate marital relationship versus illicit and fleeting relationships with a multitude of partners, relationships that are characterised by the text as prostitution, fornication, and adultery. *Exeg. Soul* makes clear that there *is* in fact such a thing as legitimate

¹⁵¹ Cf. Sevrin, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 47–48.

¹⁵² For the notion that that the marriage with Christ is a perpetual union where the married do not separate, and which is therefore much better than a human marriage, see Harrison, “Gender, Generation, and Virginity,” 52–53, who quotes a translation of Gregory of Nazianzus’ poem *Exhortatio ad virgines*, PG 37.632–634. Cf. also Aphrahat, *Dem.* VI:6 (PS I, 269:20–24) (see the translation in Kuriakose A. Valavanolickal, *The Use of the Gospel Parables in the Writings of Aphrahat and Ephrem* [Studies in the Religion and History of Early Christianity 2; Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1996], 183).

sexual intercourse for the soul, metaphorically speaking, but only with her true spouse, Christ. Everything else is characterised as πορνεία or μοιχεία.

The quoted passage from Gen 2:24, “they shall become a single flesh” (συνασώπη αἰσάρζ οὔωτ),¹⁵³ is a passage that is closely paraphrased in 1 Cor 6:16, Eph 5:31, and in the parallel accounts in Matt 19:5 and Mark 10:8, and its use in *Exeg. Soul* may recall any or all of these New Testament passages.¹⁵⁴ Especially the latter two passages, where Gen 2:24 is used by Jesus in an argument against divorce, blends easily with the rhetoric of *Exeg. Soul*. The potential blends created on the basis of 1 Cor 6:12–20 and Eph 5:22–33, on the other hand, address somewhat different concerns. Where the focus in Matt 19 and Mark 10 is on the wrongness of divorce, 1 Cor 6:16 cites Gen 2:24 in a metaphorical argument relating to idolatry. Here it is stated that if one joins with a prostitute one becomes one body with the prostitute, or likewise one body with Christ if one joins with him. The emphasis in First Corinthians on joining with Christ instead of the prostitutes is echoed in *Exeg. Soul*, and the concern with idolatry may also be of some importance in *Exeg. Soul* as well. As for Eph 5:31, it quotes Gen 2:24 within a different metaphorical argument relating to the joining of Christ and the church. While Eph 5’s collective focus seems to be rather different than *Exeg. Soul*’s focus on the individual soul, the insistence in Eph 5 on the wife’s submission to her husband blends perfectly with our Nag Hammadi tractate.

Finally, in view of the already established intertextual connections with First Corinthians, one might well in this context recall the statement in 1 Cor 7:2 that to avoid πορνεία every woman should have a husband, and 1 Cor 11:11 stating that “there is no woman without man, nor man without woman in the Lord” (ἡν̄ς̄ζ̄ῑμε̄ δ̄ξ̄ν̄ζ̄ο̄ο̄γ̄τ̄ ο̄γ̄δ̄ε̄ ζ̄ο̄ο̄γ̄τ̄ ἡ̄ο̄γ̄ε̄ω̄ν̄ς̄ζ̄ῑμε̄ ζ̄ḡπ̄λ̄ο̄ε̄ῑς).¹⁵⁵

3.2.3. Conception, Birth, and Rebirth

Another major group of metaphorical blends that are closely related to the MARRIAGE ICM consists of blends with inputs from the domain of

¹⁵³ *Exeg. Soul* 133.3.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. Elaine Pagels, who argues that *Exeg. Soul* reads Gen 2:23 f. “allegorically, primarily through Ephesians 5:21–33, often in conjunction with passages drawn from 1 Corinthians” (Pagels, “Adam and Eve, Christ and the Church,” 160).

¹⁵⁵ οὔτε γυνή χωρὶς ἀνδρὸς οὔτε ἀνὴρ χωρὶς γυναικὸς ἐν κυρίῳ.

procreation. When the soul is united in communion with the Saviour, she receives from him “the seed” (πεςπερμα) which makes her bear good children:

αγω ν̄ταρεσ̄ρκο[ι]νω̄νει ν̄μᾱα [α]σ̄χι ἡ̄πεςπερμα εβολ ριτοοτ̄ε̄ ετεπιπ̄ᾱ
 πε ετ̄τη̄ρο̄ φ̄αντες̄χπο̄ ν̄ρ̄νω̄ηρε εβολ̄ ν̄ρη̄τη̄ ε̄νᾱνο̄γο̄ῡ ἡ̄σ̄σ̄ανο̄γο̄ῡ
 πᾱεῑ γαρ̄ πε̄ π̄νο̄σ̄ ἡ̄τε̄λειον̄ ἡ̄θᾱγμᾱ ἡ̄χ̄πο̄ ρ̄ω̄στε̄ πε̄εῑγᾱμο̄σ̄ ε̄φ̄χ̄ω̄κ̄ ε̄βολ̄
 ρ̄η̄πο̄γω̄ω̄ ἡ̄πεῑω̄τ̄

And when she had communion with him she receive[d] the seed from him that is the life-giving spirit,¹⁵⁶ so that she gave birth to good children from it and nourished them. For this is the great perfect marvel of birth, as it is by the will of the Father that this marriage is fulfilled.

(*Exeg. Soul* 133.34–134.6)

Only with the Saviour can the soul produce good children. As long as she prostitutes herself and “has communion” (κοινωνεῖν) with others, her offspring are of a decidedly less than perfect nature:

νε̄ντᾱσ̄χ̄πο̄οῡ ε̄βολ̄ ρ̄η̄ν̄μο̄ιχο̄σ̄ ἡ̄κ̄ω̄φο̄σ̄ νε̄ ᾱγω̄ ρ̄η̄β̄λλᾱᾱγ̄ νε̄ ᾱγω̄ σε̄ο̄
 ἡ̄ρ̄η̄η̄λᾱχ̄λε̄χ̄ πο̄γ̄ρη̄τ̄ πο̄ω̄τ̄

those whom she bore from the adulterers are dumb and blind and sickly and mentally disturbed.

(*Exeg. Soul* 128.23–26)

Offspring generated by the soul from the “seed” provided by the Saviour are thus effectively contrasted with offspring resulting from her encounters with “the adulterers” (μοιχός).¹⁵⁷ Moreover, *Exeg. Soul* stresses that the Father sent her a husband from heaven “since she is a woman unable to engender children on her own” (ε̄πεῑ ο̄ῡσ̄ρῑμε̄ τε̄ ἡ̄ν̄σο̄μ̄ ᾱτ̄ρε̄σ̄χ̄πε̄ω̄η̄ρε̄ ο̄γᾱᾱτ̄ε̄).¹⁵⁸ The effectiveness of the imagery of Christ implanting “seed” in the soul at this point, and the subsequent imagery of childbirth, are both facilitated by the references to the anatomical detail of the womb earlier on in the text.¹⁵⁹

It is significant that the result of the soul’s communion with Christ is described in terms of conception and birth. The imagery of birth is here linked to the implanting of the seed by the Saviour and is described as “the great, perfect marvel of birth” (π̄νο̄σ̄ ἡ̄τε̄λειον̄ ἡ̄θᾱγμᾱ ἡ̄χ̄πο̄).¹⁶⁰ The latter comment seems slightly out of place in its immediate narrative

¹⁵⁶ Cf. John 6:63; 1 Cor 15:45.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Sevrin, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 107.

¹⁵⁸ See *Exeg. Soul* 132.6–8.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 73–74.

¹⁶⁰ *Exeg. Soul* 134.4–5.

context, however, prompting us to consider reading it as an allusion to John 3,¹⁶¹ with its discussion of rebirth through water and spirit. Especially John 3:7, “Do not marvel that I said to you, ‘You must be born again’” (ἡπρῶτον ἦρε δευτερογενεῖς γεννηθῆναι ἕνεκεν),¹⁶² with its combination of the themes of marvelling and rebirth, is easily evoked and creates a productive blend with this passage in *Exeg. Soul*.¹⁶³ When blending John 3 with the passage in *Exeg. Soul*, the process of salvation that *Exeg. Soul* refers to as “the great perfect marvel of birth” (πνοσ̄ ἡτελειον̄ ἡθαγμᾱ ἡχπο) is in the resulting blend mapped onto the rebirth through water and spirit mentioned by Jesus in John 3.

Exeg. Soul also deals with the question of rebirth more directly. Following a quotation of Ps 102:1–5 LXX, which concerns the renewal of the soul and its subsequent ascent, ending with the phrase “Your youth will be renewed like that of an eagle” (τενιτκογεῑ ναρβῆρε̄ ἡε̄ ἡταογαετος),¹⁶⁴ *Exeg. Soul* comments:

εσθαῖρβῆρε̄ σε̄ σναβωκ̄ ερρᾱ εσμοῦ̄ επειωτ̄ ἡἡπεσσον̄ παεῑ ἡτασογχαεῑ
εβολ̄ ριτοοτῆ̄ ταῑ τε̄ θε̄ ἡτῦγχῑ εσναογχαεῑ ριτηπεχπο̄ ἡκεσσῑ παεῑ
δε̄ εβολ̄ ρῆἡθαδε̄ αν̄ ἡασκησῑ εσθαεῑ ογδε̄ εβολ̄ αν̄ ρῆἡτεχνη̄
ογ[Δ]ε̄ ρῆσβω¹⁶⁵ ἡερᾱ ἡλλᾱ τχαρ[ι]ε̄ ἡπ[. . .]ε¹⁶⁶ ἡλλᾱ τλωρεᾱ
ἡππ[.]δε¹⁶⁷ πεειρωβ̄ γαρ̄ ογεῑ πε̄ ἡ[πσα] ἡτπε̄

So, when she becomes renewed she will ascend, praising the Father and her brother, this one by whom she was saved. Thus the soul will be saved through the rebirth. But this comes not from ascetic words nor from skills nor from written teaching, but the grace of [. . .], but the gift of [. . .].¹⁶⁸ For this thing is heavenly. (*Exeg. Soul* 134.25–34)

¹⁶¹ Sevrin, however, prefers to interpret this phrase as a reference to the (“Gnostic”) Pleromatic realities (Sevrin, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 107), rather than reading it intertextually with Scripture.

¹⁶² μὴ θαυμάσης ὅτι εἶπόν σοι δεῖ ὑμᾶς γεννηθῆναι ἄνωθεν.

¹⁶³ The intertextual connection between *Exeg. Soul* and John 3 is further strengthened by the fact that Jesus is referred to as the “bridegroom” (νυμφίος) at John 3:29.

¹⁶⁴ *Exeg. Soul* 134.24–25.

¹⁶⁵ The ρ in ρῆσβω is barely visible in the facsimile, but has been read with ultraviolet light (see Layton and Robinson, “Expository Treatise,” 160).

¹⁶⁶ Possible reconstructions include ἡπ[νογτ]ε̄, ἡπ[νογτε̄]ε̄, ἡπ[ειωτ̄]ε̄, ἡπ[πἡδ]ε̄, ἡπ[χοεῑς]ε̄. For the various suggested reconstructions, see appendix A.

¹⁶⁷ It seems probable that the first word of this lacuna should be restored ἡπ[ογτε̄], but the rest of the lacuna is highly uncertain. For the various suggested reconstructions, see appendix A. Sevrin, partly following Krause, reconstructs the passage as follows: τχαρ[ι]ε̄ ἡπ[ε]ἡ[ωτ̄]ε̄ ἡλλᾱ τλωρεᾱ ἡππ[εγμητικη̄ ντ]ἡε̄ (Sevrin, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 76), acknowledging that while the first part of the reconstruction (“the grace of [the father]”) is probable, the rest is guesswork (Sevrin, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 110).

¹⁶⁸ Cf. Eph 2:8–9.

This intriguing passage emphasises that salvation entails rebirth. The nature of this rebirth, however, is not clear. For a start, the phrase “the soul will be saved through the rebirth” (τῆς ψυχῆς σωθήσεται διὰ τῆς γενέσεως), is ambiguous, especially in light of the intertexts it evokes.

We have already seen that the soul is described, at the beginning of page 134, as giving birth to good children from the seed received in her communion with the Saviour. Now we are told near the bottom of the same page in the manuscript that salvation will be attained by means of rebirth. The use of the phrase διὰ τῆς γενέσεως, “through the rebirth,” is significant, since γενέσεως can here be understood not only as referring to the soul being reborn, but also to her giving birth again. The exact phrase γενέσεως (“the rebirth”) is attested only twice in the Sahidic New Testament, namely in Matt 19:28 and Titus 3:5,¹⁶⁹ in both instances as a translation of the Greek παλιγγενεσία.¹⁷⁰ In Matt 19:28, Jesus is presented as saying that those who follow him in “the rebirth” (γενέσεως) will be able to sit alongside him in heaven and will receive eternal life. The phrase “when she becomes renewed she will ascend” (*Exeg. Soul* 134:25–26) thus evokes both the preceding quotation of Ps 102:5 LXX, “Your youth will be renewed like that of an eagle,” and Jesus’ answer to the disciples in Matt 19:28. The soul who has been renewed through the rebirth is in this way identified with the eagle in the quoted Psalm, and in the blend the eagle/soul will ascend to heaven together with Christ.

But there are also other, even more relevant intertexts. In Titus 3:1–11, which has been described as an exhortation to training in Christian virtue,¹⁷¹ we find a very interesting passage that dovetails nicely with the concerns of *Exeg. Soul*:

ΝΕΝΟ ΓΑΡ ΨΩΩΝ ἡπίογοείω ἡάθητ ἡάτωωτῆ επλάνα ενο ἡζῆραλ ἡεπιθώμια
 μῆἡζγλδονη ετωοβε ενμοοωε ρῆνογκακία μῆογφθονος ενο ἡμεστε ενμοστε
 ἡνεενηγ ἡτερετῆἡτρηστος δε μῆτῆἡτῆαἡρωμε ογωἡε εβολ ἡππογτε
 πενωωτηρ εβολ αν ρῆεεεεβῆγε ἡδικαιοσύνη εανααγ ανον αλλα καταπεφνα
 αφτογδον ρῆτῆπχωκῆ ἡπεχπο ἡκεσοπ ἡτῆἡτῆρρε ἡπεπῆα ετογααβ παἡ
 ενταφπαρῆε εραἡ εχωκ ρῆογῆἡτῆἡμαο ρῆτῆἡε πεχῆ πενωωτηρ

¹⁶⁹ The connection between this passage in *Exeg. Soul* and Titus 3:5 and Matt 19:28 is also suggested by Scopello, *L'Exégèse de l'âme*, 39–40, 109.

¹⁷⁰ See Wilmet, *Concordance*, 3:1638–1639.

¹⁷¹ See PHEME PERKINS, “The Pastoral Epistles: 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus,” in *Eerdmans Commentary on the Bible* (ed. James D.G. Dunn and John W. Rogerson; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2003), 1444–1445.

For we too were at that time ignorant, disobedient, being in error, being slaves to the different desires and pleasures, walking in depravity and jealousy, being hated, hating one another. But when the goodness and the philanthropy of God our Saviour was revealed, not from works of righteousness which we have done ourselves, but according to his mercy, he saved us through the washing of the rebirth and the renewing of the Holy Spirit, which he poured upon us richly through Jesus Christ our Saviour (Titus 3:3–6)

This passage, which contains the only explicit reference to Christian ritual in the Pastoral Epistles,¹⁷² parallels our text in several interesting ways. First, the emphasis here on the point that salvation does not come from works done by the Christians themselves, but from the mercy of God, is similar to *Exeg. Soul's* statement that the soul's salvation is a "gift" (ΔΩΡΕΑ) and a "grace" (ΧΑΡΙΣ) and will not come from "practised words" (ΝΩΡΑΔΕ ΝΑΣΚΗΣΙΣ), "skills" (ΝΤΕΧΝΗ), or "written teaching" (ΣΩ ΝΣΖΑΙ). Moreover, the theme of renewal which is illustrated by *Exeg. Soul* partly by means of the quotation of Ps 102:1–5 LXX¹⁷³ is in this passage in Titus connected directly to the Holy Spirit and baptismal rebirth. An explicit connection between the metaphor of rebirth and the ritual of baptism is made through the phrase "the washing of the rebirth" (ΠΧΩΚΥ ΜΠΕΧΠΟ ΝΚΕΟΠ). Baptismal washing is thus attributed with salvific power, and there is a close connection between renewal and the Holy Spirit, the latter presented as being given by Christ. In a reading of *Exeg. Soul* 134.28–29, the Titus 3 input space thus has the potential to direct attention to the previous passage in *Exeg. Soul* dealing with the baptismal washing of the soul. The specific passage in *Exeg. Soul* that calls up the Titus input space suppresses the direct reference to baptism that is present in Titus 3:5, by skipping the word ΠΧΩΚΥ ("the washing"), but at the same time the implicit activation of the Titus 3:5 input space may still direct attention to the baptismal washing of the soul—paradoxically by means of the very part of the Titus intertext that *Exeg. Soul* here leaves out. This suppression on the part of *Exeg. Soul* is also significant for the way it opens up for yet another relevant intertext to be brought into the interpretive blend. For there is also another New Testament passage that closely resembles *Exeg. Soul's* phrase ΕΝΑΟΥΧΑΔΕΙ ΖΗΤΗΠΕΧΠΟ ΝΚΕΟΠ, "she will be saved through the rebirth (or: birth again)," namely 1 Tim 2:15: ΕΝΑΟΥΧΑΔΙ ΔΕ

¹⁷² See Perkins, "The Pastoral Epistles," 1445.

¹⁷³ See *Exeg. Soul* 134.16–25.

ἡ ἄνθρωπος σωθήσεται διὰ τὸ γεννηθῆναι, “but she will be saved through childbirth,” a statement that is found in the context of a discussion concerning the salvation of woman:

τεσσημε μαρεσχιςβω εἰσογμῆτρῆραω εἰραὶ εἰρηγοταγι νιμ ἡτῆμα δε αν
 ἡσσημε εἰσβω οὔδε εἰσοεισ επεσραὶ αλλα εἰρεσωωπε εἰσογμῆτρῆραω
 αδαμ γαρ πενταγπλασσε ἡμοσ ἡωορῆ ἡἡσωω εἰσα αὔω αδαμ
 ἡἡοαπατα ἡμοσ τεσσημε δε ἡτεροαπατα ἡμοσ ασωωπε εἰσογαπαβασις
 σναοὔχαι δε εἰτῆπεχπεωηρε εἰσωανσω εἰτῆπισις ἡἡταγαῆ ἡἡπῆβω
 ἡἡογμῆτρῆρηεητ

Let the woman learn in gentleness in all subordination. But I do not permit a woman to teach nor to rule over her husband, but to come to be in gentleness. For it was Adam who was formed first and afterwards Eve. And Adam was not deceived, but the woman, when she was deceived she came to be in sin. But she will be saved through childbirth, if they remain in faith and love and purity and wisdom. (1 Tim 2:11–15)

As we can see, there are several themes here that parallel those of *Exeg. Soul*. The issues of the salvation of woman, the subordination of woman to man, the relationship between Adam and Eve, Eve’s culpability, and the connection between salvation and birth are found in both texts. Blended with the account in *Exeg. Soul*, the references to woman in this passage in First Timothy are readily mapped onto the soul. It would thus be among the inferences created by this blend that the soul should submit to her husband and that she will be saved by giving birth. In this light we may interpret *Exeg. Soul*’s statement that the soul will be saved though πεχπο ἡκεσσι to mean that the soul will be saved by *giving* birth again, referring to the birth of good children from the seed of the Saviour.¹⁷⁴

In the greater intertextual blend, then, which also includes the Titus passage just discussed, we see the possibility of a simultaneous reference to the soul’s rebirth and her giving birth again, through a parallel activation of input spaces in a multiple-scope blend. This dual reference seems also to be supported more directly by *Exeg. Soul*, when it states in another passage that,

ωωε δε αἰρετῆγχι ἄποσ οὔαατῆ ἡσωωπε οη ἡτεσεε ἡωορῆ

it is necessary for the soul to give birth to herself and to become once again as she was before. (*Exeg. Soul* 134.6–8)

¹⁷⁴ Cf. *Exeg. Soul* 134.2–3.

This statement of the soul's need to give birth to herself thus undergirds the ambiguity created through the blending of the Titus and First Timothy intertexts, namely that the soul must both give birth again and become reborn. The fact that this process is also subsequently described as an ascent to heaven,¹⁷⁵ again tightens the intertextual links to the Ps 102 LXX and Matt 19:28 intertexts.

In summary, we find that the way in which rebirth and ascent are mentioned in *Exeg. Soul* 134.25–34 serves to call up intertextual input spaces from Titus, First Timothy, Matthew, and the Psalms, leading to a rich polysemic integration network of intertextual mental spaces, some of which have already been primed by previous references, and some, most notably those from Titus and First Timothy, that are called up for the first time—and in parallel (see fig. 14).

But let us now return to the passage under scrutiny to consider the statement that the soul will not be saved though $\bar{\nu}\omega\lambda\alpha\chi\epsilon\ \bar{\nu}\alpha\sigma\kappa\eta\iota\varsigma$ (“practised words”), $\bar{\nu}\tau\epsilon\chi\eta\eta$ (“skills”), or $\varsigma\omega\omega\ \bar{\nu}\zeta\alpha\iota$ (“written teaching”). What specifically do these terms refer to? Frederik Wisse speculates that they “perhaps mean that salvation does not come through ascetic practices, (cultic) acts or (the belief in) written doctrines,”¹⁷⁶ but, as Wisse rightly notes, “the sentence does not seem to say this.”¹⁷⁷ So what does it say? In contrast to these three terms, *Exeg. Soul* specifies that salvation is to be regarded as a grace ($\chi\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\varsigma$) and a gift ($\delta\omega\sigma\epsilon\acute{\alpha}$).¹⁷⁸ The gist of the passage thus seems to be the message that the soul cannot save herself, but needs help,¹⁷⁹ a point that is also brought home through the description of the soul being unable to give birth on her own, without the seed that is provided by Christ. This does not necessarily mean, however, that $\bar{\nu}\omega\lambda\alpha\chi\epsilon\ \bar{\nu}\alpha\sigma\kappa\eta\iota\varsigma$, $\bar{\nu}\tau\epsilon\chi\eta\eta$, or $\varsigma\omega\omega\ \bar{\nu}\zeta\alpha\iota$ work counter to salvation, nor indeed that they are unimportant.¹⁸⁰ It may simply mean that one must acknowledge that salvation is unattainable without the help of God, the Father. Salvation is thus first and foremost a gift and a grace from him and not something for which one can purely depend on one's own actions, whatever they may be.

¹⁷⁵ *Exeg. Soul* 134.13–15.

¹⁷⁶ Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 76.

¹⁷⁷ Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 76.

¹⁷⁸ Cf. Eph 2:8–9.

¹⁷⁹ Cf. Sevrin, *L'Exégèse de l'âme*, 110.

¹⁸⁰ Cf. the discussion below.

to become yet another input space that may be added to the intertextual integration network we have discussed here. The same can moreover be said with regard to further parts of Eph 2 that speak of the former separation from God and Christ in the world and in the flesh,¹⁸³ and of “he who made the two one” (ΠΕΝΤΑϞΡ̅Π̅ΕΣΝΑϞ Ν̅ΟΥϞΑ).¹⁸⁴

3.3. Concluding Analysis: The Feminisation of the Soul

In *Exeg. Soul.*, the soul is metaphorically a woman, and, as we have seen, this metaphor is expanded using related metaphors like THE SOUL IS A PROSTITUTE, THE SOUL IS A BRIDE, and THE SOUL IS A WIFE. We encounter intertextual triggers at various points throughout the narrative that enable the activation of different external texts as input spaces for various blends that are employed in the narrative of the soul’s fall and redemption. Different intertexts, which highlight different aspects of the various metaphorical representations of the soul, are thus activated. Some of these intertexts, like for instance Hosea and First Corinthians, are activated by way of explicit citations, while others are activated implicitly through allusions. When they are primed and activated as input spaces, or sources for input spaces, these intertexts contribute to establishing, as well as highlighting, different aspects of what may be regarded as the main conceptual metaphor in *Exeg. Soul.*, namely THE SOUL IS A WOMAN. Hosea, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel, for instance, flesh out the THE SOUL IS A PROSTITUTE metaphor,¹⁸⁵ while inputs from, e.g., Ephesians, Matthew, and the Song of Songs, help set up metaphorical blends around the conceptual metaphor THE SOUL IS A BRIDE. Interestingly, while *Exeg. Soul.* uses lengthy quotations from Jeremiah, Hosea, and Ezekiel in its descriptions of the soul’s former life of prostitution, fornication, and adultery, the focus shifts noticeably to New Testament allusions with regard to the soul’s salvation through marriage.

We have seen that the conceptual metaphor THE SOUL IS A WOMAN is employed throughout the narrative, and that this is a single-scope network that is conducive to metaphorical interpretation. But at the same time as the soul is metaphorically a woman, we may also to some extent understand it as a PART FOR WHOLE metonymy with the soul referring to the whole person. Moreover, the womb of the soul also has an important

¹⁸³ Eph 2:12.

¹⁸⁴ Eph 2:14.

¹⁸⁵ See *Exeg. Soul* 129.8–22 (Jeremiah); 129.23–130.11 (Hosea); 130.11–20 (Ezekiel).

metonymic function in this tractate. First of all, the womb may in some respects, especially in connection with the turning of the womb from the outside to the inside, be seen to stand metonymically for the whole metaphorical woman, and thus, *inter alia*, for the entire soul, in which case the turning of the womb can also be understood metonymically to refer to the conversion of the whole person (for these metaphorical and metonymical relations, see fig. 15).

Now, in *Exeg. Soul* the soul is metaphorically a woman. But does this mean that the tractate is only concerned with the souls of women?¹⁸⁶ This does not seem to be the case. The overall rhetoric of the tractate seems rather to imply that the soul is metaphorically female regardless of the gender of the body it inhabits.¹⁸⁷ In this conceptual THE SOUL FOR THE PERSON metonymy, however, the person is not just anybody, but would represent, again metonymically, by a MEMBER OF CATEGORY FOR CATEGORY metonymy, the prototypical Christian convert, and we may thus speak of the metonymy THE SOUL FOR THE CHRISTIAN. The soul may therefore be regarded at various points in the tractate as both a metaphor and a metonymy for the Christian (see fig. 16).

¹⁸⁶ By interpreting the imagery of the soul as a woman literally rather than metaphorically, Scopello has used *Exeg. Soul* as evidence for “the historical and social reality of women in the gnostic communities” (Scopello, “Jewish and Greek Heroines,” 87–90). Scopello even thinks the author of *Exeg. Soul* was probably a woman, since in Scopello’s view “the sexual accounts of a text such as the *Exegesis on the Soul* are more probably ascribed to a woman than to a man” (*ibid.*, 90). Birger Pearson shares the view that “a female author could easily be posited” (Pearson, “Mikra in Gnostic Literature,” 642 n. 43). Julia Iwersen argues that *Exeg. Soul* is likely the product of a female proselyte (see Julia Iwersen, “Metanoia und Brautgemach: Der frühgnostische Seelenmythos als Konversionssmythos,” in *Religionswissenschaft in Konsequenz: Beiträge im Anschluß an Impulse von Kurt Rudolph* [ed. Rainer Flasche, et al.; Marburger Religionsgeschichtliche Beiträge 1; Münster: Lit, 2000], esp. 78). For the view that *Exeg. Soul* does not address the question of real women, see Perkins, *Gnosticism and the New Testament*, 174. See also the comments of Douglas M. Parrott, “Response to ‘Jewish and Greek Heroines in the Nag Hammadi Library’ by Madeleine Scopello,” in *Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism* (ed. Karen L. King; SAC; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 91–95; Arthur, *Wisdom Goddess*, 44; Kulawik, *Die Erzählung*, 6.

¹⁸⁷ This has been pointed out by, among others, Perkins, *Gnosticism and the New Testament*, 174; Deirdre J. Good, “Gender and Generation: Observations on Coptic Terminology, with Particular Attention to Valentinian Texts,” in *Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism* (ed. Karen L. King; SAC; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 38–39. As Daniel Boyarin has pointed out, “the virgin girl is a topos in both Judaism and Christianity for thinking about male bodies and their spiritual states” (Daniel Boyarin, *Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and Judaism* [Figuræ: Reading Medieval Culture; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999], 67).

3.3.1. *The Soul and Christ*

Since the husband in this case is Christ and the woman in question is the soul, more specifically, considering the metonymy mentioned above, the soul of the Christian initiate, the language of cleansing and marriage becomes easily understandable. The individual Christian soul has to become as a virgin bride in relation to Christ in order to submit to him as a proper Christian in a metaphorical marriage which also constitutes a return to the primordial state of male-female union in paradise before the fall. In summary, the ideal marriage of the soul with Christ described in *Exeg. Soul* has the precondition that the female part of the union acts like an ideal female, which *inter alia* involves an abandonment of any resemblance of maleness on her part, a maleness which is described vividly in terms of the soul actively seeking different lovers and having her womb on the outside like male genitalia. She needs to become a proper, pure, female virgin, with her womb on the inside like it should be, and subsequently submit herself to Christ the Saviour, her true husband and master. In this union, the male and female parts are obviously not equal. The soul of the individual Christian, constituting the female part of the unity, is clearly supposed to be subordinated to Christ, the male part,¹⁸⁸ and we may speak of a relation of hierarchical complementarity.

Rose Horman Arthur has claimed that *Exeg. Soul* “treats most of the feminine elements pejoratively.”¹⁸⁹ But is this really the case? One might for instance observe that in this text it is wrong for the soul to have both male and female characteristics at the same time, as is the case in her fallen state, and becoming completely male is not an option. What is proper for the soul is to be fully female. The crucial point, however, is that in her femaleness she needs a man in order to bring about a return to the original male-female state, and not just any man, but Christ her true bridegroom and perfect husband.

The effectiveness of this symbolism stems from the tractate’s opening premise that the soul is female, combined with a cultural understanding of the role of the wife in relation to her husband in marriage that is also strengthened by scriptural intertexts, as we have seen above. Therefore,

¹⁸⁸ Cf. Michael Allen Williams, “Variety in Gnostic Perspectives on Gender,” in *Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism* (ed. Karen L. King; SAC; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 15.

¹⁸⁹ Arthur, *Wisdom Goddess*, 44.

when the soul is turned into a proper woman, it is quite “natural” for her to receive her proper husband and submit herself to his rule.¹⁹⁰ This does not mean that *Exeg. Soul* disparages feminine elements or characteristics. On the contrary, femininity is what the readers are to strive for, albeit a femininity of the soul in relation to Christ. For it is the relational aspects between the Christian and Christ that are highlighted by the metaphorical femininity and marriage, as common and basic ICMs are used to conceptualise the abstract qualities and demands of life as a Christian.

By framing its discourse on Christian life with an allegorical narrative of the fall and redemption of the soul portrayed as a woman, *Exeg. Soul* creates ample opportunity for the utilisation of a whole range of rich and interlinking metaphors together with corresponding scriptural and other literary intertexts. *Exeg. Soul* draws on and expands upon the idea that the soul is female and blends this with the traditional myth of the fall and return of the soul,¹⁹¹ and various authoritative sources containing literary and historical female figures and stereotypes. In this way the tractate draws upon aspects of female anatomy and literary descriptions and discussions of female transgression and prostitution, as well as female roles in marriage and procreation, for its conceptual and intertextual blends.

4. SITZ IM LEBEN

What implications may be drawn with regard to the *Sitz im Leben* of the tractate? Who may have produced and used it, when, and for what purpose(s)? What way of life is advocated, and what can be made of its sacramental references?

¹⁹⁰ Cf. Williams, “Variety,” 15.

¹⁹¹ As Wisse has pointed out, “similar ‘myths’ about the fall and return to heaven of the soul were current in the ancient world” (Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 80). For the Platonic notion of the fall of the soul, see, e.g., John Dillon, “The Descent of the Soul in Middle Platonic and Gnostic Theory,” in *The School of Valentinus* (ed. Bentley Layton; vol. 1 of *The Rediscovery of Gnosticism: Proceedings of the International Conference on Gnosticism at Yale, New Haven, Connecticut, March 28–31, 1978*; SHR 41; Leiden: Brill, 1980), 357–364. See also Carsten Colpe, “Die ‘Himmelsreise der Seele’ ausserhalb und innerhalb der Gnosis,” in *Le Origini dello Gnosticismo: Colloquio di Messina 13–18 Aprile 1966* (ed. Ugo Bianchi; SHR 12; Leiden: Brill, 1967), 429–447; Kulawik, *Die Erzählung*, 100–101. For the use of this idea by Origen, see the discussion in section 4.4, below.

4.1. *Literary Structure and Function*

It seems that as Samuel Rubenson has strikingly put it with regard to the rhetoric of patristic homilies and monastic exhortations, so it is with *Exeg. Soul*: “What is really being said is not explicitly spelled out but visible in the gaps between the words, stories or examples.”¹⁹² As we have seen in the analysis above, in a reading of *Exeg. Soul* meaning is produced in the interrelations between mental input spaces, that may be regarded as both conceptual and intertextual. A rhetoric that lets the readers or audience reach the most important insights on their own, in light of shared cognitive models and texts which are already established as authoritative, serves at least two important purposes. Firstly, it is a highly effective pedagogical device, since insights that are gained through one’s own reasoning are more easily remembered and become more easily entrenched than those that are simply postulated and not understood on a deeper level. Secondly, it may serve an equally important communal function, since such insights are gained to a significant extent on the basis of *shared* knowledge and cognitive models. Moreover, if parts of this shared knowledge, be it knowledge of intertexts, practice, or doctrine, are of an esoteric nature, known only to a select group of people, this communal function is strengthened.

With regard to the intertexts evoked by *Exeg. Soul* it is important to note that not only is *Exeg. Soul* itself illuminated by its intertexts, but, crucially, these intertexts are themselves given additional meaning and significance by being evoked in blends that are cued in a reading of *Exeg. Soul*. Indeed, one might say that the main function of many of *Exeg. Soul*’s intertextual blends lies in the backwards projections to their respective input spaces. Or, to put it differently, the blends that are cued by *Exeg. Soul* invite its readers to identify the various intertexts and re-read and reinterpret these texts in light of the emergent meanings arising from the blends, which may again result in additional structure and elements being projected to the blends in a new reading of *Exeg. Soul*, thus causing further reinterpretations of them and their literary contexts. This, then, is a potentially infinite process of interpretation and reinterpretation of interlinked texts.

¹⁹² Samuel Rubenson, “Wisdom, Paraenesis and the Roots of Monasticism,” in *Early Christian Paraenesis in Context* (ed. James Starr and Troels Engberg-Pedersen; BZNW 125; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004), 534.

The authorial blends as they appear through their linguistic expressions on the pages of *Exeg. Soul* may be regarded as manifestations of frozen stages in their construction by a hypothetical author. We may for example regard fig. 17 as a representation of part of a hypothetical authorial blend resulting in the production of *Exeg. Soul* 134.25–34. However, these linguistic manifestations must be seen merely as cues to the potentially infinite process of further construction and running of conceptual and intertextual integration networks on the part of the reader, an example of which is represented by fig. 10, discussed above. It is evident, however, that the meaning-production constituted by this process is inherently unstable. Nothing prevents us, as readers, from running the blends differently than the author, or from constructing different integration networks and blends than the ones constructed in the mind of the author as he wrote the text. Indeed, considering the inherent complexities of these processes, a complete correspondence between the two is extremely unlikely.

Still, we might venture some qualified guesses concerning possible ideal readers of our text. We can for instance safely say that an ideal reader of *Exeg. Soul* would be a Christian reader in antiquity with a good knowledge of Scripture, as is clearly implied by the findings of the present analysis.¹⁹³ It is apparent that an internalised knowledge of the scriptural intertexts as interdependent authoritative texts is an essential requirement for a satisfactory understanding of *Exeg. Soul* along the lines of this analysis.¹⁹⁴ The same could moreover be said with regard to Christian ritual practice—at least basic knowledge is implied. Nevertheless, such an ideal understanding of the tractate through intimate knowledge of the required intertexts does not seem necessary in order to grasp some of the basic messages of *Exeg. Soul* regarding, for instance, the importance of repentance, conversion, and faithfulness to Christ. On such grounds we may further speculate that, regardless of the nature of the hypothetical authorial intentions behind it, *Exeg. Soul* may have been used for different purposes among different audiences, perhaps even at different stages of initiation or instruction, or at different stages in the monastic life.

¹⁹³ It should be noted, however, that a detailed knowledge of the Old Testament texts that are extensively quoted is by no means as necessary as a good knowledge of the evoked New Testament texts (cf. Scopello, *L'Exégèse de l'âme*, 44).

¹⁹⁴ Cf. the comments regarding the function of allusions in some Nag Hammadi tractates in Perkins, "Gnosticism and the Christian Bible," 365.

4.2. *Literal or Metaphorical Rituals?*

We can therefore say that *Exeg. Soul* may give rise to different interpretive blends as different readers activate different aspects of the intertextual input spaces, use different contextual frames, and run the blends to different degrees, perhaps even recruiting various additional input spaces in the process. For example, although the reference to baptism is not made explicit in *Exeg. Soul* 134.25–34, it is present in the Titus 3:5 input space and may easily be brought to mind by the readers or hearers of the passage when they “run the blend,” assuming of course that they know and recognise Titus 3:5. When 1 Tim 2:11–15 is also taken into account we may interpret *Exeg. Soul* to refer to the soul’s necessary baptismal rebirth, and that this again leads to her renewed ability to give birth—both to good children and herself.¹⁹⁵ These processes may again be given several metaphorical interpretations, however. For how are we to interpret the imagery of the soul giving birth again or her being reborn? And how are we to interpret the tractate’s references to ritual?

At several points throughout the tractate *Exeg. Soul* refers to ritual practice, both overtly and rather more allusively. As Majella Franzmann has pointed out, however, it is often difficult to know whether ritual terminology in the Nag Hammadi material is used metaphorically or whether it refers directly to actual ritual practice.¹⁹⁶ With regard to the passage discussed above, where the purification of the soul is described in terms of the washing of garments, the concluding statement that “this is her baptism” (παει πε πεσβαπτισμα),¹⁹⁷ can be interpreted to indicate either that the description pertains to what happens to the soul of an initiate in the ritual of baptism,¹⁹⁸ or that the baptism of the soul is a metaphor for something else, like for instance mental or spiritual processes.¹⁹⁹ We know from other early Christian sources that, at least

¹⁹⁵ Cf. Sevrin, who equates the soul’s birth of good children with her giving birth to herself, seeing these as the same thing (see Sevrin, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 107).

¹⁹⁶ Majella Franzmann, “The Concept of Rebirth as the Christ and the Initiatory Rituals of the Bridal Chamber in the *Gospel of Philip*,” *Antichthon* 30 (1996): 36.

¹⁹⁷ *Exeg. Soul* 132.2.

¹⁹⁸ See, e.g., Krause, “Die Sakramente,” 52.

¹⁹⁹ See, e.g., Eric Segelberg, “Prayer Among the Gnostics? The Evidence of Some Nag Hammadi Documents,” in *Gnosis and Gnosticism: Papers Read at the Seventh International Congress on Patristic Studies (Oxford, September 8th–13th 1975)* (ed. Martin Krause; NHS 8; Leiden: Brill, 1977), 60. In Frederik Wisse’s view, “it is not baptism which is reinterpreted in 131,29 and 132,2, but rather the purification of the soul and her womb in the allegory are interpreted to refer to baptism” (Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 79).

for some Christians, the ritual of baptism was thought to have a direct influence on the soul. This is attested by among others Tertullian,²⁰⁰ who states that “the flesh is washed so that the soul may be made spotless,”²⁰¹ and also that “we are washed with water because the defilement of sin is like dirt.”²⁰² Similarly, Cyril of Jerusalem claims that while “the water is poured externally, the Spirit also totally baptizes the soul from within.”²⁰³ *Exeg. Soul* seems to be open to an interpretation along these lines, i.e., that the text is describing real effects that are brought to bear upon the soul through ritual actions.

In the narrative, baptism is effectively presented as an important turning point in the story of the soul, highlighting repentance, purification, and conversion. Whether this baptism of the soul is itself to be understood metaphorically, or whether it, through a metonymic substitution with the soul representing the whole individual, is to be understood as a direct reference to the physical baptism of the Christian convert is in the final analysis a question of interpretation. It is possible to read the text either way. This means that depending on the postulated hypothetical context, and on the reader, we may interpret the various references to baptism in *Exeg. Soul* strictly literally, or as either the framing or focus inputs in conceptual integration networks.²⁰⁴ A combination of these alternatives is also possible. It is in any case quite apparent that *Exeg. Soul* refers to rituals, like baptism, in some way, regardless of whether they are

²⁰⁰ For a discussion of the following patristic examples and other interesting parallels, see Edward Yarnold, “The Body-Soul Relationship Mainly in Connection with Sacramental Causality,” in *Ascetica, Gnostica, Liturgica, Orientalia: Papers Presented at the Thirteenth International Conference on Patristic Studies Held in Oxford 1999* (ed. Maurice F. Wiles and Edward Yarnold; StPatr 35; Leuven: Peeters, 2001), 338–342.

²⁰¹ Tertullian, *De resurrectione carnis*, 8.3; translation quoted from Yarnold, “Body-Soul Relationship,” 339.

²⁰² *Ut quoniam vice sordium delictis inquinamur aquis abluamur* (Tertullian, *De baptismo*, 4; translation quoted from Yarnold, “Body-Soul Relationship,” 338; Latin text quoted from *ibid.*, 338 n. 2).

²⁰³ ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὕδωρ ἔξωθεν περιχεῖται, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα καὶ τὴν ἔνδοθεν ψυχὴν βαπτίζει ἀπαρραλείπτως. (Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catecheses illuminandorum*, 17:14; W.C. Reischl and J. Rupp, *Cyriilli Hierosolymorum archiepiscopi opera quae supersunt omnia* [2 vols.; Munich: Lentner, 1848/1860]; translation quoted from Yarnold, “Body-Soul Relationship,” 340). Such examples could easily be multiplied, but these should be sufficient to show the existence of such ideas.

²⁰⁴ It should be noted that I follow Patrick Colm Hogan and others in rejecting the existence of literal or metaphorical utterances per se, acknowledging only literal and metaphorical interpretations (see Hogan, *Cognitive Science*, 91, and the discussion in chapter 2).

to be understood metaphorically or not.²⁰⁵ And from these references we may gain some insight into the structure and content of the baptism ICM that is presupposed, and thus into the ritual practice and understanding underlying this document.

So, how is baptism portrayed in *Exeg. Soul*? We have seen that there are two main themes that are in focus. Baptism is interpreted in terms of washing, and in terms of begetting and birth, both of which carry important connotations of renewal that are highlighted by the tractate. In addition, directly following *Exeg. Soul*'s description of the soul giving birth to herself, we are presented with the following:

ΑΣΧΙΠΘΕΙΟΝ ΝΤΗΠΕΙΩΤ ΑΤΡΕΣΡΒΡΡΕ ΔΕΚΑΔΑΣ ΟΝ ΕΥΝΑΧΙΤῚ ΕΠΜΑ ΕΝΕΣΜΗΔΥ
 ΧΙΝΩΟΡΠ ΤΑΕΙ ΤΕ ΤΑΝΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ ΕΤΩΟΟΠ ΕΒΟΛ ΖΗΝΕΤΗΜΟΟΥΤ ΠΑΕΙ ΠΕ ΠΩΤΕ
 ΝΤΑΙΧΜΑΛΩΣΙΑ ΤΑΕΙ ΤΕ ΤΑΝΑΒΑΣΙΣ ΝΒΩΚ ΕΡΡΑΙ ΕΤΠΕ ΤΑΕΙ ΤΕ ΘΟΔΟΣ ΝΒΩΚ
 ΕΡΡΑΙ ΤΡΑΠΕΙΩΤ

She received the divinity from the Father for her to be renewed, so that she may also be taken to the place where she was from the beginning. This is the resurrection from the dead. This is the redemption from captivity. This is the ascent up to heaven. This is the way to go up to the Father.

(*Exeg. Soul* 134.9–15)

The renewal of the soul and the reception of the divinity from the Father are here directly connected with ascent and resurrection. The reception of “the divinity” (πθειον) from the Father should probably be seen in connection with the reception of “the seed” (πεςπερμα) referred to a few lines previously.²⁰⁶ However, it is impossible to know from this whether this passage should be understood as a direct reference to the effects of baptism, anointing, or other ritual actions, or whether it simply refers in a more general sense to the salvation brought about by the renewal of the soul with the Father’s help. All we can say is that there is an unverifiable possibility that the references to resurrection, ransom, and ascent may be inspired by an understanding of baptism in those terms, even though *Exeg. Soul* seems to understand baptism primarily in terms of the conceptual domains of renewal and procreation.

²⁰⁵ I therefore disagree with Wisse who thinks that the account of the soul’s baptism is just an allegory which has nothing to do with actual baptism (Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 79), and Segelberg who similarly thinks that the purification and baptism of the soul is “a purely mental-spiritual process” (Segelberg, “Prayer Among the Gnostics,” 60). The baptism of the soul may of course be an allegory, but I do not agree that it can be *just* an allegory, one that does not refer in any way to actual ritual practice.

²⁰⁶ *Exeg. Soul* 134.1.

Exeg. Soul does not give us any details of the actual ritual enactment of the baptism it refers to, except by way of its metaphorical framing input, from which it seems we may at least surmise that it probably involved full immersion, but few further details are recoverable, although one might perceive an allusion to an anointing in *Exeg. Soul's* description of the soul preparing for her marriage with the Saviour:²⁰⁷

ΑΣΤΟΥΒΟΣ ΖΗΜΑ ΝΩΕΛΕΕΤ ΑΣΜΑΖΩ ΝΣΤΗΝΟΥΦΕ ΑΣΖΜΟΟΣ ΝΖΟΥΝ ΝΖΗΤΩ ΕΣΩΩΤ
ΕΒΟΛ ΖΗΤΩ ΜΠΡΩΕΛΕΕΤ ΜΜΕ

She cleansed herself in the place of marriage, filled it with perfume, and sat within it waiting for the true bridegroom. (*Exeg. Soul* 132.13–15)

The reference to *στηνουφε*, which denotes perfume or a pleasant smell in general, may refer to the use of perfumed oil in a ritual anointing, but it may also simply be used as a metaphor for virtue without any sacramental connotations.²⁰⁸ If the passage is taken to refer to ritual actions it could allude to a ritual sequence of baptism (the cleansing) followed by an anointing (the perfume) and a Eucharist (the expected union with the bridegroom). The references to the “water” (*μοου*), “oil” (*νηε/νεε*), “clothing” (*ζουος*), “garments” (*ουτην*), “bread” (*οεικ*), and “wine” (*ηρη*) which the soul receives from the adulterers²⁰⁹ may likewise be regarded as implicit contrasts to the water, oil, clothing, bread, and wine she receives from the Saviour, and which may well be interpreted as allusions to the Christian sacraments.

With regard to the *μα νωελεετ/νυμφων*, Krause sees a reference to a special sacrament in its own right, different from Christian baptismal rites. According to him, this ritual, which he links to *Gos. Phil.* and “Valentinianism,” is where the salvation of the soul takes place.²¹⁰ He is not sure whether the “Christian Gnostics” who read the tractate would regard baptism as a sacrament, however, or whether it was “nur eine Waschung als Vorbereitung auf das Sakrament des Brautgemaches.”²¹¹ On the basis of *Exeg. Soul* 132.13, *αστουβος ζημα νωελεετ*, however, he

²⁰⁷ This possibility has been suggested, but ultimately rejected, by Krause, “Die Sakramente,” 52.

²⁰⁸ The use of the term *στηνουφε* in this sense is for instance attested by Shenoute (see Crum 363a).

²⁰⁹ See *Exeg. Soul* 130.2–5, 24–28.

²¹⁰ See Krause, “Die Sakramente,” 55; Martin Krause, “The Exegesis on the Soul,” trans. Robert McL. Wilson, in *Coptic and Mandaean Sources* (ed. Werner Foerster; vol. 2 of *Gnosis: A Selection of Gnostic Texts*; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 103; Krause does not make any distinction between the terms *μα νωελεετ* and *νυμφων*.

²¹¹ Krause, “Die Sakramente,” 52 see also *ibid.*, 55.

draws the conclusion that baptism took place in the bridal chamber.²¹² While Krause and others have here seen affinities with a supposed bridal chamber sacrament in “Valentinianism,”²¹³ Frederik Wisse, on the contrary, holds that “there is no hint in ExSoul that the bridal chamber has something to do with a sacrament.”²¹⁴

As we have seen, the translation of both $\mu\alpha\ \bar{\nu}\alpha\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\epsilon\tau$ and $\eta\gamma\mu\phi\omega\mu\alpha$ as “bridal chamber” may be misleading. Translating only the latter as “bridal chamber,” I argued above that this term may be used in *Exeg. Soul* as a reference to the place where the communion ($\kappa\omicron\iota\upsilon\omega\nu\acute{\iota}\alpha$) with Christ takes place. If we here take $\eta\gamma\mu\phi\omega\mu\alpha$ to refer metaphorically to the body, the reference to Christ adorning the bridal chamber ($\eta\gamma\mu\phi\omega\mu\alpha$)²¹⁵ may possibly be understood as a reference to a post-baptismal dressing in new garments. $\mu\alpha\ \bar{\nu}\alpha\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\epsilon\tau$, on the other hand, may refer to a specific ritual space or process where the wedding with Christ takes place, e.g., a church building/baptistery or simply the Christian rites of initiation as a whole. The idea of the body as the abode of the soul and identified with a “bridal chamber” is consistent with an interpretation of the body as the place where the unification of the soul and Christ takes place. This is especially the case if we interpret this communion in terms of the Christian communicant mingling with the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist.²¹⁶ Although Wisse may have been too quick to rule out the sacramental connotations of this imagery, we may in any case agree with him that “in the allegory of the soul the bridal chamber plays a role in the purification and preparation of the soul to receive her bridegroom,”²¹⁷ and that “It helps to bring out an important aspect of repentance.”²¹⁸

Ultimately, however, these potential allusions to ritual actions are impossible to verify, and may equally well be given a spiritual, non-sacramental, interpretation, depending on what sacramental and scriptural input spaces one calls upon in the interpretive blending networks that come into play in a reading of *Exeg. Soul*.

²¹² See Krause, “Die Sakramente,” 52 (note that Krause erroneously refers to 123.13, meaning 132.13).

²¹³ See, e.g., Krause, “The Exegesis on the Soul,” 103; Jacques-É. Ménard, “L’Évangile selon Philippe’ et l’Exégèse de l’âme,” in *Les Textes de Nag Hammadi: Colloque du Centre d’Histoire des Religions (Strasbourg, 23–25 octobre 1974)* (ed. Jacques-É. Ménard; NHS 7; Leiden: Brill, 1975), 56–67; Pétrement, *A Separate God*, 485.

²¹⁴ Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 79.

²¹⁵ See *Exeg. Soul* 132.26–27.

²¹⁶ Cf. *Exeg. Soul* 134–135; Yarnold, “Body-Soul Relationship.”

²¹⁷ Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 79–80.

²¹⁸ Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 80.

4.3. *Implied Lifestyle*

What kind of life would follow from the teaching of *Exeg. Soul*? “Only celibacy would be consistent with the teaching of the tractate,” claims Frederik Wisse.²¹⁹ Once again, however, this depends on our interpretive strategies and presuppositions. The crucial question in an allegorical reading of *Exeg. Soul* is the identification of the target of *Exeg. Soul*’s allegorical source story. In the source story, sexual connotations and procreational imagery are important, but in an interpretation of the tractate these framing inputs must be understood in connection with their respective focus input(s). Although a celibate life would certainly not contradict what we have found in our analysis of *Exeg. Soul*, bodily celibacy is not necessarily assumed by, or even necessarily an issue in, this tractate. The faithfulness of the soul, however, is clearly an issue. *Exeg. Soul* emphatically states the need for the soul to turn her back on worldly things and embrace life with the Saviour. The “prostitution of the soul” should not simply be equated with bodily prostitution, but must be regarded as a single-scope blend that indicates the soul’s passion towards, and attachment to, material and external things as opposed to spiritual ones. This kind of “prostitution” and “fornication” leads the soul away from salvation, represented by the Father and the Saviour, and towards its opposite, which is described using many of the same terms that are also used to describe salvation. The prostitution of the soul is thus in many ways the negative mirror image of salvation, which is depicted as a stable marriage with Christ in the presence of the Father. The soul is not supposed to have dealings with any other man than Christ, but whether a

²¹⁹ Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 78; cf. Perkins, *Gnosticism and the New Testament*, 171–177. Perkins connects the teaching of *Exeg. Soul* to asceticism. She characterises the teaching about the repentance of the soul in this tractate as “conventionally Christian” (ibid., 177) and also states that it, together with *Auth. Teach*, “seems more at home in third-century disputes about asceticism in the Christian life than in the wide-ranging, mythic syncretism of the second century” (ibid., 174). She even goes so far as to call it an exposition of “Christian ascetic praxis” (ibid., 177). See also Peter Bruns, “Exegesis de anima,” in *Lexicon der antiken christlichen Literatur* (ed. Siegmund Döpp and Wilhelm Geerlings; Freiburg: Herder, 1998), 228. But cf. Richard Valantasis, who does not include *Exeg. Soul* among the thirteen Nag Hammadi treatises he deems to refer to asceticism in his article “Nag Hammadi and Asceticism: Theory and Practice,” in *Ascetica, Gnostica, Liturgica, Orientalia: Papers Presented at the Thirteenth International Conference on Patristic Studies Held in Oxford 1999* (ed. Maurice F. Wiles and Edward Yarnold; StPatr 35; Leuven: Peeters, 2001), 172–190, where he includes it among those texts which “do not intersect with the ascetical tradition of Late Antiquity in any way at all” (ibid., 188).

celibate bodily life is the only way to achieve such chastity of the soul is not a question that is explicitly answered by *Exeg. Soul*, although it would indeed be an obvious interpretation in certain interpretive communities. We have seen that on the surface level of the narrative, the soul is not supposed to renounce sexuality, but only to reserve it exclusively for her true husband. It is her infidelity in relation to him that is her sin, not sexuality per se. Whether celibacy is the only way of life that is consistent with the theology of *Exeg. Soul* is therefore a question which does not receive a definite answer from a reading of this text, unless we postulate a hypothetical context where such an exegetical strategy is presupposed. The question of what kind of life would be consistent with the tractate's view of the soul thus seems ultimately to be a question of context and of the perspective of the reader and his or her interpretive community.²²⁰

4.3.1. Repentance and Prayer

Among the most pervasive features of *Exeg. Soul*, however, is the constant focus on the necessity of repentance, weeping, and prayer.²²¹ In this regard the tractate refers to the authority of the Saviour himself:

παλιν πεχααϋ ρεε[ρ]τῆνογα μεσττετεεφγγχη φναωουρρααϋ αν ἡσωει ταρχη
 γαρ ἡπουχαιει πε τμετανοια δια τοϋτο ρατερη ἡτπαροϋσια ἡπερχῶ
 αϋι ἡσῶωρρῆνης [εϋ]κηρϋσσε ἡπβαπτισμα ἡτμετανοια τμετανοια δε
 ρααωωπε ρῆνογλυπη ἡἡογῆκαρ ἡρητ πειωτ δε ογῆαειρωμε πε ἡαγαθωο
 αϋω εϋωωτῆ ατγγχη ετρεπικαλει ερραῖ ερωϋ αϋω ἡφτῆναϋ ἡασ ἡπογοειν
 ἡνουχαιει

Again he says: "If one does not hate his own soul he will not be able to follow me."²²² For the beginning of salvation is repentance. Therefore, "before the arrival of Christ, John came, preach[ing] the baptism of repentance."²²³ And repentance comes about in pain and grief. But the Father is a good philanthropist and he hears the soul who calls up to him and he sends her the saving light. (Exeg. Soul 135.19–29)

²²⁰ For the role of "interpretive communities" in the interpretation of texts, see Fish, *Is There a Text*, and the discussion in chapter 2 of the present study.

²²¹ As mentioned above, Wisse argues, quite convincingly, that repentance is the main theme of *Exeg. Soul* (see Wisse, "On Exegeting"). Kasser agrees that it is the paraenetic sections on repentance that are the main point of the tractate (see Kasser, "L'Eksēgēsis," 77).

²²² Cf. Luke 14:26.

²²³ Cf. Acts 13:24.

There are references to the necessity of repentance and prayer all the way through *Exeg. Soul*.²²⁴ In these passages it seems that we may also quite safely understand the descriptions of the life of the soul as metonymical references to proper Christian conduct:

ῥωστε ὡρε ἀρπροσευχεςοαι επιουτε ντογωη μηπεροου εμπωρω η̄ν̄σιχ
ε̄ρραϊ ε̄ροϋ η̄θε η̄νετρη̄ν̄τηη̄τε η̄θαλασσα επιπλεα τραϋληη̄ επιουτε
ρη̄ποϋρη̄τ τη̄ρη̄ ρη̄νοϋρη̄ϋποκρη̄σις αν̄ δε̄νετπροσευχεςοαι ρη̄νοϋρη̄ϋποκρη̄σις
ε̄γαπατα η̄μοου οϋγατοϋ

So it is appropriate to pray to God night and day, stretching our hands up to him like those who are sailing in the midst of the sea. They pray to God with all their heart without hypocrisy, for those who pray hypocritically deceive only themselves. (*Exeg. Soul* 136.16–22)

The fact that the tractate chooses to end on this note also highlights the importance of repentance in *Exeg. Soul*. Repentance is the focus of the last three manuscript pages, and the tractate finally ends with the statement that,

ε̄ωωπ[ε] τη̄ναρ̄μετανοεῑ νᾱμε πνοϋτε̄ νᾱςωτ̄η̄ ε̄ρον̄ προ̄αϋρη̄τ̄ αϋω
παπνο̄ς η̄να

If we will truly repent, God will hear us, the patient and abundantly merciful.²²⁵ (*Exeg. Soul* 137.22–25)

Significantly, in this and a couple of related passages, *Exeg. Soul* uses the first person plural, revealing the direct importance of repentance and prayer for the Christian:

ὡρε̄ σε̄ ε̄ωλη̄η̄ ε̄πειωτ̄ η̄τ̄η̄μοϋτε̄ ε̄ρραϊ̄ ε̄ροϋ̄ ρη̄τ̄η̄ϋϋχη̄ τη̄ρη̄ ρη̄η̄ςποτοϋ̄
αν̄ η̄π̄σᾱ νβολ̄ αλλᾱ ρη̄π̄νεϋμᾱ ε̄τρη̄π̄σᾱ η̄ροϋ̄η̄ πενταρη̄ῑ ε̄βολ̄ ρη̄π̄βαθ̄ος̄
ε̄νεϋε̄ρομ̄ ε̄νη̄μετανοεῑ ε̄χ̄η̄π̄βιος̄ η̄ταρη̄η̄η̄ααϋ̄ ε̄η̄ρη̄ε̄ζρομολογεῑ η̄νη̄νοβε̄
ε̄η̄αῑε̄θ̄ανε̄ επιπλη̄η̄η̄ ε̄τωϋοϋεῑτ̄ τᾱεῑ νε̄νωϋοο̄η̄ η̄ρη̄τ̄ε̄ αϋω̄ ατ̄ςποϋδη̄
ε̄τωϋοϋεῑτ̄ ε̄η̄ρη̄με̄ η̄θε̄ νε̄νωϋοο̄η̄ ρη̄π̄κακε̄ μη̄φοεῑμ̄ ε̄η̄ρη̄π̄ε̄νη̄εῑ νᾱη̄ οϋααν̄
δε̄καᾱς ε̄φ̄η̄η̄ᾱ νᾱη̄ ε̄μ̄μο̄στε̄ η̄μ̄ον̄ η̄θε̄ ε̄τη̄η̄ρη̄η̄τ̄ε̄ τε̄νοϋ̄

It is therefore appropriate to pray to the Father and for us to call up to him with all our soul, not with the external lips, but with the spirit within, the one which came from the deep,²²⁶ sighing²²⁷ and repenting for the life we

²²⁴ See *Exeg. Soul* 128.6–7; 128.28–129.3; 129.20–22; 131.16–19; 133.11–13; 135.4–137.25.

²²⁵ According to Wisse, this is a statement of the main point of the tractate (see Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 81).

²²⁶ Cf. 1 Cor 2:10–13.

²²⁷ Cf. Rom 8:26.

have led, confessing the sins, perceiving the empty error we were in and the empty haste, weeping like we were in the darkness and the wave, mourning ourselves so that he may have pity on us, hating ourselves as we are now.

(*Exeg. Soul* 135.4–15)

Repentance, weeping and prayer are advocated, but the kind of prayer that is prescribed seems to be an inward prayer of the soul, rather than an external prayer of the lips. Whether this statement is to be understood as an advocacy of silent prayer to the exclusion of external prayer, or simply as a statement of the absolute necessity that the prayer is sincere, is impossible to say. But the passage clearly underlines the important point that emerges from the whole tractate, that it is primarily the inclinations and actions of the soul that are at issue, and not those of the body. Moreover, activating the allusions to 1 Cor 2:10–13 and Rom 8:26, which Wisse regards as “obvious,”²²⁸ also heightens the emphasis on the importance of the soul’s reception of the spirit in this process of repentance.

4.4. *Date and Provenance*

The scholarly responses to *Exeg. Soul* have been quite representative of scholarly reactions to the Nag Hammadi texts in general. There has been a marked proclivity for dealing out sweeping judgments regarding both the perceived theological contents of the tractate and its hypothetical author. We may only recall Robert McL. Wilson’s rather negative evaluation in his 1975 article “Old Testament Exegesis in the Gnostic Exegesis on the Soul,” cited at the beginning of this chapter. Although Wilson’s description of the viewpoints of the “modern scholar” was presented thirty years ago, and although he conceded that the exegetical method of *Exeg. Soul* would indeed make sense from the ancient author’s perspective,²²⁹ his comments are indicative of the low esteem in which *Exeg. Soul* and other texts from the Nag Hammadi library have been held by many of their modern interpreters. Jean Doresse, for example, who was the first modern scholar to study the text, stated rather bluntly that *Exeg. Soul* “is not a great prophetic revelation but a long treatise by some anonymous doctor,” upon which, he said, “we must not linger too long.”²³⁰ Frederik Wisse,

²²⁸ See Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 76.

²²⁹ Wilson, “Old Testament Exegesis,” 223.

²³⁰ Doresse, *Secret Books*, 190.

who has an altogether more positive view of the importance of the tractate, lamented in 1975 what he saw as the adverse effects of this evaluation on the subsequent study of the text. In Wisse's view, "the evaluation of *Exeg. Soul* has not been able to free itself from the dubious stamp put upon the tractate by Jean Doresse."²³¹ Wisse himself instead characterised *Exeg. Soul* as "One of the most interesting Christian writings in the Nag Hammadi collection,"²³² an evaluation with which the present author, who has lingered quite a while upon this treatise, is inclined to agree. Unfortunately the text has still not been freed from the confines of the general categorisation of it that was first made by Doresse half a century ago and subsequently followed by a majority of scholars.

As is the case with most of the Nag Hammadi tractates, the category of "Gnosticism" has been central in the study of *Exeg. Soul*. In fact, a primary concern of most research on this text has been to place it chronologically and doctrinally on a "Gnostic" trajectory.²³³ Although there are exceptions, among them Frederik Wisse, who has placed it among a group of Nag Hammadi tractates which he feels "hardly deserve to be called Gnostic,"²³⁴ most scholars have taken it for granted that *Exeg. Soul* is a "Gnostic" text. Christopher Tuckett even goes so far as to say that with regard to its use of scriptural quotations, this tractate is "perhaps the closest to what one might have expected a Gnostic text to look like from the reports of the Church Fathers."²³⁵

Although there is no consensus with regard to its dating or interpretation, the *a priori* assumption of the text's "Gnostic" character has

²³¹ Wisse, "On Exegeting," 78.

²³² Wisse, "On Exegeting," 70. For a similar evaluation of the tractate, see H. Bethge, "Die Exegese," 93.

²³³ For the problematic aspects of "Gnosticism" as a category, see the discussion in chapter 1.

²³⁴ Frederik Wisse, "The Nag Hammadi Library and the Heresiologists," *VC* 25 (1971): 210; Gilles Quispel puts it even stronger, stating that "whosoever first dubbed Christian writings like the *Hymn of the Pearl* in the *Acts of Thomas*, the *Authentikos Logos* or the *Exegesis on the Soul* as Gnostic and pre-Christian, has done a semantic disservice to scholarship" (Gilles Quispel, review of Maddalena Scopello, *L'èxègese de l'âme*, *VC* 41:2 [1987]: 200). See also Wisse, "On Exegeting"; Hans-Gebhard Bethge, "Die Ambivalenz alttestamentlicher Geschichtstraditionen in der Gnosis," in *Altes Testament—Frühjudentum—Gnosis: Neue Studien zu "Gnosis und Bibel"* (ed. Karl-Wolfgang Tröger; Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Mohn, 1980), 102 n. 42; Clemens Scholten, "Die Nag-Hammadi-Texte als Buchbesitz der Pachomianer," *JAC* 31 (1988): 144 n. 3; Kulawik, *Die Erzählung*.

²³⁵ Tuckett, *Nag Hammadi*, 51–52.

thoroughly influenced the way in which such questions have been approached. The basis for Martin Krause's proposal for a late date in his 1975 article "Die Sakramente in der 'Exegese über die Seele,'"²³⁶ for instance, was the then commonly held scholarly assumption that "the Gnostics" thought themselves to be saved by nature or "gnosis" alone, and therefore had no need for sacraments. The fact that there are numerous references to ritual in *Exeg. Soul* therefore did not really square with Krause's ideal picture of "Gnosticism," so to account for this anomaly he drew the conclusion that the presence of such references had to be due to influence from the mystery religions or from Christianity. "Gnosticism" was of course regarded as something altogether different from both of these categories, and especially from the latter.²³⁷ In order to allow time for such external influence, Krause consequently assumed that the tractate had to be among the later "Gnostic" texts.²³⁸ And, based on the assumption of "Gnostic" borrowing from Christianity, he accordingly characterised the author of *Exeg. Soul* as a "Christian Gnostic."²³⁹ To be sure, Krause indeed emphasised the Christian character of *Exeg. Soul*, and even regarded the text's Christian features as more prominent than its "Gnostic" ones,²⁴⁰ but he nevertheless concluded that the text depended crucially upon "gnostischen Lehrsätzen."²⁴¹

Similar lines of reasoning have, however, also led to quite different conclusions. Indeed, it may be observed that it is largely the individual scholar's view of "Gnosticism" that has determined whether the text has been seen as an example of "Gnosticism" influenced by Christianity,²⁴²

²³⁶ Krause, "Die Sakramente."

²³⁷ Certainly, in much of what has been written about *Exeg. Soul*, and indeed on the subject of the Nag Hammadi library in general, Christianity, Judaism, and Paganism have been regarded as separate and well-defined entities. As for "Gnosticism," while having been assumed to be fundamentally different from either, it has also been regarded as being fundamentally characterised by pervasive and syncretistic borrowing from any or all of them (cf., e.g., Scopello, "Exegesis on the Soul," 191–192).

²³⁸ Krause, "Die Sakramente," 47. Krause is not alone in arguing for a late date on such grounds. On a similar note, Birger Pearson sees the text's "eclecticism" as indicating that the text is "clearly a 'late' product of Christian Gnosticism" (Pearson, "Mikra in Gnostic Literature," 643).

²³⁹ Krause, "Die Sakramente," 49.

²⁴⁰ Krause, "Die Sakramente," 50.

²⁴¹ Krause, "Die Sakramente," 51.

²⁴² See, e.g., Krause, "Die Sakramente"; Martin Krause, "The Christianization of Gnostic Texts," in *The New Testament and Gnosis: Essays in Honour of Robert McL. Wilson* (ed.

or vice versa.²⁴³ There have also been those who have seen in the treatise evidence not of a late form of “Gnosticism,” but rather of an early one. Some have linked it with the supposed teachings of Simon Magus,²⁴⁴ while others have based their early dating on the conclusion that the myth of the soul in this tractate is an early version of the “Valentinian” myth of Sophia. On such grounds, Sevrin, for example, places *Exeg. Soul* in Alexandria and dates it between 120 (due to the use of the gospel of John) and 135 (when Valentinus left Alexandria for Rome).²⁴⁵ Sevrin also uses the lack of polemics in *Exeg. Soul* to argue for an early date, and suggests that it was written prior to the Christian heresiological reactions.²⁴⁶ Scopello also connects *Exeg. Soul* with the “Valentinian” myth of Sophia²⁴⁷ and places the tractate in Alexandria, but prefers a date around the end of the second and beginning of the third century.²⁴⁸ A notable exception, however, is constituted by Kulawik, who does not regard *Exeg. Soul* as a “Gnostic” text, but instead places it in third century Alexandria on the basis of its similarity with Alexandrian theology as represented by Clement and Origen.²⁴⁹

The perception that *Exeg. Soul* is in some way related to “Gnosticism” has also influenced assessments of the theological contents of the tractate in several ways. Scopello, for example, has interpreted *Exeg. Soul* as a

A.H.B. Logan and A.J.M. Wedderburn; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1983), 187–194; Segelberg, “Prayer Among the Gnostics,” 60–61; Wilson, “Old Testament Exegesis,” 223.

²⁴³ See, e.g., Robinson, “Exegesis on the Soul,” 688–689; Sevrin, *L'Exégèse de l'âme*, 39–42; Parrott, “Response,” 91–95 esp. 92 n. 3.

²⁴⁴ See Sasagu Arai, “Simonianische Gnosis und die Exegese über die Seele,” in *Gnosis and Gnosticism: Papers Read at the Seventh International Congress on Patristic Studies (Oxford, September 8th–13th 1975)* (ed. Martin Krause; NHS 8; Leiden: Brill, 1977), 185–203. See also Meeks, “Image of the Androgyne,” 191–192 n. 119; Perkins, *Gnosticism and the New Testament*, 174; Kurt Rudolph, *Gnosis: The Nature and History of Gnosticism* (ed. and trans. Robert McLachlan Wilson; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1984), 110, 255; J.D. Turner, “Ritual in Gnosticism,” 104.

²⁴⁵ See Sevrin, *L'Exégèse de l'âme*, 58–60. This assessment has later been supported by Kasser, “La gnose,” 26. In his study of Heracleon's commentary on the Gospel of John, Ansgar Wucherpfennig follows Sevrin and concludes that *Exeg. Soul* is “repräsentativ für das Milieu ... in dem Herakleons Johanneserklärung entstanden ist” (Ansgar Wucherpfennig, *Heracleon Philologus: gnostische Johannesexegese im zweiten Jahrhundert* [WUNT 142; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002], 386).

²⁴⁶ See Sevrin, *L'Exégèse de l'âme*, 56–60; Kasser, “La gnose,” 26.

²⁴⁷ See, e.g., Scopello, “Jewish and Greek Heroines,” 76–77; Scopello, *L'Exégèse de l'âme*, 48.

²⁴⁸ See Scopello, *L'Exégèse de l'âme*, 100.

²⁴⁹ See Kulawik, *Die Erzählung*, esp. 6.

“gnostic novel,” an exoteric text aimed at explaining gnostic doctrine in an attractive manner to a large audience, with the soul representing the “gnostic heroine,”²⁵⁰ while William C. Robinson, by taking pessimism as a defining trait of “Gnosticism,” has concluded that *Exeg. Soul* is of interest as an example in Hellenistic Christianity of a Platonizing doctrine of the soul whose dualism was pessimistic enough to turn it gnostic.²⁵¹ His conclusion that the text primarily aims to warn its readers against sexuality,²⁵² also squares well with traditional theories of “Gnosticism” as a religion characterised by ethical extremism, whose adherents are often supposed to have been either libertines or ascetics.²⁵³

When it comes to placing the tractate more specifically within the history of “Gnosticism,” Robinson thinks that *Exeg. Soul*, which he characterises as an “exhortation to otherworldliness,”²⁵⁴ “as a whole . . . shows marked affinities with the Naasene views,”²⁵⁵ and locates the origins of what he regards as “the narrative source” of the text “among Pythagoras’ disciples,” claiming that this source did not contain anything “distinctively Christian, Jewish, or . . . Gnostic.”²⁵⁶ The Naassene connection has also been emphasised by other scholars.²⁵⁷ Pearson, for instance, who classifies *Exeg. Soul* among the “doctrinal treatises” of the Nag Hammadi Library, finds its affinities with “the Naassene Gnostic system” to be “noteworthy,” but that it may also have been influenced by “Gnosticism” of the “Valentinian” type.²⁵⁸ As for *Exeg. Soul*’s possible links to “Valentinianism,” these are usually seen in the tractate’s references to a

²⁵⁰ See Scopello, “Jewish and Greek Heroines,” 72; Scopello, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 96, 100. Scopello claims that *Exeg. Soul* “n’est ni un discours de révélation ni un λόγος réservé à une élite restreinte” (Scopello, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 96); cf. also Kasser, “La gnose,” 27.

²⁵¹ Robinson, “Exegesis on the Soul,” 689; Robinson paraphrases Sevrin, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 42. For the problematic aspects inherent in classifying a text as “Gnostic” on the basis of “dualism” or “pessimism,” see Williams, *Rethinking “Gnosticism”*.

²⁵² See Robinson, “Introduction,” 137–138; Robinson, “Exegesis on the Soul,” 688.

²⁵³ For a discussion and critique of libertinism or asceticism as defining characteristics of “Gnosticism,” see Williams, *Rethinking “Gnosticism”*, 139–188.

²⁵⁴ Robinson, “Introduction,” 136.

²⁵⁵ Robinson, “Exegesis on the Soul,” 116.

²⁵⁶ Robinson, “Exegesis on the Soul,” 116–117.

²⁵⁷ See Krause, “Aussagen über das Alte Testament,” 456; Pearson, “Mikra in Gnostic Literature,” 643–644; Ménard, “L’Évangile selon Philippe.” Ménard also mentions the Samothracians, Tracians, and Phrygians (see *ibid.*, 67).

²⁵⁸ See Pearson, “Mikra in Gnostic Literature,” 641–644; Birger A. Pearson, “Nag Hammadi Codices,” *ABD* 4: 989–990. Pearson also sees affinities with *Exeg. Soul* in *Pistis Sophia* (see, “Mikra in Gnostic Literature,” 643–644).

“bridal chamber,”²⁵⁹ and in similarities with the “Valentinian” myth of Sophia.²⁶⁰

However, as should be apparent from the analysis above, it is not necessary to adduce categories such as these in order to understand *Exeg. Soul*.²⁶¹ On the contrary, I have tried to show that the tractate is perfectly

²⁵⁹ See, e.g., Ménard, “L’Évangile selon Philippe”; Krause, “Die Sakramente,” 52–55; Pétremont, *A Separate God*, 485. Cf., however, Frederik Wisse who finds it “difficult to see what the marriage imagery in ExSoul has in common with the Valentinian sacrament of the bridal chamber” and rightly points out that “The use of marriage symbolism to express the relationship between Christ and the soul was no invention of the Valentinians, and it is common in patristic sources” (Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 79). This point is also made by Kulawik, who rightly points out that *Exeg. Soul* is here closer to Origen than to “Valentinianism” (Kulawik, *Die Erzählung*, 9).

²⁶⁰ See, e.g., Mark J. Edwards, who boldly claims that “There is no doubt that Sophia, the erring aeon of the mythological system, is equated with the soul in one of the Nag Hammadi codices, entitled the *Exegesis on the Soul*” (Mark J. Edwards, “The *Epistle to Rheginus*: Valentinianism in the Fourth Century,” *NovT* 37:1 [1995]: 86). Holger Strutwolf has suggested that *Exeg. Soul* is the work of a “Valentinian” redactor who reworked a platonizing religious tractate on the fall and return of the soul, bringing it in line with the myth of Sophia (see Holger Strutwolf, *Gnosis als System: Zur Rezeption der valentinianischen Gnosis bei Origenes* [Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte 56; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993], 197). Cf., however, Nils A. Dahl’s assessment that *Exeg. Soul* “provides at best a distant parallel to the Sophia myth” (Nils Alstrup Dahl, “The Arrogant Archon and the Lewd Sophia: Jewish Traditions in Gnostic Revolt,” in *Sethian Gnosticism* [ed. Bentley Layton; vol. 2 of *The Rediscovery of Gnosticism: Proceedings of the International Conference on Gnosticism at Yale, New Haven, Connecticut, March 28–31, 1978*; SHR 41; Leiden: Brill, 1981], 709 n. 48), and Deirdre Good, who rightly notes that “the fact that the text does not specifically name Sophia should caution the interpreter against seeing Sophia behind every female figure” (Deirdre J. Good, review of Maddalena Scopello, *L’Exégèse de l’âme: Nag Hammadi Codex II,6: Introduction, traduction et commentaire*, *JBL* 107:1 [1988]: 165). For “Valentinian” affinities in *Exeg. Soul*, see also, e.g., Krause, “Aussagen über das Alte Testament,” 456; Krause, “The Exegesis on the Soul,” 103; Wilson, “Old Testament Exegesis,” 223; Dillon, “The Descent of the Soul,” 363; Pétremont, *A Separate God*, 485–486; April D. DeConick, “Heavenly Temple Traditions and Valentinian Worship: A Case for First-Century Christology in the Second Century,” in *The Jewish Roots of Christological Monotheism: Papers from the St. Andrews Conference on the Historical Origins of the Worship of Jesus* (ed. Carey C. Newman, et al.; *JSJSup* 63; Leiden: Brill, 1999), 308–309; Sevrin, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 39–42, 58–59 (Sevrin thinks it is pre-Valentinian); Einar Thomassen, “Notes pour la délimitation d’un corpus valentinien à Nag Hammadi,” in *Les textes de Nag Hammadi et le problème de leur classification: Actes du colloque tenu à Québec du 15 au 19 Septembre 1993* (ed. Louis Painchaud and Anne Pasquier; BCNH Études 3; Québec: Les presses de l’Université Laval, 1995), 243–259, esp. 258 (Thomassen here regards *Exeg. Soul* as being of possible Valentinian provenance, but does not treat it as such in his recent monograph *The Spiritual Seed: The Church of the ‘Valentinians’* [NHS 60; Leiden: Brill, 2005]); Scopello, *L’Exégèse de l’âme*, 48 (Scopello sees “Valentinianism” as one source among many).

²⁶¹ For a similar approach to *Exeg. Soul*, see Kulawik, *Die Erzählung*. Cf. also the discussion in chapter 1.

well understood simply within the context of an intertextual reading with Christian Scripture, without making prior judgments regarding the text's supposed leanings toward either orthodoxy or heresy.

With "Gnosticism" and related categories out of the picture, *Exeg. Soul* appears as a thoroughly Christian text, but where does it belong within the history of Christianity? Since *Exeg. Soul* has been almost exclusively dated and placed on the basis of perceived affinities with one or more "Gnostic" movements or systems, be it "Valentinian," "Naassene" or "Simonian," the tractate will now have to be re-dated on the basis of other criteria. Such criteria are, however, difficult to come by in *Exeg. Soul*. We may, however, conclude from the state of the canon that emerges from the tractate's extensive use of quotations and, especially, allusions to New Testament Scripture, that it can hardly be dated to a time much prior to the middle of the second century. At the other end of the scale the latest possible date of Codex II gives us an absolute *terminus ante quem* for *Exeg. Soul* probably sometime in the fifth century.²⁶² Other reasonably secure bases for assigning a date to this tractate are difficult to find.

One might perhaps think that such liberal use of Homer in a Christian context as that which is in evidence in *Exeg. Soul* would indicate a relatively early date, with reference to similar use of Homer by Clement of Alexandria. However, as Robert Lamberton has pointed out, "it should be no surprise that Christians taught Homer to Christians in the schools of the fourth century empire."²⁶³ He notes that Methodius of Olympus shows a similar attitude to Homer as that which we find on display in Clement of Alexandria. As Lamberton puts it, "Here again are the marks of the assimilation of an authoritative Homer and a fabricated connection between his poetry and the Hebrew scriptures."²⁶⁴ Methodius' use of Homer is indeed close to what we find in *Exeg. Soul*. "The Homeric poems serve Methodius most strikingly as sources of warnings," states Lamberton. "The Christian will *not* desire to hear the Sirens' song in bondage, but to hear the voice of God in freedom. Such images and myths are ingeniously manipulated; the Hellenic myth 'becomes a Christian

²⁶² See chapter 1 for a discussion of the date of the manuscript.

²⁶³ Robert Lamberton, *Homer the Theologian: Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the Growth of the Epic Tradition* (The Transformation of the Classical Heritage 9; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 241.

²⁶⁴ Lamberton, *Homer the Theologian*, 242. On Methodius' use of Homer, see also Vinzenz Buchheit, "Homer bei Methodios von Olympos," *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie, Neue Folge* 99 (1956): 2–36.

one.”²⁶⁵ As Vinzenz Buchheit has put it, “Am meisten überrascht hat uns, daß Homer als literarische Autorität in hohem Ansehen steht bei den Kirchenvätern. Man beruft sich auf ihn als Gewährsmann im gleichen Maße wie auf die Hl. Schrift.”²⁶⁶ Buchheit stresses that Homer “hat auch bei den Vätern nichts von seinem Ansehen eingebüßt, vielmehr ist er durch sie zu neuer Geltung gelangt.”²⁶⁷

Unfortunately it does not seem possible to date *Exeg. Soul* with any reasonable degree of probability within the outlined period (roughly mid-second to mid-fifth century), besides acknowledging the fact that the relative probability tapers off at either end of the scale. What we may say, however, is that although the text may conceivably be dated as early as the middle of the second century, there does not seem to be any internal evidence in *Exeg. Soul* that necessitates a dating prior to the fifth century. I therefore think it would be wrong to give priority to a relatively early date of the text over a relatively late one. There has, however, been a marked bias in scholarship, that is now in need of redress, towards a comparative focus on material of an early date. Since a thorough comparative analysis of *Exeg. Soul* with other early Christian literature is outside the scope of the present study, I will here only offer some thoughts on the possible benefits of comparing *Exeg. Soul* with comparatively later sources and suggest some potentially fruitful avenues of further research.

The Nag Hammadi Codices have often been linked to the fourth-century Pachomian monasteries in the vicinity of where they were found.²⁶⁸ It is therefore interesting to note that there are in the Pachomian sources potentially significant parallels to major themes in *Exeg. Soul*. We have seen that *Exeg. Soul* is shot through with quotations from Scripture, as well as an abundance of allusions. The way this text uses Scripture in rather intricate ways seems to presuppose a rather literate readership or audience. Or, to put it somewhat differently, the ideal recipients of this text seem, at least in light of the present cognitive poetic analysis of its Scriptural intertextuality, to be steeped in Scripture. In a fourth or fifth century Egyptian context we find this kind of literary culture especially within the monastic communities. Palladius, for example, reports in his *Lausiatic History* from the early fifth century, that the Pachomians “learn

²⁶⁵ Lamberton, *Homer the Theologian*, 243.

²⁶⁶ Buchheit, “Homer bei Methodios von Olympos,” 35.

²⁶⁷ Buchheit, “Homer bei Methodios von Olympos,” 35–36.

²⁶⁸ For an up to date discussion of the provenance of the Nag Hammadi Codices, see Goehring, “The Provenance.”

all the scriptures by heart.”²⁶⁹ William Graham has emphasised the pronounced centrality of Scripture in the Pachomian tradition, and states that “in even the most cursory reading of the Pachomian sources, one is struck by the often almost seamless web of scriptural allusions and citations that runs through nearly every document written by or about Pachomius and his disciples.”²⁷⁰ Graham points out how this fact, “reflect the daily role of scripture in the chanting of psalms, the special gatherings for instruction on the meaning of scripture, and the reading or recitation during daily work and night vigils.”²⁷¹ Armand Veilleux similarly stresses the way in which “The spiritual life of the pachomian monks was constantly nourished by the Scriptures,” and that this is reflected in their style of writing. Veilleux also highlights the way in which Scripture is quoted rather freely in these texts, and how it is adapted to suit the context.²⁷²

On the basis of a study of Pachomius’ letters, Christoph Joest has described Pachomius’ style of writing and Scriptural exegesis in terms that also fit well as a description of *Exeg. Soul*. Joest speaks, for instance, of the way in which Pachomius uses metaphor and allegory without explanation and without identifying it as such, and he points out how Pachomius has a tendency to compress citations of different biblical passages within the same sentence.²⁷³ Philip Rousseau has in a recent article argued for certain overlapping interests in this regard between the Nag Hammadi codices and texts by Theodore and Horsiesios, the successors of Pachomius. Rousseau points out how Horsiesios combines Old and New Testament quotations and allusions in his presentation of the monastic life, and how he in one example strings together “beads from Hosea, Psalms, Malachi, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel, passing then to Matthew and Romans, and finally returning to Deuteronomy; a *passeggiata* of which every step rings out the theme of the heart’s return to God,” as Rousseau puts it.²⁷⁴

²⁶⁹ Palladius, *Historia lausiaca*, 32.12.

²⁷⁰ William A. Graham, *Beyond the Written Word: Oral Aspects of Scripture in the History of Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 129.

²⁷¹ Graham, *Beyond the Written Word*, 129.

²⁷² Armand Veilleux, trans., *Pachomian Koinonia: The Lives, Rules, and Other Writings of Saint Pachomius and His Disciples* (3 vols.; Cistercian Studies Series 45–47; Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications, 1980–1982), 1: xxvii.

²⁷³ See Christoph Joest, “Joseph in der ‘Wüste’: Der achte Brief Pachoms und seine Botschaft,” *Journal of Coptic Studies* 8 (2006): 103–122.

²⁷⁴ Philip Rousseau, “The Successors of Pachomius and the Nag Hammadi Codices: Exegetical Themes and Literary Structures,” in *The World of Early Egyptian Christianity*:

What emerges from the Pachomian sources is a picture of a monastic culture that literally breathed the Scriptures.²⁷⁵ In the *Bohairic Life of Pachomius* Theodore is made to admonish the monks to “have always at hand the holy Gospels of our Lord Jesus Christ and all the rest of the holy Scriptures and their thoughts.”²⁷⁶ We may thus safely conclude that the monastic reading and writing practices that emerge from the Pachomian sources would seem to constitute an historical context within which the rhetoric of *Exe. Soul* would make very good sense. Moreover, the focus in *Exeg. Soul* on repentance and a pure life of the soul committed to Christ fits remarkably well with the interests of the writings of Theodore and Horsiesios. Moreover, such a culture of Scriptural memorization would indeed fit the patterns of Scriptural allusions identified in the present cognitive poetic analysis of *Exeg. Soul*. Interestingly, *Exeg. Soul* also seems to point out that mere memorization and recitation of Scripture, which may well be what the tractate means by the phrase, $\bar{\nu}\omega\lambda\lambda\epsilon\bar{\nu}\ \bar{\nu}\alpha\kappa\eta\varsigma$, “ascetic words,”²⁷⁷ does not bring about salvation unless it is accompanied by genuine repentance and prayer—because salvation, as *Exeg. Soul* makes abundantly clear, is ultimately a gift from God and cannot be obtained without his good will.

As we have seen, the theme of repentance and prayer is a central concern of *Exeg. Soul*. Scopello has linked these features mainly to Jewish sources and argued for a Jewish background, but while she has argued in favour of Jewish precedents for the imagery of repentance, weeping, and prayer in *Exeg. Soul*, these features are also widespread in Christian, and especially monastic, sources.²⁷⁸ Indeed they are among the features that would seem to make *Exeg. Soul* especially congenial to a monastic reading. The theme of repentance and return to God, which Rousseau highlights in the Pachomian sources, thus resonates very well with *Exeg. Soul*, although Rousseau himself does not actually refer to this particular text. In fact, all the major themes Rousseau singles out in the Pachomian

Language, Literature, and Social Context (ed. James E. Goehring and Janet A. Timbie; CUA Studies in Early Christianity; Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 152.

²⁷⁵ In *The Instructions of Theodore*, one of Pachomius’ successors, Scripture is even referred to repeatedly as $\pi\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\ \bar{\nu}\tau\epsilon\pi\eta\iota\omicron\gamma\tau\epsilon$, “the breath of God” (see *Theod. Instr.* 19, 35, 38).

²⁷⁶ SBo, 189; translation quoted from Veilleux, *Pachomian Koinonia*, 1:231–232.

²⁷⁷ *Exeg. Soul* 134.30.

²⁷⁸ See, e.g., Rubenson, “Wisdom,” 530–531; Benedicta Ward, *Harlots of the Desert: A Study of Repentance in Early Monastic Sources* (Cistercian Studies Series 106; Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications, 1987); Rousseau, “The Successors of Pachomius.”

sources are also found in *Exeg. Soul*. Apart from the style of the Pachomian writings, Rousseau also points out their focus on rebirth and revelation, redemption and rest, prophecy and fulfillment, all of which are interests that are prominently on display in *Exeg. Soul*. With regard to rebirth, we indeed find that the Pachomian sources use this term to refer both to baptism and to the monastic life itself. Repentance is described as a rebirth in the Bohairic version of the *Life of Pachomius*,²⁷⁹ while Theodore, for instance, refers to the monastic life as “the holy vocation of rebirth” (πρωτῶν ἐτοῦσαβ ἡπεξπο ἡκεσο),²⁸⁰ and states that through the monastic life “we renew ourselves” (τενεῖρε ἡμον ἡβῆρε).²⁸¹

Although he argues on more general grounds, building primarily on Michael Williams’ argument for the intentional arrangement of individual tractates within each of the Nag Hammadi codices,²⁸² Rousseau’s suggestion that “people who thought like Theodore and Horsiesios would have found the Nag Hammadi codices useful,”²⁸³ may thus also find support in the internal evidence of texts like *Exeg. Soul* and, as we shall see in the next chapter, *Gos. Phil*.

We may perhaps also venture some more specific suggestions concerning the possible function of *Exeg. Soul* within such a monastic context. We know, for instance, that there were catechumens in the Pachomian monasteries.²⁸⁴ It could thus have been possible, considering the way in which *Exeg. Soul* treats Christian ritual practice, to read it as a homily delivered to those about to be baptized or, perhaps more likely, to the newly baptised monks—people who would relate to the text’s allusive

²⁷⁹ See SBo 142; Veilleux, *Pachomian Koinonia*, 1:201.

²⁸⁰ Theodore, *Instructions*, 3:28 (L.-Th. Lefort, ed., *Oeuvres de S. Pachôme et de ses disciples* [CSCO 159, *Scriptores Coptici* 23; Leuven: L. Durbecq, 1965], 53).

²⁸¹ Theodore, *Instructions*, 3:28 (Lefort, *Oeuvres*, 52). See also *Letter of Ammon*, 2 (James E. Goehring, *The Letter of Ammon and Pachomian Monasticism* [PTS 27; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986], 124). On the interpretation of baptism in the Pachomian sources, see Hugo Lundhaug, “Baptism in the Monasteries of Upper Egypt: The Pachomian Corpus and the Writings of Shenoute,” forthcoming in *Ablution, Initiation, and Baptism: Late Antiquity, Early Judaism, and Early Christianity* (3 vols.; ed. David Hellholm et al.; BZNW; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010).

²⁸² See esp., Michael Allen Williams, “Interpreting the Nag Hammadi Library as ‘Collection(s)’ in the History of ‘Gnosticism(s),” in *Les textes de Nag Hammadi et le problème de leur classification: Actes du colloque tenu à Québec du 15 au 19 Septembre 1993* (ed. Louis Painchaud and Anne Pasquier; BCNH Études 3; Québec: Les presses de l’Université Laval, 1995), 3–50.

²⁸³ Rousseau, “The Successors of Pachomius,” 157.

²⁸⁴ See SBo, 81. For a discussion of this passage and other references to baptism in the Pachomian sources, see Lundhaug, “Baptism.”

references to baptism and the Eucharist, as well as to its focus on a life in total devotion to Christ filled with constant repentance and prayer. If we also choose to read the description in *Exeg. Soul* of the soul's union with Christ, her bridegroom, as a reference to the first eucharistic communion of the newly baptised, the fear and trembling experienced by the soul prior to her union with Christ, as described in *Exeg. Soul*, is very much in line with what we find in the Pachomian sources with regard to the first communion. Both Theodore and Horsiesios express such an attitude of fear in relation to the Eucharist,²⁸⁵ and the former even mentions it explicitly in connection with an admonition to the catechumens in the monastery to weep and lament their past sins in preparation for their first reception of the body and blood of the Saviour.²⁸⁶

Much of what I have outlined here is not necessarily specific to Pachomian monasticism, but the sources we have for the practices of the Pachomians are far better than what we have for other monastic movements in this period and area—with the exception, of course, of the writings of Shenoute, abbot of the White Monastery in Upper Egypt from 385 to 465, whose monastic community was situated not far from the site of the discovery of the Nag Hammadi codices and close to several Pachomian monasteries.²⁸⁷ And, indeed, many of the features of the Pachomian

²⁸⁵ See Theodore, *Letter* 1; Horsiesios, *Reg.* 14; Veilleux, *Pachomian Koinonia*, 3:124, 130.

²⁸⁶ “As for the catechumens in the monasteries who are expecting the awesome remission of sins and the grace of the spiritual mystery, let them be taught by you that they must weep and lament their past sins and prepare themselves for the sanctification of their souls and bodies, so that they may bear the reception of the Lord Saviour's blood and body, the very thought of which is awesome” (Theodore, *Letter* 1,6; translation from Veilleux, *Pachomian Koinonia*, 3:124) The fear described here in connection with the catechumens' reception of the Eucharist is similar to what we find in relation to the soul's anticipation for the bridegroom in *Exeg. Soul* 132.17–21.

²⁸⁷ On the life of Shenoute, see, e.g., Stephen Emmel, *Shenoute's Literary Corpus* (2 vols.; CSCO 599–600, Subsidia 111–112; Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 6–14; Stephen Emmel, “Shenoute the Monk: The Early Monastic Career of Shenoute the Archimandrite,” in *Il monachesimo tra eredità e aperture: “Testi e temi nella tradizione del monachesimo cristiano” per il 50° anniversario dell'Istituto Monastico di Sant' Anselmo, Roma, 28 maggio–1° giugno 2002* (ed. Maciej Bielawski and Daniël Hombergen; SA 140, *Analecta Monastica* 8; Rome: Centro Studi S. Anselmo/Herder, 2004), 151–174; Stephen Emmel, “From the Other Side of the Nile: Shenute and Panopolis,” in *Perspectives on Panopolis: An Egyptian Town from Alexander the Great to the Arab Conquest: Acts from an International Symposium Held in Leiden on 16, 17 and 18 December 1998* (ed. A. Egberts, et al.; Papyrologica Lugduno-Batava 31; Leiden: Brill, 2002), 95–99. I refer to the writings of Shenoute using the titles listed in Emmel, *Shenoute's Literary Corpus*, xviii–xxii, and to the White Monastery codices using the sigla listed in *ibid.*, xxiii–xxiv and described in *ibid.*, 111–379.

writings that I have just mentioned is also found in the writings of Shenoute. The picture we get from the Pachomian sources of a monastic community steeped in the Scriptures is, for instance, one that is also reflected in the Shenoutean corpus. Also in Shenoute's White Monastery the practice of memorizing and internalizing Scripture was important enough to be included among the monastic rules. In this regard Bentley Layton speaks of "the totalizing character" of Shenoute's monastic system, which, as he puts it, "even extends into the mind and voice of the monk when he is alone in the cell," for even when he is alone, the monk is commanded by the rules to do constant handiwork and to meditate "with his brain and his vocal cords."²⁸⁸ Layton speaks of "the constant recitation or mumbling of prayers and passages of Scripture," and asserts that "there is no silence in this monastery, but rather a constant buzzing sound like a flight of bees, as everyone continually mumbles prayers and passages of Scripture in a low voice."²⁸⁹ Layton argues that when the mind is constantly permeated by monasticism in this way, free thought is replaced by constant meditation on Scripture and prayer.²⁹⁰

Such controlled memorization practices would ideally serve to create a highly uniform body of Scriptural memory among the monks, and thus of a similar basis for associative thinking. That is, of a group of monks who would possess similar grounds of reference with regard to Scriptural references, doctrines, rules and regulations. The aim and effect of these practices would thus be to create as uniform an interpretive community as possible. Significantly, this kind of monastic community would seem to constitute an ideal interpretive community for such an intricately allusive text as *Exeg. Soul.*, which seems to presuppose considerable knowledge of Scripture and Christian religious practice on the part of its readers or hearers.

There is, however, an even closer parallel to *Exeg. Soul.* to be found in the writings of Shenoute than the purely stylistic ones. As is the case with our Nag Hammadi text, Shenoute also understands the Old Testament allegorical descriptions of Israel's infidelity to apply to the soul. In surviving fragments of a writing known as *So Listen*, Shenoute

²⁸⁸ Bentley Layton, "Rules, Patterns, and the Exercise of Power in Shenoute's Monastery: The Problem of World Replacement and Identity Maintenance," *J ECS* 15:1 (2007): 70–71.

²⁸⁹ Layton, "Rules, Patterns," 71.

²⁹⁰ See Layton, "Rules, Patterns," 71.

explicitly makes this identification and even quotes a part of the same passage from Ezekiel that *Exeg. Soul* quotes at 130.11–20:

εωδεκοϋω εχρος σε νακ αν ε̄μπε̄ιμα πσον δετεφυχη̄ μη̄πορνη̄
καταψαδε̄ μη̄ε̄προφητης̄ δε̄ναω̄ η̄ρε̄ ᾱπολις̄ τ̄πιστη̄ ε̄τετεφυχη̄ τε̄
̄̄πορνη̄ η̄ δε̄ᾱρε̄πορνε̄γε̄ μη̄η̄ω̄η̄ρε̄ η̄κνη̄ ε̄τετεφυχη̄ τε̄ ε̄τπορνε̄γε̄
̄̄η̄νε̄ς̄μ̄ε̄γε̄ κα[τ]ᾱψαδε̄ η̄[ν]ε̄π[ροφητης̄]

So, if you do not want to say to yourself here, brother, “the prostitute soul,” according to the word of the prophet, for how was the city of faith, which is you soul, a prostitute, or, “you prostituted yourself to the sons of Egypt,”²⁹¹ which is your soul who prostitutes herself in her thoughts, according to the words of the [prophets]²⁹² (Shenoute, *So Listen*, XO 48)

Unfortunately the fragment breaks off at this point, but Shenoute returns to the same theme on the following leaf, where he addresses “those who have become weak in the true teaching” (νε̄ντᾱγ̄ρω̄β̄ ε̄η̄τε̄ς̄βω̄ μη̄με̄), of whom he says that the Old Testament

ε̄ς̄ο̄χ̄β̄η̄ μη̄οο̄γ̄ ε̄η̄νε̄ῑψαδε̄ ε̄τε̄νᾱῑ νε̄· δε̄ε̄τ̄βε̄πᾱῑ τ̄πορνη̄ ε̄τε̄τε̄φυχη̄
τε̄· σω̄τη̄ ε̄ψαδε̄ η̄π̄λο̄εις̄ ε̄τ̄βε̄δε̄ᾱρε̄πω̄ε̄τ̄ ε̄βολ̄ η̄πο̄ῡζο̄μ̄τ̄ μη̄η̄κε̄ψαδε̄
τη̄ρο̄ῡ ε̄τε̄ψᾱς̄χο̄ο̄ῡ η̄τε̄ῑρε̄ ε̄η̄πε̄ς̄ω̄η̄τ̄ η̄ο̄ῑτ̄πᾱλᾱιᾱ μη̄η̄νε̄φυχη̄ ε̄τ̄πορνε̄γε̄
ε̄βολ̄ η̄π̄νο̄ῡγε̄ μη̄τε̄ρε̄ς̄βω̄ μη̄με̄ η̄ο̄ῡο̄εῑω̄ η̄ῑμ̄ ε̄τ̄βε̄δε̄ᾱρε̄πω̄ε̄τ̄ρᾱγε̄ ε̄βολ̄
ε̄ᾱτ̄η̄ο̄ῡον̄ η̄ῑμ̄ ε̄τ̄πᾱρᾱγε̄· ε̄τε̄πᾱῑ πε̄ δε̄ᾱτε̄φυχη̄ η̄τε̄κ̄μη̄νε̄ η̄ρω̄με̄
μη̄η̄νε̄τ̄δᾱε̄μη̄ κᾱτᾱς̄μο̄τ̄ η̄ῑμ̄ πω̄ρω̄ η̄νε̄ς̄μ̄ε̄γε̄ ε̄βολ̄ η̄ νε̄ς̄μο̄κ̄μη̄ε̄κ̄ ε̄ᾱρᾱτο̄ῡ
η̄η̄δᾱῑμο̄νῑο̄ν̄· ε̄τ̄ρε̄ῡδᾱε̄μη̄ε̄ς̄ ε̄η̄νε̄ῡκᾱκ̄ιᾱ· μη̄η̄νε̄ῡς̄ω̄ω̄· μη̄η̄νε̄ῡη̄η̄τ̄ᾱτ̄ς̄ω̄τη̄·
ᾱγ̄πορνε̄γε̄ η̄μη̄μᾱς̄ ε̄η̄νε̄ῡω̄ο̄χ̄η̄νε̄ η̄κ̄ρο̄ῡ· ε̄το̄ η̄ο̄ε̄ η̄η̄σᾱρ̄ε̄ η̄η̄νε̄ο̄ο̄γ̄·
μη̄η̄νε̄ε̄τ̄ω̄αρ̄ κᾱτᾱψαδε̄ η̄η̄ε̄προφητης̄·

smites them with the following words: “Therefore, prostitute,” which is your soul, “listen to the word of the Lord, because you have poured out your copper,”²⁹³ and all the other words which the Old (Testament) says like this in its anger against the souls that go a whoring from God²⁹⁴ and his true teaching, always, “because you have spread your legs for everyone who passes by,”²⁹⁵ which is the soul of people like you and those who are

²⁹¹ Ezek 16:26; cf. *Exeg. Soul* 130.19. Shenoute had no qualms about using this negative biblical image of Egypt and the Egyptians, and we also find similar use of this motif in Philo, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen (see Kulawik, *Die Erzählung*, 147), thereby showing that the use of this reference cannot be used as an argument against an Egyptian provenance for *Exeg. Soul*.

²⁹² This fragment of White Monastery codex XO, which is in the collection of the Institut français d'archéologie orientale, Cairo (EG-CF Copte 2 f. 1), remains unpublished. The present reading is based on a photograph. For the reading ε̄η̄νε̄ς̄μ̄ε̄γε̄ κα[τ]ᾱψαδε̄ η̄[ν]ε̄π[ροφητης̄] I am indebted to Anne Boud'hors, who is preparing an edition of this manuscript for the IFAO series, as well as a critical edition of Shenoute's *Canon* 8.

²⁹³ Cf. Ezek 16:35–36.

²⁹⁴ Cf. Hos 9:1.

²⁹⁵ Cf. Ezek 16:25.

defiled in every way, spreading its thoughts or its considerations beneath the demons for them to defile it with their badness and their pollution and their disobedience. And they fornicate with it with their deceitful counsels which are like the flesh of the donkeys and the dogs according to the words of the prophets.²⁹⁶ (Shenoute, *So Listen*, XO 49–50)²⁹⁷

Like *Exeg. Soul*, Shenoute identifies the prostitute in Ezekiel's parable, not with Jerusalem, but with the soul, and the soul's prostitution is explicitly identified with its impious thoughts.²⁹⁸ To my knowledge the writings of Shenoute thus provide the closest parallels to *Exeg. Soul's* application of the Old Testament accounts of Israel's infidelity to the actions and inclinations of the soul. Scopello has brought to light the sixth homily of the Syrian church father Jacob of Serugh as an interesting parallel to *Exeg. Soul's* use of this Old Testament imagery.²⁹⁹ Indeed utilising many of the same Old Testament passages concerning Israel's infidelity as does *Exeg. Soul*, Jacob of Serugh does not, however, apply the prophetic imagery of Jerusalem as a whore to the soul, but rather to the Church.

There is, however, a prominent feature of *Exeg. Soul* that is not at all compatible with the views of Shenoute, namely the idea we have seen presupposed in *Exeg. Soul* of the pre-existence of souls prior to their fall into material bodies. Significantly, this is an idea that is associated with Origen³⁰⁰ and the later so-called "Origenists,"—and one for which they were indeed vehemently attacked by people like Shenoute, Theophilus of Alexandria, and others.³⁰¹ We could perhaps suggest that Origenist monks of some kind might have constituted an ideal fourth/fifth century Egyptian readership/audience for this particular text? As Samuel

²⁹⁶ Cf. Ezek 23:20.

²⁹⁷ The Coptic text is from Ariel Shisha-Halevy, "Unpublished Shenoutiana in the British Library," *Enchoria* 5 (1975): 64–65.

²⁹⁸ It may also be noted that while Shenoute is here using the metaphor THE SOUL IS A WOMAN, he is addressing a male interlocutor, possibly a fellow monk. Shenoute is here using a female stereotype, the prostitute ICM, which he takes from Ezekiel, as a metaphorical source in order to describe the sins of the soul.

²⁹⁹ See Madeleine Scopello, "Jacques de Saroug et l'Exégèse de l'âme," in *Deuxième journée d'études coptes: Strasbourg 25 mai 1984* (Cahiers de la Bibliothèque Copte 3; Leuven: Peeters, 1986), 130–136.

³⁰⁰ See, e.g., Celia E. Rabinowitz, "Personal and Cosmic Salvation in Origen," *VC* 38:4 (1984): 319–329; Kulawik, *Die Erzählung*, 101.

³⁰¹ See, e.g., Shenoute, *I Am Amazed*, 333–344, 357; Theophilus of Alexandria, *Sixteenth Festal Letter*; Norman Russell, *Theophilus of Alexandria* (The Early Church Fathers; London: Routledge, 2007), 92; Ronald E. Heine, *The Commentaries of Origen and Jerome on St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians* (Oxford Early Christian Studies; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 12–14.

Rubenson has convincingly argued, Origenism was widespread among the monks in fourth century Egypt.³⁰² Also Shenoute implicitly testifies to the currency of this idea in his own lifetime and his own area of influence in Upper Egypt, when he attacks it in the writing known as *I Am Amazed*.³⁰³ As for the presence of Origenists in Upper Egypt at the time of Shenoute, this is also attested by a partially preserved letter sent by Dioscorus, the archbishop of Alexandria, to Shenoute sometime between 444 and 451.³⁰⁴ Dioscorus is in this letter worried about the presence of Origenist monks in the vicinity of Shenoute's monastic community and even singles out as a specific problem the presence of the writings of Origen and other heretics in one of the nearby monasteries.³⁰⁵ Moreover, the possibility of an "Origenist" provenance for *Exeg. Soul* would also find support in the many similarities, shown by Kulawik, between *Exeg. Soul* and Origen not only with regard to the pre-existence of souls, but also with regard to bridal mysticism and the use of Scripture.³⁰⁶ Still, it seems clear, as we have seen, that in its main themes, not least in its emphasis on repentance, as well as in its style, *Exeg. Soul* would also have been amenable to the interests of the Pachomians and even to those of Shenoute's monastic community.

At the very least, these examples would seem to warrant further comparison with other related writings of the period. Such analyses are, however, well outside the scope of the present study, so I will content myself with these observations and a call for a thorough comparative analysis of *Exeg. Soul* with sources of the fourth and fifth centuries. With the abundance of sources available to us from this period there is truly much comparative work yet to be done.

³⁰² See Samuel Rubenson, "Origen in the Egyptian Monastic Tradition of the Fourth Century," in *Origeniana Septima: Origenes in den Auseinandersetzungen des 4. Jahrhunderts* (ed. W.A. Bienert and U. Kühneweg; BETL 137; Leuven: Leuven University Press/Peeters, 1999), 319–337; Samuel Rubenson, *The Letters of St. Anthony: Monasticism and the Making of a Saint* (SAC; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995).

³⁰³ See Shenoute, *I Am Amazed*, 333–344, 357.

³⁰⁴ This letter, *Epistula ad Sinuthium* (which also includes within it *Epistula ad Sabinum et Gennadium [et Hermogenem]*) is partly preserved in four folios from White Monastery codex XZ. The first three folios have been published by Herbert Thompson, "Dioscorus and Shenoute," in *Recueil d'études égyptologiques dédiées à la mémoire de Jean-François Champollion* (BEHE 234; Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1922), 367–376, while the fourth folio has been published by Henri Munier, *Manuscripts coptes* (Catalogue Général Des Antiquités Égyptiennes Du Musée Du Caire 9201–9304; Cairo: Imprimerie de l'Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1916), 147–149.

³⁰⁵ See esp. Dioscorus, *Epistula ad Sinuthium*, XZ 73 (Munier, *Manuscripts coptes*, 148–149).

³⁰⁶ See Kulawik, *Die Erzählung*.

5. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

Logion 114 of the *Gospel of Thomas*, undoubtedly one of the most well known and often cited passages in the entire Nag Hammadi corpus, famously states the need to become male in order to be eligible for salvation:

πεχесιμων петрос ναγ χεμαρεμαριζαμ ει εβολ ηρητην χειςριουε ιπρωα
 αν ιπωνη πεχεις χειςρηνητε ανοκ τναςωκ ημος χεκαας σειναας ηροουτ
 ρινα σεναωωπε ρωωε ηογπια εφονη εφεινε ημωτη ηροουτ χεσυιμε ηιμ
 σεναας ηροουτ σναωκ εροην ετηνητερο ηιπηγε

Simon Peter said to them: “Let Mary leave us, for women are not worthy of life.” Jesus said: “Behold! I shall lead her in order to make her male, so that she too may become a living spirit resembling you males. For every woman who will make herself male will enter the kingdom of heaven.”³⁰⁷

(*Gos. Thom.* 51.18–26)

Numerous scholars have seized upon this, and a handful of similar passages in the Nag Hammadi texts,³⁰⁸ either as evidence for the supposedly “Gnostic” soteriological imagery of turning female into male, or as an example of “Gnostic” or more general late antique misogyny or “antifemininity.”³⁰⁹ Regarding such attitudes as being especially pervasive in the Nag Hammadi texts, Frederik Wisse has even suggested that there is “the possibility that the Coptic owner or owners of the Nag Hammadi Codices selected tractates for inclusion on the basis of their antifemininity stance.”³¹⁰ But how does *Exeg. Soul* fit into this picture? As we have seen, we find in *Exeg. Soul* a rather unusual take on metaphors of

³⁰⁷ The Coptic text is taken from Bentley Layton, ed., Thomas O. Lambdin, trans., “The Gospel According to Thomas,” in *Gospel According to Thomas, Gospel According to Philip, Hypostasis of the Archons, and Indexes* (ed. Bentley Layton; vol. 1 of *Nag Hammadi Codex II, 2–7 Together with XIII, 2**, *Brit. Lib. Or.4926(1)*, and *P. Oxy.* 1, 654, 655; NHS 20; Leiden: Brill, 1989), 92.

³⁰⁸ See, e.g., *Treat. Seth* 65.24–31; *Zost.* 130.20–131.14; *Dial. Sav.* 144.15–23; *1 Apoc. Jas.* 24.25–29; 41.15–19; *Tri. Trac.* 94.16–20; *Thom. Cont.* 144.8–10.

³⁰⁹ See, e.g., Frederik Wisse, “Flee Femininity: Antifemininity in Gnostic Texts and the Question of Social Milieu,” in *Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism* (ed. Karen L. King; SAC; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 297–307.

³¹⁰ Wisse, “Flee Femininity,” 298. However, the imagery of gender transformation from male into female in this period is not confined to so-called “Gnostic” sources. Indeed, as Kari Vogt has shown, this imagery is actually more common in early “mainstream” Christian sources (referred to by Vogt simply as Christian), than in sources commonly classified as “Gnostic” (Kari Vogt, “‘Becoming Male’: A Gnostic and Early Christian Metaphor,” in *Image of God and Gender Models in Judaeo-Christian Tradition* [ed. Kari Elisabeth Børresen; Oslo: Solum, 1991], 172–187).

male and female, and gender transformation. As Marvin Meyer has put it, “Rarely does a religious text from antiquity and late antiquity recommend that one become female.”³¹¹ *Exeg. Soul*, however, is one of those rare occurrences where the metaphorical sex-change takes the opposite direction of what we have come to expect, and thus constitutes an interesting departure from the usual metaphor of “becoming male” prevalent in early Christian literature.³¹² However, while Meyer’s statement seems to be true with regard to the three earliest Christian centuries, there seems to have been a shift in Christian discourse in the fourth century, where the Christian ideal becomes for the male to be like a female virgin, in contrast to the two preceding centuries where the norm was the female becoming male.³¹³ Depending on how we date it, then, *Exeg. Soul* may either be regarded as a very early example of this kind of imagery, or as a part of a broader trend.

However this might be, *Exeg. Soul* may be described as a sustained elaboration of the conceptual metaphors THE SOUL IS A WOMAN and CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A MARRIAGE WITH CHRIST.³¹⁴ The soul’s fall into matter and attachment to transitory and material things is described in terms of a wife leaving her husband in favour of a life of adultery and prostitution, and in terms of an unnatural masculinisation. The salvation of the soul consequently requires her to regain her original femininity and virginity, marry Christ, and stay faithful to him as a subordinate wife.

But, as we have seen, *Exeg. Soul* is also much more complicated than it might appear at first sight. While the tractate gets its main points across by manipulating a relatively small number of overarching conceptual blends and by exploiting the connections and primings offered by their activated mental spaces, it also prompts for the creation of complex additional structures of conceptual and intertextual blending of which we have barely scraped the surface in the present analysis. Here the complex

³¹¹ Marvin W. Meyer, “Gospel of Thomas Logion 114 Revisited,” in *For the Children, Perfect Instruction: Studies in Honor of Hans-Martin Schenke on the Occasion of the Berliner Arbeitskreis für koptisch-gnostische Schriften’s Thirtieth Year* (ed. Hans-Gebhard Bethge, et al.; NHS 54; Leiden: Brill, 2002), 107.

³¹² Some scholars have nevertheless made *Exeg. Soul* conform to expectations. See, e.g., Peter Cramer, *Baptism and Change in the Early Middle Ages, c.200–c.1150* (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life & Thought; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 27, who describes the Father in *Exeg. Soul* as turning the womb of the soul from the inside to the outside, rather than the other way around as explicitly stated in the manuscript.

³¹³ See Boyarin, *Dying for God*, 74–77.

³¹⁴ As such it conforms to Quintillian’s and Demetrius’ definition of allegory, that is, as a sustained metaphor (See Innes, “Metaphor, Simile, and Allegory,” 12).

web of multiple interrelations with a substantial corpus of canonical texts is especially worthy of note as the primary mechanism of *Exeg. Soul's* considerable interpretive polysemy.

CHAPTER FOUR

NO LONGER A CHRISTIAN, BUT A CHRIST: DEIFICATION AND CHRISTOLOGY IN THE GOSPEL OF PHILIP

πειογοῖω τηρῆ τῆνῆμῆτῆ ἀω
μπῆσογῶντ φιλιππε πενταφναγ εροῖ
ἀφῆαγ ἐπιῶτ ἀω ἡτοκ ἡαῶ ἡρε κχῶ
ἡμος χεματσαβον ἐπεκῖῶτ ἡῖπιστεγε
ἀν χεανοκ †εῖῖπαῖῶτ ἀω παῖῶτ ἡεῖῖτ

“All this time I have been with you,
and you have not known me, Philip?
He who has seen me, he has seen the
Father. And you, how can you say,
‘Show us your father?’ Do you not
believe that I am in my Father and my
Father in me?” (John 14:9–10)

1. INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter we saw that the concepts of birth and rebirth are of central importance in *Exeg. Soul*, even to the point where salvation is said to depend on it. In that text we are told that “the soul will be saved through the rebirth” (τῖγχι ἐσῆαογχαεῖ εῖτῆπεχπο ἡκεσοῖ).¹ *Gos. Phil.* strikes a similar note, stating that “it is truly necessary to be born again” (ῶῶε ἀλῆῶε ἀτροχποογ ἡκεσοῖ), but adds the important specification “through the image” (εῖτῆτῆρικῶν).² For, as *Gos. Phil.* makes clear, “there is a rebirth and an image of rebirth” (ογῆογχο ἡκεσοῖ ῶοοῖ ἡῖνογῆρικῶν ἡχπο ἡκεσοῖ).³ This relationship between the thing itself, the reality, and its image or type, is an important feature of *Gos. Phil.*, with reflections on this general theme constituting one of the major strands that are woven together to create the rich rhetorical tapestry of this text.

¹ *Exeg. Soul* 134.28–29.

² *Gos. Phil.* 67.13–14. Cf. John 3:3, 7.

³ *Gos. Phil.* 67.12–13.

As we shall see, *Gos. Phil.* devotes considerable space to the problems and significance of what has been described in the present study as conceptual blending. For *Gos. Phil.* is to a significant degree concerned with the relationship between types, images, and symbols and their various referents. Aside from harnessing a wide range of conceptual blends as rhetorical devices in a complex and at times playful manner, *Gos. Phil.* also devotes considerable attention to discussions of the ontological status of the various concepts it evokes and the connections between them. Special focus is given throughout *Gos. Phil.* to questions concerning the means, possibility, and, indeed, necessity of a passage or projection from an ontologically lower level of reality to a higher.

In the present chapter, I will analyse how much of *Gos. Phil.*'s rhetoric is structured around certain key conceptual blends, and I will draw some tentative conclusions with regard to its overall theology and possible *Sitz im Leben* on the basis of this analysis. The main focus will be on how the text functions on the basis of an interplay between intertwined conceptual blends, scriptural intertexts, and highly complex intratextual references. The complexity of *Gos. Phil.* can hardly be overstated. Confronted with its intricate system of single-, double-, and multiple-scope blending, and a constant and obliquely structured interaction of complex metaphor systems, many scholars have given up trying to make sense of *Gos. Phil.* as a meaningful whole. Instead they have opted to treat it as a composite document made up of diverse and more or less unconnected parts. Others have tended to base their explanations of the doctrinal contents, of the tractate as a whole or its constituent parts, on perceived heresiological parallels, rather than on links and cues within the text itself. Although trying to understand the text on its own merits, as a complete literary statement, has even been described as a hazardous enterprise,⁴ I aim to show in this chapter that it is possible to understand *Gos. Phil.* on its own terms, that is, on the basis of an analysis of the conceptual as well as the intra- and intertextual blends it activates, the most relevant intertextual context, as in the case of *Exeg. Soul*, being that of authoritative Scripture.

⁴ See A.H.C. van Eijk, "The Gospel of Philip and Clement of Alexandria: Gnostic and Ecclesiastical Theology on the Resurrection and the Eucharist," *VC* 25 (1971): 104, and cf. also Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 326; Martha Lee Turner, *The Gospel According to Philip: The Sources and Coherence of an Early Christian Collection* (NHS 38; Leiden: Brill, 1996), 17, 255.

2. TEXTUAL AND REDACTIONAL ISSUES

Gos. Phil. is the third and longest tractate of the seven that make up the contents of Nag Hammadi Codex II, where it is found between the *Gospel of Thomas* and the *Hypostasis of the Archons*. Our tractate was copied into the codex by the same scribe who in addition to producing most of this codex, including *Exeg. Soul*, may also have been responsible for the surviving parts of Codex XIII.⁵ There are several critical editions of the Coptic text, the most important being that of Bentley Layton, with English translation by Wesley Isenberg, from 1989,⁶ and the monumental study by Hans-Martin Schenke, published in 1997.⁷ In the present study,

⁵ See, e.g., the helpful figure in Williams, *Rethinking "Gnosticism"*, 243.

⁶ Bentley Layton, ed., Wesley W. Isenberg, trans., "The Gospel According to Philip," in *Gospel According to Thomas, Gospel According to Philip, Hypostasis of the Archons, and Indexes* (ed. Bentley Layton; vol. 1 of *Nag Hammadi Codex II, 2–7 Together with XIII, 2**, *Brit. Lib. Or. 4926(1)*, and *P. Oxy.* 1, 654, 655; NHS 20; Leiden: Brill, 1989), 142–215. Layton has recently also published the Coptic text of *Gos. Phil.* in an analytical format in his *Coptic Gnostic Chrestomathy: A Selection of Coptic Texts with Grammatical Analysis and Glossary* (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 161–188.

⁷ Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*. This was only the latest of Schenke's many publications on the text of *Gos. Phil.* See also Hans-Martin Schenke, "Das Evangelium nach Philippus: Ein Evangelium der Valentinianer aus dem Funde von Nag-Hamadi," *TLZ* 84:1 (1959): 1–26; Hans-Martin Schenke, "Das Evangelium nach Philippus: Ein Evangelium der Valentinianer aus dem Funde von Nag-Hamadi," in *Koptisch-gnostische Schriften aus den Papyrus-Codices von Nag-Hamadi* (Johannes Leipoldt and Hans-Martin Schenke; Theologische Forschung: Wissenschaftliche Beiträge zur kirchlich-evangelischen Lehre 20; Hamburg-Bergstedt: Herbert Reich, 1960), 31–65; Hans-Martin Schenke, "Die Arbeit am Philippus-Evangelium," *TLZ* 90:5 (1965): 321–332; Hans-Martin Schenke, "The Gospel of Philip," in *Gospels and Related Writings* (ed. Wilhelm Schneemelcher and R. McL. Wilson; vol. 1 of *New Testament Apocrypha*; rev. ed.; Cambridge: James Clarke, 1991), 179–208; Hans-Martin Schenke, "Zur Exegese des Philippus-Evangeliums," in *Coptology: Past, Present, and Future: Studies in Honour of Rodolphe Kasser* (ed. Søren Giversen, et al.; OLA 61; Leuven: Peeters, 1994), 123–137; Hans-Martin Schenke, "Das Evangelium nach Philippus (NHC II,3)," in *Nag Hammadi Deutsch* (2 vols.; ed. Hans-Martin Schenke, et al.; GCS, Neue Folge 8, 12, Koptisch-Gnostische Schriften II–III; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001–2003), 1:183–213. The first critical edition to be published was Till, *Das Evangelium nach Philippus*. Also of note is Jacques-É. Ménard, *L'Évangile selon Philippe: Introduction, Texte—Traduction, Commentaire* (Strasbourg: Université de Strasbourg, 1967), and the revised second edition Jacques-É. Ménard, *L'Évangile selon Philippe: Introduction, Texte—Traduction, Commentaire* (2d ed.; Gnostica; Paris: Cariscript, 1988). In addition to the abovementioned editions there are also several book-length studies on *Gos. Phil.*, the most important being Robert McL. Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip: Translated from the Coptic Text, with an Introduction and Commentary* (London: Mowbray, 1962); Giversen, *Filippusevangeliet*; Gaffron, *Studien*; M.L. Turner, *Gospel According to Philip*; and see now also the voluminous study by Herbert Schmid, *Die Eucharistie ist Jesus: Anfänge einer Theorie des Sakraments im koptischen Philippusevangelium (NHC II 3)* (VCSup 88; Leiden: Brill, 2007). Last, but not least, several noteworthy dissertations have been dedicated to *Gos. Phil.*, including Gerald Leo Borchert, "An Analysis of the Literary Arrangement and

all known editions of the Coptic text have been taken into account, alongside the *Facsimile Edition* of Codex II.⁸

2.1. *Textual Coherence and the Question of Redaction*

One of the major issues in previous scholarship on *Gos. Phil.* has been how to account for its highly complex literary structure. As Wesley Isenberg has put it, *Gos. Phil.*'s structure "is neither strictly topical nor predictable."⁹ As it stands, the tractate interweaves discourses on a seemingly wide range of topics concerning bodily, social, and sacramental processes, all done in a rhetorically highly ornamental fashion that relies upon frequent use of metaphors, similes, paradoxes, wordplays, citations, and allusions. Moreover, in doing this the text has a tendency to jump back and forth between its key themes in a seemingly unpredictable fashion while alternating its use of literary devices.¹⁰ The fact that *Gos. Phil.*, unlike *Exeg. Soul.*, does not utilise a narrative structure to tie its various discourses together certainly does not make things easier. At the SBL meeting in 1959 Robert M. Grant famously stated that both *Gos. Thom.* and *Gos. Phil.* seemed "to be arranged chaotically, if one can speak of chaotic arrangement."¹¹ The result of all this is a text

Theological Views in the Coptic Gnostic Gospel of Philip" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton Theological Seminary, 1967); Isenberg, "Coptic Gospel"; William Joseph Stroud, "The Problem of Dating the Chenoboskion Gospel of Philip" (Ph.D. diss., Iliff School of Theology, 1970); Jean-Marie Sevrin, "Pratique et doctrine des sacrements dans l'Évangile selon Philippe" (Ph.D. diss., Université Catholique de Louvain, 1972); Edward T. Rewolinski, "The Use of Sacramental Language in the Gospel of Philip (Cairensis Gnosticus II,3)" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1978).

⁸ All translations from the Coptic throughout are my own. For the complete Coptic text utilised in this study, with my own English translation, see appendix B, where I have noted all divergences from the Coptic text of the major critical editions. Since the manuscript pages containing *Gos. Phil.* have suffered significant damage, it is important to refer to the photographic reproduction of the manuscript (see *Facsimile Edition: Codex II*), supplemented by Emmel, "Unique Photographic Evidence." The first photographic edition was that of Pahor Labib, *Coptic Gnostic Papyri in the Coptic Museum at Old Cairo: Volume 1* (Cairo: Government Press, 1956), plates 99–134, but the quality of these photographs is decidedly poor.

⁹ Wesley W. Isenberg, "Philip, Gospel of," *ABD* 5: 313. Isenberg elsewhere speaks of *Gos. Phil.*'s "peculiar arrangement of material" (Isenberg, "Coptic Gospel," 2) and its "peculiar literary technique" (*ibid.*, 15, 33).

¹⁰ Michael Williams has described it as "a meandering series of theological statements covering a variety of subjects" (Michael Allen Williams, "Uses of Gender Imagery in Ancient Gnostic Texts," in *Gender and Religion: On the Complexity of Symbols* [ed. Caroline Walker Bynum, et al.; Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1986], 205).

¹¹ Robert M. Grant, "Two Gnostic Gospels," *JBL* 79:1 (1960): 2.

that, as Martha Lee Turner has put it, “both intrigues and frustrates its readers,” and which is “very rich in provocative enigma.”¹² Hans-Martin Schenke shares this sentiment and links the attractiveness of *Gos. Phil.* as “ein geheimnisvoller und faszinierender Text,” with its literary structure, “der dem Betrachter den Eindruck vermitteln kann, als habe er es mit einem Kaleidoskop zu tun.”¹³

Considering this state of affairs, it is hardly surprising that there has been substantial disagreement on the degree, nature, and significance of *Gos. Phil.*'s coherence, or lack of it. We may speak here of two types of coherence, however, textual and doctrinal, and various combinations of the two. While on one end of the scale some scholars have argued that *Gos. Phil.* is both textually and doctrinally incoherent, others have argued in favour of the coherence of both, with the majority of scholars positioning themselves somewhere in between these two extremes.¹⁴

There has been no shortage of proposed explanations for the literary structure of the text,¹⁵ ranging from seeing it as a collection of excerpts from a variety of different sources, to seeing it as the work of a single author, an author who is supposed to have composed the text as we have it for reasons that may have been more or less intentional or well thought

¹² M.L. Turner, *Gospel According to Philip*, 17.

¹³ Schenke, “Zur Exegesis,” 123.

¹⁴ Martha Lee Turner has summarised the situation by pointing out that, “most interpretations of the *Gospel according to Philip* have been based on the tacit assumption that a single viewpoint, theology, or set of ritual practices can be recovered from the document by considering all the passages it presents on a given theme or topic of interest.” She divides those who have used this approach into two groups, (1) those who defend *Gos. Phil.*'s coherence as an original work or as an anthology “shaped by a strong redactor,” and (2) those who have simply focussed on specific issues in the text without explicit consideration of its coherence. As for the opposing view she notes that “several of those who have focused on the nature of the document, rather than on the meaning of its contents, have insisted on its composite nature, but this assessment has had little or no impact on the actual procedures used by those who sought to interpret the document's contents” (M.L. Turner, *Gospel According to Philip*, 58). Turner herself, who belongs to the latter group, admits that her argument for the composite nature of the text is circular (see *ibid.*, 15).

¹⁵ For a comprehensive overview of the various explanations of the literary structure of *Gos. Phil.*, see M.L. Turner, *Gospel According to Philip*, 17–59; Martha Lee Turner, “On the Coherence of the *Gospel According to Philip*,” in *The Nag Hammadi Library After Fifty Years: Proceedings of the 1995 Society of Biblical Literature Commemoration* (ed. John D. Turner and Anne McGuire; NHS 44; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 223–250; see also Jorunn Jacobsen Buckley, “Conceptual Models and Polemical Issues in the Gospel of Philip,” *ANRW* 2.25.5 (1988): 4167–4169; Louis Painchaud, “La composition de l'*Évangile selon Philippe* (NH II,3): une analyse rhétorique,” *SBLSP* 35 (1996): 35–66.

out.¹⁶ In 1962 Robert McL. Wilson came to the conclusion that “it cannot be contended that Philip is a single coherent text, composed according to normal standards of writing. That any such claim would be erroneous is evident on every page.”¹⁷ Wilson even went so far as to claim that “to speak of ‘structure’ or ‘composition’ in relation to such a document as the Gospel of Philip may appear at first sight to be a misuse of these terms.”¹⁸ A few years prior to Wilson’s study, Hans-Martin Schenke had argued that *Gos. Phil.* should be regarded as a collection of excerpts, notes, or instructions expressing diverse and even contradictory doctrinal contents,¹⁹ and in a highly influential move he divided the text into numbered “Sprüche” similar to *Gos. Thom.*²⁰ Schenke had little doubt concerning the nature of the text, stating that, “nach Form und Inhalt muß man unsere Schrift als eine Art Florilegium gnostischer Sprüche und Gedanken bezeichnen.”²¹ Moreover, he argued that these various “Sprüche” stand in relation to each other “unvermittelt oder nur durch Stichwortanschluß.”²² Among those who have agreed with Schenke in regarding the text as some kind of florilegium or collection from different sources,²³ there have been disagreements concerning the nature and

¹⁶ For a strong statement in favour of the coherence, singularity of thought and intentional rhetorical structure of *Gos. Phil.*, see Painchaud, “La composition.”

¹⁷ Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 9.

¹⁸ Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 7.

¹⁹ See, e.g., Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip”; Schenke, “Zur Exegesis”; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*; M.L. Turner, *Gospel According to Philip*; M.L. Turner, “On the Coherence.”

²⁰ He first did this in his 1959 article, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959]”, but later made several subsequent changes to his original division and numbering of the text (see, e.g., Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip”; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*). For critiques of Schenke’s division of the text, see, e.g., Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 26–29; Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 22–33; Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4167–4169.

²¹ Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960],” 33.

²² Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960],” 33.

²³ In his later works, however, Schenke conceded that the excerpts might all come from the same work. Schenke stated in 1994 that, inspired by Layton and Isenberg in particular, he tried “das Philippus-Evangelium als eine Sammlung von Exzerpten zu verstehen, die möglicherweise aus ein und demselben umfangreichen Werk stammen, dessen zentrale Themen Bekehrung und Initiation gewesen sein müßten” (Schenke, “Zur Exegesis,” 123; cf. Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 11–12), and came to tentatively identify this hypothetical single source as the lost *Acta Philippi* (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 7–8, 12, 251–252, 255–256, 278, 436). He also conceded elsewhere that he tried in his latest work to put the various pieces together again “searching for the line, or lines, of thought running through the document” (Hans-Martin Schenke, “The Work of the Berliner Arbeitskreis: Past, Present, and Future,” in *The Nag Hammadi Library After Fifty Years: Proceedings of the 1995 Society of Biblical Literature Commemoration* [ed.

significance of the connections or thematic overlap between these various excerpts or “Sprüche.” While some have held these connections to be meaningful on a fundamental level, others have regarded them as superficial. Martha Lee Turner, for example, has argued strongly in favour of seeing the tractate as a collection, while at the same time acknowledging that it still displays some degree of organisational and conceptual coherence.²⁴ She ends up characterising *Gos. Phil.* as “a lightly edited notebook,”²⁵ which can be characterised as “a sourcebook for speculation,”²⁶ and “a tinker’s collection of odds and ends, an assortment of texts that might come in handy in gnostic *bricolage*.”²⁷

A majority of scholars have indeed found some degree of doctrinal coherence in spite of the tractate’s seemingly incoherent textual nature. While agreeing with Schenke concerning the textual state of the document, even asserting that “the textual incoherence of *Gos. Phil.* is an indisputable fact,”²⁸ but acknowledging that “it is less evident how this incoherence should be explained,”²⁹ Einar Thomassen is among those who hold that the work still shows a high degree of doctrinal coherence, stating that “it expresses a reasonably coherent system of thought, which can have represented the shared beliefs of a community, and is hardly adequately described as an unmethodical collection of disparate quotations.”³⁰ On a similar note, Gaffron concluded that *Gos. Phil.* “ist weder

John D. Turner and Anne McGuire; NHS 44; Leiden: Brill, 1997], 70). Herbert Schmid has taken up Schenke’s later position while seeing a greater degree of coherence and plan to the composition of the compilation that constitutes *Gos. Phil.* as we know it (see Schmid, *Die Eucharistie*, 9).

²⁴ See M.L. Turner, *Gospel According to Philip*; M.L. Turner, “On the Coherence.”

²⁵ M.L. Turner, *Gospel According to Philip*, 256.

²⁶ M.L. Turner, *Gospel According to Philip*, 257.

²⁷ M.L. Turner, *Gospel According to Philip*, 259.

²⁸ Einar Thomassen, “How Valentinian is the *Gospel of Philip*?” in *The Nag Hammadi Library After Fifty Years: Proceedings of the 1995 Society of Biblical Literature Commemoration* (ed. John D. Turner and Anne McGuire; NHS 44; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 252.

²⁹ Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 252.

³⁰ Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 279. Thomassen mentions three possible, and not mutually exclusive, explanations for the literary character of the text: (1) “A process of excerpting and compilation from older written sources”; (2) the text may be “a series of personal notes made by an individual writer, either for the purpose of oral expansion in a sermon or a teaching situation, or as materials for a written work”; or, as Thomassen deems likely, (3) the text might have been “rearranged at a stage subsequent to its original composition by a redactor, or even by a scribe arbitrarily displacing passages in the text.” Thus, according to Thomassen, the version of *Gos. Phil.* that has come down to us might be “the outcome of several successive stages of excerpting, collecting, independent note-composition, redaction and scribal confusion” (*ibid.*, 252–253). See also David

ein Florilegium gnostischer Sprüche und Gedanken noch ein Brief oder eine Abhandlung im strengen Sinne,”³¹ while arguing that its style, as well as its “einheitliche Denkstruktur und Bilderwelt” indicates that *Gos. Phil.* is the work of a single author, “der sich verschiedenartigen Traditionsstoffes bedient, ihn aber mit persönlicher Hand, wenn auch nicht immer glücklich und überzeugend, gestaltet.”³² But how textually incoherent is *Gos. Phil.*? Grant suggested early on that it seemed like the lack of arrangement in *Gos. Phil.* could be intentional,³³ and this suggestion was later taken up by Isenberg, who in his doctoral dissertation argued that much of *Gos. Phil.* consists of parts that have been intentionally disjointed and distributed to various positions in the text by a compiler-editor.³⁴

The individual scholar’s stance with regard to these questions has naturally also to a significant degree influenced the interpretation of *Gos. Phil.*’s contents. Bentley Layton, for example, claims that “it would be misleading to reconstruct a single theological system” from the entire *Gos. Phil.* since in his opinion the text is an anthology representing “probably more than one Valentinian theological perspective.”³⁵ Therefore, Layton argues, “individual groups of excerpts” are better “studied in isolation, with comparison of other works or fragments of Valentinianism or of classic gnosticism.”³⁶ Layton thinks it is probably only “through an inadvertence” that “the excerpts are not divided from one another” in the manuscript.³⁷

For the scholar seeking to understand the doctrinal contents and function of the text there are, however, serious problems connected with treating the text as a collection of excerpts.³⁸ Michael Williams has

H. Tripp, “The ‘Sacramental System’ of the Gospel of Philip,” in *Studia Patristica 17: The 8th International Conference on Patristic Studies met in Oxford from 3 to 8 Sept. 1979* (ed. Elisabeth A. Livingstone; *StPatr* 17:1; Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982), 251–260, esp. 251–252, who regards the text as a collection of “sermon notes.”

³¹ Gaffron, *Studien*, 220.

³² Gaffron, *Studien*, 220.

³³ Grant, “Two Gnostic Gospels,” 3.

³⁴ See Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 30–37, as well as Isenberg, “Introduction,” 133–134.

³⁵ Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 326.

³⁶ Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 326. Layton characterises the text as “a Valentinian anthology containing some one hundred short excerpts taken from various other works,” although admitting that these works “have not been identified, and apparently they do not survive” (*ibid.*, 325).

³⁷ See Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 327.

³⁸ Jorunn Jacobsen Buckley even characterises Schenke’s division of the text into numbered sayings as a “violation of the text” (Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4167).

argued that the task of dividing the text into various groups of excerpts is methodologically problematic, and that “our best hope probably remains with understanding the text as we have it. The existence of the text itself justifies the working assumption that for its composer it somehow ‘held together’ and was not merely a collection of mutually contradictory teachings.”³⁹

Finally, some scholars have in fact argued in favour of the document as we have it as a complete literary work that is both textually and doctrinally coherent.⁴⁰ Søren Giversen has pointed to the fact that the damaged state of the manuscript may make it seem more incoherent than it really is, an especially pertinent comment considering the intricate nature of the textual and rhetorical structure of the surviving parts of the document. Giversen rejects the view that *Gos. Phil.* is a kind of florilegium. He argues, on the contrary, that the tractate is not only doctrinally coherent, but that it also has many compositional traits in common with other contemporary texts.⁴¹ Similar views concerning the doctrinal and textual coherence of the tractate have also been argued by, among others, Gerald Borchert, Edward Rewolinski, Jorunn Jacobsen Buckley, and Louis Painchaud.⁴²

For the purposes of the present analysis, I have chosen to treat *Gos. Phil.* as a coherent composition, with a coherent theology. This approach also implies a reluctance to dismiss problematic passages by appeals to redactional layers or different sources. I tend to agree with Giversen that there is indeed a high degree of probability that several keys to the

³⁹ Williams, *Rethinking “Gnosticism”*, 150. Williams has also argued that *Gos. Phil.* displays “a rather tight theological consistency” (Michael Allen Williams, “Realized Eschatology in the Gospel of Philip,” *ResQ* 14 [1971]: 2).

⁴⁰ See, e.g., Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, esp. 22–34; Buckley, “Conceptual Models”; Painchaud, “La composition.”

⁴¹ See Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, esp. 16–34. Without arguing for any direct influence, Giversen finds the text to be comparable to Hebrews, as well as the writings of Philo and Clement of Alexandria, in terms of rhetorical style and composition (see Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 33).

⁴² See, esp., Borchert, “Literary Arrangement”; Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language”; Buckley, “Conceptual Models”; Painchaud, “La composition,” but see also Klaus Koschorke, “Die ‘Namen’ im Philippusevangelium: Beobachtungen zur Auseinandersetzung zwischen gnostischem und kirchlichem Christentum,” *ZNW* 64 (1973): 308 n. 5; Régine Charron and Louis Painchaud, “‘God is a Dyer’: The Background and Significance of a Puzzling Motif in the Coptic *Gospel According to Philip* (CG II,3),” *Mus* 114 (2001): 43 n. 6; Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 252. Thomassen takes as his starting point “the hypothesis that *Gos. Phil.* contains a coherent doctrine representing a single form of Valentinianism.”

understanding of the text have been lost in the manuscript's many lacunae, and that mistaken reconstructions have led to further misinterpretations. The focus will therefore be purely on the poetics of *Gos. Phil.* as a coherent text in the form in which it has been preserved in Nag Hammadi Codex II, and not on some hypothetical original or source(s).⁴³ Louis Painchaud has argued that in order to perform a literary analysis of *Gos. Phil.* one has to work on the basis of the hypothetical Greek original.⁴⁴ However, as argued in chapter 1, and in line with the present study's focus on the perspective of the reader as outlined in chapter 2, there is no reason not to perform a literary analysis on the basis of our preserved Coptic text. The latter approach would also seem to have the advantage of being the less hypothetical venture of the two.

This is not to say that I do not think it is possible, or even probable, that the text may have gone through a long history of redactional change and augmentation. The very nature of the textual composition of the tractate invites changes in light of contemporary theology.⁴⁵ This is especially the case considering the mystagogical emphasis of the tractate, since, in order to stay relevant, the tractate would need to stay in tune with contemporary ritual practice.⁴⁶ We should therefore not be surprised to find references to practice and theology datable relatively close to the time of the production of the manuscript, while at the same time preserving considerably older layers. In any case, what we have is a Coptic document that may be analysed on its own terms. A reader encountering this Coptic text in the fourth, or even fifth century,⁴⁷ would encounter it as a single text, even a text that bore the name "The Gospel according to Philip" (πεγαγγελιον πκαταφιλιππος).⁴⁸ We should therefore give the text the benefit of the doubt and try to understand it as a whole before we start to dissect it.

⁴³ See the discussion in chapter 1.

⁴⁴ See Painchaud, "La composition," 36–37.

⁴⁵ Cf. Larry W. Hurtado, *Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2003), 538.

⁴⁶ See, e.g., Bradshaw, *Search for the Origins*, 91–92.

⁴⁷ As argued in chapter 1, we know even less concerning the date the manuscript was buried than we do concerning its date of production. Proposals in this regard amount to little more than speculation.

⁴⁸ *Gos. Phil.* 86.18–19.

2.2. Scriptural Intertextuality

As Robert McL. Wilson has noted, *Gos. Phil.*'s references to the New Testament "range from clear and unmistakable quotations down to echoes which may appear significant to one scholar yet unimportant, or even non-existent, to another."⁴⁹ Unlike *Exeg. Soul*, none of *Gos. Phil.*'s quotations and paraphrases of Scripture are introduced by explicitly naming the source, and the allusions are usually "worked into the context as if [the author] were a man steeped in the Scriptures, to whom their language and phrases came as a natural vehicle for the expression of his ideas," as Wilson puts it.⁵⁰ Another difference in relation to *Exeg. Soul*. is that not only do we not find a single quotation specifically identified as being from any of the Old Testament Scriptures, but there does not seem to be any direct quotations of these texts at all,⁵¹ although there are abundant allusions to them, and especially to Genesis.⁵²

As for the New Testament texts, Grant noted already in 1960 that *Gos. Phil.* uses the Gospels of Matthew and John extensively,⁵³ and several scholars have later noted that *Gos. Phil.* shows a clear preference for Matthew among the synoptic gospels.⁵⁴ In an overview of *Gos. Phil.*'s use of the synoptic tradition, Christopher Tuckett concludes that apart from the use of the Lukan parable of the Good Samaritan,⁵⁵ all the synoptic allusions can be explained as deriving from Matthew,⁵⁶ and he agrees with Wilson that the tractate shows a preference for Matthew and

⁴⁹ Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 6; cf. also Eric Segelberg, "The Gospel of Philip and the New Testament," in *The New Testament and Gnosis: Essays in Honour of Robert McL. Wilson* (ed. A.H.B. Logan and A.J.M. Wedderburn; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1983), 205–206.

⁵⁰ Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 7.

⁵¹ See Segelberg, "The Gospel of Philip," 204.

⁵² As Segelberg puts it, "These references clearly show that the author or authors of the Gospel of Philip had access to basic Old Testament teaching about the beginning of the world and of the elect people of God in Abraham" (Segelberg, "The Gospel of Philip," 204).

⁵³ Grant, "Two Gnostic Gospels," 5. See also Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 7.

⁵⁴ See, e.g., Robert McL. Wilson, "The New Testament in the Nag Hammadi Gospel of Philip," *NTS* 9 (1963): 291–294; Gaffron, *Studien*, 32–54; Segelberg, "The Gospel of Philip," 205.

⁵⁵ *Gos. Phil.* 78.7–10, referring to Luke 10:34.

⁵⁶ See Tuckett, *Nag Hammadi*, 81; see also 74, and Christopher M. Tuckett, "Synoptic Traditions in Some Nag Hammadi and Related Texts," *VC* 36:2 (1982): 178. Tuckett even expresses doubts that *Gos. Phil.* has derived its reference to the Good Samaritan directly from the Gospel of Luke, and suggests that it might just as well have known the parable independently of the complete gospel (see Tuckett, *Nag Hammadi*, 80).

John among the four Gospels.⁵⁷ As we shall see in the following analysis, however, *Gos. Phil.* also seems to allude to several distinctly Lukan passages aside from the parable of the Good Samaritan.⁵⁸ In addition it has been acknowledged that there are multiple references to the Johannine writings (John and 1 John), as well as several Pauline (Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians), Pseudo-Pauline (Hebrews), and Catholic (1 Peter) Epistles.⁵⁹ Scholars have in fact detected references to a wide range of New Testament texts in *Gos. Phil.* Wilson mentions Ephesians, Colossians, and Thessalonians as among the few texts to which he could not detect references,⁶⁰ while Gaffron finds no evidence for the use of Acts, the Pastoral or Catholic epistles, or Revelation.⁶¹ As we shall see in the following analysis, however, there are in fact indications of the use of most of these.

3. ANALYSIS OF MAJOR BLENDS

In the previous chapter we saw how the conceptual blend THE SOUL IS A WOMAN is fundamental to the rhetoric of *Exeg. Soul* and how it interacts crucially with various scriptural intertexts and other conceptual blends. In the present chapter I will approach *Gos. Phil.* from a similar angle and investigate the function of certain key conceptual blends and their interrelations. Analogous to the previous chapter's focus on the blend THE SOUL IS A WOMAN, the main focus here will be on that of THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST.

One of the main obstacles to a coherent analysis of *Gos. Phil.* is the highly intricate web of interconnections among its many conceptual and intertextual blends. I have already mentioned the phenomenon that many of the themes and discussions running through the tractate seem to have been cut up into pieces and distributed variously around the tractate. Whether or not Isenberg's theory that this arrangement is that of a

⁵⁷ See Tuckett, *Nag Hammadi*, 81 n. 295; Tuckett, "Synoptic Traditions," esp. 177–178; Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 7; Wilson, "The New Testament," 291.

⁵⁸ The overwhelming majority of scholars recognise the fact that *Gos. Phil.* refers to the canonical gospels. An exception to this rule is Richard Longenecker, who thinks *Gos. Phil.* is probably independent of the canonical gospels (see Richard N. Longenecker, *The Christology of Early Jewish Christianity* [London: SCM Press, 1970], 82).

⁵⁹ See, e.g., Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 7; Wilson, "The New Testament."

⁶⁰ See Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 7.

⁶¹ See Gaffron, *Studien*, 54–55, 59.

compiler-editor is correct or not, this literary structure necessitates, as Michel Desjardins has pointed out, “that the work must be treated as a whole. Yet one pericope cannot be understood necessarily by setting it into its immediate context. Accordingly, the full meaning of each pericope ... must be determined by examining the relevant issues in the entire work.”⁶² There are complex linkages between the various themes and discussions that run considerably deeper than the level of catchword connections or thematic overlap. The complexity and multidimensionality of these connections not only present an obstacle to our understanding of the tractate, but also complicate the attempt to make a linear exposition and explication of it.⁶³ Pressing such a multidimensional tractate into a linear one-dimensional format for the purposes of academic analysis inevitably involves a reduction of its complexity, and also leads to some repetition, as a considerable number of passages function within several of the discourses that make up *Gos. Phil.*'s web of signification.

3.1. *The Christian as a Christ*

The identification of the individual Christian with Christ is a central theme in *Gos. Phil.* and seems to be a premise underlying much of its rhetoric. The most direct statement of this identification occurs at the end of an important passage referring to Christian initiation, where the fully initiated person is described with the words, “this one is no longer a [Christian], but a Christ” (παει γαρ ουκετι ου[χρη]ετ[ι]ανος πε αλλα ουχρ̄ς πε).⁶⁴

In the present section we shall see how the conceptual blend THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST serves a similar function in *Gos. Phil.* to that of THE SOUL IS A WOMAN in *Exeg. Soul.* The present tractate is, however, a considerably more complex composition than *Exeg. Soul.*, and has a much greater tendency to use framing inputs from the same ICMs in different blends, and it is more prone to link together blends in intricate ways. Moreover, in contrast to the single-scope blend THE SOUL IS A WOMAN in

⁶² Michel R. Desjardins, *Sin in Valentinianism* (SBLDS 108; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), 92.

⁶³ As Isenberg has noted, a description of the contents of *Gos. Phil.* “is complicated by the eccentric structure, by the many lacunae, by the diverse locations of statements on any one topic, and by the numerous and varied subjects of interest in which it appears to delight” (Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 37–38).

⁶⁴ *Gos. Phil.* 67.26–27. See below for an analysis.

Exeg. Soul, the blend THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST is a double-scope one.⁶⁵ This means that while *Exeg. Soul* draws on the WOMAN ICM to supply framing structure to the blend and subsequent significant backwards projections to the soul-input, and not the other way around, we shall see that in *Gos. Phil.*'s blend THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST it is of fundamental importance that the process works in both directions. Taken together, these traits make for far more complex interpretive processes in *Gos. Phil.* than those encountered in *Exeg. Soul*.

The passage quoted above concerning the Christian becoming a Christ sets up a conceptual blend of the initiated Christian and Christ as shown in fig. 18. This blend will be the main focus of the following analysis. As already mentioned, this is a conceptual blend of the double-scope variety, which means that each of the two inputs provides important structure at various points throughout the tractate that may cause a reinterpretation of them both. As will be shown in the following analysis, this conceptual integration network is fleshed out throughout *Gos. Phil.* by means of complex intertextual and conceptual blending.

Several important questions present themselves at this point. Implicit in the abovementioned blend lies the need to consider the question of the properties of the Christ input space in order to grasp its potential implications. We may say that the sentence identifying the Christian with Christ activates certain aspects of the reader's knowledge of what we may term the concept of Christ. That is to say, the sentence activates certain properties of this ICM in the reader's long-term memory depending upon the context in which it is brought to mind,⁶⁶ and it primes the rest of the ICM for potential subsequent activation.⁶⁷ It is an inherent feature of this point of view that the CHRIST ICM would to some degree be constructed differently by each individual reader. Its various aspects would thus also have different potential for activation, causing potentially different interpretations. The CHRIST ICM would, for instance, have been interpreted differently depending on the reader's knowledge and memory of Scripture, creeds, exegetical tractates and traditions, experienced ritual practice, and various forms of catechetical and mystagogical instruction. The interpretation of what it means for the initiated Christian to have become a Christ would therefore be differently construed according to a reader's

⁶⁵ For the distinctions between single-, double-, and multiple-scope blends, and the notion of Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs), see chapter 2.

⁶⁶ Cf. Gibbs, "Prototypes."

⁶⁷ For the notion of "priming," see chapter 2.

prior knowledge of the cognitive models called upon in the reading of the text. This thus illustrates the individual and context-dependent nature of the activation of a reader's knowledge of the relevant cognitive models when prompted by particular integration networks. In this case, what intertextual and conceptual knowledge, which mental images, will be brought to the reader's mind by the reference to Christ will of necessity vary, as will the features that are projected to the blend to mutually reframe the concepts of the Christian and Christ in a reading of *Gos. Phil.*

The construction of such interpretive blends is not only dependent on the reader's prior knowledge of Christ, but is of course also shaped by the tractate's rhetoric. Of prime importance in this regard is the manner in which a number of conceptual, intertextual, and intratextual blends is cued and combined throughout the text. Here it must again be emphasised that *Gos. Phil.* gives its readers rather free reins with regard to the construction, combination, and running of these blends, as many of the blends in *Gos. Phil.*, and the inferences they create, are left unstated for the reader to make on his or her own.⁶⁸ It is basically this openness which has made it so difficult for modern scholars to get a firm grip on *Gos. Phil.* It is an openness that makes for a potentially very wide and diverse range of interpretations, especially among readers who are far removed from, and lack knowledge of, the tractate's original context(s), as modern treatments of *Gos. Phil.* amply attest to.

3.1.1. *Christology and Anthropology*

With regard to the statement that the initiated Christian has become a Christ, the central issue is one of Christology. In cognitive terms this entails a question of the contents of the CHRIST ICM as it is presupposed by *Gos. Phil.* It further raises the issue of how the ICM is utilised in a triggering of interpretive blends. Which elements of the CHRIST ICM are called upon and projected to the interpretive blend to enlighten the reader's understanding of the anthropology of the individual Christian? And in what ways are the CHRIST ICM itself affected by the blend? Since the specific nature of the projection is not specified in the passage in question, and we lack any firm knowledge of the extra-textual context of *Gos. Phil.*, such as its date and provenance,⁶⁹ we have to infer which

⁶⁸ Cf. Painchaud, "La composition", and the discussion below.

⁶⁹ Although one might get the impression from recent scholarship that *Gos. Phil.* can be confidently classified as a "Valentinian" text, the fact remains that we really do not

elements are involved on the basis of information gained from other parts of *Gos. Phil.*, and on the basis of intra- and intertextual cues found there. As we shall see, *Gos. Phil.* is a tractate that expresses its underlying Christology in a variety of ways, and to uncover this Christology we need to interpret a wide range of blends.

The conceptual blend of Christ and the Christian initiate is not metaphorical in the strict sense. Since both input spaces project structure to the blended space, they are both framing inputs, and the inferences created in the blend are projected backwards to both inputs, not just to one of them. The concept of the Christian is illuminated by the concept of Christ, but at the same time the opposite is also true.⁷⁰ Not only may the reader's experience of ritual initiation, and of bodily experience in general, inform his or her understanding of Christ, but *Gos. Phil.*'s references to Christ's baptism, for example, may also help the reader to conceptualise his or her own experience of baptism and chrismation.⁷¹ Moreover, the reader's own experience of baptism and chrismation also creates a frame of reference with regard to the understanding of the baptism of Christ in the river Jordan. In what follows we shall see how *Gos. Phil.*'s descriptions and discussions of Christ's names, titles, constitution, birth, death, baptism, and other works or deeds may inform our understanding of the tractate's underlying sacramental soteriology.

Before we do that, however, we need to consider the basic anthropology underlying the tractate, that is, its basic views concerning the constitution of the human being. *Gos. Phil.* seems to presuppose a relatively simple constitution of body and soul, and no division of the latter into separate parts seems to be implied. There is not much direct information concerning the human soul in *Gos. Phil.*, but we do learn that "it is a valuable thing, and it has come to be in a contemptible body" (ΟΥΡΩΒ ΕΡΤΑΙΕΗΥ ΠΕ ΑΣΩΠΠΕ ΕΪΝΟΥΣΩΜΑ ΕΦΩΗC).⁷² Moreover, the trac-

have any firm knowledge concerning either its geographical or sectarian provenance, or its date. See the discussion in section 4, below.

⁷⁰ This is thus a double-scope blend rather than a single-scope one. As DesCamp and Sweetser put it, "*Double scope blends*, like single scope blends, involve inputs . . . with different organizing frames. The more one feels that a single input's inferential structure dominates in the final blend, the more a given cognitive construction will feel like a metaphor, or single scope blend" (DesCamp and Sweetser, "Metaphors for God," 223, emphasis in original).

⁷¹ In this study the term "chrismation" is used to denote any application of chrism (cf. E.C. Whitaker, *Documents of the Baptismal Liturgy* [3d ed.; revised by Maxwell E. Johnson; Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 2003], 308).

⁷² *Gos. Phil.* 56.25–26.

tate emphasises that the state of one's soul is important, pointing out that a proper "disciple of God" (μαθητης ἡππογτε) will not be deceived by "the bodily forms" (ἡμορφη ἡσωματικη), but will see "the condition of each one's soul" (ταλιαθεσις ἡτεφυγχι ἡπογα πογα).⁷³ In addition to the body and the soul, however, there is also the spirit (πῠνα / πνεῦμα), but where the latter enters into the picture is not immediately apparent, nor is it easy to discern the relationship between it and the soul. Is the spirit to be regarded as a part of the human constitution to begin with, or is it rather a gift received in connection with ritual initiation? It is also worth noting that although the text employs the terms ψυχή (ΨΥΧΗ) and πνεῦμα (πῠνα), a term such as νοῦς is absent, and the word ϷΗΤ, which is often used as an equivalent in Coptic, does not seem to be used in this sense in *Gos. Phil.*⁷⁴ It is thus a rather simple anthropology that seems to be presupposed by *Gos. Phil.* and its discourse is distinctly non-technical. There are no detailed discussions on either the human soul or its relationship with the body, nor of a human spirit and its relationship to the soul. As we shall see, however, the text rather confusingly uses the terms "body" (σῶμα), "flesh" (σάρξ), "soul" (ψυχή), and "spirit" (πνεῦμα) in several different senses for different purposes in different contexts. We will return to the several ways in which these terms are used as we proceed.

The Christology of *Gos. Phil.* draws to a considerable extent on the Gospel of John, and we will see that certain passages, such as the prologue, the discourse on the bread of life, and the Nicodemus dialogue, are fundamental. Secondarily, it seems to draw on Hebrews, Revelation, the Johannine epistles, and several of the Pauline epistles. The synoptic material primarily from Matthew, but also from Luke, cited and alluded to by *Gos. Phil.* seems to be interpreted primarily from the perspective given by the abovementioned material.

⁷³ *Gos. Phil.* 81.1–6.

⁷⁴ The Coptic word ϷΗΤ can be used as an equivalent not only of the Greek νοῦς, but also of καρδιά (cf. Crum 714a; Rubenson, *The Letters of St. Anthony*, 69 n. 1).

3.1.2. *The Names and Titles of Christ*

Christ is referred to in a number of ways in *Gos. Phil.*⁷⁵ Apart from “Christ” (πᾶ̄χ̄ς),⁷⁶ “Jesus” (ἰ̄ς),⁷⁷ and “Jesus Christ” (ἰ̄ς πᾶ̄χ̄ς),⁷⁸ he is also called “the Nazarene” (πῆαζαρη̄νος or πῆαζωρᾱιος),⁷⁹ “Saviour” (σωτηρ̄),⁸⁰ “Lord” (χο̄εις),⁸¹ “Messiah” (με̄σσιας),⁸² “perfect man” (τελειος ῥω̄με),⁸³ “the Son of Man” (πω̄ηρε ἱ̄πρω̄με),⁸⁴ “the Son of God” (πω̄ηρε ἱ̄πποϋ̄τε),⁸⁵ “the Son” (πω̄ηρε),⁸⁶ and “Pharisatha” (φᾱρισᾱθα),⁸⁷ the latter being explained as a Syriac term meaning “the one who is spread out” (πετπο̄ρω̄ ε̄βολ).⁸⁸

In cognitive terms, then, these names and titles can all be said to activate mental spaces that are connected to different aspects of the same CHRIST ICM. *Gos. Phil.* gives outright explanations of the significance of some of them, like “the Nazarene” and “Pharisatha,” while most are used without direct explanation. In the following analysis we will see how some of these titles function in the rhetoric of the text.

⁷⁵ The following names and titles all seem to refer to the same character (cf. Franzmann, *Jesus*, 34–35, 50 n. 3). Contrary to certain scholars (see, e.g., Bernard Barc, “Les noms de la triade dans l’Évangile selon Philippe,” in *Gnosticisme et Monde Hellénistique: Actes du Colloque de Louvain-la-Neuve (11–14 mars 1980)* [ed. Julien Ries, et al.; Publications de l’Institut Orientaliste de Louvain 27; Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut Orientaliste, 1982], 361–376, who argues that “Jesus,” “the Nazarene,” and “Christ” refer to different manifestations of the Saviour), I see no reason to suppose that, e.g., “Jesus” and “Christ” are to be regarded as different entities in *Gos. Phil.*

⁷⁶ The spelling varies: πᾶ̄χ̄ς: *Gos. Phil.* 52.19; 56.9; 61.30; 62.15; πᾶ̄χ̄ς: *Gos. Phil.* 55.6, 11; 56.13; 62.9; 68.17; 71.19; 74.15–16; πᾶ̄χ̄ς: *Gos. Phil.* 62.10; 68.20; 69.6–7; πᾶ̄χ̄ρ̄ς: *Gos. Phil.* 52.35; 56.4, 7; 62.12; 70.13.

⁷⁷ The spelling varies: ἰ̄ς: *Gos. Phil.* 56.5; 57.2; 62.10, 13, 16; 63.21; 71.12; 73.23; 77.1, 7; 83.16; ἰ̄ς: *Gos. Phil.* 57.28; 63.24; 70.34; ἰ̄ς: *Gos. Phil.* 56.6; ἰ̄ς: *Gos. Phil.* 62.8; 73.15; ἰ̄ς: *Gos. Phil.* 62.9.

⁷⁸ *Gos. Phil.* 80.1.

⁷⁹ πῆαζαρη̄νος: *Gos. Phil.* 56.12; 62.11, 14–15, 16; πῆαζωρᾱιος: *Gos. Phil.* 62.8, 9.

⁸⁰ *Gos. Phil.* 64.3.

⁸¹ *Gos. Phil.* 55.34, 37; 56.16; 59.7, 24; 62.6; 63.25; 64.10; 67.27; 68.6–7; 74.25; 78.22, 25; 81.16. In one instance, however, at 68.27, it may be used as a reference to God.

⁸² *Gos. Phil.* 56.8–9; 62.8, 11.

⁸³ τελιος ῥω̄με: *Gos. Phil.* 55:12; 60.23–24; τελιος ῥω̄με: *Gos. Phil.* 58.20–21; 75.19, 20–21; 80.4.

⁸⁴ *Gos. Phil.* 63.29–30; 76.1–2, 2–3; 81.14–15, 15–16, 16–17, 17–18, 18–19, 19.

⁸⁵ *Gos. Phil.* 78.20–21.

⁸⁶ πω̄ηρε is clearly used to designate Christ at *Gos. Phil.* 53.30; 54.7; 59.11–12; 67.20; 74.17, 23.

⁸⁷ *Gos. Phil.* 63.22–23.

⁸⁸ *Gos. Phil.* 63.22–23.

3.1.3. *The Constitution of Christ*

A christological term of considerably greater complexity in this tractate than those mentioned above, however, is “the Logos / Word” (πλορος). In cognitive terms, the Logos seems to be a highly significant constituent part of the Christ ICM as it is constructed and reflected in *Gos. Phil.*,⁸⁹ but its function is not immediately apparent.

3.1.3.1. *Christ’s True Nature*

Indeed, the status and function of the Logos is one of the most interesting and puzzling aspects of *Gos. Phil.*, albeit one that has attracted surprisingly little scholarly attention. We find *Gos. Phil.*’s first direct reference to the Logos in connection with the Eucharist, where we are told that it is to be identified with the “flesh” (σαρξ) of Jesus.⁹⁰ Later, we come across it in an interpretation of the transfiguration story, where *Gos. Phil.* refers to “his Logos” (πεφλορος) and says about Jesus that,

Ἰταροφωνηρ εβολ ἡθε ετ[ογναω]ϛῆῃσῃμ ἡναγ εροϛ ἡρητῃ ν[αιε δε τη]ροϛ
 αροφωνηρ εβολ ναϛ αϛ[ογωναρ] εβολ ἡ[ἡ]νοσ ρωσ νοσ αροϛϛ[ηρ εβολ]
 ἡἡκογει ρωσ κογει αϛ[ο]γωναρ εβολ ἡἡ]αγγελοσ ρωσ αγγελοσ αϛω ἡῤῥωμε
 ρωσ ρωμε ετβεπαει απεϛλογοσ αϛροπϛ εογον ἡμ ροεινε μεν αϛναϛ
 εροϛ εῤῃεγε ρεναϛ ναϛ εροοϛ ἡμἡν ἡμοοϛ αλλα ἡταρεφοϛωνηρ εβολ
 ἡνεϛμαθητῃσ ρἡνογεοοϛ ριϛἡπτοοϛ νεϛο αν ἡκογει αϛωϛπε ἡνοσ αλλα
 ἡταϛῤῃμαθητῃσ ἡνοσ ρεκαασ εῤῃναϛϛῆῃσῃμ ἡναϛ εροϛ εϛο ἡνοσ

it was as [they would] be able to see him that he appeared. [All these (ways),] he appeared to them. He [appeared] to [the] great as great. He [appeared] to the small as small. He [appeared to the] angels as angel and to the men as man. Therefore his Logos hid itself from everyone. Some saw him thinking that they saw themselves, but when he appeared to his disciples in glory upon the mountain he was not small, he became great, but he made the disciples great so that they might be able to see him being great. (*Gos. Phil.* 57.30–58.10)

Although this passage might be based on, and refer the reader to, any of the synoptic accounts of the transfiguration,⁹¹ it seems to be the Lukan account, which is the only one that mentions Jesus’ “glory” (δόξα / εοοϛ), that is the primary reference here, as Luke tells us specifically that the disciples Peter, John and James saw Christ’s “glory.”⁹²

⁸⁹ It should be noted, however, that the word πλορος is also used at least three times to refer simply to the word of Scripture (*Gos. Phil.* 80.5; 83.11; 84.8).

⁹⁰ *Gos. Phil.* 57.6. See below for further discussions of this important passage.

⁹¹ Luke 9:28–36; Matt 17:1–9; Mark 9:2–10.

⁹² Luke 9:32. That it was Peter, John, and James who witnessed the transfiguration is

In *Gos. Phil.*'s account of what actually transpired in the transfiguration, the Logos is presented as a part of Christ's constitution that was normally kept hidden from view. We are told that it was hidden as long as people, including his disciples, were unable to see Jesus' true appearance, which thereby implies that the Logos was an integral part of his true being and appearance. Significantly, however, the Logos was kept hidden according to the principle that like sees like,⁹³ and thus the Logos was hidden from view until the disciples became like Jesus. Normally, however, people did not see Jesus as he truly was, but according to their own status and abilities. It is significant that in what *Gos. Phil.* presents as the only exception to this rule, namely in the transfiguration, our tractate emphasizes that Jesus did not make himself (and hence "his Logos") visible to the disciples "in glory" (ἐνδοξαίῳ) by making *himself* small, but rather by making *them* great.⁹⁴ According to *Gos. Phil.*, then, Jesus' appearance to his disciples was as a reflection of themselves, and thus only by becoming truly like him could they see Jesus as he really was.⁹⁵ This also recalls 1 John 3:2, which, like *Gos. Phil.*, makes the causal connection between becoming like Christ and seeing him as he is: "when he appears we shall become like him, for we shall see him as he is" (ἐφ' ὃς ὡραῖον ἴδωμεν ὡς ἔστιν).⁹⁶ Another passage that may be recalled in this context is Phil 3:21, where Jesus is described as "this one who shall change the body of our humility into the likeness of the body of his glory" (παῖς ἐταπεινῶν σώματα ἵνα ἡμεῖς ὡς αὐτοῦ ἴδωμεν ὡς ἔστιν).⁹⁷ According to *Gos. Phil.*, Jesus

mentioned by all the synoptics (Matt 17:1; Mark 9:2; Luke 9:28). In Patristic interpretation the transfiguration is commonly interpreted as a revelation of the pre-existent Logos (see John Anthony McGuckin, *The Transfiguration of Christ in Scripture and Tradition* [Studies in the Bible and Early Christianity 9; Lewiston / Queenston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1986], 110–111). According to Origen, as in *Gos. Phil.*, Christ changes his appearance in accordance with the spiritual state of those who see him (see Origen, *Comm. Matt.*, 12.36–37).

⁹³ See the discussion below.

⁹⁴ Majella Franzmann claims that the Logos is here "a kind of heavenly garment of glory which must hide itself in certain circumstances, so that Jesus can be seen" (Franzmann, *Jesus*, 35). However, *Gos. Phil.* only states that the Logos was hidden to those who were not like Jesus in power, it does not say that it had to be hidden in order for Jesus to be seen. A more plausible interpretation is thus that it only becomes visible to those who are like him.

⁹⁵ "The disciples are able to see Jesus because he has created a situation of compatibility," as Buckley puts it (Buckley, "Conceptual Models," 4172).

⁹⁶ ἕαν φανερωθῆ, ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ ἔσομεθα, ὅτι ὁψόμεθα αὐτὸν καθὼς ἔστιν.

⁹⁷ ὃς μετασχηματίζει τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν σύμμορφον τῷ σώματι τῆς

appeared to people as they would be able to comprehend him, which in this context means that they were only able to see him on their own level, and thus the only way to achieve a vision of the real Jesus, was to be made equal to him in greatness by Jesus himself. Then, and only then, was “his Logos” (πεφλογος) visible.

But what does it mean for the disciples to be able to see “his Logos”? Just prior to the passage cited above, *Gos. Phil.* identifies the Logos with Jesus’ flesh, stating that “his flesh is the Logos” (τεφσαρξ πε φλογος).⁹⁸ To be able to see “his Logos,” then, should by extension refer to the ability to see and comprehend the nature of Jesus’ flesh, a flesh that was kept hidden from everyone who was not on the level of the glorified Jesus. When one reaches this level, however, “[If] you become Logos,” as *Gos. Phil.* puts it, “it is the Logos that will mix with you” (εκ[φαναω]ωπε φλογος φλογος πετνατωρ νημακ).⁹⁹ The question of how to achieve this kind of equality with Jesus and his Logos is indeed one of *Gos. Phil.*’s main concerns. It involves acquiring his Logos as an important part of one’s own being, as will be shown in detail below. First, however, we need to investigate further the identity and function of the Logos itself.

In *Gos. Phil.*, the Logos does not operate in isolation, but is intimately connected with the Holy Spirit and with mystagogy. The tractate’s most explicit statement of this relationship appears in the passage, already referred to above, which identifies Jesus’ flesh with the Logos:

πεταουωμ αν ητασαρξ αγω ηφω ηπασνοφ ηηταφωνη ρραϊ ηρητη αω τε
τεφσαρξ πε φλογος αγω πεφσνοφ πε πηνα ετογααβ

“He who will not eat my flesh and drink my blood has not life in him.”¹⁰⁰
What is it? His flesh is the Logos, and his blood is the Holy Spirit.

(*Gos. Phil.* 57.4–7)

The passage is mystagogical, in that it concerns the Eucharist,¹⁰¹ but also exegetical, consisting as it does of an interpretation of one of Jesus’ statements in the Gospel of John. It is the words of Jesus from John 6:53–54

δόξης αὐτοῦ. Cf. Cyril of Alexandria, *Hom. Div.* 9, where this passage is invoked in the context of the transfiguration.

⁹⁸ *Gos. Phil.* 57.6.

⁹⁹ *Gos. Phil.* 78.34–79.1, and cf. 78.29–30. See below for discussion.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. John 6:53–54.

¹⁰¹ For the view that this passage refers to the Eucharist, see, e.g., Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 197, 306; Gaffron, *Studien*, 180; Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 333; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 234. Borchert, however, “finds it rather doubtful that this logion has a sacramental emphasis,” on the grounds that the flesh and blood are identified with the Logos and the Holy Spirit (Borchert, “Literary Arrangement,” 126 n. 4); Thomassen

that *Gos. Phil.* paraphrases here,¹⁰² but in order to see the rationale for the direct connection between the eucharistic flesh of Christ and the Logos, we should read this passage not only in conjunction with this Johannine passage, but also with John 1:14a: “the Word became flesh” (ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο / πῶς αὖτε ἀφ’ ἑαυτῶν). *Gos. Phil.* 57.4–7 may in fact be described as a blend of John 6:53–54 and John 1:14a (see fig. 19).

This, however, is not the intertextual integration network that would be composed by a reader of *Gos. Phil.* 57.4–7.¹⁰³ In a reading of this passage, what is shown as a blended space in this figure becomes itself an input space that calls up the two inputs from the Gospel of John. Moreover, the latter two intertextually triggered mental spaces from the Gospel of John are not likely to be confined purely to the directly evoked verses. Upon grasping the references to John 6:53–54, a reader well acquainted with John is likely to recall additional aspects of the discourse on Jesus as the bread of life in John 6:48–58. Similarly, upon realising the reference to the Johannine prologue, that input space will not likely be limited to 1:14a. The resulting interpretive blend thus has the potential to create wideranging inferences, as the possible emergent meanings far surpass the simple statement of *Gos. Phil.* 57.4–7. For what does this blend of the Fourth Gospel’s prologue and bread of life discourse entail? What does it mean that the flesh of Jesus is directly identified as the Logos? For one thing it implies a direct link between Jesus’ flesh and the preexistent Logos of John 1, at the same time as this flesh is identified with the Eucharist and the flesh of the Son of Man mentioned in John 6. Some of the possible entailments of such a readerly intertextual integration network based on *Gos. Phil.* 57.4–7 are shown in fig. 20.

both argues in favour of a eucharistic interpretation (Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 349), but also expresses his doubts, stating that “it remains uncertain” whether this passage refers to the Eucharist (Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 345); cf. also Sevrin, “Pratique et doctrine.”

¹⁰² This Johannine passage certainly establishes a eucharistic setting for this section in *Gos. Phil.* (cf. Strutwolf, *Gnosis als System*, 195). Although Schenke notes that, “Man darf ja nicht ohne weiteres voraussetzen, daß unser Autor—wie wir Modernen—in Joh 6,51b–58 einen Zusatz sieht, in dem das Symbol des Lebensbrottes, unter dem bis dahin Jesus selbst und seine Worte verstanden wurden, gewaltsam und massiv auf die Eucharistie umgebogen worden ist. Es wäre ja durchaus möglich, daß er umgekehrt, tapfer und arglos, Joh 6,52b–58 von Joh 6,22–51a her interpretiert,” he comes to the conclusion that, “Im EvPhil insgesamt sind die Sakramente—mit Einschluß der Eucharistie—ein so wichtiges Thema, daß in diesem Lichte der theoretisch mögliche Zweifel an der sakramentalen Auffassung von # 23b doch verstummen muß” (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 234).

¹⁰³ Cf. the discussion of the blend at *Exeg. Soul* 134.28–29 in chapter 3.

A conspicuous aspect of *Gos. Phil.* 57.4–7, which we have yet to take into consideration, however, is the identification of Jesus’ blood with the Holy Spirit. What does this blend tell us concerning the status and function of the Holy Spirit? The identification of the Holy Spirit with the blood of Jesus must be seen in connection with several other descriptions of the Holy Spirit in *Gos. Phil.*, as well as a range of important scriptural intertexts. Throughout *Gos. Phil.* the Holy Spirit is connected to such concepts as life, light, fire, blood, breath, wind, to motherhood and virginity, and sacramentally to both the chrism and the Eucharist. We will look closer at each one of these connections, but first, in order to gain a better understanding of the relationship between the Holy Spirit and the Logos, we should once again take the Johannine prologue into consideration. We see from the figure above that with Jesus’ flesh being the Logos, and his blood the Holy Spirit, a possible inference from this blend is that the Holy Spirit is within the Logos in the same way as the life-which-is-light is within the Logos according to John 1:4, and as blood is within the flesh of the human body.

As we shall see in what follows, the relationship between the Logos and the Holy Spirit is crucial to the Christology of *Gos. Phil.* and central to the understanding of the relationship and parallelism between Christ and the individual Christian. We saw that *Gos. Phil.* 57.4–7 described Jesus saying that those who do not eat his flesh and drink his blood do not have life in them. There is also another important Johannine intertext that must be taken into consideration with regard to the concept of having life in oneself, namely John 5:26:

ἸΘΕ ΓΑΡ ΕΤΕΥΧΝΤΕΠΩΤ ΠΩΝΖ ΖΡΑΪ ΝΖΗΤῶ ΤΑΪ ΟΝ ΤΕ ΘΕ ΕΝΤΑΥΤ ἸΠΩΗΡΕ
ΕΤΡΕΦΚΩ ΝΑΦ ἸΠΩΝΖ ΖΡΑΪ ΝΖΗΤῶ¹⁰⁴

For as the Father has life in him, thus also he has given to the Son to have life in him. (John 5:26)

It has been argued that this Johannine passage draws on the discourse in Wis 15:15–19 concerning the maker of idols who is unable to pass on his own “borrowed” life to the idols.¹⁰⁵ In what follows we shall see that this passage from the Wisdom of Solomon is in fact alluded to elsewhere in *Gos. Phil.*, and that the concept of the transfer of life from father to son is highly significant in *Gos. Phil.*’s overall rhetoric.

¹⁰⁴ The Greek text reads: ὡσπερ γὰρ ὁ πατήρ ἔχει ζωὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὕτως καὶ τῷ υἱῷ ἔδωκεν ζωὴν ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.

¹⁰⁵ See Urban C. von Wahlde, “He Has Given to the Son to Have Life in Himself (John 5:26),” *Bib* 85:3 (2004): 409–412.

3.1.4. Procreation and Kinship

Metaphors of procreation and kinship are indeed pervasive in *Gos. Phil.*, and are used in most of its major discourses.

3.1.4.1. Adam as Prototype

Gos. Phil. refers to the account of the creation and fall of Man in Genesis in several ways to set up an antitype to Christ, and to explain the ultimate cause of the wrongs the Saviour comes to right, i.e., it is used as a background for the Christ event. The description of the creation of Man in Gen 2:7 is for instance employed in quite an original fashion by *Gos. Phil.* to argue that Adam had two mothers:

ΑΔΑΜ ΩΠΕ ΕΒΟΛ ΖΗΠΑΡΘΕΝΟC CΝΤΕ ΕΒΟΛ ΖΗΠΠΙΝΑ ΔΥΩ ΕΒΟΛ ΖΗΠΚΑΖ
 ΠΠΑΡΘΕΝΟC

Adam came into being from two virgins, from the spirit and from the virgin earth. (Gos. Phil. 71.16–18)

Genesis 2:7 describes how Adam was formed “from the earth” (ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς) and given life by the inbreathing of “the breath of life” (πνοὴν ζωῆς). *Gos. Phil.* identifies the latter with the spirit, and in this way gets its “two virgins.” Moreover, since he came into being from two virgins, Adam has two mothers. We may infer that these “mothers” are not on the same level, however, since it is described on the previous page of the manuscript that what came into being from the spirit/breath was his “soul” (ΨΥΧΗ). This passage also utilises Gen 2:7, but sets up a blend that also includes several other important Genesis passages, and offers the following intriguing exegesis:

ΤΨΥΧΗ ΝΑΔΑΜ ΝΤΑCΩΠΕ Ε[Β]ΟΛ ΖΗΝΝΟΥΝΙΦΕ ΠΕCΖΩΤΡ̄ ΠΕ ΠΠ[Ν]Α
 Π[Ε]ΝΤΑΥΤΑΑΥ ΝΑΥ ΤΕ ΤΕΦΗΑΔΥ ΔΥ[ΦΙ]¹⁰⁶ ΝΤΕΦΨΥΧΗ ΔΥ† ΝΑΥ ΝΝΟΥ[ΩΝΖ
 Ε]ΠΕCΜΑ¹⁰⁷

It was from a breath that Adam’s soul came into being. Its partner was the spirit. That which was given him was his mother. His soul was [taken] and he was given [life] in its place. (Gos. Phil. 70.22–26)

¹⁰⁶ ΔΥ[.] is no longer visible on the photographs in the *Facsimile Edition*, but has been read in earlier photographs of the manuscript (see Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 182).

¹⁰⁷ This reconstruction is my own (see discussion below for its rationale; for parallel, cf. *Gos. Phil.* 70.16–17). Schenke, in his 1997 critical edition, has ΝΝΟΥ[. . . Ε]ΠΕCΜΑ (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 50). Layton, following Schenke’s 1959 reconstruction (Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959]”), has ΝΝΟΥ[ΠΝΑ Ε]ΠΕCΜΑ (Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 182). The rest of page 70 is unfortunately too damaged to allow any reliable reconstruction.

This passage not only refers to Gen 2:7, but also to 2:21–23 and 3:20. The first part, describing how the soul of Adam came into being from “a breath” (οὐμικε) and that its/her partner was the spirit clearly recalls Gen 2:7. The further, and on the face of it puzzling, statement that Adam was given “his mother” is easily explained as Adam’s reception of the spirit, based on Gen 2:7, and by the statement, quoted above, that Adam came into being from two virgins, the spirit and the earth. Since Adam has the spirit as one of his two virgin mothers, and since the spirit is described as being given to him, it stands to reason that Adam was in fact given “his mother” when he was given the spirit.¹⁰⁸ The spirit is thus paradoxically at the same time both Adam’s mother and his soul’s partner.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, with the spirit being specifically the mother of Adam’s *soul*, as this passage states it, his other mother, “the virgin earth” (πκαε μ̄παρϑενος), may by extension be regarded simply as the mother of his body.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ Thomassen, however, asserts that “the phrase π[ε]νταγτααϋ . . . τεφμααϋ cannot be correct” and suggests that some words might be missing, venturing as a possible emendation, π[ε]νταγτααϋ ναϋ (εβολ εἰρητισοφια ετεταει) τε τεφμααϋ (Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 445). As Schenke points out, however, the manuscript reading is “in sich grammatisch und auch semantisch ohne Tadel” (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 415). Nevertheless, Schenke, who, like Thomassen, interprets the text on the basis of “Valentinianism,” also has problems making sense of the text as it stands, and opts to change it. Schenke argues that one does not expect the text to go on from its identification of the spirit as the soul’s partner to a statement concerning what the spirit is, but rather one concerning its origin or who gave it, concluding that, “wenn man diesen Satz im Kontext verstehen will, kommt man wohl nicht um die Diagnose einer Textverderbnis herum,” and suggests to change the text to π[ε]ντα(ϋ)τααϋ, and translates “Der, (der) ihm gegeben hat, war seine Mutter” (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 415). A description of the spirit is, however, exactly what I think we have here, and there is consequently no need to emend the text, which in my view makes good sense as it is.

¹⁰⁹ Although it is a feature that has often given its modern interpreters a hard time, sometimes even causing them to alter the preserved text (see above), *Gos. Phil.* seems to reveal in paradoxes. See below for a discussion of how *Gos. Phil.*’s views on the Virgin Mary and Mary Magdalene parallels this motif of the spirit as both mother and partner.

¹¹⁰ Both of these terms, “the spirit” (πν̄μα) and “the earth” (πκαε) are grammatically masculine in Coptic. In Greek, “the earth” (ἡ γῆ) is feminine, while “the spirit” (τὸ πνεῦμα) is neuter. In Hebrew and Syriac, however, both terms are feminine (see, e.g., Segelberg, “Antiochene Background,” 220–221; Pétremont, *A Separate God*, 75). Reference to Adam having been brought forth by the virgin earth is also found in, e.g., Irenaeus, *Haer.* III.21.10; Ephrem, *HNat.* 1,16 (see Robert Murray, *Symbols of Church and Kingdom: A Study in Early Syriac Tradition* [London: Cambridge University Press, 1975], 145 n. 2); and in Jacob of Serugh (see Sebastian P. Brock, “Baptismal Themes in the Writings of Jacob of Serugh,” in *Symposium Syriacum 1976: célébré du 13 au 17 septembre 1976 au Centre Culturel “Les Fontaines” de Chantilly (France)* [OrChrAn 205; Rome: Pontificium Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1978], 332).

The final part of the passage quoted above is somewhat more complicated. Adam's $\Upsilon\Upsilon\chi\eta$ is taken, and he is given something else in its place. Now, what was he given in return for his $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$? Unfortunately there is a lacuna at exactly this point in the manuscript. In 1959, Schenke proposed to reconstruct $[\pi\bar{\nu}\alpha \epsilon] \pi\epsilon\sigma\mu\alpha$, “[Geist] an ihrer Stelle,” a reconstruction that was later adopted by, among others, Layton in his critical edition.¹¹¹ This reconstruction is problematic, however. In the first part of the passage Adam is clearly given the spirit, but in the latter part it does not really make sense that it is “the spirit” ($\pi\bar{\nu}\alpha$), which has just been identified as the soul’s “partner” ($\rho\omega\tau\bar{\rho}$),¹¹² which is given to Adam as a *replacement* for his soul ($\Upsilon\Upsilon\chi\eta$).

The idea that Adam’s soul was taken from him is evidently an interpretation of the account of the creation of woman in Gen 2:21–23. The description of God taking Adam’s rib to create his female counterpart is here interpreted as his soul being taken away from him, an interpretation that finds support in the fact that Eve, as the female part of the original $\alpha\bar{\nu}\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$, was often interpreted as originally being inside him,¹¹³ as we have also seen in our discussion of *Exeg. Soul*. Like in *Exeg. Soul*, the part taken out of the original $\alpha\bar{\nu}\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ is also in *Gos. Phil.* interpreted as his soul. The novel twist in *Gos. Phil.* lies in what Adam is given in return. Gen 2:21 notes that the place from where Adam’s rib was taken is filled with flesh, but this does not seem to be relevant to *Gos. Phil.*’s interpretation, and the lacuna in question is not large enough to reconstruct $\sigma\alpha\rho\zeta$ (“flesh”).¹¹⁴ Instead, *Gos. Phil.* seems to focus on the fact that Gen 2:22 says that Adam is given a woman in return, a woman that Adam in Gen 3:20, after the fall, names “Eve,” “because she was the mother of all living” ($\theta\tilde{\upsilon}\tau\iota \alpha\tilde{\upsilon}\tau\eta \mu\eta\tau\eta\rho \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\nu \tau\tilde{\omega}\nu \zeta\acute{\omega}\nu\tau\omega\nu$). In the Greek of the Septuagint, “Eve” is here rendered $Z\omega\eta$, which means “life,” and the Coptic equivalent of this is $\omega\eta\zeta$.¹¹⁵ It thus seems likely that Adam is here given $\omega\eta\zeta$ (“life”) in return for his soul, i.e., he is given Eve as described in Gen 2:22–23 and 3:20. I have therefore chosen to reconstruct the lacuna at *Gos. Phil.* 70.26 accordingly as $\alpha\Upsilon\Upsilon \bar{\nu}\alpha\gamma \bar{\nu}\bar{\nu}\omicron\Upsilon[\omega\eta\zeta \epsilon] \pi\epsilon\sigma\mu\alpha$, “he was given [life] in

¹¹¹ See note 107 above.

¹¹² *Gos. Phil.* 70.23–24.

¹¹³ See, e.g., Kugel, *Traditions of the Bible*, 85–86; Murray, *Symbols of Church and Kingdom*, 83, 301–304.

¹¹⁴ The Coptic equivalent $\alpha\gamma$ is too short, and only attested at *Gos. Phil.* 80.27 in a very different context. The term $\sigma\alpha\rho\zeta$, however, is used frequently throughout the text.

¹¹⁵ See Crum 525b.

its/her place.”¹¹⁶ Adam thus has one feminine aspect taken away from him and another one given back. His “soul” (ΨΥΧΗ) is taken and, if my reconstruction is correct, “life” (ΩΝΗ) is given in return.

Here we should also take into consideration the fact that the Greek word ψυχή (ΨΥΧΗ) not only denotes “soul,” but also “life.” There is thus a potential play on words in this passage, where the tractate makes a point both of the connection between Eve, as the woman given Adam in return, and “life,” and between the “soul” and “life.”¹¹⁷ Thus in a polysemically based blend, Adam’s original life (his soul/life) is taken from him and a new “life” is given in return. This should probably not be taken too literally, but the juxtaposition between the taking of Adam’s original life and its replacement by a new one, would rather seem to highlight his loss of eternal life and its replacement by its earthly counterpart, i.e., mortality. Nevertheless, the passage may function on several levels simultaneously, as we will see below when we turn to consider the meaning of “life” and “death” in *Gos. Phil.* more broadly, and the tractate’s many parallelisms between the garden of Eden narrative and the life and deeds of Christ. It is, however, the latter, the life and deeds of Christ, which we will turn to first.

3.1.4.2. *The Conception and Birth of Christ*

A logical place to continue our analysis of the Christology of *Gos. Phil.* is with its views on Christ’s incarnation. Here the tractate is rather difficult to interpret. The first problem concerns the role of the Virgin Mary. That “Christ was born from a virgin” (ἀγχεπεπεχῶ εβολ εἰνογπαρθενος)¹¹⁸ is affirmed in a comparison with Adam, who, as we have seen, is alleged to have come into being from two virgins.¹¹⁹ *Gos. Phil.* also stresses the virginity of the Virgin Mary in connection with the birth of Christ in an apparently polemically slanted and rather tricky passage:

ΠΕΧΕΡΕΩΙΝΕ ΧΕΑΜΑΡΙΑ Ω ΕΒΟΛ ΕἰΠΠΙῆ ΕΤΟΥΑΑΒ ΣΕΡΠΙΔΑΝΑΣΘΕ ΟΥ ΠΕΤΟΥΧΩ
 ἸΜΟΦ ΣΕΣΟΟΥΗ ΔΝ ΑΩ ἸΡΟΟΥ ΕΝΕΖ ΠΕΝΤΑΣΡΙΜΕ Ω ΕΒΟΛ ΕἰΝΣΡΙΜΕ ΜΑΡΙΑ ΤΕ
 ΤΠΑΡΘΕΝΟΣ ΕΤΕἰΠΕΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ ΧΑΡΜΕΣ

¹¹⁶ The giving of life is also nicely paralleled a few lines above where it is said of Christ that he shall come to those who have died and εφιατ̄ ναχ ἴνογωνη, “he will give them life” (*Gos. Phil.* 70.16–17). We shall return to this passage in detail below.

¹¹⁷ The latter also seems to be the case in *Gos. Phil.* 53.6–9.

¹¹⁸ *Gos. Phil.* 71.19.

¹¹⁹ *Gos. Phil.* 71.16–17.

Some say that Mary conceived¹²⁰ by the Holy Spirit. They are wrong. They do not know what they are saying. When did a female ever conceive by a female? “Mary is the virgin whom no power defiled.”¹²¹

(*Gos. Phil.* 55.23–28)

The suggestion that the Virgin Mary conceived by the Holy Spirit is ridiculed by *Gos. Phil.* on the grounds that the Holy Spirit is female.¹²² Since females do not conceive by females, argues *Gos. Phil.*, the Virgin Mary cannot have conceived by the Holy Spirit.¹²³ Mary is still to be referred to as a virgin, but this is in relation to the “powers” (ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ), and not in relation to Joseph,¹²⁴ whose actual fatherhood *Gos. Phil.* indeed seems to stress:

¹²⁰ ω: ἐν γαστρὶ ἔχεν (cf. Matt 1:23).

¹²¹ For this phrase, see also *Hyp. Arch.* 92.2–3. It may be worth noting that the Coptic word that is here translated as “defiled,” ⲁⲱⲉⲛ, is closely related to the word ⲁⲱⲉ, which means “smear,” or “anoint.” Considering the importance of the anointing in relation to sacramental begetting in *Gos. Phil.*, the description of Mary’s undefiled state in relation to the “powers” might thus conceivably be read as a pun on the anointing, in which case it may signify that Mary did not conceive by the Holy Spirit because she was not defiled/smear/anointed by any “power,” including the Holy Spirit. See below for a discussion of the continuation of the passage in relation to *Gos. Phil.*’s views regarding Hebrews/Jews and apostles.

¹²² The concept of the Holy Spirit as female is shared by, e.g., the *Gospel of the Hebrews* (See Philipp Vielhauer and Georg Strecker, “Jewish-Christian Gospels,” in *Gospels and Related Writings* [ed. Wilhelm Schneemelcher and R. McL. Wilson; vol. 1 of *New Testament Apocrypha*; rev. ed.; Cambridge: James Clarke, 1991], 177; the relevant passage is cited in Origen, *Comm. Jo.*, 2.12; *Hom. Jer.*, 15.4; Jerome, *Comm. Micah*, 7.6; *Comm. Is.*, 40.9; *Comm. Ezek.*, 16.13) and many early Syriac patristic sources, including Aphrahat and Ephrem (see Murray, *Symbols of Church and Kingdom*, 143; Pètremont, *A Separate God*, 75).

¹²³ According to Elaine Pagels, “Philip castigates those who believe that Jesus’ birth was an event that derived its significance from its uniqueness, a miraculous event in which a woman conceived by parthenogenesis” (Elaine H. Pagels, “Ritual in the *Gospel of Philip*,” in *The Nag Hammadi Library After Fifty Years: Proceedings of the 1995 Society of Biblical Literature Commemoration* [ed. John D. Turner and Anne McGuire; NHS 44; Leiden: Brill, 1997], 285, and later in Elaine H. Pagels, “Irenaeus, ‘the Canon of Truth,’ and the *Gospel of John*: ‘Making a Difference’ Through Hermeneutics and Ritual,” VC 56 [2002]: 357). That *Gos. Phil.* holds that Jesus was conceived parthenogenetically is also the view of Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 77. It is quite clear, however, that it is not a theory of conception by parthenogenesis that is being confronted by *Gos. Phil.*, but simply the idea that Mary conceived by the Holy Spirit (rather than by Joseph). Yet another idea has been presented by Brian McNeil, who argues on the basis of a rather late Christian Arabic Sibylline prophecy that if Jesus was born from two women he would be the Antichrist, and suggests that there might thus be “more to this logion than a sophisticated sneer at the illogical beliefs of the simple” (Brian McNeil, “New Light on Gospel of Philip 17,” *JTS* 29 [1978]: 143–146, esp. 144). This parallel seems quite spurious, however (cf. the refutation of this theory in Strutwolf, *Gnosis als System*, 176 n. 133).

¹²⁴ See Ingvild Sælid Gilhus, *The Nature of the Archons: A Study in the Soteriology of*

αὐτὸς ἢ[ἐφ'ἑαυτὸν] ὅτι ἀν ἡσιν πατέρων ἐπαφ'ἰωτ ἐτ[ε] ἡμῶν πηγε εἰμητι
 ἐνεγῆντα[ι] ἢ[κ] ἑωτ ἀλλὰ ῥαπλωσ ἀφ'ἑαυτοῦ[ο] ἐπαφ'ἰωτ]

And the Lord [would] not [have] said, “my [father who is] in heaven,”
 unless he had [another] father, but he would simply have said, “[my
 father].”¹²⁵ (Gos. Phil. 55.33–36)

Scripture is here invoked to argue in favour of Christ having more than one father. The allusion, as so often in *Gos. Phil.*, is to the Gospel of Matthew,¹²⁶ where Jesus repeatedly refers to “my father who is in heaven,”¹²⁷ a phrase that is unique to Matthew among the four canonical gospels. That Christ has two fathers thus seems to imply the fatherhood of Joseph, a fatherhood which is also affirmed elsewhere in *Gos. Phil.* where Jesus is referred to directly as Joseph’s seed.¹²⁸ A biblical intertext that may be recalled here is Rom 1:3, where Paul describes Christ as one “who came into being from the seed of David according to the flesh” (παῖ ἐνταφωπὲ ἐβὼλ ῥῆπεςπέρμα ἡδὰγγείδ κατὰσαρξ).¹²⁹

We have seen that Jesus is the “seed” of Joseph and that he is born by the Virgin Mary, who is a virgin only in relation to the “powers.” It is thus hard to resist the conclusion that in *Gos. Phil.*’s view, Jesus had Mary and Joseph as his real earthly parents.¹³⁰ But does this mean that Jesus was

a *Gnostic Treatise from Nag Hammadi* (CGII, 4) (StOR 12; Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1985), 92; Franzmann, *Jesus*, 49. Thomassen, although he describes the Demiurge as “the cosmic power *par excellence*,” nevertheless holds him to be “the father of the Saviour’s material body,” and argues that what *Gos. Phil.* asserts here “is not that Mary was not made pregnant by the Demiurge, but that *in spite of* that she was not defiled” (Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 92–93, Thomassen’s emphasis). Williams takes the use of the term “defiled” in this passage to indicate that *Gos. Phil.* holds sexual intercourse to be defiling in itself (see Williams, *Rethinking “Gnosticism”*, 294 n. 26).

¹²⁵ This part of the manuscript is heavily damaged, but on the basis of the preserved letters and Matt 16:17 the restoration of the passage is reasonably secure (cf. Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 47 n. 9).

¹²⁶ For *Gos. Phil.*’s preference for Matthew among the synoptic gospels, see, e.g., Tuckett, *Nag Hammadi*, 72–81.

¹²⁷ παῖωτ ἐτῆμῶν πηγε (ὁ πατήρ μου ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς and variants); Matt 7:21; 10:32, 33; 12:50; 16:17; 18:10, 19; cf. also Matt 15:13; 18:35.

¹²⁸ *Gos. Phil.* 73.9–15, esp. 14–15: ἡνεπεφωρος πὲ ἡῦ (“his seed was Jesus”), but cf. Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 268; *The Spiritual Seed*, 91, who holds “Joseph” to be simply a reference to the Valentinian demiurge, a possibility that has also been suggested by Strutwolf, *Gnosis als System*, 177. See below for a discussion of this passage.

¹²⁹ Rom 1:3 (γενομένου ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυὶδ κατὰ σάρκα). By explicitly stating that Joseph’s “seed” was Jesus, *Gos. Phil.* also recalls Gal 3:16, where Christ is directly identified as the “seed of Abraham.” This is interesting not least in light of the fact that Gal 3 is also triggered elsewhere in the tractate.

¹³⁰ Cf. Pagels, “Ritual,” 285; Pagels, “Irenaeus,” 357.

born from Mary complete with the Logos as his flesh and the Holy Spirit as his blood? Or was just the earthly man, the material body of Jesus, born in this way? After having affirmed Jesus' descent from David "according to the flesh," in Rom 1:3, Paul continues in the next verse by describing Jesus as "the one who was fixed as Son of God in power according to the Spirit of purity from the resurrection of the dead" (ΠΕΝΤΑΥΤΟΩΨ ἸῶΗΡΕ ἸΠΠΟΥΤΕ ΖῆΝΤΟΣΜ ΚΑΤΑΠΕΠΝᾶ ἸΠΤῆΒΟ ΕΒΟΛ ΖῆΠΤΩΟΥΝ ἸΝΕΤΜΟΟΥΤ).¹³¹ From a blend created from Rom 1:3–4 together with the Matthean phrase concerning his "father in heaven," explicitly used by *Gos. Phil.*, we may in fact infer that Christ in a sense had two fathers, and that he was first begotten and born according to the flesh and only later achieved the status of being the Son of God. Rom 1:4 indicates that Jesus' sonship is connected to the resurrection. In what follows we will see whether this connection is made in *Gos. Phil.* as well, and we will investigate how and when Christ attains to full sonship. For if *Gos. Phil.* does not regard him as being born from Mary as the complete saviour there are basically two alternatives open to the tractate. He must either have attained to full sonship through adoption or some kind of second begetting and birth.

Keeping in mind the double-scope blend THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST, which underlies much of *Gos. Phil.*'s rhetoric, the tractate's insistence on the fatherhood of Joseph also has important implications for its underlying sacramental soteriology, since it strengthens the parallelism between the individual Christian and Christ. This parallelism will become especially apparent when we now turn to consider *Gos. Phil.*'s interpretation of the Jordan event, where it is useful to keep in mind the importance of the Spirit for Christ's sonship according to Rom 1:4.¹³²

3.1.4.3. *The Baptism of Jesus in the Jordan*

At the end of page 70 in the manuscript we encounter an enigmatic, but crucially important, passage that is most likely an interpretation of the baptism of Jesus in the Jordan:

αιϛ Ϝωλπ [εβολ πειο]ρδανης πλη[ρωμα ἡτηῆτε]ρο ἡπηγε
 πεν[ταχποϛ] ϛατερη ἡπηρηϛ παλιν αχποϛ π[εντα]χ[ρ]ο[σ]ϛ ἡωρ[π]
 παλιν αχτορϛ π[εν]ταχσοτῆ παλιν αφωτε εωδεωδε εχω ἡομηστηριον
 απιωτ ἡπηρηϛ ϛωτῆ απαρθενος ἡταρει απτη ἡω αχκατ ρογοειν
 εροϛ ἡφοοϛ ετῆμαϛ αφωλπ εβολ ἡπνος ἡπατος ετβεπαι περϛωμα

¹³¹ Rom 1:4 (ὄρισθέντος υἱοῦ θεοῦ ἐν δυνάμει κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιοσύνης ἐξ ἀναστάσεως).

¹³² We will return to the relationship between *Gos. Phil.* and Rom 1:3–5 below.

Ἰταρωπε ἡφοοῦ ἐτῆμαγ ἀφει εβολ ρηπαστος ἡε ἡπενταρωπε
 εβολ ρῆπνημφιος ἡἡτνημφῆ ταιε τε οε αἰς τερο ἡἡπτηρϣ ερατϣ ρραῖ
 ἡρητϣ εβολ ριτῆἡαιε ἀγω ωρε ετρεπογα πογα ἡἡμαθητης μοοωρε εροϣἡ
 ετεφαναπαγσις

Jesus revealed [... the Jo]rdan, the [fullness of the kingdom] of heaven. He who [was begotten] before all things was begotten again. He [who was anointed] first was anointed again. He who was redeemed redeemed again. Indeed it is fitting to speak of a mystery. The Father of all things joined with the virgin who came down, and a fire illuminated him. On that day he revealed the great bridal chamber. It was because of this that his body came into being. On that day he came out from the bridal chamber like the one who came into being from the bridegroom and the bride. Thus Jesus established everything within himself through these, and it is appropriate for each one of the disciples to walk into his rest. (*Gos. Phil.* 70.34–71.15)

The major problem of this notoriously difficult passage concerns the identities of “the virgin who came down” (παρῥενος ἡταρει ἀπιτῆ), “the father of all things” (πειωτ ἡπτηρϣ), and “the great bridal chamber” (πνοσ ἡπαστος). Despite the regrettable damage to the beginning of the passage, we may here still discern a direct reference to the river Jordan and to Jesus revealing or opening (σωλι [εβολ]) something. I suggest that the passage is best understood primarily in the light of the canonical accounts of the Jordan event, cued already by the direct reference to the river. We shall see, however, that there are also other crucial intertexts that need to be invoked in order to make sense of the passage.

In the canonical gospels the baptism of Jesus in the Jordan is described in Matt 3:13–17, Mark 1:9–11, and Luke 3:21–22, while John only refers to it indirectly (John 1:31–33). From the references to begetting, and the phrase “on that day” (ἡφοοῦ ἐτῆμαγ) in the passage quoted above, the Lukan variant reading with the wording “this day I have begotten thee”¹³³ seems to be the most relevant of these accounts for the interpretation of our passage. Moreover, while all the synoptic accounts and even the Gospel of John include the descent of the Spirit upon Jesus in the form of a dove,¹³⁴ only Luke specifies that the Spirit comes down “in bodily

¹³³ ἐγὼ σῆμερον γεγέννηκά σε (Luke 3:22). David Tripp (Tripp, “Sacramental System,” 254–255) rightly notes that *Gos. Phil.* probably knew this version of the gospel tradition. This wording also appears, however, to have been the one used in the *Diatessaron* (see Kilian McDonnell, *The Baptism of Jesus in the Jordan: The Trinitarian and Cosmic Order of Salvation* [Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1996], 93), so we cannot rule out the possibility of the *Diatessaron*, rather than Luke itself, being the chief authorial input text, and also a more relevant intertext for the prospective reader. The formula is also found in Heb 1:5, 5:5, and Ps 2:7.

¹³⁴ Matt 3:16; Mark 1:10; Luke 3:22; John 1:32.

form” (σωματικῶς / ῥηνοῦσμοτ ἴσωμα), which may be echoed in *Gos. Phil.*’s reference to “his body” (πῆρσωμα).

Taking the primary setting to be the baptism of Jesus in the Jordan, my suggestion is that the “virgin who came down” is to be identified with the Holy Spirit descending upon Jesus. There are several reasons for this. As we have already seen, the Holy Spirit is regarded as a female entity in *Gos. Phil.* Secondly, the identification of “the virgin who came down” with the Holy Spirit also accords with the identification of the spirit as one of the virgin mothers of Adam in the paradise account discussed above.¹³⁵

The identification of “the father of all things” is more difficult,¹³⁶ but if we proceed from the assumption that “the virgin who came down” refers to the descent of the Holy Spirit upon Jesus at his baptism in the Jordan,

¹³⁵ There has been no lack of suggestions with regard to the identity of “the virgin who came down,” including Sophia (see Strutwolf, *Gnosis als System*, 177; Jean-Daniel Kaestli, “Valentinisme italien et valentinisme oriental: leurs divergences a propos de la nature du corps de Jesus,” in *The School of Valentinus* [ed. Bentley Layton; vol. 1 of *The Rediscovery of Gnosticism: Proceedings of the International Conference on Gnosticism at Yale, New Haven, Connecticut, March 28–31, 1978*; SHR 41; Leiden: Brill, 1980], 399; Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 92); Sophia Achamoth (see Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 17 n. 154; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960],” 53 n. 11; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 419; Jean-Marie Sevrin, “Les noces spirituelles dans l’Évangile selon Philippe,” *Mus* 87 [1974]: 160; Franzmann, *Jesus*, 50–51); Sophia-Mary Magdalene (see Yvonne Janssens, “L’Évangile selon Philippe,” *Mus* 81 [1968]: 109); the Holy Spirit (see Pagels, “Adam and Eve, Christ and the Church,” 164; Pagels, “Ritual,” 285); Mary, as the psychic consort of the demiurge (see Strutwolf, *Gnosis als System*, 177, who rejects this possibility); the Virgin Mary (see Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 146; Ménard, *L’Évangile selon Philippe*, 202); “the heavenly Mary” (see Jorunn Jacobsen Buckley and Deirdre J. Good, “Sacramental Language and Verbs of Generating, Creating, and Begetting in the Gospel of Philip,” *JECS* 5:1 [1997]: 17); Jesus (see Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 257; see also note below).

¹³⁶ Suggestions have included the Father (see Franzmann, *Jesus*, 50); the supreme aeon (see Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 146; Ménard, *L’Évangile selon Philippe*, 202; see also Strutwolf, *Gnosis als System*, 177, who ultimately rejects it); Christ (see Franzmann, *Jesus*, 50); the Saviour (see Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 17 n. 153; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960],” 53 n. 10; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 419; Janssens, “L’Évangile selon Philippe,” 109; Sevrin, “Les noces spirituelles,” 160; Strutwolf, *Gnosis als System*, 177; Franzmann, *Jesus*, 50); the Logos-Saviour (see Kaestli, “Valentinisme,” 399; Ménard, *L’Évangile selon Philippe*, 202). Einar Thomassen, interpreting *Gos. Phil.* on the basis of “Valentinian” theology, suggests and rejects the possibility that the father in this passage may be the Saviour and that “the virgin who came down” is Sophia, and comes to the conclusion that “the virgin who came down” is actually Jesus, who in baptism is re-united with the pleromatic “Father of the Totality” (see Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 257). In his recent monograph, however, Thomassen seems rather to want it both ways, and now holds “the virgin who came down” primarily to be Sophia (see Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 92), but also “the Saviour ... cast in the role of the female partner and bride in the marital union” (see *ibid.*, 98).

then the “father of all things” should in some way refer to Jesus. The use of the title “the father of all things” (πειωτ ἡπτηρη) presents him as the creator of all things, which makes good sense in light of the prologue of the Gospel of John, where it is the Logos who is specifically described in such terms: “It was through him that everything came into being” (ἡταπτηρη φωπε εβολ ριτοοτῳ), states John 1:3.¹³⁷ As we shall see, it is also highly significant that John goes on to state in 1:4 that, “that which came into being within him was life, and life was the light of men” (πενταφωπε ρραι ἡρητῳ πε πωνε ρω πωνε πε πογοῖν ἡρρωμε).¹³⁸ Moreover, the reference in this passage to “He who [was begotten] before all things” (πεν[ταφωπε ρ]ατερη ἡπτηρη) also recalls the statement that the Logos was with God in the beginning (John 1:2), and other statements to that effect elsewhere in John. So it seems to fit the context best to identify “the Father of all things” with the Logos,¹³⁹ and “the virgin who came down” with the Holy Spirit. Significantly, it is these two entities that constitute the flesh and blood of Jesus according to *Gos. Phil.* In the present passage we thus seem to be witnessing the descent of the Holy Spirit upon the Logos at the baptism of Jesus in the Jordan, which, *Gos. Phil.* informs us, is properly described as “a mystery” (ομηστηριον), where “the Father of all things joined (ρωτῳ) with the virgin who came down, and a fire illuminated him (αρωτ ρωοειν ερω).” What *Gos. Phil.* describes in this passage, then, seems to be the joining of the Logos and the Holy Spirit at the baptism of Jesus, which also, in the light of the important passage discussed earlier, implies the joining of Jesus’ flesh with his blood, which may also explain the puzzling statement that “it was because of this that his body came into being” (ετβεπαει περωμα ἡταφωπε).¹⁴⁰

Significantly, *Gos. Phil.* not only states that Jesus’ body came into being at his baptism, but the event is also described as an opening or manifestation of “the great bridal chamber” (πνοσ ἡπαστοσ).¹⁴¹ The use of the term “bridal chamber” is here obviously linked closely to the joining together of the Holy Spirit and the Logos, but the generation

¹³⁷ πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο.

¹³⁸ ὁ γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἦν τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

¹³⁹ For the identification of Christ, the Logos, as “the Father of all things” (πειωτ ἡπτηρη), see also Shenoute, *The Lord Thundered*, DU 18 (É. Amélineau, *Oeuvres de Shenoudi: Texte copte et traduction française* [2 vols.; Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1907–1914], 1:368).

¹⁴⁰ *Gos. Phil.* 71.8.

¹⁴¹ Suggestions have included the Pleroma (see Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 147), the Virgin Mary (see Sebastian P. Brock, “Passover, Annunciation and Epiclesis: Some Remarks on the Term *Aggen* in the Syriac Versions of Lk. 1:35,” *NovT* 24:3 [1982]: 228).

of the body of Christ also seems to be described in terms of a begetting and seems to involve an anointing. As is stated at the beginning of the passage, he who was begotten and anointed in the beginning was anointed and begotten again.¹⁴² Joining and begetting are of course exactly the kind of things that are supposed to happen in a bridal chamber. The imagery of begetting and joining is thus connected logically to the imagery of the bridal chamber by way of being closely linked concepts within the same domain or ICM of marriage and procreation. The connections to the anointing and the illuminating fire do not belong naturally to that same ICM, but the association of fire and light to begetting on the one hand, and to anointing with chrism on the other, is explicitly stated in *Gos. Phil.*:

εβολ εἰσογμοογ μῆνογκωετ ἡτατγγχ[η] μῆππῆνα ωωπε εβολ εἰσογμοογ
μῆνογκωετ μῆνογοειν ἡταπωμρε ἡππγμφων πκωετ πε πχρισμα πογοειν
πε πκωετ

It was from water and fire that the soul and the spirit came into being. It was from water and fire and light that the son of the bridal chamber (came into being).¹⁴³ The fire is the chrism, the light is the fire.

(*Gos. Phil.* 67.2–6)

So, water, fire, and light are the elements needed to generate a “son of the bridal chamber,” and both fire and light are connected with the chrism. Water, in the context of a discussion of Jesus’ baptism in the Jordan, must of course refer to the baptismal waters. The description of the fire illuminating Jesus at his baptism, when the Logos joined with the Holy Spirit and “his body came into being,”¹⁴⁴ seems to refer to the chrismation,¹⁴⁵ and light seems here as elsewhere in *Gos. Phil.* to refer to the Holy Spirit.¹⁴⁶

The connection between fire and chrism is also made elsewhere in *Gos. Phil.*:

¹⁴² This may either refer to his creation before all things, or alternatively, to Jesus’ later anointings referred to in the canonical Gospels (Matt 26:7; Mark 14:3; Luke 7:37–38; John 12:3; 19:39–40; cf. Craig A. Evans, et al., *Nag Hammadi Texts and the Bible: A Synopsis and Index* [NTTS 18; Leiden: Brill, 1993], 160).

¹⁴³ Cf. Matt 9:15; Mark 2:19; Luke 5:34.

¹⁴⁴ See *Gos. Phil.* 71.6–8.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 94. Pagels takes the reference to “his body” here to indicate the church as the body of Christ (Pagels, “Adam and Eve, Christ and the Church,” 164).

¹⁴⁶ The connection between the Holy Spirit and fire is also made in Matt 3:11 = Luke 3:16, and John 1:33 in certain manuscripts (including P⁷⁵ and the Sahidic manuscripts) in a baptismal setting, and in Acts 2:3–4 at Pentecost.

ΖΙΤ̄ΝΟΓΜΟΟΥ Μ̄ΝΟΓΚΩΞΤ̄ ΕΥΤΟΥΒΟ Μ̄ΠΜΑ ΤΗΡΥ ΝΕΤΟΥΟΝΣ ΖΙΤ̄Ν̄ΝΕΤΟΥΟΝΣ ΕΒΟΛ
 ΝΕΘΗΠ ΖΙΤ̄Ν̄ΝΕΘΗΠ ΟΥΝΖΟΥΕΙΝ ΕΥΖΗΠ ΖΙΤ̄Ν̄ΝΕΤΟΥΟΝΣ ΕΒΟΛ ΟῩΜ̄ΜΟΥ Ζ̄ΝΟΓΜΟΟΥ
 ΟῩΝ̄ΚΩΞΤ̄ Ζ̄Ν̄ΝΟΥΧΡΙΣΜΑ

It is by means of water and fire that everything¹⁴⁷ is purified, the revealed by means of the revealed, the hidden by means of the hidden. There are some (things) that are hidden by means of the revealed. There is water in water, there is fire in chris̄m.¹⁴⁸ (*Gos. Phil.* 57.22–28)

Put slightly differently, then, when Jesus was baptised in the waters of the Jordan and he was anointed with the Holy Spirit, “his body” (περσωμα) came into being as a result of the unification of the Logos and the Holy Spirit.¹⁴⁹ This anointing thus seems at one and the same time to constitute both a joining and a begetting, and is consequently aptly described in terms of the goings on in a bridal chamber. Later, the tractate supplies more details of this process:

ΠΕΝΤΑΥΤΟΥΣΟΥ ΟῩΝ̄ΤΕΥ ΠΤΗΡΥ Μ̄ΝΑΥ ΟῩΝ̄ΤΑΥ ΤΑΝΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ ΠΟΥΟΕΙΝ ΠΕΣ.ΡΟΣ
 ΠΠ̄Ν̄ ΕΤΟΥΑΔΒ ΔΠΕΙΩΤ † ΝΑΥ Μ̄ΠΔΕΙ Ζ̄Μ̄ΠΝΥ[Η]ΦΩΝ ΔΥΧΙ ΔΥΘΩΠΕ Ν̄ΣΠΕΙΩΤ
 Ζ̄Μ̄ΠΩ[Η]ΡΕ ΑΥΩ ΠΩΗΡΕ Ζ̄Μ̄ΠΕΙΩΤ

He who has been anointed has everything. He has the resurrection, the light, the cross, the Holy Spirit. The Father gave him this in the bridal chamber (νυμφών). He received, and the Father came to be in the Son and the Son in the Father.¹⁵⁰ (*Gos. Phil.* 74.18–24)

In his anointing, then, Christ, and it seems also the individual Christian, receives “everything” (πτηρη), as it is also stated in the Jordan passage that through the processes associated with his baptism, “Jesus established everything within himself” (ᾱῑς τε̄ξο μ̄πτηρη̄ ερατϋ ρρᾱῑ ν̄ζητηϋ).¹⁵¹ And “everything” here includes the Holy Spirit, a reception of which is also referred to towards the end of the tractate, once again directly connected to the imagery of the bridal chamber: “If one becomes a son / child of the bridal chamber (νυμφών),¹⁵² he will receive the light” (ερωδογα ωππε

¹⁴⁷ For this understanding of the term πμα τηρη, see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 4; Louis Painchaud, et al., “Le syntagme πμα τηρη dans quelques textes de Nag Hammadi,” in *Coptica—Gnostica—Manichaica: Mélanges offerts à Wolf-Peter Funk* (ed. Louis Painchaud and Paul-Hubert Poirier; BCNH, Études 7; Québec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2006), 619–645, esp. 623.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. also *Gos. Phil.* 67.2–9.

¹⁴⁹ Williams holds the body that came into being to be that of the Father (see Williams, *Rethinking “Gnosticism”*, 125). From the overall context it seems more likely that it refers to the body of Christ, however.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. John 10:38; 14:10–11; 17:21; and cf. also John 10:30; 14:9, 20.

¹⁵¹ *Gos. Phil.* 71.12–13.

¹⁵² Cf. Matt 9:15; Mark 2:19; Luke 5:34.

ἄωρη ἡπνύμφων φησὶ ἡπογοεῖν).¹⁵³ Another clue to the nature of the “everything” contained within Jesus is given in a passage close to the beginning of the tractate, which states that, “Christ has everything within himself, whether man or angel or mystery and the Father” (πεῦ̄ οὐ̄ντᾱ οὐ̄ον̄ νιμ̄ ρρᾱῑ ἡρη̄τη̄ ε̄ιτε̄ ρω̄με̄ ε̄ιτε̄ ἀγγε̄λος̄ ε̄ιτε̄ μ̄στη̄ριον̄ ἀω̄ πειω̄τ).¹⁵⁴ These statements must of course be read in light of such New Testament passages as Col 2:9, concerning the bodily indwelling of all the fullness of the divinity in Christ,¹⁵⁵ and the verses in John referring to Jesus and the Father as being one, and within each other.¹⁵⁶

That the joining of the Logos and the Holy Spirit, and the begetting of the body of Christ as described in these passages may aptly be presented metaphorically in terms of bridal chamber imagery is readily understandable, but it still does not answer the question concerning the identity of the metaphorical target which *Gos. Phil.* describes in terms of a “bridal chamber.” It will be shown below that this is an ICM that may be used to frame several different inputs, so at this point we will limit the analysis to the identity of “the great bridal chamber” (π̄νο̄ς ἡ̄πασ̄τος) mentioned in the Jordan passage. The setting being as it is, and the joining being one between the Logos and the Holy Spirit, there seem to be two possibilities available to us. One is simply that the term refers to the ritual act(s) of baptism and /or chrismation at the Jordan, which opened up these ritual acts for the (re)enactment by Christians. Another compelling possibility is that the term may be understood as a reference to the body of Christ, for the body of Christ may itself be regarded as the “bridal chamber” within which the Logos and Holy Spirit, the flesh and blood of Jesus, are joined.¹⁵⁷ Finally, the concept of the bridal chamber may here simply be understood as a reference to the *process* of joining and begetting rather than as a reference to where it took place.

Importantly, however, these possibilities are by no means mutually exclusive. In an interpretation of the passage in question the more specific referential and christological aspects and the more general processual

¹⁵³ *Gos. Phil.* 86.4–5. Cf. also *Gos. Phil.* 67.3–5.

¹⁵⁴ *Gos. Phil.* 56.13–15.

¹⁵⁵ ἄε̄ρεῑπ̄λω̄κ̄ τη̄ρ̄ ἡ̄τη̄νη̄το̄γε̄ οὐ̄η̄ ἡ̄ρη̄τη̄ σᾱμᾱτικ̄ω̄ς / ὅ̄τῑ ἐν̄ αὐ̄τῷ̄ κατοικεῖ̄ π̄αν̄ τὸ̄ π̄λή̄ρω̄μᾱ τῆ̄ς̄ θε̄ότη̄τος̄ σωμᾱτικ̄ῶ̄ς.

¹⁵⁶ See John 10:30, 38; 14:7, 9–11, 20; 17:21, 23.

¹⁵⁷ Such a three-levelled constitution of Christ may also be implicit in some of *Gos. Phil.*'s uses of temple imagery (see below for discussion).

and ritual aspects may fruitfully be blended, not least in subsequent interpretations of the deeper meaning and significance of both the rituals in question and the tractate's implied Christology. We will return to the question of the implications of this understanding of the baptism of Jesus for the understanding of the function of the Christian rituals below, but first we must take a look at how this understanding of the generation of Christ parallels the tractate's understanding of the constitution and actions of the first man, Adam.

We have seen that through his (first) begetting and birth, from Joseph and Mary, either as simply the body of the earthly Jesus, or as the Logos incarnated, and his second begetting and birth at the baptism in the Jordan, with its joining together of the Holy Spirit and the Logos, Jesus "established everything within himself." In fact, these conclusions regarding the birth and baptism of Jesus reveal an interesting conceptual blend between the figures of Adam and Christ, and one that is also pointed out quite explicitly by *Gos. Phil.* in a passage already referred to several times in the discussion above, where the tractate explains exactly why it is that Jesus must be born from a virgin:

ΑΔΑΜ ΟΥΩΠΕ ΕΒΟΛ ΖΗΠΑΡΘΕΝΟΣ ΣΗΤΕ ΕΒΟΛ ΖΗΠΠΗΑ ΔΥΩ ΕΒΟΛ ΖΗΠΚΑΖ
 ΗΠΑΡΘΕΝΟΣ ΕΤΒΕΠΑΕΙ ΔΥΧΠΕΠΕΧ̄ ΕΒΟΛ ΖΗΟΥΠΑΡΘΕΝΟΣ ΔΕΚΑΑΣ ΠΕΣΛΟΟΤΕ
 ΝΤΑΖΟΥΠΕ ΖΗΤΕΡΟΥΕΙΤΕ ΕΦΝΑ[С]ΕΖΩΥ ΕΡΑΤΥ

Adam came into being from two virgins, from the spirit and from the virgin earth.¹⁵⁸ Therefore Christ was born from a virgin, so that he might rectify the fall that happened in the beginning. (*Gos. Phil.* 71.16–21)

Several scholars have assumed that since Adam is described as having come into being from two virgins, and since Christ came specifically to rectify Adam's primordial mistakes, then *Gos. Phil.* here implies that Christ had to be born of one virgin mother, rather than two as was the case with Adam.¹⁵⁹ From what is stated in various places throughout the text, however, it may be gathered that Christ in fact also seems to have come into being from two virgin mothers,¹⁶⁰ namely the Virgin Mary and "the virgin who came down," i.e., the Holy Spirit,¹⁶¹ and that he

¹⁵⁸ Cf. Gen 2:7.

¹⁵⁹ See, e.g., Janssens, "L'Évangile selon Philippe," 110; Buckley, "Conceptual Models," 4181.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 422; Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 92.

¹⁶¹ Cf. Franzmann, *Jesus*, 49, 52; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 422; Pagels, "Ritual," 285.

indeed also had two fathers, Joseph and God the Father.¹⁶² We thus get the Adam-Christ conceptual integration network shown in fig. 21.¹⁶³

We see that both Adam and Christ have two mothers, one of which is earthly and the other being a spirit. The latter is indeed in both cases described as being the mother of its recipient, and as the partner of, in Adam's case, the soul, and, in the case of Christ, the Logos. A highly interesting entailment of this blend is that the Logos, Christ's flesh, is conceptually on the level of Adam's soul, an entailment which we shall see carries potentially great significance for the sacramental soteriology of the tractate as a whole.

The enigmatic reference to Christ coming out of the bridal chamber recalls Ps 18:5 LXX.¹⁶⁴ It may, however, also be interpreted as a metaphor highlighting the parallels between this second begetting and birth in the Jordan and the first, natural one, since Christ is described as coming out "like the one who came into being from the bridegroom and the bride." It may thus be read as a metaphorical description of what happened at Jesus' baptism in the river Jordan, which at one and the same time refers to subsequent ritual reenactment by Christian priests and initiates, and recalls his begetting and birth from the Virgin Mary. Jesus' birth according to the flesh thereby becomes simultaneously a metaphor and a prefiguration for both his own baptism and that of the Christians.

From what we have found concerning *Gos. Phil.*'s statements on the birth and baptism of Jesus, it seems reasonably clear that Jesus was not born completely as the Saviour until his baptism in the Jordan. It also seems clear that the Holy Spirit did not enter into Jesus until this event, where it united with his Logos, and the body (σῶμα) of Christ was "begotten." Thus, *Gos. Phil.*'s statement concerning the baptismal rebirth

¹⁶² Cf. Franzmann, *Jesus*, 49, 52; Pagels, "Ritual," 285. According to Thomassen, however, Jesus' two virgin mothers are Sophia and Mary, and his two fathers are "the transcendent father" and "the Demiurge ('Joseph')" (Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 91–92). Catherine Trautmann argues that the Saviour's two fathers correspond to Adam's two mothers (see Catherine Trautmann, "La parenté dans l'Évangile selon Philippe," in *Colloque International sur les textes de Nag Hammadi [Québec, 22–25 août 1978]* [ed. Bernard Barc; BCNH Études 1; Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1981], 274).

¹⁶³ The contrast between the first Adam as the one brought forth by "the virgin earth" and the new Adam (Christ) brought forth by the Virgin Mary is also found in, e.g., Irenaeus, *Haer.* III.21.10 (like *Gos. Phil.*, Irenaeus uses it as an argument for the fact that Christ was born from a virgin), as well as in Ephrem, *HNat.* 1,16 (see Murray, *Symbols of Church and Kingdom*, 145 n. 2), and in Jacob of Serugh (see Brock, "Baptismal Themes," 332).

¹⁶⁴ Cf. also Joel 2:16.

of the Christian initiates, namely that “when we were begotten we were joined” (ἄταροῦχρον ἀγχοτρῆ),¹⁶⁵ may be said to be equally true for the baptism of Jesus, where he was begotten when his Logos united with the Holy Spirit.

As for the Logos, here there are two main possibilities. Either it was born through the Virgin Mary or it descended at the Jordan along with the Holy Spirit. However, the fact that there is a clear reference to the descent of the spirit at the Jordan, but no references that may reasonably be taken to refer to any descent of the Logos, makes it seem most probable that the Logos was born through Mary. Now, where does this leave Joseph? And does this mean that the Jesus who was born of Mary was incorporeal? We have seen that the Logos is described as both “the father of all things” and as existing “before everything,” both of which make it unlikely that it is to be equated with the seed of Joseph. We thus seem to be left, as the most viable solution, with the conclusion that the earthly body of Jesus was begotten by Joseph and born of Mary, while at the same time containing the Logos within it. Jesus’ true body then seems only to come into being when the Logos is united with the Holy Spirit at baptism, within the body of the earthly Jesus.¹⁶⁶

Majella Franzmann has argued that even though Jesus is described as having flesh and blood, “this does not mean that he is human,” and she suggests that even though Jesus might be a human being prior to the Jordan event, “his transformation there leaves no doubt that thereafter he is a spiritual being. The gospel tells us that his flesh is the Logos (57.2) and his blood is the Holy Spirit (57.6–7).”¹⁶⁷ We should remember, however, that “his flesh” in this context should most probably be understood as Jesus’ true flesh, which, as we have seen from *Gos. Phil.*’s interpretation of the transfiguration, was normally hidden from view.¹⁶⁸ That his true flesh (σαρξ) is the Logos, and his blood (σπο) is the Holy Spirit does not necessarily imply that Jesus did not have a material body (σῶμα) in addition to the body that came into being at his baptism. One implication we may draw from *Gos. Phil.* is that Jesus’ true flesh and blood—his true

¹⁶⁵ *Gos. Phil.* 69.8; see below for a discussion of this passage.

¹⁶⁶ This view is not without patristic attestation. See, e.g., Aloys Grillmeier, *From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451)* (vol. 1 of *Christ in Christian Tradition*; trans. John Bowden; Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975); Grillmeier, *The Church of Alexandria*.

¹⁶⁷ Franzmann, *Jesus*, 72.

¹⁶⁸ Cf. *Gos. Phil.* 58.2–3. The term “true flesh” seems to be used at *Gos. Phil.* 68.35 ([οὐς]αρξ τε ἴαληοεινή), but the damage to the manuscript at this point sadly makes any reconstruction and interpretation of the passage where it appears highly conjectural. For a hypothetical reconstruction of the passage, see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 46.

body—was in a sense normally hidden within his material body, the body that may be identified with the seed of Joseph. We shall see more indications that point in this direction when we later turn to consider *Gos. Phil.*'s interpretation of the crucifixion, where Christ's divinity abandons the earthly body on the cross.

3.1.4.4. *Kinship*

By now it should be evident that imagery related to procreation and kinship is central to the rhetoric of *Gos. Phil.* It is precisely this aspect we will now turn to, starting with the tractate's construction and prompting of blends involving fatherhood and sonship. In the following passage, which will serve as our starting point, *Gos. Phil.* calls upon biological aspects of the ICM of a father-son relationship as a conceptual framing (source) input:

ⲡⲉⲱⲧ ⲧⲁⲙⲉⲓⲟⲩⲏⲣⲉ ⲁⲭⲱ ⲡⲱⲏⲣⲉ ⲙⲏⲃⲟⲙ ⲙⲏⲟⲩ ⲛⲓⲢⲧⲁⲙⲉⲓⲟⲩⲏⲣⲉ ⲡⲉⲛⲧⲁⲭⲭⲡⲟⲩ
ⲓⲁⲣ ⲙⲏⲃⲟⲙ ⲙⲏⲟⲩ ⲛⲓⲢⲭⲡⲟ ⲁⲗⲗⲁ ⲉⲡⲱⲏⲣⲉ ⲭⲡⲟ ⲛⲁⲩ ⲛⲉⲣⲏⲥⲛⲏⲏⲩ ⲛⲉⲣⲱⲏⲣⲉ ⲁⲛ

The father makes a son, and it is impossible for the son to make a son. For it is impossible for the one who has been born to beget, but the son acquires/begets brothers, not sons. (Gos. Phil. 58.22–26)

Gos. Phil. here seems to play on the polysemy of the Coptic word ⲭⲡⲟ. The word may be translated variously as “beget,” “give birth to,” or “acquire,”¹⁶⁹ and, remarkably, the passage seems to utilise all three of these denotations. *Gos. Phil.* asserts that the son cannot, like his father, create sons, but may only acquire/beget (ⲭⲡⲟ) brothers.¹⁷⁰ The explanation given for the son's inability to create a son is that “it is impossible for the one who has been born (ⲭⲡⲟ) to beget (ⲭⲡⲟ).” Now, what are we to make of this passage, and why is it impossible for the son do as his father? It is safe to assume that this father-son relationship should be interpreted metaphorically, and the tractate is here giving us only framing inputs, while keeping the target(s) implicit. What may be the reason for the son's inability to beget? From the everyday-life source ICM of fatherhood and sonship, the inference may be drawn that the son should here probably be regarded as a child. Children, as we all know, cannot reproduce. Bentley Layton's free translation makes this assumption explicit:

¹⁶⁹ See Crum 778b–780a. Cf. also Buckley and Good, “Sacramental Language,” 10.

¹⁷⁰ Buckley's assertion that the Coptic term ⲭⲡⲟ here “implies a spiritual, not a material, creation of siblings” (Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4182) is only half right. The term denotes literal biological begetting, a denotation which in this context is used metaphorically and in playful combination with the word's sense of “acquire.”

A parent makes children and a (young) child is powerless to make children. For one who has (recently) been born cannot be a parent: rather, a child gets brothers, not children.¹⁷¹

Significantly, the further inference may be drawn from this ICM that when the son eventually grows up and becomes mature, as sons do, he may one day become a father himself.¹⁷² But what is the target input we are here implicitly prompted to activate?¹⁷³ To answer this question we need to consider a couple of other passages where *Gos. Phil.* uses metaphors of procreation. In another intriguing, if slightly confusing, passage, the tractate discusses the terms “create” (ϸΩΝΤ) and “beget” (ϸΠΟ). Notice the nice rhetorical symmetry of the statements:

ΠΕΝΤΑΞΧΙ ΕΤΡΕΦΩΝΤ ΟΥϸΩΝΤ ΠΕ
 ΠΕΝΤΑΞΧΙ ΕϸΠΟ ΟΥϸΠΟ ΠΕ
 ΠΕΤϸΩΝΤ ΜἸἸḶΟΜ ἸϸϸΠΟ
 ΠΕΤϸΠΟ ΟΥἸἸḶΟΜ ἸϸϸΩΝΤ
 ḶΕϸΩ ΔΕ ἸΜΟϸ ΞΕΠΕΤϸΩΝΤ ϸΠΟ
 ΑΛΛΑ ΠΕϸϸΠΟ ΟΥϸΩΝΤ ΠΕ

He who has received the ability to create (ϸΩΝΤ)¹⁷⁴ is a creature (ϸΩΝΤ).¹⁷⁵

He who has received (the ability) to beget (ϸΠΟ)¹⁷⁶ is a begotten one (ϸΠΟ).¹⁷⁷

He who creates (ϸΩΝΤ) cannot (ΜἸἸḶΟΜ) beget (ϸΠΟ).

He who begets (ϸΠΟ) can (ΟΥἸἸḶΟΜ) create (ϸΩΝΤ).

They say that he who creates (ϸΩΝΤ) begets (ϸΠΟ), but his “offspring” (ϸΠΟ) is a creature (ϸΩΝΤ).¹⁷⁸ (*Gos. Phil.* 81.21–26)

¹⁷¹ Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 334. Although this translation obscures the word-plays and hence does not capture the passage’s broad range of connotations, I would argue in favor of the gist of this interpretation since it does indeed highlight the potentiality of the son to eventually become mature. See also Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 191, and the discussion in Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 257–260. Cf. also Williams, *Rethinking “Gnosticism”*, 157.

¹⁷² Cf. *Gos. Phil.* 60.1–6; 61.29–32.

¹⁷³ Jorunn Jacobsen Buckley and Deirdre Good claim that in this passage and in its discussion about being born of one versus two parents, the difference highlighted in *Gos. Phil.* is one between a horizontal versus a vertical relationship, and anachronistically invoke the difference between cloning and generation (Buckley and Good, “Sacramental Language,” 6–7).

¹⁷⁴ ϸΩΝΤ: κτίζειν, ποιεῖν.

¹⁷⁵ ϸΩΝΤ: κτίσις, κτίσμα, ποίημα.

¹⁷⁶ ϸΠΟ: γένεσις, γενετή, γεννάν, γίγνεσθαι, τεκνογονεῖν, τίπτειν, σπεῖρειν.

¹⁷⁷ ϸΠΟ: γένεσις, γεννᾶσθαι, γέννημα, γεννητός, (παλι)γενεσία, σπορά, τεκνογονία.

¹⁷⁸ For a highly similar discussion of the differences between creating and begetting, see Coptic Manuscript M706b in the Pierpont Morgan Library, published by Leo Depuydt as Coptic fragment No. 82, a *Homiletic Fragment* without attribution (Leo Depuydt,

Once again *Gos. Phil.* is playing on words, this time $\text{c}\omega\text{nt}$ and $\text{x}\rho\text{o}$, which are here both used as predicates and objects. According to *Gos. Phil.*, then, only those who have been begotten have the potentiality to beget. While such a person may also create, it is impossible for those who have merely been created to beget, despite the fact that one may refer metaphorically to an act of mere creation as begetting. In other words, only one who has been begotten himself can create others who may also obtain the power to beget. In contrast to proper begetting, creating does not imply any kinship relations, descent, succession, or inheritance. It is here of utmost significance that begetting involves fathers and sons, rather than creators and creations. In order to be able to continue a lineage, and to receive one's "maker's" abilities, it is necessary to be begotten, rather than made.

Gos. Phil. links its discussion of the differences between being created and begotten directly to Christ, referred to here as the Son of Man:

ϣϣοορ ⲛⲥⲓⲡⲱⲛⲣⲉ ⲓⲡⲣⲱⲙⲉ ⲁϣⲱ ϣϣοορ ⲛⲥⲓⲡⲱⲛⲣⲉ ⲓⲡⲣⲱⲛⲣⲉ ⲓⲡⲣⲱⲙⲉ ⲡϣⲟⲓⲉ
 ⲡⲉ ⲡⲱⲛⲣⲉ ⲓⲡⲣⲱⲙⲉ ⲁϣⲱ ⲡⲱⲛⲣⲉ ⲓⲡⲣⲱⲛⲣⲉ ⲓⲡⲣⲱⲙⲉ ⲡⲉ ⲡⲉⲧϣⲟⲛⲧ ϣⲓⲧⲓⲡⲱⲛⲣⲉ
 ⲓⲡⲣⲱⲙⲉ ⲁⲡⲱⲛⲣⲉ ⲓⲡⲣⲱⲙⲉ ⲁⲓ ⲛⲧⲟⲟⲧϥ ⲓⲡⲛⲟϥⲧⲉ ⲉⲧⲣⲉϥϣⲟⲛⲧ ⲟϥⲛⲧⲁϥ ⲓⲛⲁϥ
 ⲉⲧⲣⲉϥϣⲡⲟ

There is the Son of Man and there is the son of the Son of Man. The Lord is the Son of Man and the son of the Son of Man is he who creates through the Son of Man. The Son of Man received from God the ability to create. He has the ability to beget. (*Gos. Phil.* 81.14–21)

Here Christ as the Son of Man ($\text{p}\omega\text{nr}\epsilon$ $\text{i}\text{p}\text{r}\omega\text{m}\epsilon$)¹⁷⁹ is described as having received the power to create ($\text{c}\omega\text{nt}$) from his father. This does not mean that he himself is a creature ($\text{c}\omega\text{nt}$), however, since he is also described as having the ability to beget ($\text{x}\rho\text{o}$). And, as we have seen, one who has been begotten may both create and beget. It follows from this that the son of the Son of Man ($\text{p}\omega\text{nr}\epsilon$ $\text{i}\text{p}\omega\text{nr}\epsilon$ $\text{i}\text{p}\text{r}\omega\text{m}\epsilon$), who is described as creating ($\text{c}\omega\text{nt}$) through the Son of Man,¹⁸⁰ since he is a son, is also begotten and hence also has the power to beget ($\text{x}\rho\text{o}$). We will return below to the

Catalogue of Coptic Manuscripts in the Pierpont Morgan Library [2 vols.; Corpus of Illuminated Manuscripts 4–5, Oriental Series 1–2; Leuven: Peeters, 1993], 1:163).

¹⁷⁹ Layton, however, chooses to translate the term as "the child of the human being," relegating the traditional epithet, "son of man," to a footnote (Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 350).

¹⁸⁰ Cf., however, Schenke, "Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959]," 22; Schenke, "Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960]," 61; C.J. de Catanzaro, "The Gospel According to Philip," *JTS* 13 (1962): 64; Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 57; Till, *Das Evangelium nach Philippus*, 61; Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 91; Isenberg, "Coptic Gospel," 392; Ménard, *L'Évangile selon Philippe*, 107, who all translate $\text{p}\epsilon\tau\text{c}\omega\text{nt}$ in 81.18 passively, understanding

identity of the son of the Son of Man,¹⁸¹ but first we need to consider some related uses of procreation imagery in *Gos. Phil.* It may be remarked here, however, that whoever he is, the son of the Son of Man stands in a direct line of descent from God, the Father, through Christ, the Lord, and has the ability to extend this lineage through his own offspring. His act of creating (ϰΩΝΤ) through the Son of Man must therefore be understood as a begetting (ϰΠΟ).

3.1.4.4.1. Creating and Begetting

Metaphors of procreation and discussions concerning the differences between creating and begetting are pervasive in *Gos. Phil.*¹⁸² In several passages, such imagery is used to contrast the Christians with the Jews.¹⁸³ The first of these, which comprises the very first lines of the tractate,¹⁸⁴ makes for an interesting parallel to the passages discussed above:

ΟΥΣΕΒΡΑΙΟΣ ΠΡΩΜΕ [Ω]ΔΥΓΤΑΜΙΕΣΕΒΡΑΙΟΣ ΔΥΩ ΩΔΥΜΟΥΤΕ [ΕΝΔ]ΕΙ ΝΤΕΕΙΜΙΝΕ
 ΔΕΠΡΟΣΗΛΥΤΟΣ ΟΥΠ[ΡΟΣΗ]ΛΥΤΟΣ ΔΕ ΜΑΥΤΑΜΙΕΠΡΟΣΗΛΥΤΟΣ

A Hebrew man creates¹⁸⁵ Hebrew, and [those] of this sort are called “proselyte,” but a p[rose]lyte does not create proselyte.

(*Gos. Phil.* 51.29–32)

the son of the Son of Man as being the one who is *created* through or by the Son of Man. For the active sense, as it is understood in the present study, cf. Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 203; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 71; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus (NHC II,3),” 1:210; Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 350; Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 205. Schenke, however, translates the sentence rather freely as “the son of the Son of Man is the one who creates in the power of the Son of Man” / “der Sohn des Menschensohnes ist derjenige, der in der Kraft des Menschensohnes schafft,” thus adding the word “power / Kraft” which is not in the Coptic text.

¹⁸¹ Frederick Houk Borsch, for example, understands this figure as “the gnostic believer formed in some likeness to the Son of Man” (Frederick Houk Borsch, *The Christian and Gnostic Son of Man* [SBT Second Series 14; London: SCM Press, 1970], 82), but as we shall see in the discussion below, it is possible to be more specific regarding the nature and function of this character.

¹⁸² See, e.g., M.L. Turner, *Gospel According to Philip*, 261.

¹⁸³ Jeffrey Siker has argued that *Gos. Phil.* refers to two distinct groups by the terms “Hebrew” and “Jew.” According to Siker the former refers to “non-gnostic Christians” and only the latter to Jews proper (Jeffrey S. Siker, “Gnostic Views on Jews and Christians in the Gospel of Philip,” *NovT* 31:3 [1989]: 275–288). I see no reason to make such a distinction, however, and treat both terms as references to Jews and Judaism. See discussion below.

¹⁸⁴ Schenke rightly notes that *Gos. Phil.* “*beginnt* abrupt und genau so seltsam, ja rätselhaft, wie es der *gesamte* Text ist” (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 139, Schenke’s emphasis).

¹⁸⁵ ΤΑΜΙΟ: ΠΟΙΕΪΝ.

According to *Gos. Phil.* the product of a Hebrew creating a Hebrew is a proselyte. We may observe that this Hebrew-proselyte relationship is analogous to the father-son relationship seen in the passage concerning the father making a son who is in turn unable to make his own sons. Just as the son in that passage cannot create sons, the proselyte cannot create proselytes. This sets up a blend between the father-son relationship and the relationship between the Hebrew and the proselyte (see fig. 22).

There are here counterpart mappings between the father and the Hebrew, and between the son and the proselyte. In setting up this conceptual integration network, *Gos. Phil.* both suggests, but also resists, the implication that the relationship between the Hebrew and the proselyte may be regarded as a father-son relationship. For there is a clash of contextual frames in the blended space. The first implication one is likely to draw from the blend is that the Hebrew is analogous to the father creating the son who is unable to reproduce, and that the proselyte is analogous to the latter.¹⁸⁶ In this sense, the unproductive proselyte is a child like the unproductive son.

There is, however, also an implicit difference between the two, which follows from the knowledge of the father-son ICM, namely that the son has the potential to grow up, mature, and become a father himself. In the case of the proselyte, this potential implication suggested by the blend, that he may become a productive Hebrew too, is resisted both by the absence of any direct statements to this effect in *Gos. Phil.* and by real-world knowledge of proselyte initiation.¹⁸⁷ But why is this? What is the actual difference between the Hebrew creating the proselyte and the father creating the son?

Gos. Phil. states that “he who has not received the Lord is a Hebrew still” (ΠΕΝΤΑΡΧΙΠΛΟΕΙΣ ΑΝ Ο ΝῆΡΕΒΡΑΙΟΣ ΕΤΙ),¹⁸⁸ thus inferring that the reception or not of Christ is a vital difference between the two processes. The statement may be understood metaphorically as referring to the acceptance of Christianity, but it may also be seen as a direct reference to the Eucharist and the rites of initiation. In the Eucharist the Lord is received by means of the eucharistic elements, and in the initiation

¹⁸⁶ Both these passages use the term ΤΑΜΙΟ, rather than ΚΩΝΤ or ΧΠΟ to denote this creative process, and *Gos. Phil.* thus manages to steer clear of any obvious identification of these processes with any of the two latter opposing terms, thus keeping the passage ambiguous with regard to the exact nature of the generative processes that are compared here.

¹⁸⁷ See the discussion below.

¹⁸⁸ *Gos. Phil.* 62.5–6.

rites we shall see that this may be a part of both baptism and chrismation. Another equally conspicuous difference between the Jews and the Christians is spelled out in terms of parentage:

ἸΕΡΟΥ ΝΕΝΩΘΟΠ ἸΕΒΡΑΙΟΣ ΝΕΝΟ ἸΟΡΦΑΝΟΣ ΝΕΥἸΤΑΝ ἸΤῚΜΑΔΥ ἸΤΑΡἸΩΠΕ
ΔΕ ἸΧΡΗΤΙΑΝΟΣ ΔΕΙΩΤ ΖΙΜΑΔΥ ΩΠΕ ΝΑΝ

When we were Hebrews we were fatherless. We had our mother, but when we became Christians, we got (both) father and mother.¹⁸⁹

(*Gos. Phil.* 52.21–24)

Here the difference between Hebrews and Christians is identified as the Hebrews' lack of a father, and, by extension, we see that this also differentiates the son from the proselyte. The son has a father, the proselyte does not. And what is it that differentiates the father's creation of a son from the Hebrew's creation of a proselyte? From the father-son source ICM and from certain other passages in *Gos. Phil.*¹⁹⁰ we may infer that the father's creation of the son who cannot yet reproduce is a begetting. We are thus left with the conclusion that the difference between the Hebrew's production of the proselyte and the father's production of the son is the one between creating (ωῶντ) and begetting (χπο) discussed above. The son is begotten, while the proselyte is made. And, as we have seen, he who has merely been made, and not begotten, does not have the power to beget, as *Gos. Phil.* makes clear.

Gos. Phil. here also blends two time-frames, namely the wider historical one before and after the coming of Christ, and the time frame before and after the individual's initiation in the contemporary period with both Judaism and Christianity in existence. In this way, Judaism is effectively presented as merely a bygone earlier phase of history that has now been superseded by Christianity, and the term "Hebrew" is used metaphorically to refer to such a pre-/non-Christian state, both of the individual and in a broader historical sense.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁹ Einar Thomassen is of the opinion that this passage presupposes the Valentinian myth (Thomassen, "How Valentinian," 254). Although I agree that it may be possible to read the passage in the light of the Valentinian myth I see no compelling reason why the passage should necessarily presuppose it.

¹⁹⁰ Cf., e.g., *Gos. Phil.* 81.14–21.

¹⁹¹ A number of scholars have taken these passages quite literally, however. See, e.g., Schenke, who takes this passage to refer to the author's previous state of actually being a Jew (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 159). Similarly, Isenberg states that "Philip's readers were once 'Hebrews'" (Isenberg, "Coptic Gospel," 42). See also Grobel, review of Wilson, 318; Gaffron, *Studien*, 65–66, 69. See below for a more in depth analysis of *Gos. Phil.*'s polemics against Judaism.

Gos. Phil. also uses the created-begotten opposition in another argument, however, once again hailing back to the garden of Eden:

[πεντ]ἀγπλασσε ἴμοϋ νε[σϱϱ ἀλλα η]εκναρε ἀνεϱϱηρε¹⁹² εϱο ἴπλασμα ἢεϱγενης εϱδεἴποϱῆπλασσε ἴμοϋ ἀλλα ἀϱϱποϱ ηεκναρε ἀπεϱσπερμα εϱο ἢεϱγενης τενοϱ δε ἀγπλασσε ἴμοϋ ἀϱϱπο ἀϱ ἢεϱγενεια πε παει ϱορπ ἀτῆῆτνοεικ ϱωπε ἴῆῆῆσϱς φϱτβε ἀϱω ἀϱϱποϱ εβολ ϱῆτῆῆτνοεικ νεϱϱηρε γαρ ἴφοϱ πε δια τοϱτο ἀϱϱωπε ἢεϱατῆρϱμε ἢεε ἴπεϱκϱεειϱτ ἀϱω ἀϱμοϱοϱτ ἴπεϱσον κοῖνωῖα δε ἴῆῆ ἴταϱϱωπε εβολ ϱῆῆεῆῆε ἀῆ ἢῆοϱεῆῆϱ οϱῆῆῆτνοεικ τε

[He who has been] moulded [is beautiful, but] you would find his children being noble creations. If he were not moulded, but begotten, you would find that his seed was noble. But now he was moulded and he begot. What nobility is this? First, adultery happened, and afterwards, murder.¹⁹³ And he was begotten in adultery, for he was the son of the serpent. Therefore he became a murderer like his father too, and he killed his brother. Every communion that has taken place between those who do not resemble each other constitutes adultery. (*Gos. Phil.* 60.34–61.12)

In this paragraph it is clear that a beautiful creation is still just a creation, while one born beautiful would be of noble “seed” (σπερμα), i.e., of noble descent. While the latter is clearly the best, there does not seem to be anything inherently wrong in being a beautiful and noble creation. What is clearly wrong, however, which the tractate describes as “adultery” (ῆῆῆτνοεικ), is a creature that begets. In this case such mixed communion, a communion between those who do not resemble each other, led to the creation of Cain, who killed his brother Abel. *Gos. Phil.* holds this to be due to the fact that a moulded creature, in this case the serpent,¹⁹⁴ had

¹⁹² Layton emends η]εκναρε <δη> α- (Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 160; and cf. Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 336). I have chosen to follow the manuscript reading, η]εκναρε α- (“you would find”). Schenke also sticks to the manuscript reading and translates “w]ürdest du finden” (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 33).

¹⁹³ Cf. John 8:41–44.

¹⁹⁴ I have chosen to interpret the passage as a continuous whole. Schenke originally divided this passage into his sayings number 41 and 42 (Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 10–11; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960],” 45; Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 193), but later divided it even further into 41, 42a, and 42b (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 33; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [NHC II,3],” 197). Schenke regards the one who is described as being “moulded” in 60.34 as Adam. Although this interpretation can be supported by seeing this terminology as an allusion to Gen 2:7, it is problematic if the passage is to be read together as a whole. The father of Cain is clearly the serpent, and it seems to be the serpent’s mating with Eve that is described as adultery (cf. Isenberg, “Introduction,” 135). This means that the one who was moulded and begot should here be the serpent, not Adam. The

communion with one that was not like him, namely Eve, and through this adulterous relationship begot an offspring that was decidedly less than perfect.¹⁹⁵ Despite the serpent being a beautiful creation, then, his adulterous relationship with Eve led to death. That not only Cain, but also the serpent is called a murderer is probably due to the fact that it was his bad advice that led to Adam and Eve's eating from the Tree of Knowledge, which became the beginning of mortality, and hence death.¹⁹⁶

3.1.4.4.2. Fathers and Sons

As we have seen, the father-son imagery in *Gos. Phil.* is closely connected to Christ, and we will now take a closer look at some aspects of what Christ and the individual Christian have in common, and how they are related. In a passage that, significantly, deals directly with the rituals of baptism and chrismation we learn that,

πΧΡΕΙΣΜΑ ΟΟ ΝΧΘΕΙΟΙΟ ΕΠΒΑΠΤΙΟΙΟ ΕΒΟΛ ΓΑΡ ΖΜΠΧΡΙΟΙΟ ΑΥΜΟΥΤΕ ΕΡΟΝ
 ΧΕΧΡΙΟΙΟΝΟΟ ΕΤΒΕΠΒΑΠΤΙΟΙΟ ΑΝ ΑΥΩ ΝΤΑΥΜΟΥΤΕ ΕΠΕΧΟ ΕΤΒΕΠΧΡΙΟΙΟ
 ΑΠΕΙΩΤ ΓΑΡ ΤΩΟΟ ΝΠΩΗΡΕ ΑΠΩΗΡΕ ΔΕ ΤΩΟΟ ΝΑΠΟΟΤΟΟΟ ΑΝΑΠΟΟΤΟΟΟ ΔΕ
 ΤΑΟΟΝ

The chrism is superior to baptism, for from the chrism we were called Christian, not because of baptism, and it was because of the chrism that Christ was named (such). For the Father anointed the Son, and the Son anointed the apostles, and the apostles anointed us.

(*Gos. Phil.* 74.12–18)

identification of the moulded creature with Adam is also made by Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 336; Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 104; Buckley and Good, “Sacramental Language,” 8. Grant interprets the serpent as Ialdabaoth (Robert M. Grant, “The Mystery of Marriage in the Gospel of Philip,” *VC* 15 [1961]: 135; cf. also Borchert, “Literary Arrangement,” 175–176). Trautmann holds that it is Adam who is the father of Cain and argues that the union between Adam and Eve is described as adultery because Adam in her opinion is equated with the serpent (see Trautmann, “La parenté,” 271). Pagels has argued that Eve's adultery with the serpent should here be regarded as the union between ψυχή, represented by Eve, and ύλη, represented by the serpent (Pagels, “Adam and Eve, Christ and the Church,” 163; Elaine H. Pagels, “Pursuing the Spiritual Eve: Imagery and Hermeneutics in the *Hypostasis of the Archons* and the *Gospel of Philip*,” in *Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism* [ed. Karen L. King; SAC; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988], 199–200).

¹⁹⁵ The notion that Cain was the son of Eve and the Serpent is also found in other sources, e.g., the *Protevangelium of James*, *Targum Pseudo-Jonathan*, and *Pirke de Rabbi Eliezer* (cf. Kugel, *Traditions of the Bible*, 147; Gary A. Anderson, *The Genesis of Perfection: Adam and Eve in Jewish and Christian Imagination* [Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001], 90–92).

¹⁹⁶ See Gen 3:4–5.

There are several interesting features in this passage. First, the name Christ and the name Christian are here both derived etymologically from the chrism. This connection serves several purposes. Not only does it connect the abovementioned names to the ritual act of chrismation, it also strengthens the identification between Christ and the individual Christian, and it makes the point that chrismation is of greater importance than baptism.¹⁹⁷ The special importance of the chrism is highlighted in several places throughout the tractate, and we shall later return to a more detailed analysis of what this and other passages have to say concerning the function of the anointing in relation to baptism and Eucharist.

Equally significant in this passage as the concern with the relative importance of the chrism, however, is the emphasis upon the unbroken succession from God the father, via Christ and the apostles, to the authorial “us,” and the role of the chrism in this process.¹⁹⁸ It is also highly significant that God and Christ are here referred to as Father and Son, thereby creating the inference that the relationship between the other pairs in the sequence are analogous to a father-son relationship. This is especially the case in light of certain other passages in *Gos. Phil.* which we will return to below. We will also see how this important feature functions rhetorically elsewhere in *Gos. Phil.*, but first let us take a look at the analogies that are implied here (see fig. 23).

We are prompted by the very juxtaposition of these relationships to consider each pair in terms of the others and to consider what they might all have in common. Each of the input spaces consists of a relationship between an anointer and an anointed, and there are extensive mappings of counterpart-relations between them. There are vital outer-space role-relations between Father, God, Christ, and Apostles, and similarly between Son, Christ, Apostles, and “Us.”¹⁹⁹ Moreover, there is a vital analogy-relation between the anointer-anointed relationships in each of the four inputs. This relation between an anointer and an anointed is common to all input spaces, and is consequently projected to the generic

¹⁹⁷ It does not seem to constitute an argument against baptism per se. The importance of baptism in its own right seems to be confirmed elsewhere in the tractate (see *Gos. Phil.* 67.27–30; 69.22–23; 77.7–12). Nor does it seem to be directed against what is usually regarded as “normal,” “mainstream,” or “orthodox” Christian practice. It seems merely to be an argument for the higher importance of chrismation relative to baptism. See below for a discussion of the polemical aspects of *Gos. Phil.*

¹⁹⁸ Cf. M.L. Turner, *Gospel According to Philip*, 154.

¹⁹⁹ For a discussion the concept of “vital relations” between input spaces, see chapter 2.

space. Moreover, two pairs of these input spaces also have their own local generic spaces. The Father-Son and God-Christ inputs are linked by vital outer-space role-relations and share the Father-Son input's generic properties, in this context most notably that of a begetter-begotten relationship. The other pair of inputs, the analogically linked Christ-Apostles and Apostles-"Us" inputs, are both initiator-initiate relationships, and this relationship is thus duly projected to their shared local generic space (see fig. 24).

The two pairs of inputs may thus be blended individually, but what is of special interest here is the greater blend caused by the four together, including their two local generic spaces. Significantly, these generic spaces, the initiator-initiated and the begetter-begotten spaces, are themselves linked by analogy,²⁰⁰ and themselves become input spaces in their own local integration network. This is a highly important double-scope blend, and from their position as higher-level inputs within the overall integration network, these generic-inputs project important structure to the main blend. The most notable entailment of this local integration network is the inference that initiation can be regarded as a begetting and vice versa. We may isolate and analyse this conceptual integration network as shown in fig. 25.

We may also regard as properties of this common generic space the relationships between a predecessor and a successor, and that of a giver and a receiver, as well as a hierarchical power relationship. In the overall blended space which receives elements and structure from all six input spaces—the four original ones plus the two local generic spaces—God's begetting of Christ may consequently be regarded as an initiation, the apostles' initiation of "us" by means of an anointing may be regarded as a begetting, and the relationship between the initiator and the initiated may be seen as a father-son relationship, to mention just a few of the many possible entailments of this mega-blend. With its three levels of generic spaces, fig. 26 shows the interaction between the two networks, and illustrates how the two generic spaces on the lowest level also function as input spaces. Significantly, all who are on the "father"-level in these input spaces may be regarded as begetters, and what may be seen as characteristic of all who are on the level of "sons" is that they are all begotten. We may also note that in this blend too, the relationships projected from

²⁰⁰ This link is also made explicit by certain passages in *Gos. Phil.* which will be discussed below.

the input spaces are all compressed to the same human scale.²⁰¹ Moreover, each of the mental spaces in this network will prime knowledge of related intertexts and ICMs for easier subsequent activation, all of which may provide additional structure to feed the blend under consideration here. For example, the fact that Christ appears in this network as both father and son primes the passages in John where Jesus refers to himself and the Father as being one and within one another.²⁰² We may therefore indeed consider the conceptual integration network shown in the previous figure as merely a small part of a potentially much larger network of mental spaces, but we will focus on this model for the time being.

As we have seen, this is an integration network that creates counterpart relations between a set of linked input spaces containing initiator-initiated and begetter-begotten relations and blends them. On the level of begetter/initiator we have Father, God, Christ, and Apostles, while on the begotten/initiator side we have Son, Christ, Apostles, and Us. Of major significance here is the fact that Christ appears both as begotten and as a begetter in this network, that is, as a counterpart of both Father/begetter/initiator and Son/begotten/initiated. A major inference of this blend, which lies close to the surface of the passage quoted above, is the instrumentality of the chrismation in the blended processes of begetting and initiation. Throughout *Gos. Phil.*, baptism and chrismation is closely connected to begetting and birth, as for instance when we are told that “the son of the bridal chamber” (ΠΩΝΡΕ ΉΠΝΥΜΦΩΝ)—an epithet that seems to point simultaneously to Christ and the Christian initiate—comes into being through “water and fire and light” (ΟΥΜΟΥ ΜΝΟΥΚΩΞΤ ΜΝΝΟΥΘΕΙΝ), the latter two being subsequently identified with the chrism.²⁰³

Now, with all this in mind we may go back to the overarching THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST blend we started out with. Since Christ appears as both father and son, the Christ ICM thereby comes to contain the roles and aspects of both son and father. Both of these elements, fatherhood and sonship, become part of the CHRIST ICM and may be projected to the blend, creating the inference that the Christian as Christ may be

²⁰¹ For the concept of compression to human scale, see, e.g., Fauconnier and Turner, “Compression and Global Insight”; Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 322–324, and the discussion in chapter 2 of the present study.

²⁰² See John 10:30, 38; 14:7, 9–11, 20; 17:21, 23.

²⁰³ *Gos. Phil.* 67.3–6. See below for the further connections that are made elsewhere in the tractate between the chrism and the resurrection, baptism, the cross, and the Tree of Life (*Gos. Phil.* 73.8–19). Cf. Williams, “Realized Eschatology,” 12–13, 16.

both father and son. We may consequently infer from this blend that the Christian initiate also has these two potential roles in and of his state of being a Christ, and that through the anointing with chrism the Christian may be both an initiate and an initiator, father and son, and begetter and begotten. It is clear that we can make inferences in several directions in this conceptual integration network. The initiator may be regarded as a father, as (a) Christ, and as an apostle. Similarly Christ may be regarded as an initiator and as a father, but he is also a son and an initiate, and the initiate is a Christ. Significantly, the authorial “Us” may refer simultaneously not only to the Christians, including the implied author of *Gos. Phil.*, as initiates, but also to the implied author and his colleagues as initiators, and hence fathers. We will return below to the possible implications of this conceptual integration network with regard to the possible community organisation that may be presupposed by the tractate and the wider implications with regard to the tractate’s *Sitz im Leben*. However, it may be noted already at this point that *Gos. Phil.* here seems to presuppose a system of apostolic succession²⁰⁴ presented as a succession of father-son relationships that are ultimately analogical to the relationship between God the Father, and Christ the Son.²⁰⁵

3.1.4.4.3. Baptism and Chrismation

Ritually, begetting and birth are in *Gos. Phil.* closely connected to chrismation and baptism. We have seen that “the son of the bridal chamber” (ΠΩΗΡΕ ΜΠΗΝΥΜΦΩΝ) comes into being through “water and fire and light” (ΟΥΜΟΥ ΜΝΟΥΚΩΤ ΜΝΟΥΟΕΙΝ), and that *Gos. Phil.* identifies fire with the chrism and the light with the fire.²⁰⁶ What is needed to generate a “son of the bridal chamber,” then, is baptism (water) and anointing with chrism (fire and light).

Fatherhood is also directly connected to *Gos. Phil.*’s concept of the “name of the father” (ΠΑΝ ΜΠΕΙΩΤ), for the tractate states that for the son to become father he needs to put on the father’s name:

ΟΥΡΑΝ ΟΥΩΤ ΜΑΥΤΕΟΥΑΥ ΖΜΚΟΣΜΟΣ ΠΑΝ ΝΤΑΠΕΙΩΤ ΤΑΑΥ ΜΠΩΗΡΕ
 ΦΧΟΣΕ ΕΟΥΟΝ ΝΙΜ ΕΤΕΠΑΕΙ ΠΕ ΠΑΝ ΜΠΕΙΩΤ ΝΕΡΕΠΩΗΡΕ ΓΑΡ ΜΑΩΩΠΕ ΑΝ
 ΕΙΩΤ ΣΑΒΗΛ ΧΕΑΥΤ ΖΙΩΩΥ ΜΠΡΑΝ ΜΠΕΙΩΤ ΠΕΕΙΡΑΝ ΝΕΤΕΥΝΤΑΥΦ ΣΕΡΝΟΕΙ ΜΕΝ
 ΜΝΟΥ ΣΕΩΑΧΕ ΔΕ ΕΡΟΥ ΑΝ ΝΕΤΕΜΝΤΑΥΦ ΔΕ ΣΕΡΝΟΕΙ ΜΝΟΥ ΑΝ

²⁰⁴ Cf. Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 13, 158.

²⁰⁵ Cf. *1 Clem.*, 42.2: ὁ Χριστός οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ οἱ ἀπόστολοι ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ (Greek text from Bart D. Ehrman, *The Apostolic Fathers*, 1:108).

²⁰⁶ See *Gos. Phil.* 67.3–6.

A single name is not uttered in the world, the name which the Father gave to the Son. It is exalted above every (other name), that is, the name of the Father. For the Son would not have become father unless he had put on the name of the Father. Those who have this name know it, but they do not speak it, but those who do not have it do not know it.²⁰⁷

(*Gos. Phil.* 54.5–13)

This special name seems at least partly to be an allusion to the Divine Name, the Tetragrammaton (YHWH).²⁰⁸ This description of the name may be understood in light of Phil 2:5–11, Rev 19:12–13, and several passages in John.²⁰⁹ It is stated in Phil 2:9 that Christ was given by God “the name that is above every name” (τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πάντων ὀνομάτων / πάντων ἐπιχρῆσαν ἡμῖν), and in the following verse this name is identified as the name possessed by Jesus.²¹⁰ Philippians 2:11 then goes on to imply that Jesus Christ is “Lord” (κύριος / πᾶσι) exactly because he possesses this name. According to Charles Gieschen, this name is the Divine Name.²¹¹ Revelation 19:12 describes Christ wearing a name that only he himself knows, and the following verse (19:13), which describes him as being dressed in a robe dipped in blood, identifies this name as the Logos of God.

In *Gos. Phil.* this name is associated with the chrismation, since we are told that “it was because of the chrism that Christ was named (such)” (ἡτάχυμογτε ἐπεχῶς ἐτβεπχρίσμα).²¹² We are also told that “the name of the father and the son and the Holy Spirit,” are received,

ἐπιχρίσμα ἡμῶν . [...] ἡτάχυμανὶς ἡμῶν [ο]ς τὰ [ε]! νενᾶποστολος μογτε ἐρος χε[το]γῆμαν μῆτερωορ παει γαρ ογκετι ογ[χρη]ετ[ι]ανος πε ἀλλα ογχεῖ πε

in the chrism of the [...] of the power of the cross. The apostles called this “[the] right and the left,”²¹³ for this one is no longer a [Christian], but a Christ.
(*Gos. Phil.* 67.23–27)

Chrismation, we are told, is what makes the Christian initiate into a Christ.²¹⁴ So, becoming Christ, which involves the acquisition of sonship

²⁰⁷ Cf. John 14:17; 10:3; 17:6–8; Phil 2:5–11; Rev 19:12–13; *Gos. Truth* 38.7–40.29.

²⁰⁸ See Charles A. Gieschen, “The Divine Name in Ante-Nicene Christology,” *VC* 57:2 (2003): 115–158.

²⁰⁹ See John 14:17; 10:3; 17:6–8. Cf. also Eph 1:21.

²¹⁰ See Gieschen, “The Divine Name,” 128–129.

²¹¹ See Gieschen, “The Divine Name,” 129.

²¹² *Gos. Phil.* 74.15–16.

²¹³ Cf. 2 Cor 6:7.

²¹⁴ Cf. e.g., Franzmann, *Jesus*, 63, 175.

and gaining the “name of the father,” requires chrismation. The “name of the father” mentioned here is thus closely connected to the name “Christ,” which, as we saw earlier, connects father and son through chrismation.²¹⁵ The son becomes Christ, like his father, and the means by which this is effected is the anointing with chrism. Chrismation, then, is the fundamental ritual act that makes the Christian initiate into a Christ. But does this anointing take place prior to baptism or after it? Or should it be considered a ritual separate from baptism at all? There are strong indications in *Gos. Phil.* that its chrismation is of the baptismal variety:

ερωδογα βωκ επεσнт епμοоу н̄чеі ерраі емπερχιλααγ н̄qxоос δεανок
 ουχρηστianос н̄таqχι н̄пран етмнсе еρωαχι δε м̄пп̄на еτογαав ουη̄таq
 н̄маγ н̄таδpεα н̄пран пентаρχι н̄ογδpεα μαγχιτ̄с н̄тоотq пентаρχι
 δε еxωq етмнсе ωαγωαтq таеі те ое етωp[о]п н̄ан еρωαογα ωπε
 ρ̄н̄ογмγстн̄pиo[н]

If one goes down to the water and comes up without having received anything and says, “I am a Christian,” he has borrowed the name at interest. But if he receives the Holy Spirit he has the gift of the name. He who has received a gift does not have it taken away from him, but he who has borrowed at interest has it extorted from him. Thus it is for us if one comes into being in a mystery.²¹⁶ (*Gos. Phil.* 64.22–31)

From this passage it is clear that the reception of the name is associated in a temporal sense with baptismal immersion and functionally with the reception of the Spirit. Since we have seen that both the reception of the name and the reception of the Holy Spirit is connected with chrismation, it seems evident that in order to receive the name “as a gift” in baptism one needs to receive it together with the Holy Spirit by means of a chrismation.²¹⁷ This chrismation thus seems to take place as a part of the baptismal ritual itself.

Revelation 19:12 speaks of the name worn by Christ as being known only by Christ himself, but as Charles Gieschen points out, this is

hyperbolic “insider” language, since Revelation states the saints are sealed with the name of Christ and bear it on their foreheads. As in John 17 where

²¹⁵ For patristic attestations of the connection between the chrismation and the name “Christ,” see, e.g., Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, 139–141.

²¹⁶ Cf. 1 Cor 2:7.

²¹⁷ The connection between the name of Christ and the bestowal of the Holy Spirit is also made in John 14:26. Charles Gieschen notes that the imagery of the reception of the name in the New Testament “is grounded in the writing, speaking, and imparting of the Divine Name during the baptismal rite” (Gieschen, “The Divine Name,” 133). Buckley sees a polemic against “Orthodox, ineffectual baptism,” which in her view “is likened to a transaction in which the recipient unwittingly remains in debt” (Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4189).

Jesus states that he revealed his (hidden) name to his disciples . . . , the enlightened reader of Revelation is expected to know this secret name that only Christ knows.²¹⁸

This point is made explicit in *Gos. Phil.*, which states that only *those* who wear the name know it. This also seems to connect the wearing of the name closely to the name Christ in *Gos. Phil.* It is a name that is worn by all Christians, and by Christians only.²¹⁹

The close connection between baptism and chrismation is, moreover, emphasised in a couple of passages with clear allusions to John 3:3–9 which stress the importance of being reborn through both water and spirit, which in the context of *Gos. Phil.* is to be understood as baptism and chrismation:

ΩΥΕ ΑΡΒΑΠΤΙΖΕ ΖΗΠCΝΑΥ ΖΗΠΟΥΘΕΙΝ ΗΠΠΜΟΥ ΠΟΥΘΕΙΝ ΔΕ ΠΕ ΠΧΡΙCΜΑ

it is necessary to baptise in both: in the light and the water, and the light is the chrim. (Gos. Phil. 69.12–14)

In accordance with John 3:5, *Gos. Phil.* stresses the necessity of both baptism in water and baptism in the Holy Spirit as bestowed by means of the chrim, and interprets the process in terms of begetting and rebirth:

ΕΒΟΛ ΖΙΤΗΠΠΗΔ ΕΤΟΥΔΑΒ CΕΧΠΟ ΜΕΝ ΗΜΟΝ ΗΚΕCΟΠ CΕΧΠΟ ΔΕ ΗΜΟΝ ΖΙΤΗΠΕΧΘ ΖΗΠCΝΑΥ CΕΤΩΡC ΗΜΟΝ ΖΙΤΗΠΠΗΔ ΗΤΑΡΟΥCΠΟΝ ΑΥΘΟΤΡΗ

We are born again by means of Holy Spirit,²²⁰ but we are begotten by Christ in the two.²²¹ We are anointed by the Spirit. When we were begotten we were joined. (Gos. Phil. 69.4–8)

This links directly back to Jesus' baptism in the river Jordan, in which all these aspects are closely connected in *Gos. Phil.*'s interpretation. The connections between the two can be illustrated as shown in fig. 27.

Both Christ and the Christians are baptised in water and receive the Holy Spirit by means of an anointing. This anointing is connected to a joining and a begetting. In the case of Christ, he received the Holy Spirit which united with his Logos, and his "body" came into being. The baptism and chrismation of the Christians thus parallel those of Christ himself by involving the reception of the Holy Spirit, as well as a joining

²¹⁸ Gieschen, "The Divine Name," 131–132 n. 62.

²¹⁹ Charles Gieschen sees in *Gos. Phil.*'s references to putting on the name of the father reflections of "older Jewish-Christian adoptionist Christology" (Gieschen, "The Divine Name," 155).

²²⁰ Cf. Titus 3:5.

²²¹ Cf. John 3:5.

and a begetting. But in the latter case, what is it that the Holy Spirit joins with, and what kind of body is it that comes into being? It is apparent from this conceptual integration network that the crucial question here is the identification of which part of the individual Christian's constitution that corresponds to, and is thus mapped onto, Jesus' Logos. From the connections of this blend to the Adam-Christ blend discussed above, and from the logic of the present baptismal blend, the most logical answer seems to be that the part that corresponds to the Logos is actually the individual Christian's soul, or perhaps a part of it. By extension, then, what takes place in the baptismal chrismation is the reception of the Holy Spirit, which joins with the individual initiate's soul, thus causing a begetting and a rebirth.²²² The metaphor of a "bridal chamber" is evidently quite apt with regard to the ritual interpretation outlined here.

3.1.4.4.4. The Kiss

We have seen how *Gos. Phil.* plays with the polysemic possibilities of the word $\chi\pi\omicron$ to denote begetting, birth and acquisition, and how the unproductive child could not make sons, but only acquire brothers. The use of the term $\chi\pi\omicron$ in the latter statement may, however, also function as an intratextual connection to another passage in *Gos. Phil.*, where begetting is associated with kissing. These intratextually linked passages may also function simultaneously as composite allusions to Scripture and ritual, by way of an interesting twist on the imagery connected with the term $\chi\pi\omicron$:

ἸΠΤΕΛΙΟC ΓΑΡ ΖΙΤῆΟΥΠΕΙ ΕΥῶ ΔΥῶ ΕΥΧΠΟ ΔΙΑ ΤΟΥΤΟ ΔΝΟΝ ΖΩΩΝ ΤῆΤῆΠΙ
ΕΡῆΝῆΝΕΡΗΥ ΕΝΧΙ ἸΠῶ ΕΒΟΛ ΖῆΤΧΑΡΙC ΕΤΖῆΝῆΝΕΡΗΥ

for it is by means of a kiss that the perfect conceive and beget. Therefore
we too kiss one another, conceiving from the grace that is in one another.
(*Gos. Phil.* 59.2–6)

It is especially interesting to note that *Gos. Phil.* here explicitly connects conception and birth with a kiss and with grace ($\chi\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\varsigma$). A ritual kiss was common in Christianity from a very early stage,²²³ and is also referred

²²² For the connection between chrismation and rebirth, cf. Eric Segelberg, "The Coptic-Gnostic Gospel According to Philip and Its Sacramental System," *Numen* 7:2 (1960): 194.

²²³ According to the editors of the new English edition of the *Apostolic Tradition*, "the ritual kiss appears to be a distinctively Christian practice that emerged in the New Testament Period" (Paul F. Bradshaw, et al., *The Apostolic Tradition: A Commentary* [ed. Harold W. Attridge; Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2002], 42), and according

to in several New Testament texts.²²⁴ In all these cases, as also in *Gos. Phil.*, the kiss is closely connected to the reception of grace (χάρις). The most notable scriptural intertext to this passage in *Gos. Phil.*, however, is 2 Cor 13:12–13, where Paul advises his “brothers” (ἀδελφοί) that they should “greet one another with a holy kiss.” He follows this with the statement that, “The grace (χάρις) of the Lord Jesus Christ and the love (ἀγάπη) of God and the communion (κοινωνία) of the Holy Spirit be with you all.” Moreover, *Gos. Phil.* also refers to the repeated begetting of sons or children elsewhere, referring to “the sons / children of the perfect man” (ἄωρη ἰππελειος ῥωμε) as “these who do not die, but are always begotten” (ἄει ἐμαγμογ ἀλλα σεχπο ἴμοογ ογοειω νιμ).²²⁵

3.1.4.4.5. Rest

The concept of “rest” (ἀνάπαυσις / ἡσυχία) is used in at least three different senses in *Gos. Phil.*²²⁶ It is used to refer to the heavenly rest after this worldly life, as the goal of salvation which is also related to the idea of a “restoration” (ἀποκατάστασις), and it is used to denote the giving of relief or being at ease in this world. In addition, it is used in a sense that is related to the present theme of marriage, unification, and procreation, with sacramental connotations.²²⁷ Most importantly, we find the term used in the latter sense in yet another passage that deals with the differences between creating and begetting:

ἄει ἐμαγμογ ἴμοογ ἄει ἀναπαυσις ἡσυχία ἄει ῥωμε ὡγαῶπε ἐβολ
 ῥῆτεφδγναμικ ἐτβεπαει σεμογτε εροογ δεῖδγναμικ νεφρβηγε νε νεφωρη
 ἴταγῶπε ἐβολ ῥῆογαναπαγσις ἐτβεπαει τεφδγναμικ ῥπολιτεγεςεε ῥραῖ

to Robert Taft, “the kiss of peace is one of the most primitive rites of the Christian liturgy. Originally it seems to have been a common greeting, probably exchanged at every Christian synaxis” (Robert F. Taft, *The Great Entrance: A History of the Transfer of Gifts and Other Pre-Anaphoral Rites* [vol. 2 of *A History of the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom*; 2nd ed.; OrChrAn 200; Roma: Pontificium Institutum Studiorum Orientalium, 1978], 375).

²²⁴ 1 Thess 5:26; 1 Cor 16:20; 2 Cor 13:12; Rom 16:16; 1 Pet 5:14.

²²⁵ *Gos. Phil.* 58.20–22.

²²⁶ Judith Hoch Wray, who has studied extensively the use of “rest” as a metaphor in *Gos. Truth* and Hebrews, strangely claims that ἀνάπαυσις / ἡσυχία occurs more than five times in only four Nag Hammadi tractates, namely *Tri. Trac.*, *Paraph. Shem*, *Gos. Eg.*, and *Gos. Truth* (see Judith Hoch Wray, *Rest as a Theological Metaphor in the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Gospel of Truth: Early Christian Homiletics of Rest* [SBLDS 166; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998], 35), thus ignoring the fact that these words actually occur a total of 14 times in *Gos. Phil.* Wray neither discusses nor mentions any of the occurrences of ἀνάπαυσις / ἡσυχία in *Gos. Phil.*

²²⁷ Cf. Buckley and Good, “Sacramental Language,” 17.

ῥῆνεφῶβηγε εἰς ἀναπαύσις δε οὐονῆ εβολ ῥῥαῖ ῥῆῆῶηρε ἄγω κῆαρε εἰαει
 εἰς ἄωτε ῥαῥῥαῖ εἰσῆωῆ ἄγω παει πε ῥῥωμε ῆῥικονικος εἰειρε ῆνεφῶβηγε
 εβολ ῥῆτεφῶσ εβολ δε ῥῆ ἀναπαύσις εἰς ἄπο ῆνεφῶηρε

As is the truth with the works of man, they result from his power. Therefore they are called the acts of power. They are his works. It is from rest (*ἀνάπαυσις*) that his children come into being. Therefore his power resides in his works, but it is in the children that the rest (*ἀνάπαυσις*) is manifested. And you will find that this extends to the image. And this one is the man pertaining to the image. It is from his power that he does his works, but it is from rest (*ἀνάπαυσις*) that he begets his children. (*Gos. Phil.* 72.4–17)

There has been considerable variation in the way scholars have understood this passage. One of the main difficulties lies in the problem of how to render the Coptic text εἰς ἀναπαύσις δε οὐονῆ εβολ ῥῥαῖ ῥῆῆῶηρε ἄγω κῆαρε εἰαει εἰς ἄωτε ῥαῥῥαῖ εἰσῆωῆ ἄγω παει πε ῥῥωμε ῆῥικονικος εἰειρε ῆνεφῶβηγε εβολ ῥῆτεφῶσ εβολ δε ῥῆ ἀναπαύσις εἰς ἄπο ῆνεφῶηρε, especially whether one should take *νεφῶβηγε νε* as belonging together with the succeeding *νεφῶηρε*, or as an independent unit referring primarily back to the preceding *ῆῥικονικος*.²²⁸ I have here chosen the latter solution on the grounds that this reading best fits the rhetoric of the rest of the passage, where power is consistently associated with works, and children with rest.²²⁹ As usual, the tractate argues several things at the same time. It has been established elsewhere in the text that begetting and creating are two rather different processes, and the present passage points to yet another difference between the two. While creation involves power, and that power is manifested in the created, the begetting of children requires “a rest” (*οὐονῆ*), and “rest” is likewise manifested in those who have been begotten. We have seen elsewhere that “he who begets also creates,” and we learn here that “the man pertaining to the image” creates from

²²⁸ For the former solution, see, e.g., Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 17; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960],” 54; Catanzaro, “The Gospel According to Philip,” 55; Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 48; Till, *Das Evangelium nach Philippus*, 45; Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 380; Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 344; Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 186; Layton, *Coptic Gnostic Chrestomathy*, 178. For the latter solution, see, e.g., Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 76; Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 199; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 55; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus (NHC II,3),” 1:204.

²²⁹ If one chooses to read *νεφῶβηγε νε φῶηρε* as a unit and translates “his works are his children,” this contrast between works and power on the one hand, and children and rest on the other, is broken. As Schenke comments regarding the solution also chosen in the present study, of treating *νεφῶβηγε νε* as a nominal sentence in itself, “Der kleine kommentierende Nominalsatz erscheint dabei zwar als ein bisschen redundant. Aber besser Redundanz als Widersinn!” (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 428). Cf. also Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 76 n. 1; Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 150–151; and the discussion concerning creating and begetting in the present study.

power and begets from rest. But how are we to understand the term “rest,” and what is the identity of “the man pertaining to the image”? The reference to the begetting of children from “rest” rather than “power” plays on the creating-begetting dichotomy, but also seems to allude to the important metaphor of the “bedroom” or “bridal chamber.”

We saw above that at the end of the discussion of the baptism of Jesus in the Jordan, *Gos. Phil.* states that “it is necessary for each one of the disciples to walk into his rest” (ὡς εἰς τρεποῦα ποῦα νῆμαθητῆς μοῦωε εἰσοῦν εἰς τεφαναπαῦσις).²³⁰ The designation “his rest” (τεφαναπαῦσις) seems to refer back to Jesus,²³¹ but what does it mean that it is appropriate for the disciples to enter Jesus’ rest? The reference to entering “his rest” recalls Heb 3:11, 18 and 4:1–11,²³² as well as Ps 94:11 LXX which partly underlies the references in Hebrews, but all the references to entering God’s “rest” in Hebrews²³³ are rendered using the Greek word *κατάπαυσις* in the Greek New Testament and the Coptic equivalent *ἡτον* in the Sahidic version, and not *ἀνάπαυσις* as in *Gos. Phil.*²³⁴ Ps 22 LXX, however, does use the word *ἀνάπαυσις*, and with its reference to “the water of rest” (ὕδατος ἀναπαύσεως) and to an anointing of the head with oil, as well as to a table, a cup, and wine,²³⁵ it constitutes a highly relevant intertext considering the baptismal context of the *Gos. Phil.* passage. Read in the light of Ps 22 LXX, then, what *Gos. Phil.* refers to with its emphatic statement that the disciples should enter “his rest” may simply be understood as a statement of the necessity for the disciples to undergo baptism, a baptism modelled on the baptism of Christ himself, which would thus be entirely in line with *Gos. Phil.*’s baptismal theology, with its parallelism of

²³⁰ *Gos. Phil.* 71.14–15.

²³¹ Schenke, however, who treats this sentence as a separate saying (82a), chooses to read τεφαναπαῦσις, “his rest,” as referring to ποῦα ποῦα, “each one,” with the following interpretation: “Jeder einzelne Jünger muß in den jeweils nur für ihn ‘bereiteten’ Ruheort eingehen. Man müßte also bei ‘Einblendung’ des größeren Zusammenhangs dann schon verstehen, daß jeder Jünger/Pneumatiker einen speziell für ihn freigehaltenen Ruheort innerhalb des großen, endzeitlichen, himmlischen Brautgemachs hat” (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 421). Schenke’s emphasis.

²³² On Heb 4:1–11, see, e.g., Harold W. Attridge, “Let Us Strive to Enter That Rest’: The Logic of Hebrews 4:1–11,” *HTR* 73:1/2 (1980): 279–288; Anthony C. Thiselton, “Hebrews,” in *Eerdmans Commentary on the Bible* (ed. James D.G. Dunn and John W. Rogerson; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2003), 1460.

²³³ See Heb 3:11, 18; 4:1, 3, 5, 10, 11.

²³⁴ The word used in Ps 94:11 LXX is also *κατάπαυσις*.

²³⁵ In the patristic sources, from Origen and onwards, this Psalm is often interpreted in a baptismal light (see, e.g., Sebastian P. Brock, *The Holy Spirit in the Syrian Baptismal Tradition* [2d ed.; Syrian Churches Series 9; Pune: Anita, 1998], 123).

Christ, the apostles, and “us.” If we also understand the reference to “rest” in *Gos. Phil.* 72.4–17 to refer to “the water of rest,” and thus to baptism, including chrismation, then “the man pertaining to the image” begets his sons / children in the ritual of baptism, including the chrismation. Understood in this way, the passage simply refers to the begetting of new Christian initiates through baptism and chrismation. The “man pertaining to the image” may thus be taken as a simultaneous reference to Christ and the individual Christian, entirely in line with the overarching blend THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST, and the fact that Christ is both father and son, thus makes both the initiate and the initiator a Christ. The “rest” that is to be entered, then, may be understood as a reference to both the “rest” achieved by means of baptism as well as to baptism itself. Although there is no direct parallel in Psalm 22 LXX to *Gos. Phil.*’s reference to enter “his rest,” a connection between the *Gos. Phil.* passage and both Psalm 22 LXX and Hebrews 4 could easily have suggested itself in Coptic, where both ἀνάπαυσις and κατάπαυσις are translated by ἡτομ.²³⁶ Such a connection, if made, would have the potential to bring into play the Joshua-Jesus comparison that seems to underlie the argument of Heb 4:1–11,²³⁷ that is, the contrast between the “Jesus” who could not give “rest” to his people and the “Jesus” who could.²³⁸ In this sense, the passage in *Gos. Phil.* may also be read in light of the contrast on display elsewhere in the tractate between the previous stage of history, and of being “Hebrews,” before the coming of Christ, and the present one where it is possible to enter by means of the Christian rites of initiation the “rest” that was previously unattainable.

3.1.4.5. *Procreation and Kinship: Summary*

In terms of conceptual metaphor theory we may identify the underlying higher-order conceptual metaphors CHRISTIAN INITIATION IS PROCREATION and THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY IS A FAMILY in *Gos. Phil.* These are conceptual metaphors that are extremely rich in their entailments, as the entire conceptual domains of procreation and kinship may be utilised and elaborated upon in the interpretation of Christian initiation

²³⁶ See Crum 194b.

²³⁷ This comparison is at least partly based on the fact that in Greek, “Joshua” and “Jesus” are both rendered as Ἰησοῦς.

²³⁸ See Thiselton, “Hebrews,” 1460. Cf. also George H. Guthrie, “Hebrews,” in *Commentary on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament* (G.K. Beale and D.A. Carson; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2007), 956.

and in conceptualising Christian community organisation.²³⁹ Conception, birth, fatherhood, motherhood, sonship, brotherhood, inheritance, lineage, succession, marriage, etc. All of these may give rise to numerous additional conceptual metaphors and metaphorical expressions, which they certainly do in *Gos. Phil.*

As we have seen, activation of the father-son ICM primes the reader's knowledge of a prototypical father-son relationship, with all that entails, e.g., in terms of the relationship of authority between the two and in terms of the father's role in procreation. Throughout *Gos. Phil.* different aspects are at various points brought to the fore and projected to the blend in order to structure the information projected from the target input of ritual initiation. It is worth noting that fatherhood and sonship are presented in strictly biological terms in *Gos. Phil.* At no point in this tractate are fatherhood and sonship understood in terms of adoption. This comes especially to the fore in the tractate's emphasis on the differences between creating and begetting, and in the way it contrasts Christian initiation with Jewish proselyte initiation.

3.1.5. *Death and Resurrection*

As is the case with its mystagogical use of the concepts of begetting and birth, *Gos. Phil.* also blends the death and resurrection of Christ with aspects of the sacramental life of the individual Christian in conformity with the overarching blend THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST.

3.1.5.1. *Life and Death*

In order to grasp *Gos. Phil.*'s understanding and use of the concept of the resurrection, it is essential to understand the multi-layered and shifting ways in which the concepts of life and death are employed in the tractate. *Gos. Phil.* makes a point of the general relationship between life and death. There can be no life without death, or vice versa, for

ΠΟΥΘΕΙΝ ΜΗΠΚΑΚΕ ΠΩΝΕ ΜΗΠΜΟΥ ΝΟΥΝΑΜ ΜΗΝΕΒΟΥΡ ΜΣΝΗΥ ΝΕ ΜΝΟΥΕΡΗΥ
ΜΗΣΟΜ ΝΣΕΠΩΡΧ ΔΝΟΥΕΡΗΥ

light and darkness, life and death, right and left, they are brothers of one another. It is impossible for them to be separated from each other.²⁴⁰

(*Gos. Phil.* 53.14–17)

²³⁹ I will return to the question of community organisation below.

²⁴⁰ Cf. 2 Cor 6:14.

Life is to death as light is to darkness and right is to left. What we have here is a conceptual integration network created from three pairs of opposites. It goes for each of these conceptual pairs that their constituents are impossible to separate from each other, since none of these concepts can exist meaningfully apart from the contrast supplied by the existence of the other. They are all relative, not absolute concepts.²⁴¹ *Gos. Phil.* subverts the polar opposition of these conceptual pairs, however, by metaphorically likening the relations with siblingship. By likening the life-death and light-darkness pairs with that between brothers, the equality between the opposites is highlighted and the connections between them are strengthened. In doing so, however, the tractate also contributes to destabilise the usual hierarchical, good-bad valuations of the relationships. The tractate pushes even further in this direction in drawing the conclusion that,

ΕΤΒΕΠΑΕΙ ΟΥΤΕ ΝΕΤΝΑΝΟΥ ΟΥΝΑΝΟΥΟΥ ΟΥΤΕ ΝΕΘΟΟΥ ΣΕΞΟΟΥ ΟΥΤΕ ΠΩΝΕ
ΟΥΩΝΕ ΠΕ ΟΥΤΕ ΠΜΟΥ ΟΥΜΟΥ ΠΕ

therefore, neither are the good good, nor are the bad bad, nor is life life,
nor is death death. (*Gos. Phil.* 53.17–20)

In a manner quite typical of *Gos. Phil.* this conclusion does not actually follow logically from the premises presented prior to it, for it does not actually follow automatically from the connectedness and equality of the constituents of the conceptual pairs in question, that life is not life, nor death death. In order to understand this reasoning, then, one has to take into account what the tractate goes on to state concerning the deceptive nature of names in the world:

ΝΡΑΝ ΕΤΟΥΤ ἤΜΟΟΥ ΔΗΚΟΣΜΙΚΟΣ ΟΥΝΤΕΥ ἤΜΑΧ ἤΟΥΝΟΣ ἤΠΛΑΝΗ ΣΕΠΩΩΣ
ΓΑΡ ἤΠΟΥΞΗΤ ΕΒΟΛ ΖἤΝΕΤΣΜΟΝΤ ΕΞΟΥΝ ΕΝΕΤΣΜΟΝΤ ΔΝ

The names that are given to the worldly contain a great error, for they turn
the mind aside from what is right to what is not right

(*Gos. Phil.* 53.23–27)

²⁴¹ This passage has been described as being “clearly deconstructionist,” and “an extraordinary anticipation of Derrida” (Schuyler Brown, “‘Begotten, not Created’: The Gnostic Use of Language in Jungian Perspective,” in *The Allure of Gnosticism: The Gnostic Experience in Jungian Psychology and Contemporary Culture* [ed. Robert A. Segal; Chicago: Open Court, 1995], 77). Gillian Beattie has called attention to similarities with structuralism and Ferdinand de Saussure (see Gillian Beattie, *Women and Marriage in Paul and His Early Interpreters* [JSNTSup 296; London: T&T Clark, 2005], 122–123). Cf. also Kurt Rudolph, “Response to ‘The Holy Spirit is a Double Name’: Holy Spirit, Mary, and Sophia in the *Gospel of Philip*” by Jorunn Jacobsen Buckley,” in *Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism* (ed. Karen L. King; SAC; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 231.

Therefore, continues *Gos. Phil.*, people do not “understand” (ῤνοεῖ) “what is right” (πετςμοντ), but rather “what is not right” (πετςμοντ αν),²⁴² when they hear terms such as “the life” (πωνε), “the light” (πουοειν), or “the resurrection” (ταναντασις).²⁴³ That is, however, “[un-]less] they have learned what is right” ([πλ]ην αυσεβο ανετςμοντ).²⁴⁴ This caveat is important, for this is one of the major themes of *Gos. Phil.*, to get across the correct understanding of certain key terms and concepts—or the correct contents of various ICMs of prime importance for the, according to *Gos. Phil.*, proper understanding of the Christian message, to put it in terms of cognitive theory. So, then, what is the correct understanding of these terms according to *Gos. Phil.*? The tractate is fond of turning common concepts on their heads and confounding readers’ expectations. In describing the relationship between, and meaning of, such concepts as life and death in terms such as we have seen here, *Gos. Phil.* furnishes us with an important interpretive key to the understanding of many puzzling statements throughout the text, however, for it has done nothing less than make us aware of the fact that whenever such important concepts are mentioned in the text, the tractate may in fact be referring to its opposite. At the same time we have been made aware of the close connection between these concepts, including, most significantly, life and death.

Let us now take a closer look at the tractate’s views on the primordial origin of death before we go on to investigate its interpretation of the death of Christ in particular, and then proceed with an analysis of its views concerning the resurrection.

3.1.5.2. *Paradise and the Origin of Death*

Our tractate traces the origin of death to two primordial events in the Garden of Eden, namely to the creation of Eve from Adam (Gen 2:21–24), interpreted as the separation of the former from the latter, and to the eating of the fruit from the Tree of Knowledge (Gen 3). We saw in the discussion above that the taking of Adam’s soul, based on Gen 2:21–23, is understood by *Gos. Phil.* as the taking of his life. In accordance with this understanding of the event, *Gos. Phil.* tells us that,

²⁴² The terms πετςμοντ and πετςμοντ αν should here be understood also in the sense of the firm, or fixed and that which is not, referring to the immutable realities and the changeable worldly “realities” respectively (cf. Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4173).

²⁴³ *Gos. Phil.* 53.27–34.

²⁴⁴ *Gos. Phil.* 53.34–35.

ἡ̅ζ̅οογ̅ η̅ε̅ρ̅ε̅ε̅γ̅ρ̅α [ρ̅]ἡ̅α[Δ̅]α̅μ²⁴⁵ ν̅ε̅η̅ἡ̅μ̅ογ̅ ρ̅οο̅π̅ ἡ̅τ̅α̅ρ̅ε̅σ̅π̅ω̅ρ̅χ̅ [ε̅ρ̅]ογ̅ α̅π̅μ̅ογ̅
 ρ̅ω̅π̅ε̅

The days when Eve was [in] Adam, there was no death. When she separated from him, death came into being. (*Gos. Phil.* 68.22–24)

Originally there was no death, *Gos. Phil.* informs us, for death only came into being with the separation of Eve from Adam. This of course refers to the account in Gen 2:21–23 of the creation of woman, also discussed in connection with *Exeg. Soul's* concept of the fall of the soul in the previous chapter.²⁴⁶ As in *Exeg. Soul*, the emphasis in *Gos. Phil.'s* interpretation of Gen 2:21–23 is on the separation of the female element from the male, rather than on the incident as a creative act, and in both tractates the episode is interpreted negatively, as a fall. *Gos. Phil.* also returns to this episode a couple of pages later:

ν̅ε̅μ̅π̅ε̅τ̅ε̅ρ̅ι̅μ̅ε̅ π̅ω̅ρ̅χ̅ ε̅φ̅ο̅ο̅γ̅τ̅ ν̅ε̅σ̅ν̅α̅μ̅ογ̅ α̅η̅ π̅ε̅ μ̅ἡ̅φ̅ο̅ο̅γ̅τ̅ π̅ε̅ρ̅π̅ω̅ρ̅χ̅
 ἡ̅τ̅α̅ρ̅ω̅π̅ε̅ ἡ̅α̅ρ̅χ̅η̅ ἡ̅π̅μ̅ογ̅

Had the female not separated from the male, she would not have died with the male. It was his separation that became the beginning of death.

(*Gos. Phil.* 70.9–12)

We saw above that, if the reconstruction of α̅γ̅τ̅ ν̅α̅ρ̅ ἡ̅μ̅ογ̅[ω̅ν̅ε̅ ε̅]π̅ε̅σ̅μ̅α̅ (“he was given [life in] its/her place”) at *Gos. Phil.* 70.25–26 is right, Adam was given a new “life” in return for the loss of his original one. Seen in connection with the tractate’s statements concerning the deceptiveness of names and concepts and its reversal of the death-life dichotomy, the life Adam was given in return must in this context actually be regarded as death. Adam was given a life of the world, a mortal life which is equated with death. The question then becomes how to regain true life. In this regard *Gos. Phil.* states, directly following the statement quoted above concerning the origin of death as a result of the separation of Eve from Adam, that

π̅α̅λ̅ι̅ν̅ ε̅ρ̅ω̅α̅β̅ω̅[κ̅ ε̅ρ̅]ο̅γ̅η̅ ἡ̅ρ̅α̅ι̅τ̅γ̅ ε̅ρ̅ογ̅ ἡ̅ἡ̅μ̅ογ̅ ν̅α̅ρ̅ω̅π̅ε̅

again, when he enters and receives it for himself, no death will take place. (*Gos. Phil.* 68.24–26)

²⁴⁵ Schenke here reconstructs [μ]ἡ̅α[Δ̅]α̅μ and translates “Als Eva [mi]t A[d]am (zusammen) war” (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 46–47). As will be shown in the discussion below it fits better into the overall argument of *Gos. Phil.* to follow Layton and restore [ρ̅]ἡ̅α[Δ̅]α̅μ.

²⁴⁶ See chapter 3.

This passage is linguistically ambiguous, for it is by no means clear who or what the referents here are. It is clear that the text cannot mean what one would perhaps expect, namely that it should refer to Adam receiving Eve again. To accommodate this view one would have to emend the text to, e.g.,

παλιν ε(ς)αββα[κ ελ]ογν ν̄χιτ(ς) εροϋ μ̄νμοϋ νααωπε²⁴⁷

again, when (she) enters and he receives (her) for himself, no death will take place.

It is possible, however, to understand the text as it stands, thereby rendering such an emendation unnecessary. Isenberg translates the Coptic text quite freely as, “If he enters again and attains his former self, death will be no more,” understanding “he” as Adam, and the “it” as Adam’s “former self.”²⁴⁸ I think, however, the actor is here better understood not as Adam himself, but as Christ, the second Adam. If so, it follows that we cannot understand what he receives as “his former self,” but rather as something else. In the lines just prior to the one quoted here, we hear that death (πμοϋ) came into being, and thus it seems probable that what Christ as the second Adam receives for himself in order to abolish death is in fact death itself.²⁴⁹ So, to paraphrase the passage I would suggest the following: “Again, when Christ enters and receives death for himself, no death will take place.” Now, how does Christ “receive death for himself,” and what is it that he enters as the second Adam in order to do so? We shall return to these questions in more detail below, but first we must consider some closely related aspects of the origins and remedies of death.

In both *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* the fall is linked to the primordial separation of Gen 2:21–23. It is therefore not surprising that also in *Gos. Phil.*, as in *Exeg. Soul*, salvation is related to the rectification of this primordial error, and that it is the return to the original paradisaic state that will ultimately lead to salvation. So, Christ comes to remove death, but that is not all. He also comes to unite and to give life:

²⁴⁷ Cf. Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 392; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 15; Louis Painchaud, “Le Christ vainqueur de la mort dans l’*Évangile selon Philippe*: Une exégèse valentiniennne de Matt. 27:46,” *NovT* 38:4 (1996): 386. Grant’s translation, “Again, when they reunite and he receives her to himself, death will be no more” (Grant, “Mystery of Marriage,” 134), presupposes a different reconstruction of the Coptic text.

²⁴⁸ Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 179.

²⁴⁹ This is also the view of Painchaud, “Le Christ,” 386.

ΔΙΑ ΤΟΥΤΟ ΑΠΕΧΡ̄Σ ΕΙ ΔΕΚΔΑΣ ΠΠΩΡΧ Ν̄ΤΑΡΩΠΕ ΧΙΝΩΟΡΠ ΕΦΝΑCΕΩΩ
 ΕΡΑΤΥ ΠΑΛΙΝ Ν̄ΦΩΟΤΡΟΥ Μ̄ΠCΝΑΥ ΔΥΩ ΝΕΝΤΑΡΜΟΥ Ε̄ΜΠΠΩΡΧ ΕΦΝΑΤ̄ ΝΑΥ
 Ν̄ΝΟΥΩΝΕ̄ Ν̄ΦΩΟΤΡΟΥ

Therefore Christ came so that the separation that happened in the beginning might be rectified. Again he will join them both together, and to those who have died in the separation he will give life, and he will join them.

(*Gos. Phil.* 70.12–17)

We see here that Christ comes to “give them life” († ΝΑΥ Ν̄ΝΟΥΩΝΕ̄), which nicely parallels the giving of worldly “life” to Adam in return for the ῩΧΗ that was taken from him. At the same time Christ comes to join what was separated in the beginning, that is, in one sense, Adam and his life/ soul (ῩΧΗ), and in another, Adam’s soul with his spirit. In describing Christ as both joining those who were separated and giving life to those who died, *Gos. Phil.* in this passage combines the rectification of the two adverse effects of the primordial separation, namely the separation which was interpreted as a taking of life, and the giving of new life which was really death.

We thus see that there are three main interlinked aspects to Christ’s salvific actions that are directly related to what we have discussed above. He removes death, he gives life, and he reunites the separated. *Gos. Phil.*’s views on how Christ accomplishes this, and what this implies for the tractate’s sacramental soteriology, will be discussed in detail below. At this point it should suffice to say that in *Gos. Phil.*, as in *Exeg. Soul*, death is linked to separation and life to unification.²⁵⁰

Still, *Gos. Phil.* does not content itself with the abovementioned accounts of the origin of death. In addition to the separation narrated in Genesis 2, the tractate also utilises the Genesis 3 story of the eating from the Tree of Knowledge. *Gos. Phil.* here sets the stage by emphasising the existence of two trees in paradise,²⁵¹ the Tree of Knowledge and the Tree of Life, and by stressing the important differences between them. *Gos. Phil.* has this to say concerning the Tree of Knowledge (ΠΩΗΝ Ν̄ΤΓΝΩCΙC):

ΠΕΤ̄ΜΑΥ ΔΥΜΟΥΤ ΔΔΔΗ ΠΕΕΙΜΑ ΔΕ ΠΩΗΝ Ν̄ΤΓΝΩCΙC ΔΥΤ̄Ν̄ΕΡΩΜΕ ΠΝΟΜΟC
 ΝΕΠΩΗΝ ΠΕ ΟῩΝ̄CΟΜ Μ̄ΜΟΥ Ν̄ΦΤ̄ ΤΓΝΩCΙC Μ̄ΠΠΕΤΝΑΝΟΥC Μ̄ΠΠΕΘΟΟΥ ΟΥΤΕ
 Μ̄ΠΠΕΚΔΑCΕ ΕΡΟΥ Ε̄ΜΠΠΕΘΟΟΥ ΟΥΤΕ Μ̄ΠΠΕΚΔΑΔ Ε̄ΜΠΠΕΤΝΑΝΟΥC ΑΛΛΑ ΔΥΤΑΜΙΟ
 ΝΟΥΜΟΥ Ν̄ΝΕΝΤΑΡΟΥCΩΜ ΕΒΟΛ Ν̄ΖΗΤΥ Ε̄ΜΠΠΤΡΕΦΧΟΟC ΓΑΡ ΧΕΟΥCΩΜ ΠΑΕΙ
 Μ̄ΝΟΥCΩΜ ΠΑΕΙ ΔΥΩΩΠΕ Ν̄ΑΡΧΗ Μ̄ΠΠΟΥ

²⁵⁰ Cf. Buckley and Good, “Sacramental Language,” 2.

²⁵¹ *Gos. Phil.* 70.22–23.

That one killed Adam, but here the Tree of Knowledge has made man alive. The Law was the tree. It could give knowledge of good and evil. It neither removed him from evil, nor did it place him in the good, but it created death for those who ate from it. For when he said, “eat this, do not eat that,”²⁵² it became the beginning of death. (*Gos. Phil.* 74.3–12)

At first sight *Gos. Phil.* here seems to contradict itself when it asserts that the Tree of Knowledge brought death to Adam in paradise, but life here. That the Tree of Knowledge killed Adam fits in well with the tractate’s interpretation of what transpired in the Garden of Eden, since the eating from the tree caused Adam’s expulsion from paradise and his reception of mortality, as we saw above. Before the tractate goes on to explain that “the law” (πνομος) was the tree, and that this law brought death, however, *Gos. Phil.* pauses to refer to the lifegiving effects of the Tree of Knowledge “here.” It thus seems like we are here in a sense dealing with two trees of knowledge.²⁵³ The first, which is later identified with the law, is the traditional Tree of Knowledge from the Genesis account. This part of the passage is unproblematic. For the identification of the other tree, however, we may want to take into account how *Gos. Phil.* here plays on several Pauline passages, first and foremost centred on Gal 3:13 and Phil 3:8–9 (see fig. 28).

The Gal 3:13 input, where Paul states that Christ has bought “us” free from the curse of the law through his crucifixion, is connected to the *Gos. Phil.* input by its discourse on the law, causing counterpart mappings between the two mental spaces. There are in addition counterpart mappings between Gal 3:13’s reference to the cross as the tree, and the Tree of Knowledge in the *Gos. Phil.* input. At the same time, the Phil 3:8–9 input, referring to the knowledge of Christ as a counterpart and contrary to the law, is connected to the *Gos. Phil.* input primarily through its references to knowledge and the law. In the blend the Tree of Knowledge is connected both to the law as a bringer of death, and to the cross as a bringer of life. We thus get the conceptual blend shown in fig. 29.

We have here what seems to be a case of conceptual disintegration,²⁵⁴ where a single Tree of Knowledge turns into two separate, but connected, conceptual entities. In the *Gos. Phil.* passage the two trees are only implicitly separated, by means of the spatial references “that tree” and “here”

²⁵² Cf. Gen 2:16–17.

²⁵³ Cf. Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 444–445.

²⁵⁴ For conceptual disintegration, see Hougaard, “Conceptual Disintegration”; Bache, “Constraining Conceptual Integration Theory”, and the discussion in chapter 2 of the present study.

and the references to their different effects, but without directly stating that there are two trees. In the blend, however, it becomes evident that there are two different but related trees of knowledge. By understating this implication in the text, *Gos. Phil.* manages to keep the two trees of knowledge at the same time both separate and intimately connected, which nicely suits its overall rhetorical strategy.²⁵⁵

Together these conceptual and intertextual blends lead to the emerging entailments that not only is the old Tree of Knowledge the law and the new one the cross, but also the implication that to follow the law, i.e., Judaism, as exemplified by its dietary restrictions, equals Adam's eating of the fruit from the Tree of Knowledge in the garden of Eden, and can only lead to death. Eating from the new Tree of Knowledge, on the other hand, brings life. Since the new Tree of Knowledge is the cross, and what hung on it as its "fruit" was Christ, it is Christ's death on the cross, and the eating of Christ that brings life. Moreover, since the eating is in this passage connected both to knowledge and to eating, we also have here a possible simultaneous reference to gaining knowledge of Christ and participating in the Eucharist. Another implication is that the new Tree of Knowledge, the cross, also replaces the old Tree of Knowledge, making the law, and hence Judaism, obsolete and brings life in place of death (see fig. 30). In this way the new tree replaces the old, the new knowledge replaces the old, the new death-which-brings-life replaces the old death, and consequently Christianity replaces Judaism.

The conceptual and intertextual blends shown here only represent the tip of the iceberg, however, since the recollection of Gal 3:13 in this context also primes the rest of Paul's discussion of the law in Galatians, and Phil 3:8–9 likewise primes the broader discussion in Phil 3 concerning death and resurrection, for possible subsequent recall. Moreover, the integration network shown in fig. 30 may further trigger passages like Col 2:21–22, Eph 2:15, and several passages in Romans (e.g., 4:15; 5:13; 7:7–13).²⁵⁶ In fact, each one of the implications we have seen arising from the

²⁵⁵ Schenke wonders why the text does not simply state something like "*Dort befindet sich jener Baum der Erkenntnis, der Adam getötet hat. Hier aber befindet sich dieser Baum der Erkenntnis, der den Menschen lebendig gemacht hat*" (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 444). However, while such a statement would certainly have been clearer, it would not have achieved the same rhetorical effects as the actual manuscript reading. Buckley, for her part, holds that "we can postulate one tree, acting in contrasting ways. . . . Depending on the status of the eater, the one tree may deal death or life" (Buckley, "Conceptual Models," 4177–4178).

²⁵⁶ Cf. Janssens, "L'Évangile selon Philippe," 114; Evans, et al., *Nag Hammadi Texts*, 163.

blending processes discussed here have the potential to activate further mental input spaces, the possible cumulative effects of which are difficult to assess.

3.1.5.3. *The Crucifixion*

We have now seen a glimpse of the importance attached to the cross and the crucifixion in the rhetoric of *Gos. Phil.* In the present section we will look closer at the tractate's interpretation of this event. We have seen that *Gos. Phil.* identifies the cross with the new Tree of Knowledge, but this is not the only tree that is blended conceptually with the cross in this text. Other connections are also drawn between the events in Eden and the crucifixion, with vital implications for the underlying sacramental soteriology. In a creative blend *Gos. Phil.* connects the crucifixion with both the paradise account in Genesis and Jesus' earthly father Joseph:

φίλιππος παποστολος πεχαρ̄ χεῖωσση̄ π̄ραμω̄ε̄ ᾱφτω̄σε̄ ἡ̄νο̄υπαρ̄ᾱδ̄εῑσο̄ς
 χ̄ε̄νε̄φ̄ρη̄ᾱ ἡ̄ρ̄ω̄ε̄ ε̄ρο̄ῡν̄ ε̄τε̄φ̄τε̄κ̄η̄ν̄ ἡ̄το̄ῡ πε̄ντᾱρ̄τᾱμ̄ιο̄ ἡ̄π̄στᾱχ̄ρο̄ς̄ ε̄βο̄λ
 ῥ̄ῆ̄ω̄ην̄ ἡ̄τᾱφ̄το̄σο̄ῡ ᾱγω̄ πε̄φ̄ρο̄ς̄ νε̄φ̄ω̄ε̄ ἀ̄π̄εντᾱφ̄το̄σ̄φ̄ νε̄πε̄φ̄ρο̄ς̄ πε̄
 ἡ̄ς̄ π̄τω̄σε̄̄ δε̄ πε̄ πε̄σ̄φ̄ο̄ς̄ ἀ̄λλᾱ π̄ω̄ην̄ ἡ̄π̄ω̄ν̄ε̄ ῥ̄ῆ̄τ̄μ̄η̄ν̄τε̄ ἡ̄π̄ᾱρᾱδ̄εῑσο̄ς̄ ᾱγω̄
 τ̄β̄ε̄ῆ̄ξ̄ο̄ε̄τ̄ ἡ̄τᾱπ̄ε̄χ̄ρ̄εῑσ̄η̄ᾱ ω̄ω̄πε̄ ε̄βο̄λ̄ ἡ̄ρ̄η̄τ̄ε̄ ε̄βο̄λ̄ ῥ̄ῑτο̄ο̄τ̄φ̄ ᾱτ̄ᾱνᾱσ̄τᾱσ̄ῑς̄

Philip the apostle said, “Joseph the carpenter planted a garden because he needed wood for his trade. It was he who made the cross from the trees that he planted, and his seed hung upon that which he planted. His seed was Jesus,²⁵⁷ and the plant was the cross.” But the Tree of Life is in the middle of the garden,²⁵⁸ and it is from the olive tree that the chrisem came, and from it (i.e., the chrisem) the resurrection. (*Gos. Phil.* 73.8–19)

In this interesting passage, *Gos. Phil.* sets up a blend between the garden (ἡ̄π̄ᾱρᾱδ̄εῑσο̄ς̄) planted by Joseph and the garden of Eden.²⁵⁹ At the same time Joseph's vocation as a carpenter is utilised to connect him to the making of the cross and thereby also to link the cross to the Tree of Life. Moreover, by describing Joseph's “seed” as hanging “on that which he planted,”²⁶⁰ the text also makes a pun on the multiple meanings of

²⁵⁷ Cf. Gal 3:16 where Christ is described as “the seed” (σπέρμα) of Abraham.

²⁵⁸ Cf. Gen 2:9; 3:3; Rev 2:7.

²⁵⁹ Cf. Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 91.

²⁶⁰ From the point of view of a “Valentinian” reading of *Gos. Phil.*, Thomassen holds Joseph to represent the “Valentinian” Demiurge, the garden to represent the cosmos, the cross to represent matter, and Jesus hanging on the tree to represent his birth in a material body (see Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 268–269; Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 91). The connection between crucifixion and incarnation is also made by Catherine

“seed” (σποσ), denoting both the “seed” of plants, human “sperm,” and “offspring”²⁶¹ (see fig. 31).

This is a crucial blend in the overall rhetoric of *Gos. Phil.* Most significantly, by blending the two gardens and identifying the cross with the Tree of Life, Jesus is implicitly identified as the fruit of this tree. In Genesis, eating from the Tree of Life is said to bestow eternal life.²⁶² Jesus, as the fruit of the Tree of Life, brings life by dying, thus reversing the meaning of life and death, and at the same time reversing the effects of the opposing (old) Tree of Knowledge. To counter the effects of the primeval eating from the Tree of Knowledge in paradise, what is needed is the fruit of the Tree of Life, i.e., Christ, and his “death” on the cross (the Tree of Life) was not really death, for it brought life (see fig. 32).²⁶³

Gos. Phil. makes clear the sacramental entailments of this passage, firstly by connecting the cross with the Tree of Life and its fruit with Christ, thus indicating the Eucharist, and secondly by associating the chrism with this tree. There is thus a simultaneous connection from the Tree of Life/cross to both the chrismation and the Eucharist. As for the latter, it is clear from the blend that partaking of Christ in the Eucharist brings life, and that this eucharistic effect is intimately connected with Christ’s life-giving death on the cross. Moreover, by connecting the chrism to the Tree of Life/cross and to the resurrection, the life-giving qualities of the chrism are also directly connected to Christ and the cross (see fig. 33).²⁶⁴

Interestingly, it becomes clear from this analysis that in *Gos. Phil.* the two trees from the Genesis account are blended in, and with, the crucifixion, and, by metonymical extension, with Christianity, as the cross becomes simultaneously the Tree of Life and a new Tree of Knowledge (see fig. 34). Crucifixion, then, is the crucial event where death is connected with life and the differences between the two are subverted. These effects should be seen in connection with the statements discussed above concerning *Gos. Phil.*’s views on the relationship between life and death,

Trautmann, “Le schème de la croix dans l’Évangile selon Philippe (NH II,3),” in *Deuxième journée d’études coptes: Strasbourg 25 mai 1984* (Cahiers de la Bibliothèque Copte 3; Leuven: Peeters, 1986), 129.

²⁶¹ The Greek equivalent is σπέρμα (see Crum 831b).

²⁶² Gen 3:22.

²⁶³ As Buckley puts it, *Gos. Phil.* “clearly associates the cross, the tree of life, and Jesus’ life-giving death” (Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4179).

²⁶⁴ Cf. Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4179.

and also the passage where Christ says that he has come to make the below like the above and the outside like the inside.²⁶⁵

Gos. Phil. further makes the connection between the body of Jesus, the Eucharist, and the crucifixion by way of a Syriac etymology:

τεύχαριστεία πε ἰς εὔμοϋτε γαρ ερωϋ ἰμνιτςϋρος χεφαρισαθα ετεπαει πε πετπορω εβολ λις γαρ ει εϋσταϋρωϋ ἰπκοςμος

The Eucharist is Jesus, for in Syriac he is called Pharisatha, that is, “the one who is spread out,” for Jesus came crucifying the world.

(*Gos. Phil.* 63.21–24)

That Jesus came crucifying the world may perhaps seem strange at first sight, but clearly recalls Gal 6:14 where Paul states that Christ has crucified the world to him and him to the world.²⁶⁶ Moreover, the dual reference to the Eucharist and the crucifixion is done rather cleverly with the use of this Syriac etymology, for the word “Pharisatha” denotes simultaneously the spreading out of the body of Jesus on the cross and the distribution of the bread in the eucharistic ritual.²⁶⁷ Segelberg points out that this Syriac word may mean both “spread” and “break” and also points to parallel words in Hebrew and Aramaic with the same double meaning of spreading and separating.²⁶⁸ What Segelberg does not mention, however, is that this wordplay also works well in Coptic with the phonetically similar words πωρω (spread out) and πωρϫ (divide / be divided), which are often confused, as Crum notes.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁵ See *Gos. Phil.* 67.31–35.

²⁶⁶ See W.C. van Unnik, “Three Notes on the ‘Gospel of Philip,’” *NTS* 10 (1964): 469. Cf. also Col 2:14. Segelberg, however, finds this to be “a peculiar interpretation of [*Gos. Phil.*], where we would expect to find the Gnostic way of thought revealed” (Segelberg, “Antiochene Background,” 219).

²⁶⁷ See Unnik, “Three Notes,” 468–469; Segelberg, “Antiochene Background,” 218–219; Jacques-É. Ménard, “Beziehungen des Philippus- und des Thomas-Evangeliums zur syrischen Welt,” in *Altes Testament—Frühjudentum—Gnosis: Neue Studien zu ‘Gnosis und Bibel’* (ed. Karl-Wolfgang Tröger; Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus / Gerd Mohn, 1980), 318. Segelberg states that this seems to be based on “traditional Christian thinking,” and that “it may be interpreted in an orthodox Christian way.” W.C. van Unnik points out that the word “pharisatha” is used in the Syriac translation of Acts 2:46: “and they brake the pharisatha in the houses” (Unnik, “Three Notes,” 469). He concludes that “It must be assumed that the author of this saying stood not far apart from the church and its vocabulary, but he gave the words a typical twist” (ibid.). Thomassen, however, connects the term to “the abstract notion of an emanation from unity to plurality,” and holds its use here to represent “a characteristic Valentinian synthesizing of protology, salvation in history, and redemption in ritual” (Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 275).

²⁶⁸ See Segelberg, “Antiochene Background,” 218–219.

²⁶⁹ See Crum 271b. Moreover, πωρω εβολ is also used in Coptic texts to denote

Gos. Phil. also deals with what transpired in the crucifixion in more detail, giving its own interpretation of Jesus' final words on the cross:

[π]ΑΝΟΥΤΕ ΠΑΝΟΥΤΕ ΕΤΒΕΟΥ ΠΧΘΕΙC [Δ]ΚΚΑΔΤ ΝCΩΚ ΝΤΑΥΧΕΝΑΕΙ ρΙΠCΡΟC
[Ἰ]Τ]ΑΥΠΩΡΧ²⁷⁰ ΓΑΡ ἸΠΠΑ ΕΤ[Ἰ]ΜΑΥ

“[My] God, my God, why, Lord, [have] you forsaken me?”²⁷¹ It was on the cross that he said these (words), for it was in that place that he was divided [...]

(*Gos. Phil.* 68.26–29)

With one exception, the insertion of the word “Lord” (ΠΧΘΕΙC),²⁷² *Gos. Phil.* here closely follows Matt 27:46 / Mark 15:34 in rendering the words of Jesus on the cross.²⁷³ Jesus is said to be divided on the cross, and this seems to be presented as the reason why he uttered the quoted words, thus presenting what seems to be an argument for the separation of the divinity from the earthly Jesus at the crucifixion.²⁷⁴ This division on the

liturgical preparation (see, e.g., Theophilus of Alexandria, *Letter to Horsiesios*, 47 in Crum, *Papyruscodex*, 14, and see also Crum's remarks in *ibid.*, 68 n. 1).

²⁷⁰ I follow Schenke's reconstruction of this lacuna (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 46). Layton has [νε] ΑΥΠΩΡΧ (Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 178).

²⁷¹ Cf. Matt 27:46; Mark 15:34.

²⁷² Schenke, however, thinks this is a scribal error. According to him, ΠΧΘΕΙC is written too early and should come after ΝCΩΚ, and hence translates the passage “‘[M]ein Gott, mein Gott, warum { } [hast] du mich verlassen?’ (Der Herr) sprach diese (Worte) am Kreuz” (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 46–47). The passage makes good sense as it is, however, and there is in my view not sufficient justification for making such an emendation. Cf. Painchaud, “Le Christ,” 382–392, esp. 391, who argues strongly in favour of reading the text as it is.

²⁷³ Cf. Painchaud, “Le Christ,” 383; Tuckett, “Synoptic Traditions,” 175. Unfortunately the following lines in the manuscript are heavily damaged, so we must acknowledge the uncertainty caused by the loss of the possible continuation of the argument. Schenke has proposed reconstructions for most of these lines (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 46), but due to the highly speculative nature of such a reconstruction, I have chosen to disregard this heavily damaged part of the text (cf. Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 71 n. 3).

²⁷⁴ This separation of the divinity from the humanity is also argued by Ambrose, who states that “it was the man who cried out as he was about to die by separation from the divinity” (*Exposition of the Gospel of Luke* 10.127; translation quoted from Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100–600)* [vol. 1 of *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine*; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971], 245), and Theodore of Mopsuestia is reported to have held similar views (see Pelikan, *Emergence of the Catholic Tradition*, 246). Shenoute attributes such a view to Nestorius: ΠΕ[Χ]ΑΥ ΧΕΤCΑΡΧ ΤΕΤΩΩ ΕΡΡΑΙ ΟΥΒΕΤΗΝΤΗΝΟΥΤΕ ΧΕΕΤΒΕΟΥ ΑΚΚΑΔΤ ΝCΩΚ ΑΥΩ ΧΕΑΓΗΝΤΗΝΟΥΤΕ ΒΟΚ ΕΠΧΙCΕ ΑCΚΑΤCΑΡΧ ρΙΠΩΕ “he (i.e., Nestorius) said that it is the flesh which calls up toward the divinity, ‘Why have you forsaken me?’ and that the divinity departed to the height and abandoned the flesh on the cross” (Shenoute, *I Am Amazed*, 469 [DR 131 = IT-NB IB14 f. 21^r]); This reading is based on a photograph of a leaf of Codex DR, now at the Biblioteca Nazionale “Vittorio Emanuele III” in Naples, which is better

cross may also be seen in connection with the reference to Jesus as “the one who is spread out,” as we saw that this terminology also carries connotations of separating and dividing in several languages including Syriac and Coptic. Not only is Jesus “spread out” on the cross and in the eucharistic ritual, but he is also divided in both places, on the cross and in the ritual. In this way, *Gos. Phil.* reinforces the links between crucifixion, Eucharist, and Christology. In its description of Jesus’ separation on the cross, *Gos. Phil.* also sets up yet another paradox. Not only does Christ bring life by dying, but analogically it is also in a sense by means of his own division that he mends the primordial separation. Separation is thus connected to unification as death is connected to life.

3.1.5.3.1. The Rending of the Veil

As Louis Painchaud has suggested, this passage should be read in conjunction with what *Gos. Phil.* has to say concerning another effect of the crucifixion, namely the rending of the veil of the temple.²⁷⁵ All the synoptic gospels report that when Christ died on the cross, the veil of the temple was torn.²⁷⁶ This means that exactly at the point when Christ, according to *Gos. Phil.*, was divided on the cross, the veil of the temple was divided as well. *Gos. Phil.*’s argument for the division of Christ on the cross is thus lent additional weight by this simultaneous rending of the veil. It is, as we have seen several examples of already, a pervasive rhetorical practice of *Gos. Phil.* to set up several parallels to important events in the life of Christ, and we shall see that this particular blend, of the rending of the veil and the division of Christ, has important ramifications with regard to both the Christology and the soteriology of the tractate. The significance of this conceptual blend is only fully realised, however, when it is connected to the identification, made in Heb 10:20, of the veil of the

preserved at this point than the manuscripts used by Orlandi in his edition of the text, *Shenute Contra Origenistas: Testo con Introduzione e Traduzione* [Unione Accademica Nazionale: Corpus dei Manoscritti Copti Letterari; Roma: C.I.M., 1985], but which was not yet identified as a witness to *I Am Amazed* when Orlandi prepared his edition of the text. For the present state of the reconstruction of *I Am Amazed*, see Lundhaug, “Baptism.” I refer to *I Am Amazed* using Orlandi’s numeration). Shenoute himself does, however, acknowledge that Christ left his body on the cross and went down to Amente: ⲁϥⲁⲓⲧⲏⲉ ⲁⲉ ⲛⲧⲟϥ ⲛⲡⲙⲟϥ ϩ[ⲁ]ⲣⲟⲛ ⲛⲟⲩⲡⲓϥⲟⲉ[ⲓ]ϥ ⲓⲥ ⲁϥⲕⲁⲡⲉϥϥⲟⲛⲁ ϩⲓⲡⲟⲉ ⲁϥⲱⲕ ⲟⲩⲁⲛⲉⲧⲉϱⲛⲁⲛ[ⲛⲧ]ⲉ “But as for the Lord Jesus, he tasted death for us and he left his body on the cross and went to those who are in Amente” (Shenoute, *I Am Amazed*, 478 [DQ 63; Shisha-Halevy, “Unpublished Shenoutiana,” 76; cf. Orlandi, *Shenute Contra Origenistas*, 54]).

²⁷⁵ See Painchaud, “Le Christ,” 392.

²⁷⁶ Matt 27:51; Mark 15:38; Luke 23:45.

temple with the flesh of Jesus²⁷⁷ (see fig. 35). The intertextual connection with Heb 10:20 creates a direct connection between the division of Christ and the rending of the veil, and also strengthens the eucharistic implications of the two events. If we also take the local intertextual context in Hebrews into consideration, the statement in 10:19 that one may enter into the holy of the holies by means of the blood of Jesus is significant, along with 10:20 stating that this entry is through his flesh.

Gos. Phil. refers to the temple veil at several occasions, each time in connection with the New Testament motif of it being torn, and uses it to describe the soteriological effects of not only the crucifixion, but also of the Christ event in general:

νερεπκαταπεταςμα μεν ροβ̄c̄ n̄ωρη̄ πως̄ ερεπνογτε̄ ρ̄διοικεῑ n̄tk̄tic̄ic̄
εφωαπωρ̄ δε̄ n̄σ̄ip̄καταπετᾱς[μ]̄ᾱ ᾱγω̄ n̄τενᾱip̄cā n̄ρογ̄n̄ ο̄γ̄ων̄η̄ [εβολ̄]
cēnaκ̄ω̄ δε̄ m̄πεῑνεῑ n̄c̄ω̄oγ̄ [εφο̄] n̄ερ̄n̄m̄oc̄ μαλλ̄ον̄ δε̄ cēnāρ̄κατα[λ̄χε̄]
m̄moq̄ t̄m̄n̄t̄noγ̄tē δε̄ t̄h̄p̄c̄ cāp̄ōt̄ [εβολ̄] n̄n̄weīmā ε̄ρογ̄n̄ an̄ enētoγ̄aāb̄
[n̄ten̄]ε̄t̄[o]γ̄aāb̄ cān̄āω̄t̄ω̄ρ̄ γ̄αρ̄ an̄ m̄n̄πογ̄[ōein̄ n̄]āt̄t̄ω̄ρ̄ m̄n̄p̄p̄l̄h̄p̄ōmā
n̄āt̄[ω̄tā al̄]λᾱ cān̄āω̄p̄ē ρ̄ān̄t̄n̄η̄ m̄n̄c̄p̄oc̄ [ᾱγω̄ ρ̄an̄]ε̄q̄c̄b̄ōēī t̄eēīc̄īb̄ω̄t̄oc̄
nāω̄ā[nē m̄po]γ̄oγ̄x̄aāī n̄tāpēn̄κατακ̄λ̄ȳc̄m̄oc̄ m̄moq̄ ēmāρ̄tē ε̄ρ̄ρᾱī ε̄x̄ω̄oγ̄
ε̄ρ̄ω̄ā ρ̄n̄ρ̄ōēinē ω̄ω̄pē ρ̄n̄t̄φ̄γ̄λ̄n̄ n̄t̄m̄n̄t̄oγ̄n̄h̄b̄ nāēī nāω̄c̄n̄c̄ōm̄ n̄b̄ōk̄ ε̄ρογ̄n̄
ε̄p̄cā n̄ρογ̄n̄ m̄n̄καταπεταςμᾱ m̄n̄πᾱρχ̄ιε̄ρε̄ȳc̄

The veil covered at first how God administered the creation,²⁷⁸ but when the veil is rent and those of the inside are revealed this house will be left behind [as] a desert,²⁷⁹ or rather, it will be [destroyed],²⁸⁰ but the entire divinity²⁸¹ will flee [from] these places, not into the Holies [of the] Holies, for it will not be able to mix with the unmixed [light] and the [fault]less fullness, [but] it will come to be under the wings of the cross²⁸² [and under] its arms. This ark will [become their] salvation when the flood of water bears down upon them. If some happen to be of the priestly tribe, these will be able to enter inside the veil with the high priest.

(*Gos. Phil.* 84.23–85.5)

This is an allusive passage that has the potential of prompting the creation of highly complex blends, of which we will here only scratch the surface. First of all we notice an interesting blend of the two arks, namely that of the covenant, located inside the temple, and that of Noah, which saved men and animals from the flood. These two arks are not only blended

²⁷⁷ “through the veil, that is, his flesh” (ῥῑt̄m̄n̄καταπεταςμᾱ ε̄τε̄πᾱī nē t̄ēq̄cāp̄z̄ / διὰ τοῦ καταπετάσματος, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ). Cf. Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 185.

²⁷⁸ Cf. Rom 1:20.

²⁷⁹ Cf. Matt 23:38; Luke 13:35; Acts 1:20; Ps 68:25 LXX.

²⁸⁰ Cf. Matt 24:2; 26:61; 27:40; Mark 13:2; 14:58; 15:29; Luke 21:6; Acts 6:14; 2 Cor 5:1.

²⁸¹ Cf. Rom 1:20.

²⁸² Cf. Matt 23:37; Luke 13:34.

with each other, however, but also with the cross, which here becomes both the ark of the covenant and Noah's ark. Now, what implications may arise from this blend? If we choose to read this passage as an allegory of the eschaton, which is suggested by the imagery of the flood and the destruction of the temple, we get a blend where "this house" (περηνει), i.e., the temple, may be mapped onto the material world. It is thus the destruction of this world that is prefigured in this way by Christ's death on the cross. As the metaphorical veil is torn and the secrets of the material world are laid bare, the world will be destroyed. The rather oblique term "the entire divinity" (τῆν ἅπασαν θεότητα) should in this context probably be understood, as Schenke has suggested, as denoting "all the righteous," reading ἅπασαν θεότητα as the equivalent of εὐσέβεια and not as θεϊότης.²⁸³

"The priestly tribe" (τῆς φυλῆς τῆς ἱερωτικῆς), on the other hand, may be understood as a reference to the Christians.²⁸⁴ When the material world is destroyed, the Christians, as "the priestly tribe," may thus enter heaven within the veil together with Christ "the high priest." While all the Christians will be saved and enter heaven, all the righteous non-Christians will attain to a kind of secondary salvation. They may not enter inside the veil with the high priest, but they will be able to seek refuge under the arms of the cross, like chickens taking cover under the wings of a hen, as is clear from the allusions to Matt 23:37–38 / Luke 13:34–35. They will not be able to "mix" (τῶσθαι) with "the unmixed light" (ἀμιγρὸν φῶς). This privilege is reserved for those who have become perfect light, namely the Christians. For, as we learn elsewhere in the tractate, in order to mix with the light one must become light.²⁸⁵

Shifting its metaphors in accordance with the temple imagery and

²⁸³ See Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 509–510. In the context of the crucifixion we might have expected τῆν ἅπασαν θεότητα to refer to the divinity of Christ separated from his material body. The use of the term in this sense is attested by Shenoute (see Shenoute, *I Am Amazed*, 469), but it does not make sense in *Gos. Phil.* that the divinity of Christ would not be able to enter "the holies of the holies" or that it would be unable to "mix with the unmixed light." It has been argued that τῆν ἅπασαν θεότητα should here be taken as a reference to the Valentinian demiurge (see, e.g., Schenke, "Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959]," 3; Schenke, "Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960]," 35; Schenke, "The Gospel of Philip," 186). As Schenke rightly notes in his critical edition, however, "Die einfache Deutung auf die Gestalt des valentinianischen Demiurgen geht jedenfalls (schon wegen des *Augens* τῆς) nicht auf" (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 509 n. 1404). Thomassen sees a reference to "a special kind of salvation" for "the psychic powers," although he admits that "*Gos. Phil.* never uses the word 'psychic' (Thomassen, "How Valentinian," 274).

²⁸⁴ See Isenberg, "Coptic Gospel," 175.

²⁸⁵ See *Gos. Phil.* 78.31–32; 79.1–3, and the discussion below.

key intertexts, *Gos. Phil.* then states that for these people the cross will function as an ark when the flood comes. This blend of the two arks with the cross may moreover be blended with the reference in Wis 14:5 concerning people trusting their souls/lives to a “piece of wood,” that is, to a wooden vessel on the sea, a passage that may also be given a Christian interpretation as a reference to the cross. Another possible entailment of the blending of the ark of the covenant with the cross and the ark of Noah can be drawn by way of its relation to the tablets of the covenant, and thus to the law, which again makes it possible to understand the righteous who are saved by the blended ark/cross as Jews. It is thus possible to interpret *Gos. Phil.* as envisioning some kind of salvation for the righteous Jews, albeit a second rate one. On the other hand, these righteous may also simply be understood as references to less perfect Christians, perhaps catechumens, or maybe even to good people in general, including pagans.

Even though the Christians are Christs, in relation to Christ himself they are as sons in relation to a father, for the relationship of identity between the Christians and Christ is always to some extent subverted by the hierarchical aspect of the relation. In this example they are priests, while he is the high priest, but they are all of the same “tribe” (φυλη).

The tractate continues by stressing the fact that the veil was rent completely:

ετρεπαει ἡπεκαταπετασμα πωρ ἡπσα ντπε ογαατq επει νεγναογεν
 ἡναπσα ντπε ογαατοϋ οϋτε ἡπσα μπιτῆ ογαατq αν ἡταqπωρ επει
 ναqηαοϋωνη εβολ ἡναπσα μπιτῆ ογααϋ αλλα ἡταqπωρ ἡτπε επιτῆ
 αναπσα ντπε οϋων ναν ἡνετῆπσα μπιτῆ δεκααc ενναβωκ εροϋν αππεοηπ
 ἡταληθεια

Therefore the veil was not rent above only, since it would have been opened to those above only, nor was it rent below only, since it would have been revealed to those below only, but it was rent from above to below.²⁸⁶ Those above opened those below for us so that we may enter the hidden of the truth. (*Gos. Phil.* 85.5–13)

Here the focus of the discourse seems to shift again to the crucifixion and its combined revelatory and soteriological effects. It is the crucifixion, then, which opens up the way from the things below to the things above. With the crucifixion and the rending of the veil the workings of the material world are laid bare and the way to salvation is opened. The motif of the complete rending of the veil is also utilised elsewhere in the tractate to make the slightly different point that it is necessary to ascend:

²⁸⁶ Cf. Matt 27:51; Mark 15:38.

ετ[β]ε[π]δει ἀπεκκαταπέτασμα πρ[φ] [ρ] χιμψα ντιπε ραψα μπιτῆ νερωρε
 γαρ ερωεινε χιμψα μπιτῆ ἡσεβωκ επσα ντιπε

[Therefore] its veil was rent from above to below.²⁸⁷ For it was necessary
 for some from below to go up above. (*Gos. Phil.* 70.1–4)

Gos. Phil. elsewhere identifies Christ as the one who reveals what is hidden, by way of an interpretation of his epithet “the Nazarene” (πναζαρηνος).²⁸⁸ This explanation is later expanded when *Gos. Phil.* states that, “Nazara is the Truth, the Nazarene, then, is the Truth” (ναζαρα τε ταληθεια πναζαρηνος [[νε]] σε τε ταληθεια).²⁸⁹ For it is truth that reveals what is hidden. That Christ as truth reveals what is hidden must again be seen in connection with the fact that by his crucifixion Christ becomes the fruit of the new Tree of Knowledge, not least because it is his “death” on the cross that causes the rending of the veil of the temple and the revelation of the hidden things within.²⁹⁰

Christ is divided on the cross and his divinity leaves his humanity behind, but another question that naturally arises from this, which we have yet to consider, is which part or parts of Christ’s constitution, outlined above, leave and which part or parts are left behind? We will get back to this question after we have considered the closely related question of the resurrection, for, as we shall see, *Gos. Phil.* closely connects the crucifixion, Eucharist, and chrismation with the resurrection.

3.1.5.4. Resurrection

The question of what it is that arises from the cross when Christ is divided must be seen in connection with the rhetorical question asked by the tractate concerning what it is that arises at the resurrection.

²⁸⁷ Cf. Matt 27:51; Mark 15:38. Cf. Tuckett, “Synoptic Traditions,” 176.

²⁸⁸ *Gos. Phil.* 56.12–13.

²⁸⁹ *Gos. Phil.* 62.14–15.

²⁹⁰ It may be noted that Cyril of Alexandria uses the same point concerning the complete tearing of the veil of the Temple, based on Matt 27:51, to argue for the revelation of the Holy of Holies (a complete revelation of the mysteries) to those who believed in Christ. See Joseph W. Trigg, “Origen and Cyril of Alexandria: Continuities and Discontinuities in Their Approach to the *Gospel of John*,” in *Origeniana Octava: Origen and the Alexandrian Tradition: Papers of the 8th International Origen Congress, Pisa, 27–31 August 2001* (2 vols.; ed. L. Perrone, et al.; BETL 164; Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters, 2003), 963–964.

3.1.5.4.1. Resurrection Prior to Death

Gos. Phil. closely connects the resurrection of Christ and the resurrection of the Christians, and does so from a rather interesting perspective:

NETXW IMOC XEAPXOCIC MOY NWPORP AXW APTWOUN CEPPLANA APTWOUN
 GAP NWPORP AXW AQMOY ETMOYA XPETANACTACIC NWPORP QHNA MOY AN QONZ
 NCOIPHOYTE NEREPIH NAM(OY)²⁹¹

Those who say that the Lord died first and then arose are wrong, for he arose first and then he died. If one does not acquire²⁹² the resurrection first he will not die.²⁹³ As God lives, that one would (die)!

(*Gos. Phil.* 56.15–20)

Somewhat paradoxically, resurrection is presented as being necessary in order to die. This passage thus furnishes us with yet another example of *Gos. Phil.*'s playful inversion of the concepts of life and death. By giving death a positive valuation, making it dependent on resurrection, and making it equal salvation, the tractate gives another statement of the important point it emphasises elsewhere, namely the deceptive nature of names and concepts in the world, and the close relation between such dichotomic conceptual pairs as life and death. The text then goes on to confound our expectations, however, by suddenly using the concept of death with its usual commonsense meaning, emphatically stating that one who does not receive the resurrection while being alive will surely die.²⁹⁴ The concept of death is here certainly not used in a positive sense.

²⁹¹ The scribe has left this gap empty, probably due to damage to the source manuscript (cf. Layton and Isenberg, "Gospel According to Philip," 153; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 227). For this emendation, see Ménard, *L'Évangile selon Philippe*, 56. Schenke translates, in accordance with this reconstruction of the Coptic text, "Gott lebt, würde jener st(erben)!" (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 23), and Wilson, likewise presupposing this reconstruction, translates "As God lives(?), this one would [die]" (Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 32). Layton has NAM(- - -), and Isenberg translates "As God lives, he would . . ." (Layton and Isenberg, "Gospel According to Philip," 152–153). Giversen chooses not to reconstruct, reading NAM as "cypress," and translates "Så sandt Gud lever, ville denne cypress?" (Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 48). While Giversen's understanding of this passage is certainly commendable in not requiring an emendation, the evidence of the manuscript does seem to suggest that there are at least a couple of letters missing at this point. Moreover, despite Giversen's ingenious interpretation, the use of the term "cypress" is rather counter-intuitive at this point in the text, and also not mentioned at any other point in its preserved parts.

²⁹² Note again the use of the word XPO, here primarily in its sense of "acquire," but with connotations of begetting and birth.

²⁹³ Cf. Hermas, *Sim.* 93 (IX.16). Schenke translates this part as a rhetorical question: "muß er dann nicht sterben?" (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 23).

²⁹⁴ This interpretation is of course dependent on the reconstruction of NAM(OY) at the end of this sentence. See note 291 above for discussion.

It startles the reader, however, and signals not only the fact that terms and concepts should not be taken at face value, but it also keeps the reader on his or her toes, so to speak, by making clear that the text does not simply reverse the signification of such concepts as life and death throughout. The use of the word death in its normal sense in this punch-line thus serves as a reminder to its readers that every reference to seemingly simple concepts in *Gos. Phil.* must be understood in its rhetorical and theological context.

Gos. Phil. quite matter-of-factly connects the resurrection of Christ with that of the individual Christian, and argues on the basis of the implicit THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST blend, that since it is a general requirement to acquire the resurrection first, in order to die, this must also have been the case with Christ. But how did Christ arise before he died? It seems that *Gos. Phil.* here interprets two main events in the life of Jesus in terms of resurrection. One of these is directly connected with death, namely the crucifixion, which may be interpreted in terms of Christ arising to the cross prior to dying. And as Christ arose to the cross and died, so too the Christians need to arise before they die. But how? *Gos. Phil.* links the crucifixion to resurrection mainly by way of the event's sacramental connotations. First of all, *Gos. Phil.* connects resurrection closely with chrismation. For, as *Gos. Phil.* tells us,

ΤΒΕἸΧΘΕΙΤ ἸΤΑΠΕΧΡΕΙΣΜΑ ΟΥΠΕ ΕΒΟΛ ἸΖΗΤῚ ΕΒΟΛ ΖΗΤΟΥΤΥ ΔΥΑΝΑΤΑΣΙΣ

it was from the olive tree that the chrism came, and from it (i.e., the chrism) the resurrection. (*Gos. Phil.* 73.17–19)

We have seen how *Gos. Phil.* connects the cross to the Tree of Life and how Jesus becomes the fruit of that tree through the crucifixion.²⁹⁵ By also connecting the chrism to the cross/Tree of Life, the tractate links the crucifixion to both chrismation and Eucharist. Moreover, by also in effect making the crucifixion the source of the chrism, and the chrism the means to the resurrection, it makes two equally important links. On the one hand it connects the crucifixion directly to the resurrection, and on the other it specifies the chrismation as a ritual bestowing it. Thus, Christ's arising before death is also linked to chrismation by means of the crucifixion, but it is also associated with Jesus' baptism through the

²⁹⁵ The identification of Christ as the olive from which the chrism is derived is also attested in the Syrian tradition, including the writings of Aphrahat and Ephrem (see Murray, *Symbols of Church and Kingdom*, esp. 124–130, 320).

links made elsewhere between the chrismation and the Jordan event, which then in effect comes to constitute begetting, (re)birth, and resurrection.

It would seem that the most probable reason why the tractate insists on the importance of resurrection prior to death, for both Christ and the Christians, is mystagogical. That is, *Gos. Phil.*'s interpretation of ritual practice requires the abovementioned sequence of resurrection prior to death. The arguments advanced by *Gos. Phil.* in this regard also seem to have a polemical edge against certain opposing points of view. First, we should probably see the polemic against those who believe that Christ died first and then rose in connection with a later passage directed against an erroneous interpretation of baptism:

Ἰη̅ς ἡ̅ τὰ̅ ἰ̅ ἁ̅ ἔ̅β̅ο̅λ̅ ἡ̅ π̅μ̅ο̅ο̅ ἡ̅ π̅β̅α̅π̅τ̅ι̅ς̅ μ̅α̅
 τ̅α̅ε̅ ἡ̅ ἡ̅ ἁ̅φ̅ῶ̅ρ̅τ̅ ἔ̅β̅ο̅λ̅ ἡ̅ π̅μ̅ο̅ο̅
 ἔ̅τ̅β̅ε̅π̅α̅ε̅ ἡ̅ τ̅ῆ̅ β̅η̅κ̅ ἡ̅ μ̅ε̅ν̅ ἔ̅π̅ι̅τ̅ῆ̅ ἔ̅π̅μ̅ο̅ο̅
 τ̅ῆ̅ β̅η̅κ̅ ἁ̅ ε̅ ἁ̅ν̅ ἔ̅π̅ι̅τ̅ῆ̅ ἔ̅π̅μ̅ο̅ο̅
 ὡ̅ι̅να̅ ἁ̅ ε̅νο̅ῦ̅π̅α̅ρ̅τ̅ῆ̅²⁹⁶ ἔ̅β̅ο̅λ̅ ῥ̅ῆ̅π̅ι̅ν̅ᾶ̅ ἡ̅ π̅κ̅ο̅ς̅μ̅ο̅ς̅

As Jesus perfected the water of baptism,
 thus he poured out death.
 Therefore we go down into the water,
 but we do not go down into death,
 so that we may not be poured out in the spirit of the world.

(*Gos. Phil.* 77.7–12)

It has been argued that this passage is directed against those who, following Romans 6, regard baptism in terms of death and resurrection.²⁹⁷ However, while this passage is certainly directed against the view that baptismal immersion is a descent into death, there is nothing in the passage that speaks against an interpretation of baptism in terms of resurrection.²⁹⁸ On the contrary, *Gos. Phil.*'s emphasis on the necessity of acquiring the resurrection prior to death indicates that resurrection is something that must be experienced and/or gained ritually. The statement that in baptism “we do not go down into death” is in accordance with the claim that one is not supposed to die first, before acquiring the resurrection. But does *Gos. Phil.* interpret baptism in terms of experiencing or acquiring resurrection?

²⁹⁶ There might be a wordplay here that carries the transition from the passage on pouring to that on blowing.

²⁹⁷ See, e.g., Majella Franzmann, “A Complete History of Early Christianity: Taking the ‘Heretics’ Seriously,” *JRH* 29:2 (2005): 123.

²⁹⁸ Cf. Pagels, “Ritual,” 283.

As we have seen, baptism is certainly interpreted in life-giving terms. It is interesting to note also how *Gos. Phil.* in the passage just quoted weaves together different aspects of Jesus' baptism by way of a pun. Jesus is described as having "perfected," $\chi\omega\kappa \epsilon\beta\omicron\lambda$, the baptismal waters,²⁹⁹ a phrase which may mean perfected or completed, but which also carries connotations of filling.³⁰⁰ Especially in this context, involving the element of water, this meaning of the word $\chi\omega\kappa$ is relevant and easily primed and brought to mind. This meaning is moreover prone to be activated when seen in connection with the following verb the text uses to describe Jesus, namely that he "poured out," $\pi\omega\epsilon\tau \epsilon\beta\omicron\lambda$, death. There is also at the same time a pun on the Coptic words $\mu\omicron\omicron\gamma$ and $\mu\omicron\gamma$, meaning "water" and "death" respectively.³⁰¹ Thus, by predicating of Jesus simultaneously $\chi\omega\kappa \epsilon\beta\omicron\lambda \bar{\mu}\pi\mu\omicron\omicron\gamma$ and $\pi\omega\epsilon\tau \epsilon\beta\omicron\lambda \bar{\mu}\pi\mu\omicron\gamma$ at his baptism, a neat and effective parallel is created between Jesus filling the baptismal water with life and emptying it of death.³⁰² Yet again *Gos. Phil.* closely links life and death

²⁹⁹ For the idea of the importance of ritually perfecting the baptismal waters, see Theophilus, *Letter to Horsiesius*, 46–48; Lundhaug, "Baptism."

³⁰⁰ See Crum 761–762. The connotations of "filling" have been made explicit in Schenke's later translations: "As Jesus filled the water of baptism (with Spirit), so he emptied out death" (Schenke, "The Gospel of Philip," 201); "Wie Jesus das Wasser der Taufe erfüllt hat, so hat er es vom Tod entleert" (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 65; Schenke, "Das Evangelium nach Philippus [NHC II,3]," 208). This stands in contrast to his earlier translation, "Wie Jesus das Wasser der Taufe vollendet hat, so goß er den Tod aus" (Schenke, "Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959]," 20; Schenke, "Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960]," 58).

³⁰¹ The wordplay and rhetoric of this passage work exceedingly well in Coptic with its juxtaposition of $\chi\omega\kappa \epsilon\beta\omicron\lambda \bar{\mu}\pi\mu\omicron\omicron\gamma$ and $\pi\omega\epsilon\tau \epsilon\beta\omicron\lambda \bar{\mu}\pi\mu\omicron\gamma$. Schenke has argued that the $\mu\omicron\omicron\gamma$ vs. $\mu\omicron\gamma$ wordplay may indicate a Coptic original for this passage (Schenke, "Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959]," 2). Against this it has been argued that the similarity between the two words in Coptic is simply a coincidence, and that the association of baptism with death goes back to the New Testament and esp. Romans 6 (see Johannes B. Bauer, "Zum Philippus-Evangelium Spr. 109 und 110," *TLZ* 86:7 [1961]: 554; Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 168; cf. also Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 12). But these objections do not take into consideration the fact that even though the argument of the passage may ultimately be derived from the Greek of the New Testament, it certainly works even better rhetorically in Coptic. Nor do these objections take into account the Coptic wordplay on $\chi\omega\kappa \epsilon\beta\omicron\lambda$ and $\pi\omega\epsilon\tau \epsilon\beta\omicron\lambda$. Schenke subsequently changed his mind, however, and no longer argued in favour of a Coptic original for this passage, suggesting either $\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\bar{\nu}$ / $\kappa\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\upsilon\bar{\nu}$ or $\pi\lambda\eta\theta\omicron\upsilon\bar{\nu}$ / $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\chi\epsilon\iota\bar{\nu}$ as the Greek *Vorlage* for $\chi\omega\kappa \epsilon\beta\omicron\lambda$ / $\pi\omega\epsilon\tau \epsilon\beta\omicron\lambda$ (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 474). This suggestion shows quite clearly the rhetorical superiority of the Coptic reading in relation to the proposed Greek original. Nevertheless, Johannes Bauer is of course right to note that "auch Übersetzer bilden mitunter Wortspiele" (Bauer, "Zum Philippus-Evangelium," 554; cf. also Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 12).

³⁰² Cf. Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 474.

in a manner that is rhetorically highly effective. The wordplay creates a seemingly intuitive link between the two and makes the mystagogical claims that are made concerning baptism seem logical and intuitively persuasive.

In this context we recall *Gos. Phil.* 68.22–26, discussed above, where Christ is described as entering and receiving death for himself and thus abolishing the death which came into being from the separation of Eve from Adam, thus recalling not only Christ’s crucifixion, as we have already suggested, but also his emptying the baptismal waters of death. In this way *Gos. Phil.* cleverly sets up a simultaneous reference to events narrated in Scripture as well as to sacramental (re)enactment. On the one hand, Christ entered the world, acquired death by crucifixion, and became the fruit of the Tree of Life, but on the other hand he also entered the baptismal waters of the Jordan and emptied the waters of death, simultaneously filling them with life.³⁰³ *Gos. Phil.* thereby also makes baptism parallel the Eucharist as a life-giving sacrament, the former being linked primarily to Christ’s baptism and the second to his crucifixion.

Now, let us return to the issue of the resurrection. As we have seen, the text seems to presuppose the necessity of attaining the resurrection prior to death, that is, the necessity of attaining it ritually. We have seen above that the reception of resurrection is closely related to chrismation, and chrismation to baptism. We may therefore draw the conclusion that one may receive the resurrection in a baptismal chrismation. In terms of ritual enactment it would seem most probable that baptismal immersion immediately preceded chrismation, in such a way that chrismation and the act of arising from the baptismal waters are interpreted together in terms of resurrection. Thus one is resurrected ritually in the baptismal chrismation in order not to die at the end of life.

The necessity of arising before death is also emphasised elsewhere in the tractate, with clear sacramental overtones:

NETXΩ ἡ̅ΜΟC XECENAΜΟΥ ἡ̅ΩΡΠI AYΩ CEḤAṬΩΟΥN [[ἡ̅]]CEṖṖIΛANA CΘE EYṬĪXI
 ἡ̅ΩΡΠI ἡ̅TANACTACIC EYONZ EYΩAMOY CEḤAXIΔAAY AN TA EI TE ΘE ON
 EYXΩ ἡ̅ΜΟC EPBAΠṬICMA EYXΩ ἡ̅ΜΟC XEOYNOB PE PBABṬICMA XEEYΩAXITC
 CEḤAΩNΩZ

³⁰³ Significantly, the baptismal water is also referred to as π̅ΜΟΥ Ε̅ΤΟΝ̅, “the living water,” at *Gos. Phil.* 75.21.

Those who say that they shall die first and (then) they shall arise are wrong. If they do not first receive the resurrection while they live, they will receive nothing when they die. Thus also when they speak about baptism they say that baptism is a great thing, for if they receive it they will live.

(*Gos. Phil.* 73.1–8)

In the same way as those who say that Christ died before he arose are wrong, those who hold that they shall die first and then be resurrected are likewise wrong. Interestingly, *Gos. Phil.* connects this error to that of believing baptism to be a sufficient criterion for salvation, or perhaps the error is simply the belief that it is the baptismal water in itself that constitutes resurrection? In any case, it seems *Gos. Phil.* is arguing for the fundamental importance of the anointing with chrism in addition to baptism in water, against those implied opponents who do not share *Gos. Phil.*'s interpretation of the chrismation as resurrection. But does *Gos. Phil.*'s emphasis on the chrismation necessarily imply that baptism is unimportant? This does not seem to be the case. On the contrary, baptism seems to be regarded as an important ritual of cleansing which is necessary in conjunction with chrismation.³⁰⁴

Gos. Phil.'s argument is held together by the blend THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST, which emphasises the parallelism between the Christ event and the life of the individual Christian. Importantly, the blend is, as we have seen, a double-scope one, with inferences projected backwards to both inputs. In this case, when it comes to the chrismation and resurrection, since Christ prefigured what is to happen sacramentally to each individual Christian,³⁰⁵ and each individual Christian passes through a chrismation that is interpreted as bringing about a resurrection, it may also be regarded as important that Christ followed the same sequence in his prefiguration as the Christians do ritually in the sacraments.

Scriptural support for this view of Christ's resurrection before death, may be found in the same passage in Romans that we identified earlier as a possible intertext with regard to *Gos. Phil.*'s theology of the dual birth of Christ, namely Rom 1:3–4. We saw that in Rom 1:4 Paul refers to Christ as being “designated Son of God in power according to the Spirit of holiness

³⁰⁴ I do not think, then, that there are any grounds for claiming, with Wilson, that this passage implies “a certain disparagement of Baptism” (Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 19, 153) or that it should be understood as “a piece of polemic against the beliefs of the ‘orthodox’ Church” (Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 153). For the view that this passage does not involve a denigration of baptism, see also Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 273 n. 1.

³⁰⁵ This is one of the possible interpretations of *Gos. Phil.* 67.27–30. See below for discussion.

by his resurrection from the dead.” When read in light of the ritual act of chrismation, and the interpretation of this ritual as connected both to the bestowal of the Holy Spirit and to resurrection, we see that this passage in Romans is indeed a powerful intertext.

Gos. Phil. also argues for the importance of receiving the Holy Spirit in order to be resurrected, using a simile describing the making of glass and pottery:

Ἰσκευος ἡναβασθῆιν μῆἰσκευος ββλχε φαγωωπε εβολ ριτῆπκωρτ ἀλλὰ Ἰσκευος ἡναβασθῆιν εγωωωωωπε παλιν φαγταμιοογ ἡταγωωπε γαρ εβολ ρῆογῆῆῆῆ Ἰσκευος δε ββλχε εγωωωωωπε φαγτακο ἡταγωωπε γαρ χωρις νιφε

Glass vessels and pottery vessels come into being by means of fire, but if glass vessels are broken they are remade, for they came into being by means of a breath (ἡῆῆ), whereas if pottery vessels are broken they are destroyed, for they came into being without breath (νιφε). (*Gos. Phil.* 63.5–11)

As W.C. van Unnik has rightly pointed out, the difference between the pottery vessels and the glass vessels only becomes clear once the vessels are broken. Therefore, van Unnik argues, the breaking of the vessels probably signifies death, and the difference highlighted in the simile is between those who have been created by means of breath, who will survive death, and those who have not been made with breath, who will not survive death.³⁰⁶ This then seems to be an argument regarding the requirements for resurrection.³⁰⁷ If we regard ritual initiation as the target input of the simile, it seems clear that the glass vessels, people who have come into being by means of “breath” (ἡῆῆ/νιφε), i.e., those who have received the Holy Spirit, are the Christians, while the others, the pottery vessels who did not receive the spirit, are the non-Christians. The Christians, then, who have been made Christians by their reception of the Holy Spirit by means of the chrism, will be resurrected, while the others, as for instance the Jews, will not. The similarities in the processes described in the simile, where the only difference between the making of the vessels of pottery and those of glass is the addition of the spirit in the latter, recalls *Gos. Phil.*’s other comparisons between Christian initiation and Jewish proselyte initiation, where the difference also has to do with

³⁰⁶ See Unnik, “Three Notes,” 467. Contrary to van Unnik, however, I do not think there is any good reason to identify “fire” in this context with sexual passion (*ibid.*).

³⁰⁷ Van Unnik has brought to light an astonishingly close parallel to the present simile in *Genesis Rabbah* 14,7 which is used in an intra-Jewish debate concerning the resurrection (see Unnik, “Three Notes,” 467–468).

the lack of spirit, chrism, and begetting. This comparison is thus primed and ready for recall, making the identification of the pottery vessels with Jewish proselytes quite intuitive. It seems we may therefore also regard this simile as having a polemical edge against Judaism.

The necessity of gaining life before death is also spelled out in another passage, however, where *Gos. Phil.* singles out the “gentile” (γεθνηκος) as one who has never lived, and thus cannot die the proper death of the Christian:

ΟΥΓΕΘΗΚΟΣ ΠΡΩΜΕ ΗΑΦΜΟΥ ΜΠΕΦΩΝΕ ΓΑΡ ΕΝΕΞ ΖΗΝΑ ΕΦΝΑΜΟΥ ΠΕΝΤΑΖΠΙΣ-
ΤΕΥΕ ΕΤΜΕ ΑΦΩΝΕ ΔΥΩ ΠΑΙ ΦΘΝΔΥΝΕΥΕ ΕΜΟΥ ΦΟΝΕ ΓΑΡ ΧΙΜΠΡΟΟΥ ΝΤΑΠΧ ΕΙ

A gentile man does not die, for he has never lived so that he may die. He who has believed in the truth he has lived,³⁰⁸ and this one is liable to die, for he is alive since the day Christ came.³⁰⁹ (*Gos. Phil.* 52.15–19)

“Death” in this sense is reserved for those who have been made alive through Christ, i.e., the Christians. If one has not received life ritually, then, one has not lived and therefore cannot die.

In summary, *Gos. Phil.* shows the necessity of becoming Christian, and of passing through the required initiation rites including the vital chrismation, in order to be able to arise after death rather than simply remain dead. As *Gos. Phil.* presents the issue, neither the Jews nor the gentiles satisfy these criteria.

3.1.5.4.2. Postmortem Resurrection

Gos. Phil.'s Christology not only influences its views of the ritual resurrection of the Christians, but also the anticipated postmortem one. In a long polemical passage the tractate specifies some of the details of this process,

³⁰⁸ Cf. John 3:15–16; 5:24–25; 6:40; 11:25–26; 20:31; 1 John 5:13.

³⁰⁹ There has been some disagreement as to whether the end of the passage as quoted here is to be understood as the end of the present argument, or as the beginning of the next. Schenke, in his first translation of the text, took χιμπρροου νταπχ ει to be the start of the next sentence and his saying number 5 (see Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 6; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960],” 39; for this solution, see also Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 352; Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 329; Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip”; Ménard, *L'Évangile selon Philippe*, 49). Some years later Schenke changed his mind and adopted the solution followed here, reading χιμπρροου νταπχ ει as the end of the present passage, his saying number 4 (see Schenke, “Die Arbeit am Philippus-Evangelium,” 325; Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 188. For this solution, see also Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 29; Till, *Das Evangelium nach Philippos*, 9; Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 41). In his critical edition, Schenke once again changed his mind and chose to read φονε γαρ χιμπρροου νταπχ ει as an independent unit, numbered 4b (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 14).

presented rhetorically in opposition to at least two opposing viewpoints. First, *Gos. Phil.* engages what it presents as the erroneous belief in the actual resurrection of the material body:

οὐ̄ν̄ζοεινε̄ ῥ̄ζοτε̄ δε̄μη̄νω̄ς̄ ἡ̄σε̄τω̄ο̄υν̄ ε̄γ̄κᾱκᾱρη̄ν̄ ε̄τ̄βε̄π[α]εῑ σε̄ο̄ω̄ω̄
ε̄τω̄ο̄υν̄ ῥ̄ν̄τ̄σᾱρ̄ξ̄ ᾱγ̄ω̄ [σ]ε̄σο̄ο̄υν̄ ἀν̄ δε̄νε̄τ̄ρ̄φο̄ρεῑ ἡ̄τ̄ς[ᾱρ̄ξ̄ ἡ̄τ̄ο̄]ο̄γ̄ πε̄
ε̄τ̄κη̄κᾱρη̄ν̄ ἡ̄δ̄εῑ ε̄τε̄[.] ἡ̄μο̄ο̄γ̄ ε̄κᾱκο̄γ̄ ε̄ρη̄[γ̄] ἡ̄[τ̄ο̄ο̄γ̄ ε̄τ̄κ]ᾱκᾱρη̄ν̄
ἀν̄

There are some who are afraid that perhaps they might arise naked. Therefore they want to arise in the flesh, and [they] do not know that it is those who wear the [flesh] who are naked.³¹⁰ These [...] to unclothe themselves, [they are] not naked. (*Gos. Phil.* 56.26–32)

Once again *Gos. Phil.* plays on the deceptiveness of concepts, this time by reversing the meaning of nakedness and clothing in its argument against the implied interlocutor that there is no need to be worried about rising naked, i.e., without the flesh, stating that it is really those who “wear the flesh” who are naked. Those who “wear the flesh” are naked because they lack the proper clothing, while those who undress have it. This clothing, which is more valuable than those who put it on, is of course exactly what the model reader of *Gos. Phil.* will acquire in his or her resurrection.³¹¹

Gos. Phil. continues its polemic against those who believe in a resurrection of the material flesh by way of an exegesis of 1 Cor 15:50, in a passage which utilises composite allusions to First and Second Corinthians as well as a paraphrase of John 6:53–54:³¹²

ἡ̄ν̄σᾱρ̄ξ̄ [ῥ̄ῑς̄νο̄γ̄ ἡ̄δ̄]ῥ̄κ̄λη̄ρο̄νο̄μ̄εῑ ἡ̄τ̄μ̄ἡ̄τε̄[ρ̄ο̄ ἡ̄π̄νο̄]γ̄τε̄ ἡ̄μ̄ τε̄ τ̄ᾱεῑ
ε̄τ̄η̄κ̄λη̄ρο̄νο̄μ̄εῑ ἀν̄ τ̄ᾱεῑ ε̄τ̄ρ̄ῑω̄ων̄ ἡ̄μ̄ δε̄ τε̄ τ̄ᾱεῑ ῥ̄ω̄ω̄ς̄ ε̄τ̄η̄κ̄λη̄ρο̄νο̄μ̄εῑ
τ̄ᾱῑς̄ τε̄ ἡ̄μ̄π̄ε̄φ̄ε̄ς̄νο̄γ̄ δῑᾱ το̄γ̄τ̄ο̄ πε̄χ̄ᾱγ̄ δε̄πε̄τ̄ᾱο̄γ̄ω̄μ̄ ἀν̄ ἡ̄τ̄ᾱσᾱρ̄ξ̄ ᾱγ̄ω̄ ἡ̄ψ̄ω̄
ἡ̄π̄ᾱς̄νο̄γ̄ ἡ̄μ̄τ̄ᾱφ̄ω̄ν̄ε̄ ῥ̄ρᾱῑ ἡ̄ζ̄η̄τ̄ῶ̄

“Flesh [and blood shall] not inherit the kingdom [of God].”³¹³ What is this that shall not inherit? (It is) this which is on us. But what also is this that shall inherit? It is Jesus’ (flesh) and his blood. Therefore he said, “He who will not eat my flesh and drink my blood has not life in him.”³¹⁴

(*Gos. Phil.* 56.32–57.5)

³¹⁰ Cf. 2 Cor 5:2–4, esp. 3.

³¹¹ We will return to the imagery of nakedness and clothing below.

³¹² For *Gos. Phil.*’s blending of 1 Cor 15:50 with John 6,53–56, see Eijk, “Gospel of Philip,” 96.

³¹³ 1 Cor 15:50.

³¹⁴ John 6:53–54.

The passage, quoted and discussed above, specifying that “his flesh is the Logos³¹⁵ and his blood is the Holy Spirit” (τεφσαρξ πε πλογοσ αγω πεφσνοφ πε ππνᾶ ετογααβ),³¹⁶ follows directly after this statement against the belief in the resurrection of the flesh. So, it is not the material flesh and blood, “this which is on us” (ταει ετρωωων),³¹⁷ that shall inherit the kingdom of God, but rather the flesh and blood of Jesus.³¹⁸ And this is the reason, argues *Gos. Phil.*, using Jesus’ words paraphrased from John 6:53–54, that it is necessary to consume his flesh and blood. We will return below to the metaphor of inheritance, but first we shall follow *Gos. Phil.*’s argument as it turns to engage apparently the opposite viewpoint to the one confronted above, for it now argues with equal force against those who reject the resurrection of the flesh completely:

ΑΝΟΚ ΤΟΨΑΡΙΚΕ ΔΗΚΟΟΥΕ ΕΤΧΩ ΞΜΟC ΧΕCΑΤΑΩΟΥΗ ΔΗ ΕΙΤΕ ΉΤΟΟΥ ΉΠΕCΝΑΥ
 CΕΩΟΟΠ ΖΉΟΥΓΤΑ ΚΧΩ ΉΜΟC ΧΕΤCΑΡΞ ΝΑΤΩΟΥΗ ΔΗ ΑΛΛΑ ΧΟΟC ΕΡΟΕΙ
 ΧΕΑΩ ΠΕΤΝΑΤΩΟΥΗ ΨΙΝΑ ΕΝΑΤΑΕΙΟΚ ΚΧΩ ΉΜΟC ΧΕΠΠΙᾶ ΖΉΤCΑΡΞ ΑΥΩ
 ΠΕΕΙΚΕΟΥΘΕΙΝ ΠΕ ΖΉΤCΑΡΞ ΟΥΛΟΓΟC ΠΕ ΠΕΕΙΚΕ ΕΦΖΉΤCΑΡΞ ΧΕΠΕΤΚΝΑΧΟΟC
 ΕΚΧΕΛΑΔΥ ΔΗ ΉΠΒΟΛ ΉΤCΑΡΞ ΖΑΠῚ ΠΕ ΕΤΩΟΥΗ ΖΉΤΨΕΙCΑΡΞ ΕΖΩΒ ΝΗΜ ΩΟΟΠ
 ΉΖΗΤῚ

As for me, I find fault with the others who say that it will not rise. Or both of them are at fault. You say that the flesh will not rise, but tell me what it is that shall arise, so that we may honour you. You say, “The spirit in the flesh,” and “It is this other light in the flesh.” It is a Logos, “this other” that is “in the flesh,” because whatever you will say, you say nothing apart from the flesh. It is necessary to arise in this flesh, for everything is in it.

(*Gos. Phil.* 57.9–19)

In the words of Jorunn Jacobsen Buckley, *Gos. Phil.* “hurls sarcasm at the opponent who thinks that he can speak as a disembodied spirit.”³¹⁹ By first engaging those who believe in the resurrection of their own material flesh, and then those who do not believe in any resurrection of the flesh at all, *Gos. Phil.* does indeed seem to place itself in the middle, embracing neither of these extremes.³²⁰ But what is really at stake here?

³¹⁵ Cf. John 1:14a.

³¹⁶ *Gos. Phil.* 57.6–7.

³¹⁷ The interpretation of ταει ετρωωων (“this which is on us”) as the material flesh, and that the contrast is between this flesh and the flesh of Jesus, is made explicit by Schenke in his translation, “Welches ist das (Fleisch), das nicht erben kann? Das (Fleisch), das wir an uns tragen! Welches aber ist das, das doch erben kann? Es ist das (Fleisch) Jesu—nebst seinem Blut!” (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 25).

³¹⁸ Cf. Eijk, “Gospel of Philip,” 96; Isenberg, “Introduction,” 136.

³¹⁹ Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4188.

³²⁰ Cf. Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 333 n.f.

Is the difference between *Gos. Phil.* and the implied opponent as great as Buckley implies? We have seen that *Gos. Phil.* rejects the resurrection of the material flesh, so what the text is here defending must be the resurrection of some other kind of flesh, for *Gos. Phil.* is adamant that the phrase “to rise in this flesh” (ἐτῶσιν ἐν τῷ σάρκι) describes the reality of the resurrection. *Gos. Phil.* must therefore count on some sort of resurrection of the flesh, but what kind of flesh? Since the concluding statement of this long polemical passage insists that it is “necessary to rise in this flesh,” a key issue for the interpretation of the passage is thus the identity of “this flesh” (τῷ σάρκι). We saw above that it was Jesus’ flesh and blood that would inherit the kingdom of heaven, so “this flesh” should logically refer to the flesh of Jesus here as well, an identification that seems quite clear within the context of the passage as a whole.³²¹ *Gos. Phil.*’s solution to the problem of the resurrection of the flesh thus seems to be based on its identification of the flesh of Christ with the Logos. Those who think the Logos rises apart from the flesh are wrong. No Logos can rise independently of the flesh—it *is* the flesh. On the other hand, those who think that only the spirit rises are equally wrong, on the same grounds, because they do not understand that the flesh in question, the flesh that *really* does rise, is the Logos. So, within the theology of *Gos. Phil.*, where the Spirit is united with the Logos, and the Logos is the flesh, the Spirit cannot rise independently of the flesh, since it cannot rise independently of the Logos, it is its blood. This may also indicate that the Spirit is not only *joined* to the Logos, but that it actually resides *within* the Logos, as life is said to be within the Logos in John 1:4, as Eve was originally within Adam when no death existed, and as blood must always be within flesh.³²²

Now, why does *Gos. Phil.* take such pains to argue for the necessity of rising “in this flesh” (ἐν τῷ σάρκι) when it could easily have put the matter in less ambiguous terms, such as, e.g., “in the flesh of Jesus”? The stress on the correctness of the phrase “in this flesh” and the way it is reinterpreted here clearly indicates that the phrase is important in itself.³²³ And it

³²¹ Cf., e.g., Isenberg, “Introduction,” 136; Rudolph, *Gnosis*, 193–194; Franzmann, *Jesus*, 63. Cf. also Elaine H. Pagels, *The Gnostic Gospels* (New York: Random House, 1979), 12 who takes the reference to the necessity of rising “in this flesh” to be ironic.

³²² See *Gos. Phil.* 68.22–23; cf. Gen 2:21–23; 3:20. There is a parallelism throughout the tractate between the Spirit and Eve. The knowledge of the framing input of human flesh and blood, namely that the latter resides within the former, supports the inferences from John 1:4 and Gen 2:21–23; 3:20.

³²³ Cf. Eijk, “Gospel of Philip,” 95.

would seem most probable that the importance of such a phrase would stem from its use in either confessional or credal statements, or doctrinal debates, or indeed both. Otherwise it seems there would be scant reason for this kind of verbal and exegetical acrobatics. We will return to this question below in more detail, since it may give us clues to the tractate's *Sitz im Leben*, but we still have not really answered the question of what it is that shall rise. Granted, we have seen that it is the flesh of Christ, rather than the material flesh, but what does this actually mean with regard to the human constitution? What happens to the human soul, and what about the spirit? We saw earlier that in the Adam-Christ blend, the Logos was on the level of Adam's soul. Now, if we take that blend into consideration with regard to the THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST blend, there are several significant entailments (see fig. 36), for it emerges from this that, as with Adam, the individual Christian soul is on the level of Christ's Logos, while the spirit is on the level of the Holy Spirit, and the material body is on the level of Christ's material body. This also seems to imply that we may regard the Logos as Christ's soul. Since it is Christ's flesh, together with the Holy Spirit that rises in the resurrection, we may surmise that for the individual Christian it is the transformed soul that rises together with the Holy Spirit. If we apply this insight to the crucifixion it seems probable that that separation involved the Logos and the Holy Spirit, together constituting Christ's divinity, separating from the material body. So, it seems that in the system of *Gos. Phil.* it is the combination of soul and spirit that rises, while the material body is left behind.

What does this view of the resurrection imply with regard to *Gos. Phil.*'s attitude towards the material body? Although the material body does not rise, *Gos. Phil.* does not seem to advocate any form of extreme bodily mortification.³²⁴

μη̄ρ̄ζοτε ρητ̄ ν̄τσαρ̄ξ οὐδε μ̄ν̄μεριτ̄ εκ̄ωᾱρ̄ζοτε ρητ̄ συνᾱρ̄χοεις ερωκ
 εκ̄ωαν̄μεριτ̄ συναομκ̄ ν̄σοσ̄κ³²⁵ η̄ ν̄ϰωᾱπε ρ̄η̄πειεκοσμοσ̄ η̄ ρ̄η̄ταναστασις
 η̄ ρ̄η̄ντοποσ̄ ετ̄ρ̄η̄τμητε μη̄ γενοιτο̄ ν̄σερε̄ ερωεῑ ρ̄η̄τ̄ου

Do not fear the flesh nor love it. If you fear it, it will master you; if you love it, it will swallow you and paralyse you. And he will either come to be in

³²⁴ Cf., however, *Gos. Phil.* 82.26–29, which may indicate a practice of bodily mortification with its statement, at 82.29, that “it is necessary to destroy the flesh” (ω̄ϰε̄ ετ̄ακο̄ ν̄τσαρ̄ξ).

³²⁵ Layton emends to συναομ(κ)κ̄ ν̄σοσ(τ)κ̄ (see Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 172).

this world or in the resurrection or in the places which are in the middle.
Do not let it happen that I be found in them! (Gos. Phil. 66.4–9)

The material flesh is neither to be loved nor hated. Instead, it is to be treated with indifference. In order not to end up in the dreaded “middle,” but rather “in the resurrection” (ἐντᾶναστασις), used here in a spatio-temporal sense rather than as an event, one must acquire the resurrection in this world. This point is unambiguously made directly after the statement that in this world good is not good and evil is not evil,³²⁶ for, as *Gos. Phil.* makes clear, the state of affairs is different after this world:

οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀλλὰ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄνω καὶ ἐν τῷ κάτω
καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄνω καὶ ἐν τῷ κάτω καὶ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄνω καὶ ἐν τῷ κάτω
καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄνω καὶ ἐν τῷ κάτω καὶ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄνω καὶ ἐν τῷ κάτω
καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄνω καὶ ἐν τῷ κάτω καὶ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄνω καὶ ἐν τῷ κάτω

But there is evil after this world that is truly evil, that which is called the middle. It is death. When we are in this world it is necessary for us to acquire (ἄνω) for ourselves the resurrection so that when we strip ourselves of the flesh we may be found in the rest (ἀναπαύσις), and not walk in the middle.³²⁷ (Gos. Phil. 66.13–20)

Gos. Phil. here introduces the term “rest” (ἀναπαύσις) as a synonym for resurrection in its spatio-temporal sense. We saw already above in the passage concerning the baptism of Jesus that the tractate there stated that it is appropriate to enter “his (Jesus’) rest” (τεφᾶναπαύσις).³²⁸ “Rest” is here clearly the opposite of “the middle” (τῆς μεσοῦσης), which is specified as being the real death.

The present passage also contains certain baptismal connotations in its use of the imagery of stripping, which may remind readers of the prebaptismal divesting of garments.³²⁹ The fact that the present passage does not specifically focus on baptism, but rather on the metaphorical stripping of the garments of flesh after death, in no way precludes the simultaneous baptismal connotations of the passage,³³⁰ especially for a reader familiar with the ritual action of prebaptismal undressing and

³²⁶ See above for discussion.

³²⁷ Cf. Heb 4:1.

³²⁸ *Gos. Phil.* 71.14–15.

³²⁹ Cf. Segelberg, “Sacramental System,” 192–193.

³³⁰ Cf. the negative evaluation by April D. DeConick and Jarl Fossum, “Stripped Before God: A New Interpretation of Logion 37 in the Gospel of Thomas,” *VC* 45:2 (1991): 124–125.

Gos. Phil.'s mystagogical interpretation of the baptismal rite in terms of acquiring the resurrection. That this acquisition of the resurrection is in many ways paralleled by, and connected to, the metaphor of putting on clothing will become clear from the discussion below concerning the tractate's concept of deification.

3.1.5.4.3. Inheritance

Resurrection and the acquisition of life are also connected to the concept of inheritance. Life and death are once again contrasted, and here it seems it is the Christians who are the living, while everyone else are regarded as dead:³³¹

NETṚKΛHPONOMEI NNETMOOYṬ
 NTOOY ZWOU SEMOYṬ
 AYW EYKΛHPONOMEI NNETMOOYṬ

Those who inherit the dead (pl),
 they too are dead,
 and they inherit the dead (pl).

NETṚKΛHPONOMEI M̄PETONḐ
 NTOOY SEONḐ
 AYW SEṖKΛHPONOMEI M̄PETONḐ MN̄NETMOOYṬ

Those who inherit the living (sgl.m),
 they are alive
 and they inherit the living (sgl.m) and the dead (pl).

NETMOOYṬ M̄AYṚKΛHPONOMEI X̄L̄AAY
 P̄WC ḠAP PETMOOYṬ Q̄NAKΛHPONOMEI
 PETMOOYṬ EQ̄WAKΛHPONOMEI M̄PETONḐ
 Q̄NAMOY AN
 ALLA PETMOOYṬ EQ̄NADONḐ N̄ROYO

The dead (pl) do not inherit anything,
 for how will the dead (sgl.m) inherit?
 If the dead (sgl.m) inherits the living (sgl.m)
 he shall not die,
 but the dead (sgl.m) shall rather live.

(*Gos. Phil.* 52.6–15)

An important feature of this passage³³² that has sometimes been obscured in translation, is the difference between the plural of “the dead”

³³¹ I have chosen to present this passage in a way that shows more clearly the rhetorical structure.

³³² In his later works, Schenke regarded this passage as three separate *Sprüche*, 3a: 52.6–11, 3b: 52.11–13, and 3c: 52.13–15 (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 15; Schenke,

(νετμοογτ) and the singular of “the living” (πετωνε) that are inherited.³³³ If we understand those who are alive as the Christians, it seems most probable that the singular living (πετωνε) that they inherit is simply Christ. So, by inheriting Christ, the Christians are alive. By contrast, those who are dead, who may by extension be identified as the non-Christians, i.e. Jews and Gentiles,³³⁴ simply inherit their own dead (νετμοογτ) and stay dead. The Christians, however, not only inherit Christ, “the living” (πετωνε), but also the, plural, “dead.” This may be taken to mean that the Christians, and Christianity, also inherit the dead, that is, they supersede Judaism and gentile religion and inherit everything.

The final paragraph in my division of the passage seems to change the simile from a simple contrast between the Christians (“the living”) and the others (“the dead”) and turns to what seems to be an argument for conversion. If one chooses to stay dead, one cannot inherit, but if one is dead and chooses to inherit the living, i.e., Christ, then the dead person will no longer be dead, but he will have gained life. The only way to gain true life, then, is to be initiated into Christianity, and thus become one of Christ’s heirs. The importance of inheriting eternal life is of course stressed in the synoptic Gospels,³³⁵ and has its Pauline parallel in the inheritance of the kingdom of God,³³⁶ in Revelation the reference to the inheritance of all things,³³⁷ and in Hebrews the idea, which is highly important in *Gos. Phil.*, of the inheritance of the name.³³⁸

“Das Evangelium nach Philippus [NHC II,3],” 191). In his earlier studies he regarded it as a single passage (see Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 6; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960],” 38–39; Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 188).

³³³ See, e.g., Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 329. Layton does not indicate the singular of the living that is inherited, but indicates the plural of the inherited dead by translating “dead things.” There is, however, no word in the manuscript that corresponds to the word “things.”

³³⁴ Layton, however, understands “the dead” (νετμοογτ) that are inherited as “dead things” and translates, rather freely, “Those who inherit dead things are also dead, and what they inherit are dead things. Those who inherit the living are alive, and they inherit both the living and the things that are dead. Dead things inherit nothing, for how could a dead thing inherit anything? If a dead person inherits the living, that person will not die, but rather will greatly live” (Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 329).

³³⁵ Matt 19:29; Mark 10:17; Luke 10:25; 18:18; cf. also Tit 3:7.

³³⁶ 1 Cor 6:9–10; 15:50; Gal 5:21; cf. also Rom 8:17; Gal 4:7; Eph 5:5; Col 3:24; Jas 2:5.

³³⁷ Rev 21:7.

³³⁸ Heb 1:4.

We have already seen how *Gos. Phil.* points out in relation to procreation that the son needs to become mature in order to reproduce as his father does.³³⁹ The tractate makes a similar point with regard to inheritance. Before he can collect his inheritance, the son must grow up:

ΠΕΤΕΥΝΤΑΥϞ Ν̄ΒΠΕΙΩΤ ΝΑΠΩΗΡΕ ΝΕ ΛΥΩ Ν̄ΤΟΥ ΖΩΩϞ ΠΩΗΡΕ ΕΝΖΟΣΟΝ ϞΟ
 Ν̄ΚΟΥΕΙ ΜΑΥΠΙΣΤΕΥΕ ΝΑϞ ΑΝΕΤΕΝΟΥϞ ΖΟΤΑΝ ΕϞΩΛΩΩΠΕ Ρ̄ΡΩΜΕ ΩΑΡΕΠΕϞΕΙΩΤ
 † ΝΑϞ ΝΕΤΕΥΝΤΑΒΣΕ ΤΗΡΟΥ

That which the father has belongs to the son, and he himself, the son, as long as he is little he is not entrusted with those (things) that are his. When he becomes a man his father gives him everything that belongs to him.

(*Gos. Phil.* 60.1–6)

This is very close to Gal 4:1, which states that the heir is no different from the slave as long as he is a child, even though he is the rightful new lord. *Gos. Phil.* indeed nicely utilises Paul's teaching in Gal 4:1–2 and 4:7 also in another passage:

Π[ϞΜ]Ξ̄ΔΛ ΜΟΝΟΝ ΕϞΩΠΙΝΕ ᾹΡ̄ΕΛΕΥΘ̄ΕΡΟ[Ϟ] ΜΑϞΩΠΙΝΕ ΔΕ Ν̄ΣΑΤΟΥϞΙΑ Μ̄ΠΕϞΧΟ[ΕΙ]Ϟ
 ΠΩΗΡΕ ΔΕ ΟΥ ΜΟΝΟΝ Χ̄ΕϞΟ Ν̄ΩΗΡΕ ΑΛΛΑ ΤΚΛΗΡΟΝΟΜΕΙΑ Μ̄ΠΕΙΩΤ ΩΑϞϞΣᾹΞ̄
 Ν̄ΣΩϞ

The slave only seeks to be free, but he does not seek the property of his master. But the son, not only is he son, but he ascribes to himself the inheritance of the father.³⁴⁰

(*Gos. Phil.* 52.2–6)

Gos. Phil. here effectively makes the point that the inheritance is reserved for the son, as opposed to the slave, but also that maturation is required to collect it. If these references also remind the reader of the rest of Gal 4:1–7 he or she might discover that this Pauline passage in fact dovetails nicely with much of *Gos. Phil.*'s discourse concerning Christ and the Christian's sonship. Christ is here presented as God's son born from a woman under the law in order to redeem those who are under the law. Those who are redeemed are also adopted as sons, receive the spirit of God, and are made heirs of God through Christ. Apart from the use of the term adoption, the passage provides a fitting intertext to *Gos. Phil.*³⁴¹

³³⁹ See *Gos. Phil.* 58.22–26.

³⁴⁰ Cf. Luke 15:12.

³⁴¹ It may also be noted that Gal 4:8 resonates with certain other passages in *Gos. Phil.*

3.1.6. *Deification*

Considering the importance of the blend THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST in *Gos. Phil.* it is clear that the means by which one may become a Christ is a major issue. The way it produces an understanding of this process may even be said to be one of the primary functions of this conceptual blend, and the process may be said to be one of deification. In his recent monograph on deification in the Greek patristic tradition, Norman Russel quotes the definition of Pseudo-Dionysius: “Deification (θέωσις) is the attaining of likeness to God and union with him so far as is possible.”³⁴² This is an apt description of what it entails to become Christ in *Gos. Phil.*, as is also Augustine Casiday’s definition of deification as “that transformation of human persons which results in the legitimate ascription to them of divine attributes and names.”³⁴³ Both of these definitions capture important aspects of the logic that underlies *Gos. Phil.*’s presentation of Christian initiation and perfection.

3.1.6.1. *Humans and Animals*

Animals are mentioned quite a few times in *Gos. Phil.* In the majority of instances, however, they are used as metaphorical representations of humans. “There are many animals in the world in human form” (οὐνῆραζ ἄθηριον ῥῆπκοςμος εἶγο ἡμορφῆ ῥῥωμε),³⁴⁴ states *Gos. Phil.* and uses this as a starting point for an extended simile where it is said of “the disciple of God” (πμαθητης ἡπνουτε)³⁴⁵ that when he recognises the true nature of different people, presented metaphorically as animals,

ῥῥῖρ μεν φημεχβαλλανος εροογ ἡτβνοογ δε φημεχειδωτ εροογ χιτωε
 χιχορτος ἡογχοορ φημεχκαας εροογ ἡεμῆαλ φηατῆναγῆωροπ ἡωηρε
 φηατῆναγῆτελειον

he will throw acorns to the pigs, but he will throw barley and chaff and hay to the cattle. He will throw bones to the dogs, to the slaves he will give the first (course), and to the children he will give the complete (banquet).

(*Gos. Phil.* 81.9–14)

³⁴² Norman Russell, *The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition* (Oxford Early Christian Studies; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1, citing *EH* I,3.

³⁴³ Augustine M.C. Casiday, “Deification in Origen, Evagrius and Cassian,” in *Origeniana Octava: Origen and the Alexandrian Tradition: Papers of the 8th International Origen Congress, Pisa, 27–31 August 2001* (2 vols.; ed. L. Perrone, et al.; BETL 164; Leuven: Leuven University Press / Peeters, 2003), 995.

³⁴⁴ *Gos. Phil.* 81.7–8.

³⁴⁵ *Gos. Phil.* 81.1–2.

We may say that *Gos. Phil.* here employs the conceptual metaphor HUMAN IS ANIMAL, and it is those humans that are decidedly less than perfect that are referred to as animals. We may indeed specify the metaphorical blend as it is used here as LESSER HUMANS ARE ANIMALS, or indeed even NON-CHRISTIANS ARE ANIMALS.³⁴⁶ The only ones worthy of being characterised as humans in this tractate are the Christians. These humans, moreover, are supposed to strive to become “perfect” (τελειος). In the hierarchical *Great Chain of Being*, man is on a higher level than the animals.³⁴⁷ When animals are used metaphorically to refer to humans it is usually instinctual behaviour that is highlighted, as opposed to higher-order behaviour or attributes, like thought and rationality, which are usually associated with humans.³⁴⁸ In *Gos. Phil.* man is clearly superior to the animals, and becoming “perfect man” is the ultimate goal. The description of the lesser human beings, the non-Christians, as animals thus also highlights the absolute superiority of the perfect man in this metaphorical scheme. The “perfect man” in *Gos. Phil.* is of course none other than Christ.

3.1.6.2. *Putting on and Becoming Perfect Man*

One of the clearest indications of the importance of deification in *Gos. Phil.* is indeed the multiple references to Christ as “the perfect man,” and the concomitant insistence on the importance of becoming Christ and “perfect man.” Christ is first identified as the perfect man in a passage that with clear eucharistic connotations states that

Ἰησοῦς ὁ ἀριστὸς ἄνθρωπος ἔφερεν ἄρτον ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ὅπως
 ἡμεῖς ἐσθιέμεν τὸν ἄρτον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ

when Christ came, the perfect man, he brought bread from heaven so that man would be nourished with the food of man. (*Gos. Phil.* 55.11–14)

Christ, as perfect man, comes from heaven with nourishment suitable for those who are not, metaphorically speaking, animals, but humans. The tractate later states that Jesus Christ is “a blessed one” (οὐμακαριος) for the very reason that he is “a perfect man” (οὐτελειος ἄνθρωπος).³⁴⁹

³⁴⁶ Kövecses mentions the conceptual metaphors OBJECTIONABLE HUMAN BEHAVIOR IS ANIMAL BEHAVIOR and OBJECTIONABLE PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS as common specifications of the generic level metaphor HUMAN IS ANIMAL (Kövecses, *Metaphor*, 125).

³⁴⁷ For the *Great Chain of Being* and metaphors based on it, see Lakoff and Turner, *More Than Cool Reason*, 170–181; Kövecses, *Metaphor*, 124–127.

³⁴⁸ See Kövecses, *Metaphor*, 126.

³⁴⁹ *Gos. Phil.* 80.1–4.

Becoming perfect man is also a major goal for the Christian, and must be understood in terms of the overall goal of becoming a Christ. *Gos. Phil.* describes this process partly by using metaphorical imagery of the putting on of clothing, and as is the case with the acquisition of the resurrection, becoming perfect man is closely linked to ritual acts. Interestingly, however, it does not seem to be linked to just one particular ritual, but rather to several.

3.1.6.2.1. Baptism

First of all, *Gos. Phil.* clearly associates the putting on of the body of “the living man” (πρώμε ετονε) with baptism:

πμοογ ετονε ουσωμα πε φδε ετρνετζιωων μπρωμε ετονε ετβεπαει εχει
εφνκ επτην επμοογ φαφκακφ αρηγ φινα εφνατην ζωωφ

The living water is a body.³⁵⁰ It is necessary for us to put on the living man. Therefore, coming down to the water he strips himself naked so that he may put that one on. (*Gos. Phil.* 75.21–25)

One goes down into the baptismal waters naked in order to put on “the living man.” As we have seen, the tractate stresses the life-giving effects of baptism and rejects an interpretation of the immersion in water as death,³⁵¹ and this putting on of the living man seems to be one of the vital goals of baptism.³⁵² The identification of the living water as “a body” (ουσωμα) is what specifically creates the mental link here between the immersion and the donning of the new body of “the living man” (πρώμε ετονε).

3.1.6.2.2. Chrismation

In addition to putting on “the living man,” however, becoming perfect man is also associated with the reception of the “perfect light” (πτελειον νογοειν)³⁵³ and with the effects of the Eucharist. As for the reception of the perfect light, we have already seen how the imagery of light is intimately connected with the Holy Spirit and with the chrism. *Gos. Phil.* states that,

³⁵⁰ Cf. Heb 10:5.

³⁵¹ See *Gos. Phil.* 77.7–12 and the discussion below.

³⁵² April DeConick, however, takes the reference to “the living water” (πμοογ ετονε) in this passage to refer to the Eucharist, rather than to baptism (see April D. DeConick, “Entering God’s Presence: Sacramentalism in the Gospel of Philip,” *SBLSP* [1998]: 503).

³⁵³ *Gos. Phil.* 76.27.

ΠΕΝΤΑΧΤΟΣΟΝ ΟΥΝΤΕΟ ΠΤΗΡΟ ΜΗΔΥ ΟΥΝΤΑΟ ΤΑΝΑΚΤΑΟΙΟ ΠΟΥΟΕΙΟ ΠΕΟ.ΡΟΟ
ΠΠΝΑ ΕΤΟΥΑΔΑΒ ΔΠΕΙΩΤ † ΝΑΟ ΜΠΑΕΙ ΕΜΠΝΥ[Μ]ΦΩΝ ΔΟΧΙ ΔΟΦΩΠΕ ΝΟΠΕΙΩΤ
ΕΜΠΩ[Η]ΡΕ ΑΥΩ ΠΩΗΡΕ ΕΜΠΕΙΩΤ

he who has been anointed has everything. He has the resurrection, the light, the cross, the Holy Spirit. The Father gave him this in the bridal chamber. He received, and the Father came to be in the Son and the Son in the Father.³⁵⁴ (*Gos. Phil.* 74.18–24)

The chrismation is connected to the cross (Tree of Life), the resurrection, the light, and “the bridal chamber” (ΠΝΥΜΦΩΝ). The acquisition of the light thus takes place through chrismation, and is moreover further described in terms of the garment metaphor when *Gos. Phil.* describes the effects of putting on the perfect light in terms of becoming invisible to “the powers” (ΝΔΥΝΑΜΙΟ):

ΠΕΝΤΑΕΤΕΡΩΟ ΕΠΤΕΛΕΙΟΝ ΝΟΥΟΕΙΟ ΜΑΡΟΥΝΑΟ ΕΡΟΥΟ ΝΟΙΝΔΥΝΑΜΙΟ ΑΥΩ
ΜΑΥΘΕΜΑΕΤΕ ΜΗΟΟΥ ΟΥΑ ΔΕ ΝΑΤΕΙΩΩΟ ΕΠΠΟΥΟΕΙΟ ΕΜΠΜΥΟΤΗΡΙΟΝ ΕΜΠΕΩΤΡ

The powers cannot see those who have put on the perfect light, and they cannot detain them, and one shall put on that light in the mystery in the union.³⁵⁵ (*Gos. Phil.* 70.5–9)

The donning of the light is here explicitly stated to happen “in the union” (ΕΜΠΕΩΤΡ) which must be seen in connection with the passage cited above, which refers to the reception of the light “in the bridal chamber” (ΕΜΠΝΥΜΦΩΝ). As we saw earlier, what happens in the chrismation of the individual Christian is interpreted in relation to the events at the Jordan. We saw that in the unification of the Logos with the Holy Spirit, an event that is described as both a mystery and as a revelation of “the great bridal chamber” (ΠΝΟΟ ΜΠΑΟΤΟ), the true body of Jesus came into being.³⁵⁶ That passage also states that in this unification, “a fire illuminated him” (ΑΥΚΩΤ ΡΟΥΟΕΙΟ ΕΡΟΟ). So, the light is intimately connected to the union and the bridal chamber with regard to Jesus’ baptismal chrismation, and the same is true with regard to that of the Christian: the reception of the light is associated with the joining that takes place with the chrismation, and is thereby linked to the metaphor of the bridal chamber.³⁵⁷

³⁵⁴ Cf. John 10:38; 14:10–11; 17:21; and cf. also John 10:30; 14:9, 20.

³⁵⁵ Cf. 1 Cor 10:16; Rev 19:13.

³⁵⁶ See *Gos. Phil.* 71.3–8.

³⁵⁷ Wilson, however, instead takes the close association between the anointing and the bridal chamber in *Gos. Phil.* 74.18–24 to indicate “How far Philip is from distinct and clear-cut ideas on the subject of the sacraments” (Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 20).

Gos. Phil. emphasises at several points that the wearing of the perfect light makes one invisible with regard to “the powers” (ἄδυναμικ), and stresses that indeed the only way to attain such invisibility is to put on the perfect light and thus become perfect light:

ΟΥ ΜΟΝΟΝ ΠΡΩΜΕ ἸΤΕΛΕΙΟΣ ΣΕΝΑΦΕΜΑΖΤΕ ΑΝ ἸΜΟΦ ΑΛΛΑ ΣΕΝΑΦΝΑΦ ΕΡΟΦ
ΑΝ ΕΥΦΑΝΝΑΦ ΓΑΡ ΕΡΟΦ ΣΕΝΑΦΕΜΑΖΤΕ ἸΜΟΦ ἸΚΕΡΗΤΕ ΜἸΟΥΑ ΝΑΦΧΠΟ ΝΑΦ
ἸΤΕΕΙΧΑΡΙΣ ΕΙ [ΜΗ Ἰ]Φ†Ζ[1]ΦΩΦ ἸΠΤΕΛΕΙΟΝ ἸΟΥΟΕΙΝ [ΑΥΩ] ἸΦΩΦ[ΠΕ Ζ]ΦΩΦ
ἸΤΕΛΕΙΟΝ ΟΥΟ[ΕΙΝ]

Not only will they not be able to detain the perfect man, but they will not be able to see him. For if they see him they will detain him. No one will be able to acquire for himself this grace in another way [except by] putting on the perfect light³⁵⁸ [and] himself becoming perfect [light].

(*Gos. Phil.* 76.22–29)

This metaphorical cloak of invisibility not only secures the initiated’s postmortem ascent, however, but also life in this world:

ΕΡΩΔΟΥΑ ΩΦΠΕ ἸΩΗΡΕ ἸΠΝΥΜΦΩΝ ΦΝΑΧΙ ἸΠΟΥΟΕΙΝ ΕΤἸΟΥΑ ΧΙΤΦ
ΕΦἸΝΕΕΙΜΑ ΦΝΑΦΧΙΤΦ ΑΝ ἸΠΚΕΝΑ ΠΕΤΑΧΙΠΟΥΟΕΙΝ ΕΤἸΝΑΦ ΣΕΝΑΝΑΦ ΑΝ ΕΡΟΦ
ΟΥΤΕ ΣΕΝΑΦΕΜΑΖΤΕ ΑΝ ἸΜΟΦ ΑΥΩ ΗἸΛΑΑΥ ΝΑΦΡἸΚΥΛΛΕ ἸΠΑΕΙ ἸΤΕΕΙΜΕΙΝΕ
ΚΑΝ ΕΦἸΠΟΛΙΤΕΥΕΣΘΑΙ ΖἸΠΚΟΜΟC

If one becomes a child of the bridal chamber,³⁵⁹ he will receive the light.³⁶⁰ If one does not receive it while being here, he will not be able to receive it in the other place. He who will receive that light will not be seen nor can he be detained, and no one will be able to trouble such a person even while he dwells in the world

(*Gos. Phil.* 86.4–11)

In order to be able to enjoy these benefits one needs to receive the light here in this world, and the light is only given to those who become a “child of the bridal chamber” (ΩΗΡΕ ἸΠΝΥΜΦΩΝ). It seems, then, that also with regard to these questions *Gos. Phil.* emphasises the necessity of becoming a true initiated Christian by receiving the chrism in this world, in close relation to the baptismal ritual, and so become perfect light and invisible to the powers. Becoming a properly initiated Christian, a “child of the bridal chamber,” thus has profound implications not only with regard to life in the next world, but also in the present one.

³⁵⁸ Cf. Rev 19:13.

³⁵⁹ Cf. Matt 9:15; Mark 2:19; Luke 5:34.

³⁶⁰ Cf. *Gos. Phil.* 67.3–5.

3.1.6.2.3. Eucharist

The deificatory process of becoming perfect man does not end with the chrismation, however, for *Gos. Phil.* also connects this motif closely with the consumption of the eucharistic elements. We saw already in the passage cited above that Christ as the perfect man brings “bread from heaven,”³⁶¹ but there are also other passages that link the imagery of the “perfect man” to the Eucharist. *Gos. Phil.* describes the elements of the Eucharist as follows:

ΠΠΟΤΗΡΙΟΝ ἸΠΩΛΛΗ ΟΥΝΤΑΧΗΡΙ ΠΝΑΥ ΟΥΝΤΑΧΜΟΟΥ ΕΦΚΗ ΕΞΡΑΪ ΕΠΤΥΠΟΣ
ἸΠΕΣΝΟΥ ΕΤΟΥΡΕΥΧΑΡΙΣΤΕΙ ΕΧΩΟΥ

The cup of prayer contains wine and it contains water, for it is laid down as the type of the blood over which thanks is given.³⁶² (*Gos. Phil.* 75.14–17)

This passage gives us a rare glimpse of the ritual enactment presupposed by *Gos. Phil.*'s mystagogy by stating that the eucharistic cup, “the cup of prayer” (ΠΠΟΤΗΡΙΟΝ ἸΠΩΛΛΗ), is filled with “wine” (ΗΡΙ) and “water” (ΜΟΥ).³⁶³ The tractate then gives a mystagogical explanation for the contents of the cup, with the statement that this mixture is a “type” (ΤΥΠΟΣ) of the blood of Jesus. First and foremost, the reference to the blood of Jesus being a mixture of blood (the wine) and water recalls John 19:34, which relates that when Jesus was pierced on the cross with the spear there came out “blood and water” (ΟΥΣΝΟΥ ΜΝΟΥΜΟΟΥ / ΑΪΜΑ ΚΑΙ ὕδωρ).³⁶⁴ By being specifically mentioned in connection with the crucifixion, this Johannine passage fits well *Gos. Phil.*'s interpretation of the Eucharist.

In addition to this Johannine reference, however, the *Gos. Phil.* passage also has the potential to recall Luke 22:43–44. This much-debated passage³⁶⁵ follows the description in verses 41–42 of Jesus kneeling down,

³⁶¹ See *Gos. Phil.* 55.11–14.

³⁶² Cf. 1 Cor 10:16. In his later works, Schenke suggests that the text should here be emended to better match the structure of 1 Cor 10:16, and translates, “Der Kelch des Gebets (, über dem gedankt wird,) enthält sowohl Wein als auch Wasser. Er ist als Zeichen *des Blutes* { } eingesetzt” (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 61; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [NHC II,3],” 206, the emphasis is that of Schenke). For the rationale for this emendation, see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 456. I prefer to stay with the manuscript reading, however, since the text makes good sense as it is.

³⁶³ Cf. Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 349.

³⁶⁴ Cf. DeConick, “Entering God’s Presence,” 503.

³⁶⁵ See Claire Clivaz, “The Angel and the Sweat Like ‘Drops of Blood’ (Lk 22:43–44): P⁶⁹ and J¹³,” *HTR* 98:4 (2005): 419–440 for references. Luke 22:43–44 is omitted in most modern translations of the New Testament.

praying and asking God to remove “this cup” (τοῦτο τὸ ποτήριον). Luke 22:43–44 describes Jesus being in agony, praying earnestly and breaking into a sweat resembling blood: “and his sweat became like great drops of blood” (καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἰδρῶς αὐτοῦ ὡσεὶ θρόμβοι αἵματος).³⁶⁶ Of special interest in light of the eucharistic setting for the *Gos. Phil.* passage in question is the fact that Luke 22:43 relates that Jesus encounters “an angel from heaven, strengthening him” (ἄγγελος ἀπ’ οὐρανοῦ ἐνισχύων αὐτόν).³⁶⁷ A possible intertextual integration network based on a reading of *Gos. Phil.* 75.14–21 may thus look like the one shown in fig. 37. The three mental input spaces share a generic space that consists of the generic references to blood and water.³⁶⁸ Moreover, the *Gos. Phil.* and Luke input spaces share a local generic space containing the references to prayer and cup. The blend as a whole not only reinforces the connection between the crucifixion and the Eucharist, but also at the same time strengthens the link between the eucharistic prayer and the angels that is evident elsewhere in the tractate.³⁶⁹

The *Gos. Phil.* passage continues by describing the contents of the “cup of prayer” (ποπτηριον ἡπαληλ) in the following way:

αγω φμογρ εβολ ρηπιπῆα ετογααβ αγω παπτελειος τηρρ ρρωμε πε ροταν
εφωανσω ἡπαει τηαχι ναν ἡπτελειος ρρωμε

And it fills³⁷⁰ with the Holy Spirit, and it is that (i.e., the blood)³⁷¹ of the completely perfect man. Whenever we drink this we will receive the perfect man. (*Gos. Phil.* 75.17–21)

³⁶⁶ Luke 22:44.

³⁶⁷ It is worth noting that in several manuscripts, Luke 22:43–45a has been moved to Matt 26:39, and that many manuscripts entirely omit Luke 22:43–44. It has recently been argued convincingly that in the cases where Luke 22:43–45a has been moved to Matt 26:39 this has been done for liturgical purposes (see Clivaz, “The Angel and the Sweat”).

³⁶⁸ WATER is a generic level conceptual constituent of the ICM of SWEAT.

³⁶⁹ See *Gos. Phil.* 58.10–14.

³⁷⁰ As Schenke points out, here “zeigt der Umstand, daß nicht der *im Präsens* übliche Stativ *μερ* oder *μηρ*, sondern der (durative) Infinitiv *μογρ* gebraucht ist, daß nicht der *Zustand* des *Erfülltseins* gemeint ist, sondern das *Geschehen* des *Erfülltwerdens*” (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 456, Schenke’s emphasis). See also Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 81. Both Layton and Isenberg (in the critical edition), however, translate “it is full of the holy spirit” (Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 347; Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 193; cf. also Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 384, where Isenberg translates “it is filled with the Holy Spirit”).

³⁷¹ For the identification of *πα-* (“that of”) in *παπτελειος* with *πεσνορ* (“the blood”), see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 61, 456–457; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus (NHC II,3),” 1:206. Schenke had previously suggested that it should be identified with *πῆα* (“the spirit”) (see Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 19; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960],” 56).

The eucharistic cup contains the Holy Spirit and is thus the blood of the completely perfect man, the blood of Christ. Drinking from this spirit-filled cup, which presumably goes together with the eating of the eucharistic bread, thus causes the communicants to receive Christ. Through the cup they receive his blood, the Holy Spirit, and through the bread they receive his flesh, the Logos. One thus puts on the perfect man not only in baptism, but also in the Eucharist, and consequently the fact that the eucharistic cup contains water in addition to wine may be seen as an additional reference to baptism as well as to the scriptural passages mentioned above.³⁷²

Significantly, this process is also described in terms of the garment metaphor at the end of an important passage that we have already encountered several times:

πεχαρα δεπταουωμ αν ντασαρζ αυ ν̄qcω μπασνοq μ̄νταqωνε εραϊ
 ν̄ρητ̄q αυ τε τεqσαρζ πε πlogoc αυ πεqсноq πε π̄π̄να ετοyααb πενταεχι
 ναει οyντεqτροφη αυ οyνταqω ε̄ιβ̄cω

he said, "He who will not eat my flesh and drink my blood has not life in him." What is it? His flesh is the Logos, and his blood is the Holy Spirit. He who has received these has food, and he has drink and clothing.³⁷³

(*Gos. Phil.* 57.3–8)

Gos. Phil. here paraphrases John 6:53–55 and adds what seems to be an allusion to Matt 6:25 and 31.³⁷⁴ We have already seen how in this Johannine passage Jesus is identified with the Son of Man, and how this *Gos. Phil.* passage also sets up a blend with the Johannine prologue. What is significant in the present context, however, is the connection that is made between the Eucharist and the garment. The use of the garment metaphor here is as evocative as it is unexpected and creates a potential link between the Eucharist and the various other contexts in which the garment shows up in *Gos. Phil.* For the garment imagery is an important reference with regard to intertextual and conceptual blends involving, in

³⁷² Cf. Buckley, "Conceptual Models," 4177; Thomas M. Finn, *Early Christian Baptism and the Catechumenate: Italy, North Africa, and Egypt* (Message of the Fathers of the Church 6; Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1992), 10–11.

³⁷³ I take ε̄ιβ̄cω to be a contraction of ε̄ι-ε̄β̄cω (cf. Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 24; Andrew Helmbold, "Translation Problems in the Gospel of Philip," *NTS* 11 [1964]: 91). The wording οyνταq cω ε̄ιβ̄cω may perhaps also be construed as wordplay on cω ("drink") and ε̄β̄cω ("clothing"), which becomes even clearer with the omission of the ε̄ in ε̄β̄cω which leaves us with the pair cω and β̄cω connected by ε̄ι.

³⁷⁴ See Tuckett, "Synoptic Traditions," 174; Tuckett, *Nag Hammadi*, 74; Helmbold, "Translation Problems," 91.

addition to this eucharistic reference, not only baptism and chrismation, but also marriage and resurrection. One of the most direct statements of the deificatory aspects of the garment metaphor is found in a passage where the tractate juxtaposes the garments of this world with those of the kingdom of heaven:

ἤΠΕΕΙΚΟΣΜΟΣ ΝΕΤΨ ΖΙΩΟΥ ἠἠῤῥΒΣΩ ΣΕΣΟΤΠ ΔΗἠῤῥΒΣΩ ΖἠΤΜἠΤΕΡΟ ἠἠΠΗΥΕ
ἠῤῥΒΣΩ ΣΕΣΟΤΠ ΔΝΕΝΤΑΥΤΑΔΥ ΖΙΩΟΥ

In this world those who wear the garments are better than the garments.
In the kingdom of heaven the garments are better than those who have put
them on.³⁷⁵ (Gos. Phil. 57.19–22)

This may seem to be an almost tautological statement of the fact that the heavenly garments are heavenly, i.e., that in this world the clothes are worth less than the person who wears them, while in heaven, the clothes are more valuable than the person. This comparison, however, prompts the question of the nature and identity of the heavenly garments. The significance of the comparison becomes clear when we, in light of some of the passages discussed above, identify the garments in this world metaphorically with the material body and the garments in the kingdom of heaven with the body of Christ, in the post-initiatory and postmortem wearing of the “perfect man.” It thus seems that *Gos. Phil.* here, as in 56.29–30 where “those who wear the [flesh]” (ΝΕΤῤῥΦΟΡΕΙ ἠΤΣ[ΔΡῤῥ])³⁷⁶ are discussed, utilises the common conceptual metaphor THE BODY IS A GARMENT³⁷⁷ (see fig. 38). *Gos. Phil.* adds the twist, however, of blending this metaphor with the identification of the heavenly garment with the body of Christ (see fig. 39).³⁷⁸ This earthly, material body is of less worth than the soul who wears it, while the heavenly garment of light, on the other hand, which is the body of the perfect man, is more valuable.³⁷⁹ In this way the wearer also in a sense becomes deified by wearing the

³⁷⁵ Cf. Matt 6:25; Luke 12:23.

³⁷⁶ This reconstruction is clear from the context.

³⁷⁷ For the use of this metaphor in early Christianity, often based on an exegesis of Gen 3:21, see, e.g., J.Z. Smith, “Garments of Shame.”

³⁷⁸ Cf. Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 90.

³⁷⁹ I do not think, however, as does Gaffron, that *Gos. Phil.* is here trying to make a point concerning the constant value of the one who wears these garments (see Gaffron, *Studien*, 162), since *Gos. Phil.* seems to make a point elsewhere of the deification of the individual soul. The main thrust of the blend seems rather to be on the fundamental difference between the material body, that one will take off, and the body of Christ, which is what one ought to put on. Gaffron, however, does not equate the garment with the body of Christ, but speaks of the true flesh wearing the garment of light (see Gaffron, *Studien*, 162–163).

heavenly garments, in a way which nicely dovetails with another simile used by *Gos. Phil.*, discussed below, where the process of dyeing clothes is the primary framing input.³⁸⁰ In the final analysis, what we have here is simply another perspective on the necessity of putting on and arising in the flesh of Jesus,³⁸¹ as we saw in the analysis of *Gos. Phil.*'s discourse concerning the resurrection of the flesh,³⁸² which is of course the very passage that directly precedes the one presently under discussion. The picture that emerges from this analysis, then, is that of a functional overlapping of the sacraments, with the reception of “the perfect man,” being associated with both baptism, chrismation and the Eucharist. At the same time, the theme is also connected to a series of interrelated conceptual domains, including resurrection and deification. We may therefore, in cognitive terms, describe the garment as a concept that is used as a framing input in blends involving many different targets, often simultaneously.³⁸³

3.1.6.3. *Dyeing*

Closely related to the aforementioned motifs of resurrection and the garment-metaphor of putting on “the perfect man,” *Gos. Phil.* also utilises imagery of dyeing:

ΠΝΟΥΤΕ ΟΥΧΩΣΙΤ ΠΕ ΝΘΕ ΝΗΧΩΘΕ ΕΤΝΑΝΟΥΟΥ ΟΥΑΥΜΟΥΤΕ ΕΡΟΟΥ ΧΕΝΑΛΗΘΙΝΟΝ
 ΟΥΑΥΜΟΥ ΜΗΝΕΝΤΑΧΩΘΕ ΠΡΑΙ ΝΡΗΤΟΥ ΤΑΕΙ ΤΕ ΘΕ ΝΝΕΝΤΑΠΝΟΥΤΕ ΧΟΘΟΥ
 ΕΠΕΙΔΗ ΖΗΝΑΤΜΟΥ ΝΕ ΝΕΥΧΩΘΕ ΟΥΑΥΡΑΤΜΟΥ ΕΒΟΛ ΖΗΤΟΥΤΩ ΝΝΕΥΠΑΡΡΕ
 ΠΝΟΥΤΕ ΔΕ ΡΒΑΠΤΙΖΕ ΝΝΕΥΡΒΑΠΤΙΖΕ ΗΜΟΥ ΖΗΟΥΜΟΥ³⁸⁴

³⁸⁰ See below. This parallel is also noted by Sevrin, “Pratique et doctrine,” 31; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 239–240.

³⁸¹ Cf. Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 240.

³⁸² *Gos. Phil.* 56.26–57.19. See discussion above.

³⁸³ This, I think, may be the reason why the garment metaphor in *Gos. Phil.*, as Thomassen notes, “is not . . . explicitly connected with a specific act such as either the anointing of the body or the subsequent donning of baptismal robes” (Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 348).

³⁸⁴ The manuscript continues with, ΜΗ[ΟΥ]ΘΟΜ ΝΤΕΛΑΛΥ ΝΑΥ, with the scribe having cancelled the letters ΟΥ in ΜΗΘΟΘΟΜ (see *Facsimile Edition: Codex II*). Several scholars have suggested that the text has not been properly corrected by this scribal correction: De Catanzaro translates, “in water and power. No one sees” (Catanzaro, “The Gospel According to Philip,” 45), which indicates that he has chosen to emend the text to ΖΗΟΥΜΟΥ ΜΗΘΟΘΟΜ ΜΗΛΑΛΥ ΝΑΥ (cf. Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 162); Isenberg thinks that the ΟΥ in ΜΗ[ΟΥ]ΘΟΜ should not be cancelled, and reads ΝΤΕΛΑΛΥ as a conjunctive, translating, “in water and power. And no one sees” (see Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 364, 422); Schenke suggests the emendation ΖΗΟΥΜΟΥ ΜΗ(ΟΥΠΝΑ ΜΗ)ΘΟΜ (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 304); Charron and Painchaud argue that Schenke was basically on the right track but suggest instead the emendation

God is a dyer. Like the good dyes—they are called the true (dyes)—die with those (things) that have been dyed in them, thus it is with those whom God has dyed. Since his dyes are immortal, they become immortal by means of his remedies. But God dips (ῥβαπτιζει) those whom he dips (ῥβαπτιζει) in water.³⁸⁵ (Gos. Phil. 61.12–20)

Gos. Phil. here sets up an interesting baptismal metaphor.³⁸⁶ Regine Charron and Louis Painchaud have rightly noted that the point concerning the “good” and “true” dyes is that the colours, rather than fade away, last as long as that which is dyed in them.³⁸⁷ Good and true dyes thus perish with the things dyed in them. *Gos. Phil.* then adds the twist that since God’s dyes are immortal, those that are dyed with these dyes will also become immortal. The somewhat reverse logic seems to be that since these dyes will never die, this means that the things dyed in them must also by necessity become immortal. That is, the immortality of the dyes requires the subsequent immortality of the recipients, for otherwise they would perish with the latter like the good and true colours of the world.³⁸⁸ In addition, *Gos. Phil.* plays on the double meaning of the word παρρη, which denotes medicine / drug / remedy, as well as colour.³⁸⁹ In using this

ϩῆογμοογ (μῆογσομ μῆσομ) ἵτελλαγ ναγ (see Charron and Painchaud, “God is a Dyer,” 43). While I acknowledge that the homoteleuton and subsequent erroneous scribal correction suggested by Charron and Painchaud is certainly plausible, I have here chosen to follow the manuscript reading and accept the scribal correction, reading simply ϩῆογμοογ μῆσομ ἵτελλαγ ναγ, “in water. It is impossible for anyone to see” (for this solution, see, e.g., Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 162; Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 37; Till, *Das Evangelium nach Philippos*, 25; Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 57; Ménard, *L’Évangile selon Philippe*, 66–67). The original scribal mistake of writing μῆογσομ instead of μῆσομ can be explained by the scribe expecting the former reading, but then correcting himself when he realised that he had made a mistake. It should be pointed out that this reading is grammatically beyond reproach (cf. the discussion in Charron and Painchaud, “God is a Dyer,” 42–43). As we shall see in the discussion below, it also makes good rhetorical sense, making emendation unnecessary.

³⁸⁵ For a thorough discussion of this passage, see Charron and Painchaud, “God is a Dyer.”

³⁸⁶ As Charron and Painchaud rightly note, “The fact that the simile in the first part of the passage is about baptism is self-evident” (Charron and Painchaud, “God is a Dyer,” 44).

³⁸⁷ See Charron and Painchaud, “God is a Dyer,” 42; Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 107.

³⁸⁸ In order to explain the immortalising effects of this process of dyeing, Charron and Painchaud argue for a close connections between *Gos. Phil.* and alchemical literature (see Charron and Painchaud, “God is a Dyer,” 47–49). Although this suggestion is intriguing, Charron and Painchaud do not convincingly show that these parallels are relevant in the context of the passage in question, and ultimately they are not necessary in order to understand *Gos. Phil.*’s argument, which seems to have a clear internal logic of its own.

³⁸⁹ See Crum 282b.

particular word to denote colour at this point, rather than $\chi\omega\sigma\epsilon$, which is used earlier in the passage, *Gos. Phil.* manages to stress the medicinal, life-giving aspect of the baptismal process, while at the same time preserving the metaphorical source input of dyeing.³⁹⁰ God's dyes, then, have a medicinal, immortalising effect. Thus far the interpretation of the metaphor BAPTISM IS DYEING is relatively straightforward. The final part of the passage, however, then adds a direct reference to baptism, using the term $\rho\beta\alpha\pi\tau\iota\zeta\epsilon$, stating that God dips those whom he dips in water.³⁹¹ This term in itself, of course, not only refers to the ritual of baptism, but may also simply mean wash, dip, or submerge in a general sense, and thereby also feeds directly into the metaphorical framing input of dyeing.

Gos. Phil.'s use of this sentence as a punchline, however, seems to call for a slight reinterpretation of the metaphor. We are left with two main interpretive possibilities here. It may simply be a more direct reference to the fact that the dyeing *Gos. Phil.* has just described should be interpreted as a metaphor of baptismal immersion in water,³⁹² and that it is the water itself that is to be mapped onto the dye. This solution plays down the importance of the use of the word $\pi\alpha\rho\rho\epsilon$, however. If we take the multiple meanings of this word into consideration, not least its medicinal connotations, the chrism would probably be the most readily available counterpart in the conceptual integration invited by the tractate, rather than the water itself.³⁹³ In that case, the final sentence seems to introduce a contrast between God's dyes/remedies and the water, a contrast that seems to parallel the contrast between baptism and chrismation elsewhere in

³⁹⁰ Cf. Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 57 n. 3. Charron and Painchaud claim that with the shift to $\pi\alpha\rho\rho\epsilon$, *Gos. Phil.* puts the emphasis on the instrumentality of God's dyeing in the transformative process of baptism (Charron and Painchaud, "God is a Dyer," 48). It seems to me, however, primarily to stress the life-giving effects of the remedy that is added to the water, rather than the actor and his actions.

³⁹¹ Schenke, however, in his later works prefers to regard this sentence as a separate saying, 43b (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 33; Schenke, "Das Evangelium nach Philippus [NHC II,3]," 197), but concedes that it may be related to 43a (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 303–304). In his early translations, Schenke emended the text and translated, "Gott aber taucht ($\beta\alpha\pi\tau\iota\zeta\epsilon\iota\nu$) das, was er (färbt) ($\beta\acute{\alpha}\pi\tau\epsilon\iota\nu$) in Wasser unter" (Schenke, "Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959]," 11; Schenke, "Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960]," 45).

³⁹² Cf. Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 304: "Unsere These dürfte also im Klartext einfach noch einmal sicherstellen wollen, daß das Gleichnis die Taufe und ihre göttlichen Wirkungen meint." Cf. also Borchert, "Literary Arrangement," 178.

³⁹³ In the Sahidic New Testament, the word is, e.g., used in Rev 3:18 as a translation of $\kappa\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\rho\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu$, "eye salve" (see Wilmet, *Concordance*, 2:647–648; Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 57 n. 3).

Gos. Phil. The interpretation would then be that the baptismal washing takes place in water, but the particular remedy that helps bring about immortality is the chrism (see fig. 40). Interestingly, this blend thereby not only stresses the immortalising qualities of the chrism, but also the indispensability of baptism in water as well as the simultaneity of baptism and chrismation. We thus seem to have yet another indication that the chrismation presupposed by *Gos. Phil.* was closely connected to baptism, rather than a completely separate ritual.

We saw above that *Gos. Phil.* elsewhere connects apostolic succession through ritual initiation specifically to the effects of the chrismation. Significantly, we also seem to have indications of the dyeing-metaphor being connected to succession when we connect the passage concerning God as a dyer, discussed here, with the fact that we read elsewhere in *Gos. Phil.* that

αρχοεις βακ ερογ[ν] επιμα ν̄χωσε̄ ν̄λεγεῑ αϑιϑωβεςνοοϑς̄ ν̄χρωμα
αϑνοϑοῡ ατροϑτε̄ αϑῑτοϑ̄ εϑρᾱῑ εϑοβᾱ τηροϑ̄ αϑω̄ πεϑαϑ̄ δεταεῑ τε̄
θε̄ ν̄ταϑεῑ ν̄μοϑ̄ ν̄σιπω̄νηρ̄[ε̄ ν̄πω̄νηρ̄]ε̄ ν̄πρω̄μ[ε̄ ε̄]ϑ[ο] ν̄χϑῑτ

the Lord went into Levi's place of dyeing and took seventy-two³⁹⁴ colours and threw them into the vat and brought them out all white, and said, "Thus the Son [[of the Son]] of Man has come [as] a dyer."³⁹⁵

(*Gos. Phil.* 63.25–30)

Even the scribal error and its later correction may here indicate a connection of this "dyeing" with chrismation and apostolic succession. The scribe first wrote "the son of the Son of Man," before he or someone else corrected the text to read simply "the Son of Man." This scribal error may itself be seen as an indication of the degree of blending between the levels and functions of Christ, who is the Son of Man, and his successors in their individual capacities of being a son of the Son of Man. God is metaphorically a dyer, as is Christ, and Christ's successors may also be dyers, using God's life-giving remedies and bestowing immortality to successive generations of Christians by means of baptism and chrismation.³⁹⁶

3.1.6.4. *Seeing and Becoming*

Another major and pervasive theme relating to deification in *Gos. Phil.* has to do with the reciprocity between the one who sees and that which

³⁹⁴ Cf. Luke 10:1, 17.

³⁹⁵ Cf. Mark 9:3.

³⁹⁶ The white colour may also conceivably be read as an allusion to the white garments of the angels (see, e.g., John 20:12).

is seen. We have already encountered this concept in connection with *Gos. Phil.*'s description of the transfiguration of Christ. We saw there that in order to make the disciples able to see him in his full glory on the mountain, Christ made the disciples great. This was due to the fact that people could only see Christ according to their own abilities, and thus his glory, the Logos, was hidden from view until the disciples were themselves elevated to that level. This theme recurs in various guises at several points throughout the tractate. In the discussion of the transfiguration the disciples are changed in order to see, but sometimes the causal relationship is also reversed:

μη[ου]σoμ ητελλay ναγ αλλay ρηνητcμoнт ειμητι ητεπετημαγ ωωπε
 ηθε ηνητημαγ ηθε ηπρωμε αν εφρηπκοcμoс qнаγ еπρη εφο ρρη αν ayω
 qнаγ етπε ηηпкаz μνηηκεzβηγε τηρωу εντοу ан пе netημαγ таει те
 θε ρραї ρηтme αλλα ακнаγ ελλαγ ητεπма етηмаγ ακωωπε ηνητημαγ
 ακнаγ απηηα ακωωπε ηηηα αqна[γ α.]пхс ακωωπε ηхс ακнаγ απ[ειωт
 κ]наωωπε ηειωт δια τογτο [ηηееima.] мен κнаγ азωв ηиη ayω κ[наγ еро]к
 ан ογαак κнаγ δε ерок ηп[ма етη]маγ петκнаγ гар ероу екнаω[ωπε
 ηη]oυ

It is impossible for anyone to see any of the ordained (things) unless he becomes like them. It is not like it is with the man who is in the world. He sees the sun while not being sun, and he sees the sky and the earth and all the other things while not being those (things). Thus it is in truth. But you have seen something of that place, and you have become those (things). You have seen the Spirit, and you have become spirit. You have seen Christ, and you have become Christ. You have seen the [Father, and you] will become father. Therefore, [here] you see everything and you do not [see yourself], but you see yourself in [that place], for you will [become] that which you see. (Gos. Phil. 61.20–35)

This passage follows directly the passage concerning God as a dyer, discussed above, and is linked to that passage by the theme of transformation.³⁹⁷ At the beginning of this excerpt, seeing follows transformation, like in the transfiguration account, but then *Gos. Phil.* flips this logic on its head and seemingly presents the act of seeing as what causes the change.³⁹⁸ The overall logic thus seems decidedly circular: it is the change

³⁹⁷ Cf. Borchert, "Literary Arrangement," 179; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 304; Charron and Painchaud, "God is a Dyer," 44.

³⁹⁸ Schenke solves this problem by regarding the end of the passage, from δια τογτο at 61.32, as a new and unrelated saying (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 32–33, 306; Schenke, "Das Evangelium nach Philippus [NHC II, 3]," 198). In his earlier work, however, Schenke regarded the whole passage as one saying (see Schenke, "Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959]," 11; Schenke, "The Gospel of Philip," 44).

that causes one to see, and it is the seeing that causes one to change. In any case, if one becomes what one sees, one in fact logically ends up seeing oneself as in a mirror. Moreover, the causal relationship between viewing an image of oneself in the mirror and being that image is a thought-provoking one and one that to some extent is blurred in these passages. The metaphor of the mirror becomes especially significant when we consider the possible sacramental connotations of the passage.

As Schenke has pointed out, the change at 61.27 from third person present to second person singular perfect, coupled with the Trinitarian references at 61.29–32, give the impression of “eines Rückverweises auf eine von den Adressaten im Kultgeschehen, also in der Taufe (auf den dreieinigen Gott) und/oder in der Salbung, bereits gemachte ‘mystische’ Erfahrung.”³⁹⁹ We have already seen at several points how closely connected baptism and chrismation are in this tractate, and the imagery and importance of seeing oneself is in fact also taken up directly in the context of a mystagogical interpretation of baptism and chrismation:

μη̄λαδ̄ῡ νᾱϱνᾱῡ ε̄ροϱ ο̄ῡτε̄ ρ̄η̄μο̄οϱ ο̄ῡτε̄ ρ̄η̄ε̄ιᾱλ̄ χ̄ω̄ριϱ ο̄ῡο̄ειν ο̄ῡτε̄ πᾱλιν̄
κ̄νᾱϱνᾱῡ αν̄ ρ̄η̄ο̄γο̄ειν̄ χ̄ω̄ριϱ̄ μο̄οϱ̄ ρ̄ιᾱλ̄ δ̄ιᾱ το̄ῡτο̄ ϱ̄ϱ̄ε̄ ᾱρ̄βᾱπτ̄ιζε̄ ρ̄η̄ϱ̄ιϱ̄νᾱῡ
ρ̄η̄πο̄γο̄ειν̄ μη̄πο̄μο̄οϱ̄ πο̄γο̄ειν̄ δε̄ πε̄ ϱ̄ριϱμᾱ

No one will be able to see himself in water or in a mirror without light, nor again will you be able to see in light without water (or) mirror.⁴⁰⁰ Therefore it is necessary to baptise in both: in the light and the water, and the light is the chrism. (Gos. Phil. 69.8–14)

Here, the imagery of seeing oneself is used to argue for the necessity of the combination of baptism and chrismation. At the same time *Gos. Phil.* here furnishes us with a direct connection between the soteriological metaphors of seeing and becoming and sacramental action. It is necessary, argues *Gos. Phil.*, to baptise in both water and chrism, since the former is the mirror and the latter is the light without which it is impossible to see oneself (see fig. 41).

Combined with the evidence of the passage discussed above, the importance of this seems to be that if one cannot see oneself, neither can one become what one sees. One can see oneself, however, with the help of a mirror (water) and light (chrism).⁴⁰¹ Since we have already seen that

³⁹⁹ Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 305–306.

⁴⁰⁰ Cf. 1 Cor 13:12; 2 Cor 3:18.

⁴⁰¹ Schenke rightly notes that since “‘Wasser’ nur Wasser meinen kann, braucht bloß noch der Begriff des ‘Lichtes’ aus dem Gleichnis ausdrücklich auf die gemeinte Sache bezogen zu werden” (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 403).

by means of baptism and, especially, chrismation one becomes a Christ, what one sees as a result of baptism and chrismation should be just that, oneself as Christ. Through the chrismation one receives the name of Christ and may see oneself as Christ and become a Christ. Or rather, when one sees oneself as Christ one has become a Christ.

This also has an important eschatological component, that may be discerned in the statement that “[here] you see everything and you do not [see yourself], but you see yourself in [that place]” ([ἴνῃςίμα] ΜΕΝ ΚΝΑΥ ΔΕΩΒ ΝΙΜ ΔΥΩ Κ[ΝΑΥ ΕΡΟ]Κ ΔΝ ΟΥΔΑΚ ΚΝΑΥ ΔΕ ΕΡΟΚ ΜΠ[ΜΑ ΕΤΜ]ΜΑΥ),⁴⁰² a statement that, taken together with the mirror imagery, recalls Paul’s promise in 1 Cor 13:12: “For we see now through a mirror in a likeness, but afterwards face to face” (ΤῆΝΑΥ ΓΑΡ ΤΕΝΟΥ ΞΙΤῆΟΥΕΙΑΔ ΞῆΟΥΞΡΒ ΜῆῆΚΩΔ ΔΕ ἦΞΟ ΞῆΟ).⁴⁰³

It is important to note that *Gos. Phil.* here stresses the fundamental importance of *both* baptism and chrismation. With just one of these elements, and not the other, the ritual process would be ineffectual. This passage, which stresses the necessity of baptism and chrismation in order to be able to see oneself/Christ thus nicely complements the passages we have already discussed concerning the necessity of both baptism and chrismation in order to be reborn/begotten, and in order to receive the resurrection, as well as those passages that stress the connection between chrismation and the reception of the name.⁴⁰⁴ The use of the metaphors of mirror and light in connection with the close conceptual connection made in the tractate between seeing and becoming, that is, between seeing and transformation on the one hand, and seeing and being on the other, thus creates a highly evocative and productive blend that sheds light simultaneously on a number of theological and sacramental concepts as well as on key scriptural intertexts.

There are also other potential entailments of the use of this metaphorical blend, however. Not only does the argument that both mirror and light are necessary in order to see oneself indicate the explicitly stated fact that both the water and the chrism are necessary, but it would also logically indicate the simultaneous presence of both elements in the ritual. For not only does one need both a mirror and light in order to see one-

⁴⁰² *Gos. Phil.* 61.32–34.

⁴⁰³ For comparable uses of this Pauline motif by Clement of Alexandria and a selection of other early sources, see Raoul Mortley, “The Mirror and 1 Cor. 13,12 in the Epistemology of Clement of Alexandria,” *VC* 30:2 (1976): 109–120. See also 2 Cor 3:18.

⁴⁰⁴ See *Gos. Phil.* 67.19–24; 74.15–16.

self, but they need to be present *at the same time*. So, if we project to the blend this insight from the source input it would seem that the chrismation takes place at the same time as the baptism in water. It would, in other words, indicate that we are here looking at neither a strictly postbaptismal nor a strictly prebaptismal chrismation, but rather a chrismation taking place while the initiate is in the water. It might, for instance, take place after the full immersion(s), but while the candidate is still standing in the water, prior to emerging from it to dress in, possibly, white garments. However, the blend works even without drawing the logical inference of the simultaneity of water and chrism if one simply shifts the focus to the ritual complex as a whole.

However this might be, it is becoming abundantly clear that the tractate by no means disparages baptism, even though it singles out the chrismation for special treatment.⁴⁰⁵ What this emphasis on the chrism might further indicate is perhaps that there might have been scant reason to argue in favour of the necessity of baptism, which may have been taken for granted, but rather for the necessity of the use of chrism. What may, moreover, be significant in light of the tractate's polemics against Judaism, is the fact that this would also be an aspect of the initiatory baptismal ritual that distinguished it from the Jewish practice of proselyte baptism.⁴⁰⁶

As for Jewish proselyte baptism, it was preceded by circumcision. *Gos. Phil.* does not spend much time discussing or redefining circumcision, but it does mention it once, and it does indeed redefine it:

Ἰ̅Ν̅Τ̅Ρ̅Ε̅Α̅Β̅Ρ̅Α̅Ζ̅Α̅Μ̅ [. . .] Ἐ̅Τ̅Ρ̅Ε̅Ϟ̅Ν̅Α̅Υ̅ Ἀ̅Π̅Ε̅Τ̅Ϟ̅Ν̅Α̅Ν̅Α̅Υ̅ Ἐ̅Ρ̅Ο̅Ϟ̅ [Δ̅Ϟ̅Ϟ̅] Ἰ̅Ṭ̅Ϟ̅Α̅Ρ̅Ζ̅
Ἰ̅Τ̅Α̅Κ̅Ρ̅Ο̅Υ̅Ϟ̅Τ̅Ι̅Α̅ Ἐ̅Ϟ̅Τ̅Α̅[Μ̅Ο̅] Ἰ̅Μ̅Ο̅Ν̅ Χ̅Ε̅Ω̅Ϟ̅Ἐ̅ Ἐ̅Τ̅Α̅Κ̅Ο̅ Ἰ̅Τ̅Ϟ̅Α̅Ρ̅Ζ̅

⁴⁰⁵ As Gaffron has put it, "An einer Diskreditierung der Taufe hat das EvPh kein Interesse, wenn auch sein spekulatives Denken in stärkerem Maße der Salbung gilt. Hinsichtlich ihrer Wirkung sind beide Sakramente voneinander nicht zu trennen, wohl aber hinsichtlich ihres Bedeutungsgehaltes und ihrer spezifischen Deutungsmöglichkeiten" (Gaffron, *Studien*, 221). Majella Franzmann has observed that *Gos. Phil.* contains "polemic against baptism as practised by some other group, but give a positive view of that ritual as practised by their own group" (Franzmann, "The Concept of Rebirth," 37). It should be noted, however, that *Gos. Phil.* directs its critique not only against diverging baptismal practice, but also, perhaps even more importantly, against diverging interpretations of baptism.

⁴⁰⁶ On proselyte baptism, see, e.g., G.R. Beasley-Murray, *Baptism in the New Testament* (London: Macmillan, 1962), 18–31; Everett Ferguson, *Baptism in the Early Church: History, Theology, and Liturgy in the First Five Centuries* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2009), 76–82. See below for an extended discussion of *Gos. Phil.*'s polemics against Judaism.

When Abraham [...] for him to see that which he would see, [he] circumcised the flesh of the foreskin,⁴⁰⁷ [telling] us that it is necessary to destroy the flesh.⁴⁰⁸ (*Gos. Phil.* 82.26–29)

Gos. Phil. here alludes primarily to Gen 17:23–18:2 and seems further to blend this with Col 2:11. The Genesis passage relates Abraham’s circumcision of his household and himself, an act which is followed by a vision of God as “three men” (τρεις ἄνδρες). It is especially significant that *Gos. Phil.* in its allusion to Abraham’s circumcision makes reference to his seeing. While *Gos. Phil.* does not explicitly state that Abraham saw God, it emphasises that circumcision was necessary in order for him to see what he was going to see. The fact that the object of Abraham’s seeing remains unstated in this *Gos. Phil.* passage keeps open the possibility of reading it as an allusion not only to Gen 18:1–2, but also to John 8:56–58,⁴⁰⁹ where Jesus strongly implies that he has been seen by Abraham.⁴¹⁰ It thus seems that we may legitimately connect this passage in *Gos. Phil.* with the other passages that speak of seeing Christ, God, or even the Spirit.⁴¹¹ Seeing these, then, requires a metaphorical circumcision, which is here identified as the destruction of “the flesh” (τσαρξ),⁴¹² an identification that recalls Col 2:11, where the circumcision of Christ is associated with “the stripping off of the body of the flesh” (πικκαρηγ ἡπσωμα ἡτσαρξ).

The theme of seeing Christ and God in *Gos. Phil.* also significantly echoes key passages in John and 1 John, and 1 and 2 Corinthians. We saw above how 1 John 3:2, with its statement that “when he appears we shall become like him, for we shall see him as he is” (εφωανοϋωνῆ εβολ τῆναϋωπε ενεινε ἡμοϋ δετῆναναγ εροϋ καταθε ετῆωοοπ ἡρητῶ),⁴¹³ was

⁴⁰⁷ Cf. Gen 17:23–18:2; cf. also John 8:56.

⁴⁰⁸ Cf. Col 2:11.

⁴⁰⁹ The connection between this passage and chapter eight in John is also made by Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 501.

⁴¹⁰ In John 8:56 Jesus states that, “Your father Abraham rejoiced that he might see my day and he saw and he rejoiced” (αβραζαμ δε πετῆειωτ αϋτεληλ δεκαϋ εφεναγ επαροϋγ αϋω αϋναγ αϋω αϋραϋε). Interestingly, the Sahidic New Testament manuscripts are among those that have the Jews in verse 57 asking Jesus whether Abraham has seen him: “Abraham has seen you?” (ααβραζαμ ναγ εροϋ), rather than whether he has seen Abraham.

⁴¹¹ For Trinitarian interpretations of Gen 18:1–2 in patristic sources, see, e.g., Kugel, *Traditions of the Bible*, 342.

⁴¹² This is yet another example of a metonymically based metaphor (see chapter 2 of the present study).

⁴¹³ Cf. also 2 Cor 3:15–18: αλλα ϋαποϋγ εγναϋω ἡμωῃςχη οϋῆογκαλγνα κη εζραῖ εχῆπεϋρητ· εφει δε εφνακοτῆ επλϋοειϋ ϋαϋϋι ἡπκαλγμα· πλϋοειϋ δε πε πεῆῆα· πμα δε ετερεπεῆα ἡπλϋοειϋ ἡρητῆ εῆῆμαγ ἡοιτῆῆτρῆε· ανοι δε τηῆῆ ϋῆογρο εφσολῆ εβολ·

reflected in *Gos. Phil.*'s account of the transfiguration, and the same goes for the present context. The importance of *Gos. Phil.*'s mirroring logic of having to become the higher realities in order to be able to see them is also given another, rather unique, twist which links up with the highly important metaphorical complex of marriage and bridal chamber:

ΟΥΝΖῆΝΥΜΦΙΟΣ ΜῆΖῆΝΥΜΦΗ ΗΠ ΕΠΝΥΜΦΩΝ ΜῆΟΥΑ ΝΑΩΝΑΥ ΑΠΝΥΜΦΙΟΣ
ΜῆΤΝΥΜΦΗ ΕΙ ΜΗ [ῆϞϞ]ΩΠΕ ῆΠΑΕΙ

Bridegrooms and brides belong to the bridal chamber. No one will be able to see the bridegroom with the bride unless [he becomes] this.

(*Gos. Phil.* 82.23–26)

This is a rather difficult passage, the obvious interpretive problem being the decision whether “this” (παει), which is what one has to become in order to see the bridegroom and the bride, refers to “the bridegroom” (πνυμφιος) or “the bridal chamber” (πνυμφων).⁴¹⁴ Both of these solutions are well within the logic of the passage. One may in both cases be said to be able to see the bridegroom and the bride, and both solutions may be defended on the basis of other parts of the tractate.⁴¹⁵ One of these solutions does seem to make better sense than the other within the context of the tractate as a whole, however.

First it should be noted that what one is supposed to see is “the bridegroom with the bride” (πνυμφιος μῆτνυμφη).⁴¹⁶ Schenke points out that in real life only “die vier Wände des Brautgemachs” may see a bridegroom together with his bride, and draws the conclusion that what one must become in order to see them is therefore a bridal chamber, understood by him to refer metaphorically to the human soul as the place

ΕΝΕΙΩΡῆ ῆΠΕΟΥ ῆΠΠΟΥΓΕ ΖΙΤῆΟΥΕΙΑΛ ΤῆΧΙΡῆ ῆΤῆΙΚΩΝ ῆΟΥΩΤ ΕΒΟΛ ΖῆΟΥΕΟΥ ΕΥΕΟΥ
ΚΑΤΑΘΕ ΕΒΟΛ ΖΙΤῆΠΧΘΕΙΣ ΠΕΠῆΑ: “But until today whenever Moses is read there is a veil upon their minds, but when one turns to the Lord he lifts the veil. Now the Lord is the Spirit, and the place where the Spirit of the Lord is there is freedom. But all of us, with unveiled face, seeing the glory of God in a mirror, receive the likeness of that single image from glory to glory as from the Lord the Spirit.”

⁴¹⁴ For the identification of παει (“this”) with πνυμφιος (“the bridegroom”), see William Joseph Stroud, “Ritual in the Chenoboskion Gospel of Philip,” *Iliff Review* 28 (1971): 34. For its identification with πνυμφων (“the bridal chamber”), see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 73, 500; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus (NHC II,3),” 1:211. Buckley and Pagels somehow take it to refer to both the bridegroom and the bride (see Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4170; Elaine H. Pagels, “The ‘Mystery of Marriage’ in the Gospel of Philip Revisited,” in *The Future of Early Christianity: Essays in Honor of Helmut Koester* [ed. Birger A. Pearson; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991], 451).

⁴¹⁵ The possibility that the passage may be intentionally ambiguous on this point should of course also be kept in mind.

⁴¹⁶ Cf. Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 500.

where the person's heavenly double is united with his or her own "Licht-Selbst."⁴¹⁷ I think Schenke is right in identifying what one must become as "the bridal chamber" (πηνμφων), but the further connection he makes between the bridal chamber and the human soul, and his identification of the bridegroom and the bride, are problematic.

A vital key to the understanding of this passage seems to me to lie, here as above, in the important blend THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST. In accordance with this blend, what one should strive to become as a Christian is nothing less than Christ. We should, moreover, keep in mind *Gos. Phil.*'s use of the mirroring theory of seeing and becoming, namely that one must become Christ in order to see Christ. Here in this passage one must become a bridal chamber in order to see the bridegroom and the bride. This, then, implies the identification of "the bridal chamber" in this passage with Christ, but it also, seemingly paradoxically, identifies the bridegroom and the bride with Christ's true nature. This, however, makes good sense in the overall system of *Gos. Phil.* The disciples had to be changed in order to see Christ in his glory in the transfiguration. That is, by becoming Christ they saw his true flesh, the Logos. In this passage then, by becoming Christ as bridal chamber one may see Christ as the bridegroom and the bride. This recalls the revelation of "the great bridal chamber" (πνοσ ἡπαστος) and the creation of the body of Christ at his baptism in the Jordan,⁴¹⁸ which consisted of the unification of the Logos and the Holy Spirit. Seeing the bridegroom and the bride by becoming a "bridal chamber" (νημφων) would thus involve seeing Christ as the unification of the Logos (his flesh) and the Holy Spirit (his blood).⁴¹⁹ We may therefore identify the bridegroom and the bride with the Logos and the Holy Spirit respectively (see fig. 42). And where would one be able to see the Logos and the Holy Spirit together if not in the Eucharist? Christ as the union of Logos and Holy spirit is, as we have seen, represented in the eucharistic ritual in the form of the bread and the wine mixed with water. In the Eucharist, then, the Christian would be able to see Christ as Logos (bread) and Holy Spirit (wine). And the place where these two elements would mix would be in the bridal chamber constituted by the

⁴¹⁷ See Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 500–501. Schenke argues that νημφων should here be regarded as synonymous with κοιτων, as "das 'Allerheiligste' einer Hochzeit" (*ibid.*, 500). See below for a discussion of the various terms used in *Gos. Phil.* that may be rendered as "bridal chamber."

⁴¹⁸ See *Gos. Phil.* 71.4–13.

⁴¹⁹ See discussion above.

body of the Christian in the consumption of the eucharistic elements. Analogically to how Christ's constitution was Logos and Holy Spirit within a material body, then, the individual Christian receives the Logos (bridegroom) and Holy Spirit (bride) within the bridal chamber of his or her own "Christlike" body (see fig. 43). We will return below to an extended consideration of the question of sacramental connotations in connection with a discussion of certain other passages in *Gos. Phil.* that seem to undergird this interpretation.

3.2. *Communion Blends*

In this section we will focus on the blends that revolve around issues of communion and mystery. This means that we will look closer at blends involving joining, unification, and mixing, as well as those dealing with hiddenness, secrecy, and mystery. The reason for treating these two categories of phenomena under the same heading is the fact that in *Gos. Phil.* they are often blended by means of certain key ICMs that encompass both the theme of joining and unification, and that of hiddenness and secrecy.

3.2.1. *Joining and Mixing*

"One might say—only slightly mischievously—that Christianity is all about mixture," observes Philip McCosker, and specifies that "it is concerned with bringing into union what seem to be more or less contrary/different realities: divinity and humanity, Creator and creature, 'agenetic' and 'genetic,' self-existent and contingent."⁴²⁰ Such issues and questions come especially into focus in christological matters. As McCosker puts it, "Christians hold that there is a paradigmatic 'mixture' in the person of Christ: the mingling of human and divine natures in the person of Christ is not only paradigmatic in an exemplary (imitative) sense, but also, more essentially, the Word's incarnation fundamentally alters the recipe for such mixtures."⁴²¹ Christ is thus "the recipe and ingredients rolled into one," as McCosker strikingly puts it.⁴²²

⁴²⁰ Philip McCosker, review of Norman Russell, *The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition*, *Reviews in Religion and Theology* 13:1 (2006): 8.

⁴²¹ McCosker, review of Russell, 8.

⁴²² McCosker, review of Russell, 8.

We have seen at several points in the preceding analysis that questions concerning this recipe and its ingredients are of fundamental importance to *Gos. Phil.*, and we have seen that this issue correlates with imagery of separation on the one hand, and joining, mixing, and unification on the other, in a manner that is central to the rhetoric of the tractate.⁴²³ In this section we will look closer at the function of such interlinking metaphorical imagery as participation, communion, marriage, procreation, and eating in *Gos. Phil.*, and the way it highlights a variety of different theological issues relating to the abovementioned recipe, to borrow McCosker's metaphor.

3.2.1.1. *Like Mixing With Like*

In several passages *Gos. Phil.* treats the theme of joining and mixing analogically with the theme of seeing and becoming. The tractate informs us that if you become a logos, the Logos will mingle with you, and if you become spirit, the Spirit will mingle with you:⁴²⁴

ϩαρεπρωμε τωρ μη̄πρωμε ϩαρεπερτο τωρ μη̄περτο ϩαρεπει[ω τ]ωρ
 μη̄πειω η̄γενος νεϩαγτωρ [μη̄]νογϩβ̄ργενος ταει τε θε εϩα[ρε]η̄πινα
 τωρ μη̄πινᾱ αγω πλο[γος] ϩαϩ̄ρκ[ο]ινᾱ[η]ει μη̄πλογος [αγω πο]γο[ειν
 ϩα]ϩ̄ρκοιωνει [μη̄πογοειν εκ]ϩαϩωπε ρρωμε [πρωμ]ε̄ πε[τνα]μεριτκ
 εκϩαϩωπε [μη̄πινᾱ] πινᾱ πετναρ̄ωτ̄ρ εροκ εκ[ϩαναϩ]ωπε̄ η̄λογος πλογος
 πετνατωρ μη̄μακ ε[κ]ϩαναϩωπε̄ η̄γογειν πογοειν πετναρ̄κοιωνει μη̄μακ
 εκϩαναϩωπε̄ η̄ναπσα η̄ρε ναπσα η̄ρε ναη̄τον η̄μοογ̄ ερᾱι εϩωκ
 εκϩαναϩωπε̄ η̄ρτο η̄ η̄ειω η̄ η̄μασε η̄ η̄ογροορ η̄ η̄εσοογ̄ η̄ σε ρ̄η̄νεοη̄ριον
 ετ̄η̄πσα η̄βολ̄ μη̄η̄ετ̄η̄πσα η̄πιτ̄η̄ ϩναϩμεριτκ̄ αν̄ ογτε̄ πρωμε̄ ογτε̄
 πινᾱ ογτε̄ πλογος̄ ογτε̄ πογοειν̄ ογτε̄ ναπσᾱ η̄τπε̄ ογτε̄ ναπσᾱ η̄ρογ̄η̄
 σεναϩη̄τον̄ η̄μοογ̄ αν̄ ρ̄ρᾱι η̄ρη̄τκ̄ αγω̄ η̄η̄τακ̄η̄ερος̄ ρ̄ρᾱι η̄ρη̄τογ̄

Man mixes with man, horse mixes with horse, donkey mixes with donkey. The species used to mix [with] their fellow members. Thus spirit mixes with spirit and Logos has communion with Logos [and light has] communion [with light. If you] become man, [it is the man who will] love you. If you become [spirit,] it is the Spirit that will join with you. [If] you become logos, it is the Logos that will mix with you. If [you] become light, it is the light that will have communion with you. If you become one of those above, those above will rest upon you. If you become a horse or donkey or calf or dog or sheep or another among the animals that are outside and

⁴²³ This has been noted by several interpreters, see, e.g., Buckley and Good, "Sacramental Language" (this article focusses especially on the Coptic terminology used in the tractate, with an emphasis on the function of the words $\chi\iota$, $\chi\pi\omicron$, and $\rho\omega\tau\eta$).

⁴²⁴ Buckley takes this as indicating "a tone of optimism and confidence regarding human capacities" that in her opinion "permeates the text" (Buckley, "Conceptual Models," 4170).

those that are below, neither man nor Spirit nor Logos nor light nor those above nor those inside will be able to love you. They will not be able to rest within you and you have no part in them. (*Gos. Phil.* 78.25–79.13)

Here again the animals are metaphorical humans,⁴²⁵ and the passage must be understood as an injunction to become a perfect Christian. “Man” in this passage seems to be equivalent to the term “perfect man” in other parts of the text. In this conceptual blend the animals represent the not-so-perfect men, and the perfect Christian, being at the top of the metaphorical chain of being, is presented as human. If one becomes “man” (ῥωμε), then, one may be loved by “the man” (πρωμε), Christ, and “have communion” (ῥκοινωνει) with the Logos and the light.⁴²⁶ It is this necessity of becoming man, metaphorically speaking, that seems to be the main thrust of the passage.⁴²⁷

It is interesting to note the many different words that are here used to denote the conceptual domain of joining, communion, and mixing. The verbs τωξ (“mix”), ῥκοινωνει (“have communion”), ζωτῖ (“join”), ἄτρον (“rest”), and even μεριτ (“love”) are here employed in a parallel manner.⁴²⁸ Schenke holds that “love” is here the main term that all the other terms refer to, being themselves simply “Umschreibungen bzw. Entfaltungen von με.”⁴²⁹ But do we really have any good reason to privilege the term “love” over the other terms used here for joining and mixing? The first part of the passage, where the word τωξ is used, sets

⁴²⁵ Cf. Borchert, “Literary Arrangement,” 400.

⁴²⁶ As Schenke rightly notes, in this passage ῥωμε does not refer to the same thing throughout the passage: “In der Bildhälfte ist es das irdische Wesen, das so heißt, schlecht-hin, während in der Anwendung der Begriff ‘Mensch’ übertragen gebraucht sein dürfte; vermutlich irgendwie im Sinne von ‘wahrer Mensch’, vielleicht sogar im Sinne von ‘Menschensohn.’” This leads Schenke to suggest the following as a possible paraphrase: “Wenn du zum Menschensohn wie Jesus wirst, wird der Menschensohn Jesus dich lieben” (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 482).

⁴²⁷ Cf. Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 482.

⁴²⁸ Isenberg’s translation significantly obscures the way these terms are used, by translating τωξ variously as “have intercourse,” “associate,” and “mingle”; ῥκοινωνει as “consort with” and “share”; and by translating λογος with “thought” (see Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 199, 201; Wesley W. Isenberg, “The Gospel of Philip [II,3],” in *The Nag Hammadi Library in English* [3rd revised ed.; ed. James M. Robinson; San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1990], 156).

⁴²⁹ Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 483. Schenke concludes that the point of the passage may be summarised with the following paraphrase: “Du sollst den Menschensohn lieben! Dann wirst du als Menschensohn einer von oben. Und er und die Oberen können dich dann auch lieben und sich mit dir verbinden (, so daß du schließlich auch solche Früchte hervorbringst, wie sie einem / dem Menschensohn angemessen sind)” (ibid.).

up a framing input space in a conceptual integration network where the inputs created by the latter part of the passage are more or less metonymic representations of the target ICM. Since the mixings in the first part have a clear sexual/procreational focus, this input is especially prone to highlight this aspect in the input or inputs activated by the latter part of the passage. At the same time, the change from τῶς to ἄκοινωνοι when the discourse shifts from the zoological examples to the pairings of Logos with Logos and light with light is significant. The shift to this word at the same time as the term Logos is mentioned prompts for a Christian, and in this text sacramental, context for the interpretation of the blend.

Now, where does one mingle, or have communion with Logos or Spirit? Buckley takes the description of the fact that when one becomes logos or spirit the Logos or Spirit will reciprocate by mingling or joining with the person in question as an allusion to ritual activity.⁴³⁰ The reference to those above “resting upon you” (ἦτον ἡμοῦ ἐραῖ ἐχῶκ) recalls the reference to the Holy Spirit resting upon Jesus at his baptism in the Jordan,⁴³¹ and by extension the baptismal anointing with chrism administered to the Christian initiates.

On the grounds of *Gos. Phil.*'s identification of the flesh of Christ, and hence the eucharistic bread, with his Logos, and his blood, and hence the eucharistic wine, with the Holy Spirit, the eucharistic ritual also comes readily to mind here as *Gos. Phil.* envisages it, an important aspect being that logos mixes with Logos, and spirit mixes with Holy Spirit. In order to be able to have communion in this way, however, the communicant needs to have become what he or she is to have communion with. For the focus seems here, in the excerpt quoted above, as in the seeing and becoming passages, to be on the necessity of becoming what you want to commune with.⁴³² If one stays as an animal one may only have communion with animals. Communions happening contrary to the principles outlined above, however, are characterised by *Gos. Phil.* as “adultery” (ἄκοινωνοί):

κοινωνία δε νῦν ἢταρῶσπε εβολ εἴνετνε ἀν ἡνογερῆγ οὐκἄκοινωνοί τε

And every communion that has taken place between those who do not resemble each other constitutes adultery. (*Gos. Phil.* 61.10–12)

⁴³⁰ See Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4170.

⁴³¹ See John 1:33.

⁴³² Cf. Williams, *Rethinking “Gnosticism”*, 294 n. 26.

By designating communions between “those who do not resemble each other” (νετνε αν ἴνουερηγ) specifically as “adultery” (μῆτνοεικ), the imagery of mingling and communion of like with like, including that of logos with logos and spirit with spirit, is connected even more closely to the ICMs of MARRIAGE and SEX, and hence, as we shall see, to metaphors like that of the bridal chamber.

Intertextually, both the use of the designation “adultery” and the use of the term κοινωνια in this context point primarily to Paul’s letters to the Corinthians. The description of the communion of those who are unlike one another as adultery must specifically be seen in the light of Paul’s interpretation of Lev 19:19 in his second letter to the Corinthians. Lev 19:19 prohibits the mating of unlike animals, and Paul, in 2 Cor 6:14–7:1, applies this prohibition to human relationships, arguing that Christians should not marry non-Christians.⁴³³ *Gos. Phil.* takes this one step further, and applies Paul’s analogy metaphorically, this time not to the relationship between humans, but rather to the relationship between Christians and Christ. At the same time, the positioning of the above quoted statement at the end of the passage concerning Eve’s conception of Cain from her relations with the serpent, also connects the sinfulness of the mating of different species to the story of the fall and the paradise narrative in general.⁴³⁴

3.2.1.2. *Eating and Becoming*

Closely related to the motifs of seeing and becoming and like mixing with like, outlined above, *Gos. Phil.* also focuses on the theme of eating from the perspective of transformation and reciprocity:

οὐῖωηη σναγ ρητ [ε]ῖππαρραδισος πογα χπεθ[ηριον] πογα χπερωμε
 ααααμ ο[γωμ] εβολ εῖπωηη ηταεχπεθηρι[ον ααα]ωπε ηθηριον
 αααααα[ριον ε]τβεπαῖ σερσεβεσεε ανθ[ηριον ησ]ηηωηρε ηααααμ

There are two trees growing in paradise. One produces [animals], the other produces men. Adam [ate] from the tree that produced animals, [and he became] an animal and he begot [animals]. Therefore the children of Adam worship the [animals].
 (*Gos. Phil.* 71.22–28)

⁴³³ See Gaca, *The Making of Fornication*, 150–151. Similarly, Mishnaic law likens the union between a Jew and a gentile with the forbidden union of a horse with a donkey (see Shaye J.D. Cohen, *The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties* [Hellenistic Culture and Society 31; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999], 306).

⁴³⁴ For the connection of this passage with the paradise story of Eve and the serpent, cf. also Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 301.

It is significant that *Gos. Phil.* here once again plays on the term $\chi\pi\omicron$. Because Adam ate from the tree that produced ($\chi\pi\omicron$) animals, he too became animal and begat ($\chi\pi\omicron$) animals. The tree Adam ate from was of course the Tree of Knowledge, which is here contrasted with the Tree of Life.⁴³⁵ That he became animal seems in this context to entail first and foremost Adam's acquisition of mortality—his death sentence from eating from the forbidden tree.⁴³⁶ Adam eats from the animal tree, becomes animal and begets animals. This mirrors the above discussed passage concerning the different species only mating with their own, and also reflects the various passages that deal with seeing and becoming. It is also highly significant that eating is here closely connected to procreation. Adam eats from the tree, is changed, and produces offspring that are less than desirable. The full significance of this imagery only becomes clear, however, when Adam's food is contrasted with that of Christ:

ῥαγεῖν ἐμπατεπεῶς εἰ νενῆοικ εἰπκοσμος ἡε ἡπαραδισος πμα
 νερεαδαν ἡμαγ νεγῆταγ ραγ ἡωην ἡῆτροφῆ ἡῆθριον νενῆταγ σογο
 ἡῆτροφῆ ἡπρωμε νερεπρωμε σοειω ἡε ἡῆθριον αλλα ἡταρεπεῶς εἰ
 πτελιος ῥρωμε αεινε ἡογοικ εβολ εἰπτε ωῖνα ερεπρωμε ναῆτρεφεσῶαι
 εἰπτροφῆ ἡπρωμε

Before Christ came there was no bread in the world, like in Paradise, the place where Adam was, there were many trees for the food of the animals. It had no wheat for the food of man. Man was feeding like the animals, but when Christ came, the perfect man, he brought bread from heaven so that man would be nourished with the food of man. (*Gos. Phil.* 55.6–14)

This juxtaposition of the former state (before Christ) of nourishing like the animals, with the new state of eating the food of the perfect man, sets up a counterpart relationship between Adam's eating and begetting and the individual Christian's eating of the bread from heaven. The passage clearly alludes to the discourse in John 6:31–58 concerning Jesus as the bread of life from heaven and cannot be properly understood apart from this intertext. This intertext furnishes a connection of the bread from heaven with Jesus and the Eucharist. Thus it follows by implication from the blend that since Adam's eating from the tree that produced animals—the Tree of Knowledge—led to him to become animal, produce animals, and worship animals, eating the bread from heaven brought by Christ

⁴³⁵ Cf. Buckley, "Conceptual Models," 4177.

⁴³⁶ Cf. Kugel, *Traditions of the Bible*, 94–97.

equals eating from the tree that produced men/humans—the Tree of Life—and leads to those eating from it becoming men/humans, and producing men/humans. By implication, those who eat the bread from heaven should also worship men/humans, which makes sense when the man in question is identified as Christ. The bread from heaven is after all to be identified with Christ as the Eucharist. One thus becomes Christ and will worship Christ by eating Christ. And, as we have already seen, Christ is in *Gos. Phil.* not only equated with the bread from heaven, but also with the fruit from the Tree of Life. It might also be noted here that the close connection that is established between eating and procreation thereby also connects the Eucharist to procreative imagery.

The identification of the eater with the eaten is also one of the ways in which *Gos. Phil.* argues for the necessity of gaining eternal life prior to death, and the logic mirrors that of the seeing and becoming passages:

ΠΕΡΙΚΟΣΜΟΣ ΟΥΔΑΜΚΩΔΟΣ ΠΕ ΝΗΚΕ ΝΙΜ ΕΤΟΥΩΜ ΗΜΟΟΥ ΡΡΑΙ ΝΖΗΤΥ ΣΕΜΟ[Υ]
 ΖΩΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ ΟΥΔΑΜΩΝΖ ΤΕ ΕΤΒΕΠΑΔΕΙ ΜΗΛΑΔΥ ΖΝΝΕΤΣΩΝΩ ΖΝΤ[ΜΕ]
 ΝΑΜΟΥ ΝΤΑΙΣ ΕΙ ΕΒΟΛ ΖΜΠΜΑ Ε[ΤΜ]ΜΑΥ ΔΥΩ ΔΦΕΙΝΕ ΝΖΝΤΡΟΦΗ ΕΒΟΛ ΗΜΑΥ
 ΔΥΩ ΝΕΤΟΥΩΩ ΔΥΤ ΝΑΥ [ΕΟΥ]Ω[Μ]⁴³⁷ ΔΕ[ΚΑΔΑ] ΝΝΟΥΜΟΥ

This world is a corpse-eater. All that are eaten in it also die themselves. Truth is a life-eater. Therefore no one among those who nourish on [Truth] will die. It was from that place that Jesus came, and he brought food from there, and those who wanted he gave them [to eat, so that] they might not die.
 (*Gos. Phil.* 73.19–27)

In this passage as well, *Gos. Phil.* contrasts worldly food with heavenly, and the contrast is cleverly presented by means of a comparison by partial blending of two metaphors, namely that of the world as a corpse-eater and truth as a life-eater. One must eat the heavenly food brought by Jesus in order to gain eternal life. The argument employs a conceptual blend between the domains of EATING and DEATH and also makes use of the logic of identity between the eater and the eaten (see fig. 44). The world eating corpses may be understood as a metaphorical description of the burial and/or decomposition of corpses, and as a contrast to this, *Gos. Phil.* presents truth as an eater of life, a metaphor that is only understandable when it is contrastively blended with that of the world as

⁴³⁷ I follow Schenke's reconstruction of this lacuna (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 56, 441–442; Schenke, "The Berliner Arbeitskreis," 70–71). Layton, following Schenke, "Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959]," 18, has [ΝΟΥ]Ω[ΝΕ] (see Layton and Isenberg, "Gospel According to Philip," 188. As Schenke puts it in his later article, "Layton thought I was right, and I was not" [Schenke, "The Berliner Arbeitskreis," 70]).

a corpse-eater. From this blending of metaphors important implications arise. Those who die in the world are eaten by the world, while those who gain life will be eaten by truth, which means that instead of being dissolved into the material earth they will be dissolved into truth.⁴³⁸ And as we find elsewhere in *Gos. Phil.*, truth is to be equated with the inner, true reality hidden within the worldly types and images. Included among these worldly types and images are of course also the Christian sacraments, without which it is impossible to gain truth. For how does one attain life and thus become eaten by truth? One does this by means of the food of life brought by Jesus, for if one draws nourishment from truth one will not die.⁴³⁹ By implication, if one metaphorically eats from the worldly things one will also be eaten by the world, which means that one will die completely, in that one will simply be dissolved into the material elements.⁴⁴⁰ The use of the metaphor of eating in this way, so closely connected to the food brought by Jesus, strongly alludes to the Eucharist.⁴⁴¹

3.2.2. *Marriage and Related Imagery*

Gos. Phil. gives the following explanation for the primordial separation of Adam and Eve:

ΝΕΝΤΑΖΩΤῚ ΔΕ ΖῆΠΠΑΣΤΟΣ ΟΥΚΕΤΙ ΣΕΝΑΠΩΡΧ ΔΙΑ ΤΟΥΤΟ ΔΕΥΖΑ ΠΩΡΧ
ΑΔΑΜ ΔΕῆΤΑΣΖΩΤῚ ΕΡΟϞ ΑΝ ΖῆΠΠΑΣ[ΤΟ]C

And those who have joined in the bridal chamber will no longer be separated. Therefore Eve separated from Adam, because it was not in the bridal chamber that she joined with him. (*Gos. Phil.* 70.19–22)

Adam and Eve separated because they did not join with each other in a “bridal chamber.” In a basic sense, this means that they were not properly married, which again may imply that their joining lacked the proper

⁴³⁸ Cf. *Gos. Phil.* 53.20–23.

⁴³⁹ For an alternative, but ultimately unconvincing interpretation of the metaphor of truth as a “life-eater,” see Patricia Cox Miller, “‘Adam Ate from the Animal Tree’: A Bestial Poetry of Soul,” in *The Poetry of Thought in Late Antiquity: Essays in Imagination and Religion* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 27–28. Ignoring the context of the statement in *Gos. Phil.*, Miller suggests that “Perhaps the *Gospel of Philip* describes truth as a life-eater because truth seems destructive and subversive” (ibid., 28).

⁴⁴⁰ If we follow this logic one step further we might also argue, as Buckley has done, that the reason why the world eats what is dead is because it is itself dead (see Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4176).

⁴⁴¹ This is the case regardless of whether the Eucharist alluded to is itself to be understood metaphorically or literally.

ceremony and/or that it was not performed in the proper place. What is certain is that, according to *Gos. Phil.*, Adam and Eve were joined, but not in the way they should have been. But what does this entail in *Gos. Phil.*'s rhetoric? Generally speaking, the ICM of MARRIAGE may be utilised as an input in different conceptual blends in order to highlight certain aspects of different target inputs. Among the central constituents of the MARRIAGE ICM we find notions of the joining/unification of two people of opposite sex, the ceremonies associated with a wedding, and various ideas and aspects related to sexual procreation. We saw in the previous chapter how *Exeg. Soul* employs the MARRIAGE ICM as a powerful conceptual framing input that may shed light on several aspects of conversion, initiation, and Christian life. We will now look closer at the varied use of this conceptual domain in *Gos. Phil.* As in *Exeg. Soul*, blends involving marriage imagery are pervasive in *Gos. Phil.* too, and the cognitive model is employed in several different ways.

3.2.2.1. *Marriage with Christ*

A highly important “marriage” referred to by *Gos. Phil.* is that of the individual Christian with Christ. *Gos. Phil.* refers directly to this marriage by addressing its implied readers as “you who dwell with the Son of God” (ΝΤΩΤῆ ΝΕΤΩΟΟΠ ΜῆΠΩΗΡΕ ΜῆΠΝΟΥΤΕ) in an interesting passage where the tractate outlines a couple of basic principles that should guide the conduct of the individual in this marital relation:

ΠΕΤΕΤΣΡΙΜΕ ΜΕ ΜῆΜΟϚ ΝΕΤΣΝΑΔΠΟΟΥ ΕΥΕΙΝΕ ΜῆΜΟϚ ΕΩΩΠΕ ΠΕΣΡΑΕΙ ΕΥΕΙΝΕ
 ΜΠΕΣΡΑΙ ΕΩΩΠΕ ΟΥΝΟΕΙΚ ΠΕ ΕΥΕΙΝΕ ΜῆΠΝΟΕΙΚ ΠΟΛΛΑΚΙΣ ΕΩΩΠΕ ΟΥῆΣΡΙΜΕ
 ΕΣῆΚΟΤΚ ΜῆΠΠΕΣΡΑΙ ΚΑΤΑ ΟΥΖΤΟΡ ΕΠΕΣΡΗΤ ΔΕ ΖΗΠΝΟΕΙΚ ΕΩΔΣῆΚΟΙΝΩΝΕΙ
 ΝῆΜΑϚ ΠΕΤΣΑΝΑΣΤϚ ΩΔΣΜΑΣΤϚ ΕϐΙΝΕ ΜῆΠΝΟΕΙΚ ΝΤΩΤῆ ΔΕ ΝΕΤΩΟΟΠ
 ΜῆΠΩΗΡΕ ΜῆΠΝΟΥΤΕ ΜῆΜῆΡΠΕΚΟΜΟΣ ΑΛΛΑ ΜῆΡΕΠΔΟΕΙΣ ΩῆΝΑ ΝΕΤΕΤΝΑΔΠΟΟΥ
 ΝΟΥΩΩΠΕ ΕΥΕΙΝΕ ΜῆΠΚΟΜΟΣ ΑΛΛΑ ΕΥΝΑΩΩΠΕ ΕΥΕΙΝΕ ΜῆΠΔΟΕΙΣ

He whom the woman loves, it is him that those she will bear resemble. If it is her husband, they resemble her husband. If it is an adulterer, they resemble the adulterer. Often, if a woman sleeps with her husband out of necessity, but her mind is on the adulterer whom she usually has communion with, the one she will bear she bears resembling the adulterer. But you who dwell with the Son of God, do not love the world, but love the Lord, so that those you will bear may not come to resemble the world, but that they may come to resemble the Lord. (*Gos. Phil.* 78.12–25)

Gos. Phil. here makes it clear, through a comparison with ancient medical theory, that if one focuses mentally on a person other than one's spouse while having intercourse, the resulting children might turn out to

resemble the other one.⁴⁴² The point appears to be that it is not enough for the Christian to have communion with Christ if one's heart and mind is not with Christ.⁴⁴³

This is yet another passage where *Gos. Phil.* uses human procreation metaphorically to get a theological message across. As in *Exeg. Soul*, the children referred to here should probably be understood metaphorically as thoughts or works.⁴⁴⁴ When living and having communion with the Lord, one has to make sure that one's (metaphorical) offspring will not resemble someone else. And in this regard one may be said to be known by one's offspring, i.e., one's thoughts and actions, like a tree is known by its fruit. One should bear spiritual offspring rather than fleshly.⁴⁴⁵ This should also be seen in connection with the exhortation not to love nor fear one's material body.⁴⁴⁶ We might take all this to mean, then, that even though one is a Christian and thus "lives with" and "has communion with" Christ, one must still make an effort to love Christ and not the material world. The focus of the Christian should be strictly on Christ, and not on worldly things. That this also implies that one ought to imitate Christ in his capacity as a moral exemplar becomes clear from other sections in *Gos. Phil.* that focus on his conduct in the world.⁴⁴⁷ The use of

⁴⁴² See, e.g., Denise Kimber Buell, *Making Christians: Clement of Alexandria and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 63; Williams, *Rethinking "Gnosticism"*, 294 n. 26; Grant, "Mystery of Marriage," 135; for a discussion of such beliefs in various cultures throughout history, see Wendy Doniger and Gregory Spinner, "Misconceptions: Female Imaginations and Male Fantasies in Parental Imprinting," *Daedalus* 127:1 (1998): 97–129. Strangely, Isenberg translates the opening sentences in a completely opposite way as, "The children a woman bears resemble the man who loves her. If her husband loves her, then they resemble her husband" (Layton and Isenberg, "Gospel According to Philip," 199; Isenberg, "The Gospel of Philip [II,3]," 156; this is repeated by, e.g., Buckley, "Conceptual Models," 4179), which, in addition to being incompatible with the Coptic text, completely obscures the point of the whole passage. Isenberg did not make this mistake in his dissertation, however, where he instead translated, "As for him whom the woman loves, it is he that those whom she will beget resemble. If it is her husband, it is her husband that they resemble" (Isenberg, "Coptic Gospel," 388). On this point, see also the comments in Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 481 n. 1327.

⁴⁴³ Grant, however, takes this to mean that "the Gnostic must not love the 'unclean spirits' which wish to unite with him in adulterous unions" (see Grant, "Mystery of Marriage," 135–136).

⁴⁴⁴ Cf. *Exeg. Soul* 128.23–26; 133.34–134.6, and the discussion in chapter 3. For the connection with *Exeg. Soul*, see also Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 481.

⁴⁴⁵ Cf. Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 481.

⁴⁴⁶ See *Gos. Phil.* 66.4–6.

⁴⁴⁷ See *Gos. Phil.* 79.33–80.4.

the term $\bar{\rho}\kappa\omicron\iota\nu\omega\nu\epsilon\iota$ to refer to one's marital life with Christ may be taken as a reference to the Eucharist as the locus of the individual Christian's most intimate relations with him.

3.2.2.2. *Marriage in this World*

There is no doubt that marriage imagery is important in *Gos. Phil.*, but it is often difficult to pin down the degree to which such imagery is to be interpreted metaphorically or literally:

[ΠΜ]ΥΣΤΗΡΙΟΝ ΜΠΓΑΜ[ΟC] ΟΥΝΟC [ΠΕ ΑΧΝ]ΤῚ ΓΑΡ ΝΕΠΚΟC [ΜΟ]C ΝΑΩΩ[ΠΕ ΑΝ
ΤΕ]ΥCΤΑCΙC ΓΑΡ Μ̄[ΠΚΟ]CΜΟ[C]ΜΕ ΤΕΥCΤΑCΙC ΔΕ [. ΠΓ]ΔΜΟC
ΕΡΙΝΟΕΙ ΝΤΚΟΙ[ΝΩΝΙΑ . . . Χ]ΩΞΜ̄ ΧΕΟΥΝΤΑC Μ̄ΜΑΥ [.]ΔΥΝΑΜΙC ΤΕCΞΙΚΩΝ
ΕCΩΟΟΠ ΖΝΟΥΧΩ[ΖΜ̄]

[The] mystery of marriage [is] great, for [without] it the world would [not] have [come into being]. For [the] composition of [the world . . .], but the composition [. . . the] marriage. Consider the [communion . . .] defiled because it has [. . .] power. Its image is in a [defilement].

(*Gos. Phil.* 64.31–65.1)

Marriage is described as a mystery, but deciding whether *Gos. Phil.* is here referring simply to normal marriage between two people, which results in procreation and thus contribute to the existence of the world, or whether it should be understood as a reference to something else is by no means unproblematic. Regrettably, this passage is badly damaged, but it may still give us a couple of clues with regard to the nature of the marriage described at this point in the manuscript. If the reconstructions above are correct,⁴⁴⁸ we seem to be told that “its image is in a [defilement]” (τεcΞικων εCωοοπ ζνωυχω[ζμ̄]). This may indicate that “the communion,” however we may understand that term in this particular context, is reflected in marriage, and that the latter is a “defilement.” We shall see that the text elsewhere refers to “the marriage of defilement” (πγαμοc μ̄πχωζμ̄),⁴⁴⁹ which makes it probable that it is indeed marriage that is here identified in such terms. So it seems that we may understand the passage to describe marriage as an “image” (ζικων) of “the communion” (κοινωνια). The reference to marriage as a great mystery seems to reflect Eph 5:31–32, where the words of Gen 2:24 concerning the joining of man and woman as “one flesh” is described as a great mystery and interpreted

⁴⁴⁸ I have here followed the relatively conservative reconstructions that are used in Layton's critical edition (see Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 170). Schenke, on the other hand, reconstructs all these lacunae (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 38).

⁴⁴⁹ *Gos. Phil.* 82.4.

human marriage is reflective of the perfect marriage which takes place in the heavenly realm.”⁴⁵² It seems to me, however, that rather than having to do with any “confusion” or “constraints of language,” what *Gos. Phil.* is doing here is to highlight some potential inferences that may arise in a conceptual blend from the framing input of this-worldly human marriage, and/or intercourse, that one is not supposed to project back onto the unstated target input pertaining to the other world. What we are witnessing here, then, are some direct instructions with regard to the interpretation of the blend between the this-worldly concept and the other-worldly one, highlighting some metaphorical entailments that do not apply to the heavenly realities and concepts that *Gos. Phil.* is trying to describe. For what *Gos. Phil.* seems to be doing is to use the metaphorical input of human marriage, intercourse, and procreation in order to conceptualise central religious mysteries, mysteries that call for metaphorical modes of discourse in order to be understandable to the human mind. *Gos. Phil.*'s emphasis seems not to be on the constraints of language, but rather on the exalted nature of the realities that are merely reflected in names, symbols, and actions in the world. Rather than presenting a negative view of language, then, *Gos. Phil.* seems to focus on the positive and exalted qualities of its ultimate heavenly referents.

The tractate also points out elsewhere some similarities and differences between the marriage of this world, and that of its unstated metaphorical target:

μη[λααυ ναω]σοουν δεαω πε φο[ου ετεφοουτ] μητςιμε ρκοινωνει
 μηνογερηγ ει μη ντοογ ογααυ ογμγστηριον γαρ πε πγαμος μηκοςμος
 ννενταρχιριμε εωδεπγαμος νπχωρμ φρηπ ποσω μαλλον πγαμος
 νατχωρμ ογμγστηριον πε ναληθεινον ογσαρκικον αν πε αλλα εφτββηγ
 εφηπ αν ατεπιθωμια αλλα επογωω εφηπ αν επκακε η τογωη αλλα εφηπ
 επεροογ μηπογοειν

No [one will be able to] know [when the husband] and the wife have communion with each other except they alone. For the marriage of the world is a mystery for those who have taken a wife. If the marriage of defilement is secret, how much more is the undefiled marriage a true mystery! It is not fleshly, but pure. It is not of desire, but of the will. It is not of the darkness or the night, but it is of the day and the light.⁴⁵³

(*Gos. Phil.* 81.34–82.10)

⁴⁵² DeConick, “Entering God’s Presence,” 510.

⁴⁵³ Cf. 1 Thess 5:5.

The unstatedness of the target, however, that is, the unstated identity of what *Gos. Phil.* here refers to as “the undefiled marriage” (πγαμος ἄπυωρη), has caused significant confusion among scholars. That “the marriage of defilement” (πγαμος ἠπυωρη) is to be understood simply as another way to refer to “the marriage of the world” (πγαμος ἠπκοσμος), and that this refers to a typical marriage in the literal sense, has been a view shared by most scholars.⁴⁵⁴ But what is the identity of “the undefiled marriage” against which it is contrasted? And in what sense is the worldly marriage “defiled”? With regard to the latter question, there are two possibilities. Either the marriage of the world is defiled in an absolute sense, in which case it is most probably to be regarded as something to be avoided. The other possibility, however, is that it is simply defiled in a relative sense in relation to “the undefiled marriage.” So, does the fact that the tractate here uses the term “the marriage of defilement” (πγαμος ἠπυωρη) imply a disparagement of marriage in general,⁴⁵⁵ or is it simply to be understood as a contrasting term to “the undefiled marriage” highlighting the elevated status of the latter?⁴⁵⁶ These questions obviously have far-reaching implications for the tractate’s implied views regarding the social order and lifestyle of its adherents, but are notoriously difficult to answer.

The identity of “the undefiled marriage” is open to various interpretations, as *Gos. Phil.* is content to simply contrast it with the worldly marriage of defilement while keeping its exact identity implicit. There are here several possibilities, and the fact that no explicit identification is made also keeps open the possibility that one may take it to refer simultaneously to more than one referent, i.e., that one may blend this framing input with several different target inputs. The possibilities may be divided into three main groups. The first is that it may refer to a marriage that is literally not of this world, but rather on a higher, heavenly, plane.⁴⁵⁷ The second possibility is that it may refer to an earthly image or type of such a heavenly marriage, as for example in a marriage of continence, which would mimic the “marriage of defilement,” but without the defiling element of sexual intercourse.⁴⁵⁸ The third pos-

⁴⁵⁴ See, e.g., Williams, *Rethinking “Gnosticism”*, 144.

⁴⁵⁵ This is the view of, e.g., Williams, *Rethinking “Gnosticism”*, 144.

⁴⁵⁶ See, e.g., Antti Marjanen, *The Woman Jesus Loved: Mary Magdalene in the Nag Hammadi Library and Related Documents* (NHS 40; Leiden: Brill, 1996), 155 n. 37.

⁴⁵⁷ Among the suggestions have been a spiritual marriage between the initiate and his or her heavenly double (see, e.g., Williams, *Rethinking “Gnosticism”*, 144).

⁴⁵⁸ That is to say, either a marriage without sexual intercourse (see, e.g., Williams,

sibility, which I think makes most sense in an overall understanding of the rhetoric of *Gos. Phil.*, is that it refers first and foremost to a sacramental act or acts that are understood in terms of the ICM of MARRIAGE, but without involving actual human marriage in a basic sense. Finally, these interpretive possibilities may also be combined in various ways.⁴⁵⁹

In order to gain a better understanding of “the undefiled marriage,” however, we need to take a closer look at how marriage imagery is employed in various contexts throughout *Gos. Phil.*

3.2.2.3. *The Wedding Feast*

In the previous chapter we saw the importance of the parable of the Wedding Feast (Matt 22:2–14) in *Exeg. Soul.* Significantly, this parable, which focuses on the importance of wearing proper wedding garments, is also alluded to in *Gos. Phil.*

3.2.2.3.1. The Wedding Feast and the Transfiguration

We encounter the allusion to the parable of the Wedding Feast in an interesting passage that follows directly after *Gos. Phil.*'s account of the transfiguration. Having told us that Jesus made his disciples great so that they would be able to see him being great, *Gos. Phil.* continues:

πεχαϛ ἡφοοϛ εἰῆμαϛ εἰῆτεϛχαριστεια δεπενταρρηωτῆ ἡπτελειοϛ πογοειν
 εππινᾶ ετογααβ ροτῆ ἡαγγελοϛ ερον ρωων ανρικων ἡπῆκαταφρονη
 ἡπριειβ αχῆτϛ γαρ ἡῆωβωμ εναϛ επρο⁴⁶⁰ ἡῆλααϛ ναωτῆπεφογοει εροϛν
 επῆρο εϛκηκαρηνϛ

Rethinking “Gnosticism”, 148–149) or a marriage where sexual intercourse is ritualised and utilised for a higher purpose (see, e.g., Jorunn Jacobsen Buckley, “A Cult-Mystery in *The Gospel of Philip*,” *JBL* 99:4 [1980]: 569–581; April D. DeConick, “The Great Mystery of Marriage: Sex and Conception in Ancient Valentinian Traditions,” *VC* 57 [2003]: 307–342).

⁴⁵⁹ See, e.g., Williams, *Rethinking “Gnosticism”*, 149. Cf. also Pagels, who has suggested that *Gos. Phil.* deliberately refuses to take sides for or against celibacy (see Elaine H. Pagels, “The ‘Mystery of Marriage’ in the *Gospel of Philip*,” in *The Allure of Gnosticism: The Gnostic Experience in Jungian Psychology and Contemporary Culture* [ed. Robert A. Segal; Chicago: Open Court, 1995], 112). Discussing the problem in 1991, Pagels stated that “As I now read the text, its author intends to reject entirely the question concerning sexual practice, the same question that contemporary scholars have been trying to use the text to answer” (Pagels, “‘Mystery of Marriage’ Revisited,” 444).

⁴⁶⁰ Both Layton and Schenke regard προ as a scribal error and emend it to πῆρο (see Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 156; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 26–27, and the discussion below).

He said on that day in the Eucharist: “He who joined the perfect, the light, with the Holy Spirit, join the angels with us also, with the images!” Do not despise the lamb, for without it it is impossible to see the door. No one will be able to approach the king naked. (Gos. Phil. 58.10–17)

This is the only instance in which *Gos. Phil.* recounts a prayer of Jesus.⁴⁶¹ Significantly, the transitional phrase between the transfiguration account and this prayer, the information that the prayer took place “on that day” (ἡμέρας ἐπιμαχ), seems to place the prayer on the same day as the transfiguration,⁴⁶² while the use of the term εὐχαριστεῖα relates the prayer to the eucharistic ritual, and implies that this is in fact a eucharistic prayer.⁴⁶³ However, as Rewolinski has rightly noted, Jesus’ prayer is not the words of institution,⁴⁶⁴ but is rather more like an epiclesis.⁴⁶⁵ But how do we account for a eucharistic prayer performed by Jesus at the transfiguration? “How do we account for a eucharistic action on the mountain after the transfiguration with no elements, and then the numerous references elsewhere in the text to the elements to be eaten or drunk,”⁴⁶⁶ asks Rewolinski, and suggests that the focus of this particular paradigmatic action is squarely on the epiclesis, and that this epiclesis is primarily what effects the union with the angels.⁴⁶⁷ I think Rewolinski is right in identifying the prayer as an epiclesis, but is he right in his assumption that the Eucharist referred to here did not contain any eucharistic elements, and is he right in seeing it as a “post-transfiguration celebration”?⁴⁶⁸ The fact that the elements are not explicitly mentioned does not automatically mean that they were not included, and the fact that the *account* of the prayer follows that of the transfiguration in *Gos. Phil.* does not necessarily mean that *Gos. Phil.* holds this to have been the sequence of the *events*. Another possibility would be to see the description of Jesus’ prayer

⁴⁶¹ Schenke, however, suggests that these might be the words of Philip, excerpted from an earlier work, rather than Jesus (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 251–252).

⁴⁶² Cf. Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 118.

⁴⁶³ Cf. Pagels, “Adam and Eve, Christ and the Church,” 168; Pagels, “Pursuing the Spiritual Eve,” 203. Segelberg takes this prayer as an indication that “certain Gnostics . . . had not reached a stage when prayer was without any meaning to them” (Segelberg, “Prayer Among the Gnostics,” 58).

⁴⁶⁴ For the institution narratives, see Matt 26:20–29; Mark 14:17–25; Luke 22:14–20; 1 Cor 11:23–26. Cf. also the convenient table in Paul F. Bradshaw, *Eucharistic Origins* (Alcuin Club Collections 80; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 4, and the discussion in *ibid.*, 3–10.

⁴⁶⁵ See Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 118. Cf. also Eijk, “Gospel of Philip,” 104.

⁴⁶⁶ Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 121.

⁴⁶⁷ See Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 121.

⁴⁶⁸ See Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 122, and cf. 121.

as a description of what took place directly *prior to* or *during* the transfiguration, rather than after it. My proposal is in fact that the eucharistic ritual this epiclesis prayer of Jesus is a part of is instrumental in effecting the transformation of the disciples which enabled them to see Jesus in his glory at the transfiguration.⁴⁶⁹ The words, “he said on that day in the Eucharist” may thus point to a eucharistic epiclesis prayer,⁴⁷⁰ of which Jesus’ words are paradigmatic, but they may also point simultaneously to the process by which he made the disciples great. As we shall see, such a close connection between the Eucharist and the transfiguration is mystagogically highly significant.

For analytical purposes the passage under discussion may be divided into two parts, containing different but related references to the Eucharist. We will now look at the two parts separately and then show how they are connected.⁴⁷¹ I will start with the latter half before returning to a further analysis of the part containing the prayer.

3.2.2.3.2. The Wedding Feast and the Eucharist

The second half of the passage begins with an admonition and continues with an explanation that is highly allusive:

ἸΠΡΚΑΤΑΦΡΟΝΕΙ ἸΠΡΕΙΒ ΔΧΝΤΥ ΓΑΡ ΜΝΩΒΟΜ ΕΝΔΥ ΕΠΡΟ ΜΝΛΔΔΥ
ΝΑΔΥΤΠΕΦΟΥΟΕΙ ΕΞΟΥΝ ΕΠΡΟ ΕΦΚΗΚΑΖΗΥ

Do not despise the lamb, for without it it is impossible to see the door. No one will be able to approach the king naked. (*Gos. Phil.* 58.14–17)

This may be read as a clever composite allusion. The final sentence, which states that no one may approach the king naked, is a reasonably clear allusion to the parable of the Wedding Feast,⁴⁷² more specifically Matt 22:11–14 concerning the man who shows up at the wedding feast without a wedding garment.⁴⁷³ Interestingly, being without a wedding garment

⁴⁶⁹ See *Gos. Phil.* 58.5–10 and the discussion above.

⁴⁷⁰ Cf. Buckley and Good, “Sacramental Language,” 12.

⁴⁷¹ Schenke divides this passage into three separate sayings: 26b: 58.10–12; 27a: 58.14–15; 27b: 58.15–17 (see *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 27, 248–255; “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [NHC II,3],” 195).

⁴⁷² See, e.g., Catanzaro, “The Gospel According to Philip,” 42; Ménard, *L’Évangile selon Philippe*, 147; Evans, et al., *Nag Hammadi Texts*, 151–152. Cf. also Wilson, who cautiously states that “some connection . . . is perhaps to be suspected” (Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 93), and Tuckett, who thinks the allusion is “very indirect” (Tuckett, *Nag Hammadi*, 77).

⁴⁷³ The parable of the wedding also states that the man who lacks wedding garments is thrown out into “the outer darkness” (Matt 22:13). This Matthean phrase, πκακε ετρησα νβολ / τὸ σκότος τὸ ἔξωτερον (Matt 8:12; 22:13; 25:30), is quoted at *Gos. Phil.* 68.7–8 and probably also at 67.1.

is in *Gos. Phil.* equated with being naked, i.e., without any garment at all. This should be understood in conjunction with the other passages in *Gos. Phil.*, discussed above, that stress the importance of putting on and rising in a garment, a garment which, as we have seen, is gained through ritual actions. Without having put on this previously discussed garment one may not approach the king, which must be understood as a reference to God.⁴⁷⁴ The interpretation of this sentence is thus relatively unproblematic.

But how is this statement connected to the one preceding it? Based on the fact that the Coptic word for “door,” *po*, is similar to that for “king,” *p̄po*, Layton, Schenke and others have proposed to emend the former to the latter, making the sentence read “king” instead of “door.”⁴⁷⁵ Rather than taking the Coptic term *po* (“door”) as a scribal mistake for *p̄po* (“king”), however, we may instead read the passage as playing on the words *po* and *p̄po*.⁴⁷⁶ We thus get a transition between the two sentences that is based on a pun, and also a pun that makes good sense on several counts. Firstly, on a literal level it is of course difficult to enter into the chambers of a king without finding the door. But how is the part concerning the lamb related to the ability to see the door?⁴⁷⁷ In

⁴⁷⁴ God as king is of course connected to the general concept of the kingdom of heaven.

⁴⁷⁵ Layton regards *np̄o* as an error and emends it to *π(̄p̄)po*, and Isenberg translates it accordingly as “king,” rather than “door” (Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 156–157; Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 360). Schenke likewise thinks *np̄o* is an “Irreguläre Schreibung” for *n̄p̄o* and translates “den König” (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 26–27; see also Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 9; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960],” 43; Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 93; Till, *Das Evangelium nach Philippos*, 18–19. Till does not emend the Coptic text, but translates both *po* and *p̄po* as “König”). Most scholars have retained this emendation, see, e.g., Stephen Gero, “The Lamb and the King: ‘Saying’ 27 of the Gospel of Philip Reconsidered,” *OrChr* 63 (1979): 178; Tripp, “Sacramental System,” 253; DeConick, “Entering God’s Presence,” 504. As will be argued here, however, the manuscript reading makes good sense as is, and there is thus no reason to emend it (cf. Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 20–21, 52 n. 3).

⁴⁷⁶ Stephen Gero notes that if *po* is not emended, the two parts of the passage “may not have had a connection in the Greek *Vorlage*” (Gero, “The Lamb and the King,” 178 n. 7). Another possibility is that there was no Greek *Vorlage* for this passage. John Barns has suggested that the similarity between the words *po* and *p̄po* is purely coincidental (see John Barns, review of Robert McL. Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip: Translated from the Coptic Text, with an Introduction and Commentary*, *JTS* 11 [1963]: 496–500).

⁴⁷⁷ Ménard sees in *po* (“door”) a connection with Naassene texts and suggests a baptismal context (see Ménard, *L’Évangile selon Philippe*, 147); Kasser, who primarily emends *po* to *p̄po*, does not exclude the possibility of the reading *po* and suggests a possible connection to the story of Ulysses and Polyphemous (see Rodolphe Kasser, “Bibliothèque gnostique VIII/IX: L’Évangile selon Philippe,” *RTP* 20 [1970]: 29 n. 1). In a text that is in such consistent dialogue with the Gospel of John as is the case with *Gos. Phil.*, however,

fact it makes perfectly good sense if we understand it as a play on two Johannine identifications of Jesus combined with *Gos. Phil.*'s logic of becoming and seeing, which is also, as we have seen, to some extent itself based on the Gospel of John. "I am the door" (ἀνοκ πε προ/ἐγώ εἰμι ἡ θύρα), Jesus states in John 10:9, and adds that those who enter by him will be saved.⁴⁷⁸ As for the lamb, John the Baptist identifies Jesus as "the lamb of God" (περιεῖβ ἡπινογτε/ὁ ἄμνός τοῦ θεοῦ) in John 1:29 and 36, and Jesus as the lamb (ἄρνίον in Greek, but ριεῖβ in Coptic)⁴⁷⁹ is of course also the most important christological title in Revelation.⁴⁸⁰ We may thus identify both the lamb and the door with Jesus.⁴⁸¹ As we have seen, it is an important principle in *Gos. Phil.* that to be able to see something of the true realities one needs to become like them. Thus, to be able to see Jesus as he really is, one needs to become like him. This implies, in this passage, that one must become like Jesus in order to see "the door." Jesus as lamb, on the other hand, obviously has sacrificial, and hence eucharistic, connotations,⁴⁸² and, as we have seen, to become Christ-like by putting on the perfect man⁴⁸³ and gaining clothing⁴⁸⁴ are among the effects of the eucharistic ritual. Thus the logic seems to be that by ingesting Jesus in the Eucharist, and thereby not despising him as the lamb, one may become like him, according to the principle that one becomes what one eats. How consuming Jesus in the Eucharist (as the lamb) and seeing him (as the door) are related to the statement that one may not approach the king naked then becomes clear in relation to the references to putting on the garment by means of the Eucharist.⁴⁸⁵

a reference to that gospel seems closer at hand (a possible allusion to John 10:7–9 is also suggested by Kasser [see *ibid.*]).

⁴⁷⁸ Cf. also John 10:7 in NA²⁷. For extensive exegesis of Jesus' reference to himself as "the door," see, e.g., Origen, *Comm. in Jo.*, 2.10–11, where Origen connects Jesus as door with entry to the Father / King.

⁴⁷⁹ See Wilmet, *Concordance*, 3:1404.

⁴⁸⁰ See Rev 5:6, 8, 12, 13; 6:1, 16; 7:9, 10, 14, 17; 12:11; 13:8; 14:1, 4, 10; 15:3; 17:14; 19:7, 9; 21:9, 14, 22, 23, 27; 22:1, 3. Cf. also Acts 8:32; 1 Pet 1:19.

⁴⁸¹ Gero instead rather awkwardly identifies the lamb with the "little ones" of Matt 18:10 (see Gero, "The Lamb and the King," 180). For the possible connection of our passage with Matt 18, see the discussion below.

⁴⁸² See, e.g., Tripp, "Sacramental System," 253; Pagels, "Pursuing the Spiritual Eve," 201.

⁴⁸³ See above.

⁴⁸⁴ See above.

⁴⁸⁵ Tripp, however, has a slightly different interpretation, stating that, "The reference to Matthew xxii.11 (no Lukan parallel) and the wedding feast guests improperly dressed is made more probable by, and itself supports, the natural reading of 'the Lamb' as a reference to the Eucharist, eaten by the neophytes in their baptismal robes" (Tripp,

So, to sum up, one becomes like Christ by participating in the Eucharist and may thus see him, so that one may enter by him into the kingdom of heaven. This logic is thoroughly Johannine. Then, in accordance with Matthew, one may approach the king, since one is not naked but has attained the proper garment by means of the Eucharist. The passage thus seems basically to be an argument for the importance and indispensability of the Eucharist. One should not despise this ritual,⁴⁸⁶ for it is indispensable if one wishes to enter the kingdom of heaven.⁴⁸⁷

3.2.2.3.3. Eucharistic Epiclesis and Joining with Angels

Now it is time to return to the start of the passage under discussion, namely the part containing the eucharistic epiclesis prayer of Jesus:

πεχαϑ ἡφοοϑ ἐτῆμαϑ ρῆτεϑχαριστεια δεπενταρζωτῆρ ἡπτελειος πογοειν
επιηᾶ ετογααβ ροτῆρ ἡαγγελος ερον ρωων ἀηρικων

He said on that day in the Eucharist: “He who joined the perfect, the light, with the Holy Spirit, join the angels with us also,⁴⁸⁸ with the images!”

(*Gos. Phil.* 58.10–14)

There are several problems with this passage. We may assume that the one referred to as “He who joined . . .” (πενταρζωτῆρ) should be understood as God the Father, and that the prayer is in effect an epiclesis for the Father to send the angels to join Jesus and his disciples. We are then left with two main problems in this prayer. The first is the nature of the joining that is envisaged between the angels and the images, and the other is the nature of the joining between “the perfect, the light” (πτελειος πογοειν)⁴⁸⁹ and “the Holy Spirit” (ππηᾶ ετογααβ), with the attendant problem of the further identity of these aspects or entities.⁴⁹⁰

“Sacramental System,” 253). As the present analysis shows, however, there is no need to see any reference here to baptismal robes.

⁴⁸⁶ An admonition not to despise the Eucharist is also found in *Apos. Con.* VII.25.7 (see W. Jardine Grisbrooke, *The Liturgical Portions of the Apostolic Constitutions: A Text for Students Translated, Edited, Annotated and Introduced* [Alcuin/GROW Liturgical Study 13–14, Grove Liturgical Study 61; Bramcote: Grove Books, 1990], 18).

⁴⁸⁷ For an, although ultimately unconvincing, alternative interpretation based on “the Valentinian myth,” see Gero, “The Lamb and the King.” Gero’s exegesis depends, however, on the simplification of the passage constituted by the emendation of πο (“door”) to προ (“king”).

⁴⁸⁸ Cf. John 1:51.

⁴⁸⁹ This might be a scribal mistake for πτελειος ἡγοειν, “the perfect light” (thus, e.g., Catanzaro, “The Gospel According to Philip,” 42; Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 334; Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 156–157).

⁴⁹⁰ Most scholars have interpreted the passage in light of “Valentinian” theology. Mé-

Taken at face value, Jesus here refers not only to the disciples, but also to himself as an “image” (εἰκὼν).⁴⁹¹ If this is the case, then what they are images of cannot simply be Jesus himself, but rather the angels. It thus follows from this that Jesus himself is an image of an angel. Now, in what way may Christ be regarded as the image of an angel? Elsewhere in *Gos. Phil.* the disciples are images of Christ. Could it be that the disciples should here be regarded as the images of both Christ and the angels?

I propose that we may understand this passage on the basis of the passage just discussed, which directly follows this prayer, together with the transfiguration scene that directly precedes it. This means that we should regard it as an epiclesis prayer that is linked to the eucharistic appropriation of the perfect man and of the garment, and which takes place on the day of the transfiguration. To understand how these aspects are connected, however, we need to read this part of *Gos. Phil.* intertextually with the transfiguration accounts in Matthew and Luke. The Lukan account of the transfiguration, which is the only one that connects the

nard and Sevrin see a reference to the unification of the Saviour and Sophia on the one hand and that of the angels and the spiritual seed on the other (see Ménard, *L'Évangile selon Philippe*, 146; Sevrin, “Les noces spirituelles,” 152). Wilson sees the unification of the Light, whom he identifies as “the Saviour Jesus,” with “the Mother or Spirit,” and “the Gnostics” with the angels (see Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 92). Schenke sees “die typisch valentinianische Lehre von der vorzeitliche Hochzeitsvereinigung zwischen dem Soter (samt seinem Engelgefolge) und der Achamoth als dem Typos der erlösenden innerzeitlichen Vereinigung zwischen diesen Engeln und den ihnen entsprechenden aus jener Vereinigung hervorgegangenen Geistseelen der Menschen, die ihre endzeitliche Erfüllung bei der Rückkehr alles Geistigen in das Pleroma, das ihnen zum himmlischen Brautgemach wird, findet” (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 248, Schenke’s emphasis). See below for an alternative interpretation.

⁴⁹¹ Gaffron finds this to be rather strange, stating that “Merkwürdig ist, daß er bei der folgenden Bitte um die Vereinigung der Jünger mit ihren Engeln sich selbst mit einschließt” and offers the suggestion that it may be due to “die zuvor berichtete Polymorphie Jesu,” and that “die Bitte ist also im uneigentlichen Sinne zu verstehen; sie hat ihren Sinn vom Assimilationsgedanken her” (Gaffron, *Studien*, 184). Sevrin likewise finds it strange that the prayer is put into the mouth of Jesus, but suggests that “Cette difficulté se résout au mieux si l’on considère cette ‘eucharistie’ comme une formule liturgique mise a posteriori, et quelque peu maladroitement, dans la bouche du Christ. Dans ce cas son lien au contexte demeure fragile, et témoigne, au mieux, de l’interprétation qu’en donne le rédacteur” (Sevrin, “Les noces spirituelles,” 152). Segelberg thinks that it is “without careful consideration” that this “liturgical prayer has been put into the mouth of Jesus,” and suggests that what is quoted here may be only a part of a longer prayer, and that the reason why the phrasing has not been changed is that the phrase itself “was well known and unchangeable” (Segelberg, “Prayer Among the Gnostics,” 58).

transfiguration with Jesus praying, in fact states that his appearance changed “as he prayed” (ἐπιτρέφω ληλ / ἐν τῷ προσεύχεσθαι αὐτὸν).⁴⁹² It is also, as mentioned above, the only one that mentions Jesus’ “glory.” Moreover, while all the Synoptics report that Moses and Elijah appeared at the transfiguration, only Luke states that they appeared “in glory” (ἐν δόξῃ).⁴⁹³ However, in all the Synoptics the transfiguration narrative is preceded by a reference to the coming of the Son of Man in glory, and they all mention the angels in this context. Luke, however, states that the Son of Man shall come in his Father’s glory, his own glory and the glory of the angels.⁴⁹⁴ These details are significant, and it is worth quoting the relevant Lukan passage in full:

πετρωπιπε γαρ ναϊ νηναφωδε ποηρε ηπωμε νατωπε μπαϊ εφωανει
 εηπεφωογ ηηπαπεφωτ ηηπανεφαγγελος ετογααβ τζω δε ημος ηητη
 εηογμε δεογνηροϊνε ηηεταξερατογ ηηπεινα εηνεεχιτπε ηημογ φαντογναγ
 ετηητερο ηηπογτε αςωπε δε ηηηεανειφωδε ηηαωμογν ηροογ αφχι
 ηηπετρος ηηιωραηηης ηηιακωβος αφωακ εραϊ επτοογ εωληλ αςωπε δε
 εηηπρεφωληλ απηνε ηηπερο ρκεγα αγω ατεφρεσω ογβαφ εστογο

For he who will put me and my words to shame, the Son of Man will put this one to shame when he comes in his glory and that of his father and that of his angels. Truly I say to you, there are some among those who stand here who will not taste death until they see the kingdom of God. And it happened after these words on the eighth day he took Peter and John and James and went up to the mountain to pray. And it happened while he was praying that the likeness of his face changed and his garment shone white.

(Luke 9:26–29)

If we identify the prayer quoted by *Gos. Phil.* with the prayer of Jesus referred to in Luke 9:29, it becomes clear that it is closely connected with the transfiguration. Moreover, since we have already seen that the prayer referred to in *Gos. Phil.* is eucharistic, it fits in with what we have seen several times already, namely that the Eucharist effects a transformation of the communicants. That this transformation is a transformation into the likeness of Jesus again dovetails with what we have seen elsewhere of *Gos. Phil.*'s interpretation of the Eucharist, and with the tractate's treatment of the transfiguration, where it is the disciples who are changed rather than Jesus.

⁴⁹² Luke 9:29.

⁴⁹³ Luke 9:31.

⁴⁹⁴ Luke 9:26. Matthew and Mark state that the Son of Man shall come with his angels, but they only mention the glory of the Father (Matt 16:27; Mark 8:38).

Now, what are we to make of the epiclesis for the sending of the angels? One possibility is to understand the first joining to be that of the Logos and the Holy Spirit, and hence to see “the perfect, the light” as a reference to the Logos, an identification that may find support in *Gos. Phil.* 57.15–16, although elsewhere in *Gos. Phil.* the light is more often a property of the Holy Spirit. An alternative may be to understand “the perfect, the light” in accordance with the Gospel of John as a more general reference to Christ.⁴⁹⁵ In that case we may simply understand this joining to refer to that of Christ receiving the Holy Spirit at his baptism in the Jordan. The second joining, which is what Jesus prays for, is more problematic. As we have seen, “us” should here logically include Jesus, which means that Jesus refers to himself and the disciples as images of angels and prays for the angels to join with them. That Jesus may be referred to as an image of an angel can be supported by reference to what is stated just a few lines previously in *Gos. Phil.*’s transfiguration account, where it is stated that “he [appeared to the] angels as an angel” (αφο[χωνε] εβολ ν̄ν̄]αγγελος ζωε αγγελος),⁴⁹⁶ and the statement elsewhere that “Christ has everything within himself, whether man or angel or mystery and the Father” (πε̄χ̄ ο̄ν̄τᾱ ο̄γον̄ ν̄ιμ̄ ρ̄ᾱῑ ν̄ρη̄τη̄ ε̄ιτε̄ ρ̄ω̄με̄ ε̄ιτε̄ ᾱγγελος̄ ε̄ιτε̄ μ̄γ̄στη̄ριον̄ ᾱλω̄ π̄ιω̄τ̄).⁴⁹⁷ But what kind of joining with the angels is Christ praying for in this *Gos. Phil.* passage?

As mentioned above, the angels are referred to directly prior to the transfiguration account in the Synoptics. Also of note is the close connection between the transfiguration accounts and the post-resurrection accounts in the New Testament. For in the New Testament the manifestation of Jesus’ glory in the transfiguration has clear parallels in the appearance of the resurrected Christ.⁴⁹⁸ A particularly significant parallel is found between the Synoptics’, and especially Luke’s, account of the appearance of Moses and Elijah at the transfiguration, and the account of the ascension of Jesus in Acts 1. The latter relates that when Jesus ascended to heaven, two men stood by the disciples “in white garments” (ῥ̄ν̄ρη̄νε̄β̄ω̄ ε̄γο̄γο̄β̄ω̄) / ἐν ἐσθ̄ή̄σεῑ λευκαῖς).⁴⁹⁹ In the transfiguration scene Jesus is described as having white and shining garments, and both he, Moses, and Elijah are described by Luke as appearing in “glory.” The

⁴⁹⁵ See John 8:12; 9:5.

⁴⁹⁶ *Gos. Phil.* 57.35–58.1.

⁴⁹⁷ *Gos. Phil.* 56.13–15.

⁴⁹⁸ See, e.g., Robert H. Stein, “Is the Transfiguration (Mark 9:2–8) a Misplaced Resurrection-Account?” *JBL* 95:1 (1976): 82.

⁴⁹⁹ Acts 1:10; cf. Matt 28:2–3; Mark 16:5; John 20:12.

appearance of Moses and Elijah at the transfiguration is thus mirrored by the appearance of the two men in white garments at the ascension of Jesus in Acts 1:10. Thus the “two men” in Acts who parallel Moses and Elijah in Luke may be interpreted as angels, and it is consequently easy to make the connection in the opposite direction as well, once the two passages have been mentally connected. Jesus, for his part, may thus also be understood to appear here in a way as an image of the angels, in that he has white and shining garments and appears in “glory.”

Considering the fact that the following part of the passage alludes heavily to the Matthean parable of the Wedding Feast, and considering the widespread use of Matthew elsewhere in *Gos. Phil.*, we should not discount the possibility of also drawing on Matthew with regard to the transfiguration account and the prayer of Jesus. Matthew’s description of Jesus’ garments being white “as the light” (ἵνα ἴποιοεμ/ ὡς τὸ φῶς) and of Jesus’ face shining like the sun,⁵⁰⁰ may in fact provide a rationale for the reference to the joining of the light to the Holy Spirit. Since we have already seen that Christ’s true body in *Gos. Phil.* is constituted by the joining of the Logos and the Holy Spirit, his true flesh and blood, within an earthly body, and that the Spirit is sometimes connected with the garment, the joining of the light with the Holy Spirit could simply be understood as a reference to the synoptic account of Jesus and his garment being made bright and shining at his transfiguration.

The sequence of events relating to the transfiguration and the eucharistic prayer of Jesus may thus be construed as follows: First the Holy Spirit joins with the light causing Christ to become angelic (i.e., an image of the angels). Then the disciples are made great so as to become equal to him, thus becoming themselves images of angels in the process. This is achieved by the partaking of the Logos and the Holy Spirit by means of the eucharistic flesh and blood of Jesus, i.e., the bread and the mixed cup in the Eucharist.⁵⁰¹ Jesus then prays to his father, referring back to the

⁵⁰⁰ Matt 17:2.

⁵⁰¹ This, along with several other eucharistic passages in *Gos. Phil.*, recalls the sacramental theology of Athanasius. According to Norman Russel, for Athanasius “[t]he divine Word is a heavenly food which nourishes our souls.” Athanasius asserts that “[w]e no longer eat the flesh of a lamb but Christ’s own flesh.” As in *Gos. Phil.*, Athanasius also connects salvation to the partaking of the Logos: “we may no longer, as mere earth, return to earth, but as being joined to the Logos from heaven, may be carried to heaven by him. . . . no longer as being men, but as proper to the Logos, [we] may have a share in eternal life” (Athanasius, *C. Ar.* 3.33). For Athanasius, Russel argues, “[t]his transcendence of human nature is not, as in Origen, because we have become pure *noes*, but because we come to be wholly directed by the Logos and therefore receive his characteristics, characteristics

previous joining and asking for the sending of the angels to join him and his disciples, who have now all become images of angels.⁵⁰²

Another possibility, which does not exclude the previous one, is to regard this as a prayer taking place within the rites of initiation, being a eucharistic prayer specifically connected with the first communion.⁵⁰³ Since this is said to be a eucharistic prayer, the reference to the angels recalls the Sanctus.⁵⁰⁴ Since the prayer refers back to what may be regarded as a process of becoming images of angels, and refers forward to the joining with the angels, it might have functioned as an introduction to the Sanctus. In that case, the joining with the angels might refer to joining the angels in the heavenly liturgy. What the prayer refers back to may thus be the process by which one becomes angelic and Christlike through the rituals of baptism and chrismation. The joining of the perfect with the Holy Spirit would in that case refer both to the baptism of Christ in the Jordan and the Christian initiates' reception of the Holy Spirit in their baptismal chrismation. The interpretation of this ritual process as becoming like the angels may stem from a practice, which we have possible allusions to elsewhere in *Gos. Phil.*, of donning white garments after emersion from the baptismal water. The angels that are referred to in the prayer may refer simply to angels, but if this is a prayer used in an initiatory setting it could also simply be a reference to the congregation of already initiated Christians whom the newly initiated are now ready to join in the celebration of the Eucharist. In either case, the reference in the prayer to a joining with the angels could simply refer to a joining together in worship of the heavenly Father.

Gos. Phil. 57.28–58.17 is, as we can see, richly evocative, setting up composite allusions to the transfiguration narrative, and several passages relating to angels, in both Matthew and Luke as well as to the ascension

which may be summed up in the expression, 'life in itself'. The enjoyment of this life is presented in eschatological terms, when we shall have ascended into heaven. There we shall sit on thrones. There too we shall contemplate the Father, for that which participates in the Logos joins the angels in the everlasting contemplation of God" (see Russell, *Doctrine of Deification*, 183–184).

⁵⁰² Jesus' eucharistic prayer may thus be said to have, in a sense, a bipartite anamnesis-epiclesis structure.

⁵⁰³ Cf. Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 250–251.

⁵⁰⁴ The possibility that the references to the angels have been influenced by the Sanctus has been suggested by David H. Tripp, "Gnostic Worship": The State of the Question," *Studia Liturgica* 17 (1987): 218. For an extensive treatment of the use of the Sanctus in early Christian eucharistic prayers, see Bryan D. Spinks, *The Sanctus in the Eucharistic Prayer* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

scene in Acts. This still does not exhaust the allusive potential of the passage, however.⁵⁰⁵ Another intertext that deserves consideration is the vision of the throne room described in Rev 7:9–17. This passage contains such a significant number of themes and terms that echo those which we have discussed in *Gos. Phil.*, especially in relation to the latter’s interpretation of the Eucharist, that it would seem to be readily brought to the mind of a reader familiar with this canonical text in a reading of *Gos. Phil.* Rev 7:9–17 describes a multitude clad in white robes standing before the throne of God and the Lamb. We are further told that there are angels standing around the throne giving thanks to God. Those who are standing there in white garments are identified as those who washed their robes and “made them white in the blood of the Lamb,” which, we are told, is why they are allowed to stand before the throne of God serving him. These people will no longer hunger or thirst, nor be bothered by the sun, since they get food and drink from the Lamb, and, as we have seen, they also have white garments. They thus have “food and drink and clothing,” just like those who participate in the Eucharist according to *Gos. Phil.*⁵⁰⁶ These people described in Rev 7:9–17 may be said to have been made angel-like, wearing white garments and having joined the angels in giving thanks to God like they do. There are, as we can see, multiple connections between this vision in Revelation and the sacramental interpretation of *Gos. Phil.* Not only is the transformation of the believers into the likeness of the angels by means of the blood of the Lamb and their entry to the throne room and the king reflected here, but even *Gos. Phil.*’s garment metaphors and its similes of dyeing and Jesus’ making all colours white are reflected in Rev 7:9–17.

⁵⁰⁵ Matthew also provides us with a link between Jesus praying and the sending of angels when Jesus is described, when he is arrested, as asking whether they do not believe that he could, if he wanted to, ask God and he would send him more than twelve legions of angels (Matt 26:53). Matthew also provides a connection between the admonition not to “despise” and a reference to angels in 18:10–11, although it does not seem to make sense to connect the lamb in *Gos. Phil.* with the “little ones” of Matt 18 (for an interpretation of the passage based on such an identification, see Gero, “The Lamb and the King”). Neither should we forget the connection in Luke 22:41–44 between prayer, the cup, and angels. For, as mentioned above, in the scene where Jesus prays and sweats drops of blood, an angel appears to him from heaven. Luke 22:39–46 has several features in common with the transfiguration account in the same gospel. In both Matthew and Luke there is a reference to the ascent of a mountain, to Jesus praying, and to the disciples falling asleep (cf. also Matt 22:30; 25:31).

⁵⁰⁶ See *Gos. Phil.* 57.3–8.

3.2.2.4. *Spiritual Love*

The parable of the Wedding Feast is not the only Matthean parable that is used in *Gos. Phil.* in connection with themes with wedding-related imagery. Both the term κοιτών (“bedroom”) and νυμφών (“bridal chamber”) are used in a passage that plays on the parable of the Ten Virgins.⁵⁰⁷ This Matthean parable concerns the ten virgins who go to meet the bridegroom. Five of them are foolish, however, and forget to bring “oil” (νεὺ/ἔλαιον) for their lamps. When night comes, their lamps burn out and they go to buy more oil. While they are away, the bridegroom comes and the five wise virgins, who have oil for their lamps, enter with the bridegroom/Son of Man to the marriage (γάμος). When the foolish virgins return they find “the door” (προ/ῆ θύρα) shut and are denied entrance. In its use of the parable *Gos. Phil.* emphasises the importance of the light and the lamps:

ΟΥΟΝ ΝΙΜ ΕΤΝΑΒ[ΩΚ ΕΞΟΥΝ] ΕΠΚΟΙΤΩΝ ΣΕΝΑΧΕΡΟ ΜΠΟΥ[ΖΗΝΒ̄ ΕΦ]ο⁵⁰⁸ ΓΑΡ
 ΝΘΕ ΝΗΓΑΜΟΣ ΕΤΗΝΕ[.]ΩΠΕ ΝΤΟΥΩΝ ΠΚΩΣΤ Ω[ΑΦ]
 ΝΤΟΥΩΝ ΩΑΦΧΕΝΕ ΜΜΥΣΤΗΡΙΟΝ ΔΕ ΜΠΓΑΜΟΣ ΝΤΟΥ ΩΑΥΧΩΚ ΕΒΟΛ ΖΜΠΕΖΟΥ
 ΜΠΠΟΥΘΕΙΝ ΜΑΡΕΦΟΥ ΕΤΜΑΥ Η ΠΕΦΟΥΘΕΙΝ ΖΩΤΤ

Everyone who will [enter] the bedroom shall ignite their [lamp],⁵⁰⁹ for [it] is like the marriages that are [...] happen at night, the fire [...] at night, it is extinguished. But the mysteries of that marriage are fulfilled in the day and the light. That day or its light does not set. (*Gos. Phil.* 85.32–86.4)

Blended with the Matthean parable, the reference to the entry into the bedroom (κοιτών) in this *Gos. Phil.* passage seems to equal the entry through the door to the marriage (γάμος). In both cases, entry is closely connected to the lighting of the lamps. In the *Gos. Phil.* passage, however, the actual entry seems to precede the lighting of the lamps, rather than the other way around, a sequence of events that seems to be confirmed in the following sentences, where *Gos. Phil.* states that one may receive the light by becoming a “child of the bridal chamber” (ωπρε μπνυμφών):

ΕΡΩΔΟΥΑ ΩΠΕ ΝΩΠΕ ΜΠΝΥΜΦΩΝ ΦΝΑΧΙ ΜΠΟΥΘΕΙΝ ΕΤΜΟΥΑ ΧΙΤΥ
 ΕΦΗΝΕΕΙΜΑ ΦΝΑΩΧΙΤΥ ΔΝ ΜΠΚΕΜΑ

⁵⁰⁷ Matt 25:1–13.

⁵⁰⁸ I follow Schenke’s reconstruction of this lacuna (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 78). Layton has ΜΠΟΥ[οειν . . .] (see Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 212).

⁵⁰⁹ Cf. Matt 5:15; 25:1–13; Mark 4:21; Luke 8:16; 11:33.

If one becomes a child of the bridal chamber,⁵¹⁰ he will receive the light.⁵¹¹
 If one does not receive it while being here, he will not be able to receive it
 in the other place. (Gos. Phil. 86.4–7)

This passage seems to confirm the sequence of entry into the bedroom followed by the reception of the light, by emphasising that in order to receive the light “in the other place” (ἄπκεμα), elsewhere referred to as “the aeon” or “the kingdom of heaven,” one needs to receive it here in this world. A vital requirement for receiving the light, however, is implied by the Matthean intertext, namely the possession of “oil” (νεῖλ/ἔλαιον) for the lamps. Without this oil, the lamps cannot be lighted. The basic lesson Gos. Phil. draws from the parable, then, is not the fact that the virgins missed salvation because they were not present when the bridegroom arrived, but rather the fact that they lacked the necessary oil. Now, what are the target referents of the “oil” (νεῖλ/ἔλαιον) and the “bedroom” (κοιτων), and how does one become a “child of the bridal chamber” (ὡνρε ἄπνημφων)? We shall return to these questions, but first we shall look closer at another passage that may shed light on the reception of the light in relation to the entry to the “bedroom.” The passage in question follows an account of the rending of the temple veil, and describes the revelation of the heavenly realities through their earthly types and images:

ΑΝΑΠΣΑ ΝΤΠΕ ΟΥΩΝ ΝΑΝ ἸΝΕΤἸΠΣΑ ΜΠΙΤἸ ΧΕΚΑΔΣ ΕΝΝΑΒΩΚ ΕΡΟΥΝ ΑΠΠΕΘΗΠ
 ἸΤΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ ΠΑΕΙ ΑΛΗΘΩΣ ΠΕ ΠΕΤΓΑΕΙΝΥ ΕΤΟ ἸΧΩΩΡΕ ΕΝΑΒΩΚ ΔΕ ΕΡΟΥΝ
 ΕΜΑΥ ΖΙΤἸΖἸΝΤΥΠΟΣ ΕΥΩΗΣ ΜἸΖἸΝἸΝΤΩΒ ΣΩΩΗΣ ΜΕΝ ἸΝΑΖΡἸΠΠΕΟΥ ΕΤΧΗΚ
 ΕΒΟ[Λ] ΟΥἸΕΟΥ ΕΧΧΟΣΕ ΕΟΥ ΟΥΝΣΟΜ ΕΧΧΟΣΕ ΕΣΟΜ ΕΤΒΕΠΑΕΙ ΑΝΤΕΛΕΙΟΝ
 ΟΥΕΝ ΝΑΝ ΜἸΝΕΘΗΠ ἸΤΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ ΑΥΩ ΝΕΤΟΥΑΑΒ ἸΝΕΤΟΥΑΑΒ ΑΥΩΛΠ ΕΒΟΛ
 ΑΥΩ ΑΠΚΟΙΤΩΝ ΤΩΖΜ ἸΜΟΝ ΕΡΟΥΝ

Those above have opened those below for us so that we may enter the secret of the truth. This truly is that which is honoured, which is strong,⁵¹² but we will enter there through despised types and weaknesses. They are humbled in the presence of the perfect glory. There is glory superior to glory,⁵¹³ there is power superior to power. Therefore the perfect was opened for us with the secrets of the truth, and the Holies of the Holies were uncovered and the bedroom has invited us in.⁵¹⁴ (Gos. Phil. 85.10–21)

⁵¹⁰ Cf. Matt 9:15; Mark 2:19; Luke 5:34.

⁵¹¹ Cf. Gos. Phil. 67.3–5.

⁵¹² Cf. 1 Cor 4:10.

⁵¹³ Cf. 2 Cor 3:18.

⁵¹⁴ Cf. 1 Thess 2:12; 1 Pet 5:10.

The only way to enter into “the Holies of the Holies” (ΝΕΤΟΥΑΔΒ ἢΝΕΤΟΥΑΔΒ) and the “bedroom” (ΚΟΙΤΩΝ) is to enter by means of their “types” (ΤΥΠΟΣ) here in this world. These types are certainly described as being weak and despised in relation to the higher realities they signify, but the focus seems to be on the positive side of the equation, namely the fact that these lowly types give access to the higher realities. Indeed, they are indispensable if one is to enter the bedroom. A vital point that is also stressed here, however, is the fundamental importance of the revelatory acts of Christ. It is the rending of the veil that caused the uncovering of the Holies of the Holies, and opened up the possibility of entry into the truth by means of the worldly types and images. This clearly points in the direction of the Christian sacraments as the necessary and effective means of attaining salvation and entry into heaven. The “bedroom” seems here to have primarily an eschatological focus, being the destination reached by means of the ritual types. However, the fact that these rituals are regarded as types of the higher realities indicates a dual referent for the term in this passage. Such mirroring of the eschatological goal with the sacramental acts is also reflected a few lines after the passage quoted above:

ΖΟΤΑΝ ΔΕ ΕΦΩΔΩΛΠ ΕΒΟΛ ΤΟΤΕ ΠΟΥΘΕΙΝ ἢΤΕΛΕΙΟΝ ΝΑΖΑΓΤΕ ΕΒΟΛ ΕΧ.ἢ[Ο]ΥΟΝ
 ΝΙΜ ΛΥΩ ΝΕΤἢΡΗΤΥ ΤΗΡΟΥ ΣΕἢ[ΑΧΙΧΡΙ]ΣΜΑ ΤΟΤΕ ἢΡΜΕΛΛ ἢΑΡΕΛΕΥΘΕ[ΡΟC
 ΛΥΩ] ἢΣΕCΩΤΕ ἢΔΙΧΗΛΛΩΤΟC

but whenever it (i.e., the perfect light) is uncovered, then the perfect light will flow out upon everyone, and all those who are in it will [receive chrism.] Then the slaves will become free, [and] the captives will be redeemed. (Gos. Phil. 85.24–29)

The uncovering of the perfect light may here be read as a dual reference to the rending of the temple veil and the entry into the eschatological bedroom. Significantly, however, what is experienced eschatologically reflects what has already been experienced in ritual. When one enters the bedroom and the light is uncovered, one will be bathed in a light which is also described as chrism. This eschatological bathing in light in the bedroom is thus fundamentally reflected in its type, the ritual chrismation. We have already seen that the ritual chrismation is closely connected with the bestowal of light and that it is also described in terms of a “bridal chamber.” Moreover, these aspects are found both with regard to the chrismation as it is experienced by each and every Christian initiate, but also in the paradigmatic chrismation of Jesus in the river Jordan. We see here that the reception of the light is intimately connected with the “oil” mentioned in the parable of the Ten Virgins, and

ritually with the “chrism.” In order to receive the light / chrism in “the other place,” then, one needs to have received the light / chrism ritually in this place—and this requires oil. Through the imagery of the lamp and the allusion to the parable of the Ten Virgins we may also see more clearly the metonymical link between fire and light and the oil, and thereby of fire and light with the chrism.

Gos. Phil. also elsewhere links oil in various ways with themes of love, chrism, and ointment, in passages blending multiple references to sacraments and biblical intertexts. The tractate crucially employs the Lukan parable of the Good Samaritan⁵¹⁵ to make the link between “oil” (נֶזֶךְ) and “ointment” (סֹסֵן):

פסאמריתס נִתְאַף לֵאמֹר אֲנִי אֶפְתָּרוֹסֶּעַ עִימִי הֲרִיךְ זֵינֶזֶךְ כְּעֵלֵאֵךְ אֲנִי פִּעַ עִימִתִּי
אֶסֹּסֵן אֲדֹא אֲדֹפֶרֶאפֶּעַ נִמְּפִלְהִי תֵאֲרֵאֵנִי גַרְדַּר זֹבֵבִי נְיֹוּמִינְהֻעַ הִינֹוֶֶ

The Samaritan did not give anything to the wounded man except wine and oil.⁵¹⁶ It was nothing else except the ointment, and it healed the wounds. For “love covers a multitude of sins.”⁵¹⁷ (*Gos. Phil.* 78.7–12)

The final statement here, that “love covers a multitude of sins,” is a quotation of 1 Pet 4:8, while the reason for linking the Samaritan’s “wine and oil” (הֲרִיךְ זֵינֶזֶךְ) is given a few lines earlier, which states that “spiritual love is wine and fragrance” (תֵאֲרֵאֵנִי מִיִּנְעֻמִּי [אַתִּיקִי] וְיִהְיֶה תֵּעַ זֵיִסְתֶֹּ).⁵¹⁸ The passage continues by describing the benefit gained by those who anoint themselves with it:

סֶפֶרֶאֶפּוֹ [לֵאמֹר מִ] מֹס תִּהְיֶה נִבְּרִיִּתְנֵאֲתֹרְסֹוּ מִמֹּס סֶפֶרֶאֶפּוֹ לֵאמֹר
נִבְּרִיִּתְנֵאֲתֹרְסֹוּ מִפּוֹגְבֹל זֹבֵב עֵאֲתֹרְסֹוּ נִבְּרִיִּתְתֹרְסֹוּ נֶטְתֵּאֲרֵבִי נִסֹּסֵן
עֵאֲלֹו עֵתֹוֹוֹוּ נִסֶּבֶבֶכֶ וְאֶרֶנְהִי עֶסֶתֹרְסֹוּ אֲנִי מֹוֹנֹוֹן עֵאֲרֵֶ עֶרֶאֲתֹוּ
מִפּוֹגְבֵּאֵל וְאֲדֹבֹוֹן אֲנִי זֵיִפּוֹגְסִיִּבֹוֹוֹן

All those who will anoint themselves with it [benefit from] it. Those who stand near them also benefit, like those who are anointed who stand there. If those who are anointed with ointment leave their side and go, those who are not anointed, who are only standing near them, once again remain in their (own) stench. (*Gos. Phil.* 77.36–78.7)

It is clear, then, that the “oil” (נֶזֶךְ) refers to the same as the “fragrance” (סֹוֶֶ),⁵¹⁹ and that “spiritual love” (תֵאֲרֵאֵנִי מִיִּנְעֻמִּי אַתִּיקִי) is equated with “ointment” (סֹסֵן).⁵²⁰ The latter, moreover, is the same as the pair הֲרִיךְ

⁵¹⁵ Luke 10:30–37.

⁵¹⁶ Luke 10:34.

⁵¹⁷ 1 Pet 4:8.

⁵¹⁸ *Gos. Phil.* 77.35–36.

⁵¹⁹ See Sevrin, “Pratique et doctrine,” 42; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 479.

⁵²⁰ See Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 479.

(“wine”) and $\text{N}\epsilon\lambda / \text{C}\tau\omicron\epsilon\iota$ (“oil” / “fragrance”). The main difficulty here is the identification of the pairings of $\text{H}\rho\tau\iota \text{Z}\iota\text{N}\epsilon\lambda$ (“wine and oil”) and $\text{H}\rho\tau\iota \text{Z}\iota\text{C}\tau\omicron\epsilon\iota$ (“wine and fragrance”) with $\text{C}\omicron\omicron\bar{\text{n}}$ (“ointment”). The oil / fragrance may plausibly be seen as a reference to the chrism,⁵²¹ not least by way of metonymy, since both oil and fragrance are properties of the ointment. This identification is made even more probable by the reference to the “olive tree” as the source of chrism,⁵²² to the connection between the oil, lamps, and light, discussed above, and a couple of other links which will be discussed shortly. The identification of the “ointment” ($\text{C}\omicron\omicron\bar{\text{n}}$) with both wine and oil / fragrance, and with “spiritual love,” may thus prompt a blend in which ointment is to be regarded as a metaphorical expression of spiritual love,⁵²³ which again may be regarded as a metaphor, by way of metonymy, for chrismation (oil / fragrance) and Eucharist (wine).⁵²⁴

This is only one of several possibilities, however. We might for instance understand the connections made in these passages primarily as an equation of the references to “oil” ($\text{N}\epsilon\lambda$), “fragrance” ($\text{C}\tau\omicron\epsilon\iota$), “ointment” ($\text{C}\omicron\omicron\bar{\text{n}}$), and “chrism” ($\text{X}\rho\iota\text{C}\mu\alpha$).⁵²⁵ An equation of “ointment” ($\text{C}\omicron\omicron\bar{\text{n}}$) and “chrism” ($\text{X}\rho\iota\text{C}\mu\alpha$) may also present itself by way of an important intertext which we have not yet discussed and which is especially pertinent with regard to the use of marriage imagery in *Gos. Phil.*, namely the Song of Songs.⁵²⁶ In Cant 1:2–4 we find that “ointment” ($\mu\acute{\upsilon}\rho\omicron\nu$) is mentioned in connection with wine and love, and the text also highlights the “fragrance” ($\delta\sigma\mu\acute{\eta}$). The Coptic word $\text{C}\omicron\omicron\bar{\text{n}}$ is equivalent to the Greek $\mu\acute{\upsilon}\rho\omicron\nu$.⁵²⁷ Not only is it highly probable that the chrismation discussed in

⁵²¹ Cf. Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 347.

⁵²² See *Gos. Phil.* 73.17–18.

⁵²³ See Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 479.

⁵²⁴ Thomassen interprets the passage as referring to “a eucharistic *agape*-meal shared by those who have been anointed” (Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 347). I think, however, the passage is better understood as a general reference to aspects of the chrismation and the Eucharist as seen through the lens of a dual allusion to Luke 10:30–37 and Cant 1:2–3 (see below for the latter allusion). Schenke takes the identification of the ointment with both oil and wine to indicate an ointment consisting of wine and oil (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 480).

⁵²⁵ Thomassen has argued that in the phrase $\epsilon\iota \text{ M}\eta \text{ H}\rho\tau\iota \text{Z}\iota\text{N}\epsilon\lambda \text{ K}\epsilon\lambda\alpha\lambda\gamma \lambda\alpha\text{n} \text{ P}\epsilon \text{ E}\iota \text{ M}\eta\tau\iota \lambda\text{P}\text{C}\omicron\bar{\text{n}}$ (*Gos. Phil.* 78.8–10) the subject of the latter clause refers back only to $\text{N}\epsilon\lambda$ and not to $\text{H}\rho\tau\iota \text{Z}\iota\text{N}\epsilon\lambda$ (see Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 347). Such an understanding is in line with the simple identifications outlined here.

⁵²⁶ Cf. Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 479 n. 1323; Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 284.

⁵²⁷ See Crum 388b; René Draguet, *Index Copte et Grec-Copte de la Concordance du Nouveau Testament Sahidique* (CSCO 124, 173, 183, 185) (CSCO 196, Subsidia 16; Leuven: Peeters, 1960), 126; Wilmet, *Concordance*, 2:898.

Gos. Phil. was done with μύρον,⁵²⁸ but there is also the significant identification in Cant 1:3 of the “ointment” and “the name” of the bridegroom.⁵²⁹ As we have seen, the bestowal of the name seems to be an important aspect of the rite of chrismation in *Gos. Phil.* These considerations thus make it possible to see in “ointment” (κοσῆ/μύρον) a reference to the chrism. Moreover, the Greek word ὁσμὴ is often translated by the Coptic word στοεῖ.⁵³⁰

Identifying those who are described as being anointed as the initiated Christians, one of the main points of the passage may concern their ethical conduct. That is, *Gos. Phil.* argues, using the metonymically motivated metaphor of good fragrance for the positive effects of the anointed upon the uninitiated, which could plausibly be interpreted in terms of either good works in a literal sense or of other, “spiritual,” benefits of being close to the anointed.⁵³¹ The latter seems more probable on the grounds of the fact that the unanointed are described as being left in their own stench if they are not near the anointed, and on the grounds of the close connection between the anointing and the Holy Spirit throughout *Gos. Phil.* The interpretation *Gos. Phil.* gives of the parable of the Good Samaritan in terms of the Samaritan’s remedies being equated with “spiritual love” also seems to point in this direction.⁵³²

Now, the discussion and the identification above of κοσῆ, νεξ, and στοεῖ with χρισμα and “spiritual love” (ταγαπη ἡπνευματικη)⁵³³ are helpful to keep in mind with regard to the interpretation of one of *Gos. Phil.*’s most well-known and enigmatic passages:

⁵²⁸ See Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 346–347.

⁵²⁹ καὶ ὁσμὴ μύρων σου ὑπὲρ πάντα τὰ ἀρώματα, μύρον ἐκκενωθὲν ὀνομά σου (Cant 1:3).

⁵³⁰ This is the case in John 12:3; 2 Cor 2:14, 16 (see Wilmet, *Concordance*, 2:827; cf. also Draguet, *Index*, 133). It is also used in Luke 23:56 and Rev 18:13, however, as a translation of μύρον (ibid.).

⁵³¹ Like, e.g., the access to instruction, good advice, powers of healing, etc.

⁵³² Schenke argues that the parable of the Good Samaritan is used only as an allegory of God’s love for mankind, and not of any spiritual love the adherents of *Gos. Phil.* are supposed to bestow upon others (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 480). There is no necessary contradiction between these two interpretations, however, and both implications may without problem be drawn at the same time.

⁵³³ Schenke suggests that “Statt ‘geistliche Liebe’ könnte man also präzisierend auch ‘göttliche Liebe’ übersetzen” (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 479), but as we shall see in the discussion below, such an understanding does not seem to cover the whole range of the concept of ταγαπη ἡπνευματικη in *Gos. Phil.*

αὐτῷ [τ]κοινωνός ἦπε[. . . μα]ρια τμαγ[δα]ληνη νερεπ . [. . . . με] ἦμο[ς
 ἡ]ρογο ἀμῆαῃτ[ης]⁵³⁴ νεφ]αспаζε⁵³⁴ ἦμος ἀρες[.]⁵³⁵
 ἦσοп ἀпкесεεπε ἦ[.]⁵³⁶ . ερο . [.] . [. .]μα πεχαγ ναγ δε εтве
 οὐ κме ἦμος παρарон τηρῆ αφογωϝῆ ἡῖπсωτηρ πεχαγ ναγ {πεχαγ ναγ}
 δεεтве οὐ τме ἦμωτῆι αν ἡтесε⁵³⁷

and [the] companion of the [. . . Ma]ry Mag[da]lene [. . . loved her] more than the disciples [. . . he] kissed her on her [. . .] times. The rest of [. . .] they said to him: “Why do you love her more than all of us?” The Saviour answered and said: “Why do I not love you like her?”

(*Gos. Phil.* 63.32–64.5)

This severely damaged passage may shed further light on the relationship between “spiritual love” and the anointing in *Gos. Phil.* From the preserved parts of this excerpt it seems clear that Jesus loves Mary Magdalene more than the other disciples, and that Jesus’ answer in the form of a rhetorical question does not really seem to answer the question they pose to him. In fact, Jesus seems merely to repeat the question.⁵³⁸ However, Jesus’ rhetorical retort constitutes a critique of the disciples that may be understood on the basis of *Gos. Phil.*’s general rhetoric of reciprocity, for an implication of Jesus’ reply may be that the disciples have not loved Jesus like Mary Magdalene has done, and that this is the reason why he loves her more than he loves them. He loves her according to the manner in which she loves him.⁵³⁹

This understanding of the passage is supported by a couple of key New Testament intertexts. *Gos. Phil.* seems here to allude to a combination of Luke 7:36–50, John 11:1–5, and John 12:3–7.⁵⁴⁰ In particular, it is

⁵³⁴ Layton here reconstructs ἀμῆαῃτ[ης τηροῦ αὐτῷ νεφ]αспаζε (Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 168).

⁵³⁵ Layton reconstructs ἀρες[. ἡξαε] (Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 168). Schenke’s suggestion ἀρες[ταπρο ἡξαε] (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 36) seems highly probable, but another possibility could be ἀρες[οϥερηтε ἡξαε] (cf. Luke 7:45; Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 168).

⁵³⁶ Layton has ἦ[μῆαῃтηс] (Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 168).

⁵³⁷ I have chosen a conservative approach and only retained those reconstructions that seem reasonably certain. Schenke has offered suggestions for most of these lacunae (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 36).

⁵³⁸ I do not think the following simile concerning light, darkness, blindness, and seeing is to be regarded as a part of Jesus’ answer to this question.

⁵³⁹ This may conceivably also be strengthened by the possibility of understanding the Coptic ἡтесε, here translated as “like her” (a translation that is supported by similar usage in the Sahidic New Testament), quite literally as “in her manner.”

⁵⁴⁰ Since *Gos. Phil.* alludes to Matthew throughout, Matt 26:6–13 is also a passage that would be easily called to mind by a reader of *Gos. Phil.* The combination of the intertexts

significant that the tractate appears to regard Jesus' love for Mary of Bethany, mentioned in John 11:5,⁵⁴¹ to refer to Jesus' love for Mary Magdalene and further to identify the anonymous anointers in Luke 7 and Matt 26 with her.⁵⁴² As Robert Murray has pointed out, "It is notorious that the early Christian world was in a state of inextricable confusion on the subject of the Maries in the gospels."⁵⁴³ *Gos. Phil.* is not alone when it here seems to blend Mary of Bethany and the anonymous sinner of Luke 7:37–50 with Mary Magdalene. The similarity in the account of the sinful woman's anointing of Jesus in Luke 7 with Mary of Bethany's anointing of Jesus in John 12:3–7, and also referred to in 11:2, is such that once Mary of Bethany is conflated with Mary Magdalene, the identification of the anonymous anointer in Luke 7 with her is quite apparent. In addition, the fact that *Gos. Phil.* here and elsewhere refers to Mary Magdalene as Jesus' "companion" (κοινωνος)⁵⁴⁴ indicates that she has also been blended with the beloved disciple in John.⁵⁴⁵

Let us now see how a blend with the Lukan and Johannine intertexts may inform our reading of the *Gos. Phil.* passage concerning Jesus' love for Mary Magdalene. Luke and John tell us that Jesus has his feet anointed with "ointment" (μύρον), in Luke's case by the anonymous sinful woman, and in John's case by Mary of Bethany, and has them wiped with her hair. Luke adds to this that she also kisses his feet and washes them with her tears. Luke also has Jesus rebuke those who would criticise him for letting himself be touched by a sinful woman, pointing out that whereas they have neither given him any water for his feet, anointed his head with "oil" (ἔλαιον), nor kissed him, she has washed his feet, anointed them with "ointment" (σοῦν/μύρον), and has ceaselessly kissed

from Luke and John seems to be sufficient in this case, however. I have found no instances in *Gos. Phil.* that necessitates a Markan intertext, but the parallel to Matt 26:6–13 in Mark 14:3–9 is also a possible, although ultimately unnecessary intertext.

⁵⁴¹ Both the reading $\eta\epsilon\rho\epsilon\iota\varsigma \delta\epsilon \mu\epsilon \eta\mu\alpha\rho\alpha \mu\mu\mu\alpha\rho\iota\alpha \tau\epsilon\sigma\sigma\omega\nu\epsilon$ and $\eta\epsilon\rho\epsilon\iota\varsigma \delta\epsilon \mu\epsilon \eta\mu\alpha\rho\iota\alpha \mu\mu\mu\alpha\rho\alpha \tau\epsilon\sigma\sigma\omega\nu\epsilon$ are attested in Coptic manuscripts (see Quecke, *Das Johannesevangelium saïdisch*, 150–151).

⁵⁴² This possibility has been parenthetically suggested by Antti Marjanen (see Marjanen, *The Woman Jesus Loved*, 157 n. 43).

⁵⁴³ Murray, *Symbols of Church and Kingdom*, 330. Cf. also Marjanen, *The Woman Jesus Loved*, 1–3. For a thorough treatment of the patristic interpretations of the question of the identities of Mary Magdalene, Mary of Bethany, and the sinful woman in Luke, see esp. Urban Holzmeister, "Die Magdalenenfrage in der kirchlichen Überlieferung," *ZKT* 46 (1922): 402–422, 556–584.

⁵⁴⁴ See *Gos. Phil.* 59.8–9; cf. also 59.11, where the equivalent Coptic term $\gamma\omega\rho\tau\epsilon$ is used.

⁵⁴⁵ Cf. Marjanen, *The Woman Jesus Loved*, 157; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 335–336.

his feet. Luke then has Jesus state that she has loved much and that her sins have therefore been forgiven and that she has been saved by her faith.⁵⁴⁶

John relates that when Jesus was anointed “the house was filled with the fragrance of the ointment” (ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ μύρου ἐπληρώθη ἡ οἰκία ἐκ τῆς ὁσμῆς τοῦ μύρου),⁵⁴⁷ which strongly recalls *Gos. Phil.*’s discourse concerning the “ointment” and the “fragrance” discussed above. When taken together with the Lukan passage, we also see that *Gos. Phil.*’s identification of the “ointment,” “fragrance,” and “oil” with “spiritual love” is easily blended with Luke’s reference to Mary Magdalene’s abundant love for Jesus and *Gos. Phil.*’s passage concerning Jesus’ love for Mary Magdalene. From this interpretive blend we may then surmise that Mary Magdalene’s love for Jesus is the kind of “spiritual love” that in *Gos. Phil.* is equated with the anointing, and that it also involves her kissing his feet. Whether we should understand Mary Magdalene’s anointing of Jesus, which is thus implied in *Gos. Phil.*, to be an anointing of Jesus’ feet, head, or body depends on whether, and how, we also choose to read the Matthean account into this blend. For Matthew does not mention any anointing of the feet, but rather of the head (26:7) and body (26:12).

In any case, it seems to be Mary’s spiritual love for Jesus, expressed by means of her kissing his feet and anointing him, that leads Jesus to kiss her (probably on her mouth, but perhaps even her feet)⁵⁴⁸ and love her more than the other disciples. Significantly, there are also further links between this anointing and the chrismation with regard to their relationship with the resurrection. We have already seen that the chrismation in *Gos. Phil.* also bestows the resurrection upon its recipients. When we go to the Johannine and Matthean intertexts outlined here, we see there that the anointing of Jesus is done with a view to his burial, thus indicating the resurrection.⁵⁴⁹

⁵⁴⁶ Only two verses after this, Luke identifies Mary Magdalene as a woman out of whom seven demons has gone (see Luke 8:2), thus providing a potential link between her and the anonymous anointer who had her sins forgiven.

⁵⁴⁷ John 12:3.

⁵⁴⁸ Cf. note above.

⁵⁴⁹ It may in this regard, considering the fact that the chrism is closely connected with the identity of Christ in *Gos. Phil.*, also be mentioned that Jesus states in John 11:25 that “I am the resurrection and the life” (Ἐγὼ εἰμι ἡ ἀνάστασις καὶ ἡ ζωὴ / ἀνοκ πε ταναστασις ἀγῶ πῶνη).

The theme we have touched on here concerning the relationship between loving and giving and receiving is also taken up elsewhere in *Gos. Phil.*:

ΤΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΔΙ ΤΑΓΑΠΗ ΣΤ Μ[Ἰ]ΛΛΑΔΥ ΝΑΟΥΧΙ] ΔΧΝ̄ΤΠΙΣΤΕΙΣ [Μ]ἸΛΛΑΔΥ ΝΑΟΥΤ
 ΔΧΝ̄ΔΑΓΑΠΗ ΕΤΒΕΠΑΕΙ ΔΕΚΑΔΣ ΜΕΝ ΕΝΔΧΙ ΤἸΡΠΙΣΤΕΥΕ ΟΥΝΑ Δ(Ε) ΕΝΑΜΕ
 ΝΤἸΤ̄ ΕΠΕΙ ΕΡΩΔΟΥΑ † ΖἸΝΟΥΔΑΓΑΠΗ ΔΝ ΜΝΤΕΥΩΦΕΛΕΙΑ ΖἸΠΕΝΤΑΥΤΑΔΥ
 ΠΕΝΤΑΖΧΠΧΘΕΙΣ ΔΝ Ο ΝἸΡΕΒΡΑΙΟΣ ΕΤΙ

Faith receives, love gives. [No one will be able to receive] without faith. No one will be able to give without love. Therefore we believe in order that we may receive, but give in order that we may love. For if one does not give with love,⁵⁵⁰ he does not benefit from that which he has given. He who has not received the Lord is a Hebrew still. (*Gos. Phil.* 61.36–62.6)

As we can see, this passage also echoes the discourse in Luke 7:44–50 and Jesus’ answer to the disciples in *Gos. Phil.* 64.1–5. Especially worthy of note here is how giving and receiving love is connected with receiving the Lord so as not to stay a Hebrew. In order to receive the Lord, one needs to have faith and dedicate one’s love to him. Receiving one’s reward for loving Christ is here directly linked to receiving the Lord. If we link this discourse on love with the passages discussed above, we see that it is easy to draw the conclusion that the reception of the Lord referred to here has to do with the anointing with chrism, since we have seen love linked to the ointment, and the reception of and becoming Christ closely connected to the chrismation.⁵⁵¹ The additional points made here, then, are on the one hand the necessity of faith and love in order to receive Christ, and on the other hand that the undesirable alternative situation entails the continued existence as a Hebrew. This means in basic terms that without faith and love of Christ one cannot become a Christian, and in that case one stays on the pre-Christian level of the Hebrews.⁵⁵²

Gos. Phil. seems not only to link the reception of Christ and spiritual love strictly to ritual initiation, however, but also to doctrine.

⁵⁵⁰ Cf. *Gos. Phil.* 54:15–18.

⁵⁵¹ Cf. Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 192.

⁵⁵² As Isenberg rightly notes, “Here ‘the Hebrew’ need not mean the Hebrew by racial descent,” but is rather used “typologically for all who have not yet experienced the ‘receiving of the Lord’ and the blessings of the New Age” (Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 193). His assertion, however, that this should therefore not “be construed as anti-Jewish feeling” on the part of *Gos. Phil.* (ibid., 193 n. 1) is not convincing, since the way *Gos. Phil.* here uses the ICM of HEBREW metaphorically is also at the same time an integral part of the tractate’s overall anti-Jewish polemic. See below for discussion.

ΟΥΕΙ ΟΥΩΤ ΤΕ ΤΜΕ ΣΟ Ν̄ΡΑΖ ΛΥΩ ΕΤΒΗΤῆ ΕΤΣΕΒΟ ΕΠΑΕΙ ΟΥΑΑΔ Γ̄ΝΟΥΑΓΑΠΗ
 ΖΙΤῆΡΑΖ

Truth is one thing and it is many, and it concerns us to teach this one alone
 with love through many.⁵⁵³ (Gos. Phil. 54.15–18)

Significantly, *Gos. Phil.* stresses not only the importance of the reception of truth, i.e. the correct doctrine of Christ, but also the importance of giving this truth to others. This point becomes especially clear when we consider the Pauline intertexts that are likely to be activated in a reading of this passage. In particular, a passage from Ephesians and one from Philippians have the potentiality to be triggered, partly through their common use of the phrase *γ̄νωσῆσθε* (“with love”). Philippians states that some speak “the word of God” (*παραθε ἡμνοῦτε*) “from envy and quarrel, while others preach Christ willingly” (*εὐθεοῦφθονος ἡνοῦτῶν· ζῆνκοοῦε δε εἰναῦ σεταῤεοῖα ἡπεῤ·*), the latter doing it “out of love” (*εὐολ γ̄νωσῆσθε*).⁵⁵⁴ This intertext may thus help us identify the referent for *παει* (“this one”) in *Gos. Phil.*’s phrase *τεσεβο επαει ουααδ* (“teach this one alone”) as Christ.⁵⁵⁵ As for Ephesians, Eph 4:7–16 is especially relevant, as it connects the loving teaching of truth with deification, stating that “speaking truth with love we shall grow into him completely, that is, the head, Christ” (*ἐνχῆμε . . . γ̄νωσῆσθε ἡτῆδῆζανε εἰοῦν εῤοῦ ἡπτηρῆ εἰεπαῖ πε ταπε πεῤ·*).⁵⁵⁶

We saw that if one does not receive Christ one will metaphorically stay a Hebrew. This is not all, however, for one will also stay a slave and a captive. We saw above that in the eschatological reception of the chrisim, the slaves would be set free and the prisoners redeemed. The distinction between slaves and free also surfaces in another passage in *Gos. Phil.*, where it is directly connected to the requirements for experiencing the “bridal chamber” (*παστος*):

μαρεπαστος ωφπε ἡἡθηριον οῦτε μαφωωπε ἡἡμζῆλ οῦτε ἡςριμε εφχορμ
 αλλα φαφωωπε ἡἡρωμε ἡελεθῆρος ἡἡπαρῆος

A bridal chamber does not take place for the animals, nor does it take place for the slaves, nor for defiled women, but it takes place for free men and virgins. (Gos. Phil. 69.1–4)

⁵⁵³ Cf. Eph 4:15–16; Phil 1:14–16.

⁵⁵⁴ Phil 1:14–16. *γ̄νωσῆσθε* here corresponds to the Greek phrase *ἐξ ἀγάπης*.

⁵⁵⁵ It cannot point directly to “Truth” (*τμε*), since the latter is a feminine noun.

⁵⁵⁶ Eph 4:15 (Horner, *Sahidic New Testament*). *γ̄νωσῆσθε* here corresponds to the Greek phrase *ἐν ἀγάπῃ*.

There is no bridal chamber for animals or slaves, but for free men, and not for defiled women, but for virgins. We could say that according to the ICM of MARRIAGE, a bridal chamber is, quite naturally, something reserved for human beings, and it is also here reserved for free men and virgins. This rather commonsense statement is, of course, to be regarded as a construction of a mental framing input space, while the significance of the statement only becomes clear when it is mentally blended with one or more target, or focus, inputs and thus interpreted metaphorically.

In an interpretation of the passage as a metaphor, the use of the terms “free men” (ἄφρωνε ἡελεγεθρος) and “virgins” (ἄπαρθενος) to designate those who may experience the bridal chamber is significant. In John 8:33–36 those who are referred to as free are those who are not slaves to sin.⁵⁵⁷ Accordingly, in early Christian usage the term ἐλεύθερος is often used to refer specifically to Christians as being those who are free from sin, and in many cases the term is directly associated with freedom from sin as something achieved through faith and baptism.⁵⁵⁸ The animals must again, as elsewhere in *Gos. Phil.*, be understood as metaphorical representations of human beings, more specifically non-Christian human beings, as we have seen above. As for the virgins, it is open to interpretation whether this designation is to be understood literally or metaphorically in the blend. We will return to this question below.

Taking the human beings in this passage to refer only to the Christians, and the free men and virgins to refer to Christians who are free from sin, and who most probably have been baptised, the “bridal chamber” (παστος) is only for these people. But what should we understand the bridal chamber to refer to? The important references to joinings and unifications we have identified in *Gos. Phil.* in the analyses above have been the joining of the Logos and the Holy Spirit, the Christian and Christ, and image and reality. In this case, having identified the people who are allowed into the “bridal chamber” as Christians who are free from sin, the joining in this case seems most likely to be that of the Christian with Christ. Whether this joining is here to be regarded simply as a mental/spiritual joining with Christ, perhaps through prayer, or a ritual one, like for instance baptism, chrismation, or Eucharist, or rather an eschatological one, is open to interpretation. From an overall understanding

⁵⁵⁷ Cf. also Gal 4–5.

⁵⁵⁸ See, e.g., Lampe 449b.

of this tractate, however, it seems that it may profitably be seen to refer to both a ritual and an eschatological dimension. We have already seen that aspects of both the chrismation and the Eucharist may be described and understood in terms of the imagery of a “bridal chamber,” and we have seen that the entry into the kingdom of heaven may also be regarded as an entry to the wedding feast, or to the “bedroom.”

3.2.2.5. *The Hidden and the Revealed*

Another theme that surfaces at various points throughout *Gos. Phil.* has to do with the relationship between the hidden and the revealed, secrecy and openness, and the tractate uses several different source inputs for metaphorical blends relating to these conceptual pairs. These framing inputs are mostly taken from three main ICMs, namely that of the human body, the Jerusalem temple, and marriage. In each case important scriptural input spaces are recalled that partly explain and partly heighten the significance of the blends. We will start by considering an extended passage⁵⁵⁹ where *Gos. Phil.* sets up anatomical and botanical conceptual framing inputs which are blended with scriptural intertexts in an argument that engages several issues at once. The passage will be tackled in four parts. The first one goes as follows:

[περο]γο η̄τε[π]κοσμος ενροσον νογ[σα η̄ρογ]η̄ ρη[π σε]ᾱρηρατογ̄ ᾱγω
 σεονε̄ [ε̄γω̄αν]ο̄γων[ε̄ ε̄β]ολ̄ ᾱγμογ̄ κατᾱ πᾱ[ρᾱλιγμ]ᾱ η̄πρωμε̄ ε̄το̄γονε̄ε̄
 ε̄βολ̄ [ενροσο]η̄ η̄μᾱε̄τ̄ η̄πρωμε̄ ρη̄π̄ φονε̄ η̄σ̄πρωμε̄ ε̄γω̄ᾱσω̄λπ̄ η̄σ̄ινε̄-
 φμᾱε̄τ̄ σε̄ρ̄π̄βολ̄ η̄ρη̄η̄τ̄φ̄ φ̄νᾱμογ̄ η̄σ̄πρωμε̄

[Most (creatures/things)] of [the] world stand and are alive as long as their [insides are hidden. When they are revealed], they die, according to the [example] of the visible man. [As long as] the innards of the man are hidden the man is alive. When his innards are revealed they come out of him and the man will die. (*Gos. Phil.* 82.30–83.2)

The basic interpretation of this passage is pretty straightforward. Worldly things stand and live as long as their insides are hidden. If they are revealed, they die, like a human being does if his bowels are exposed. Here we might detect a faint allusion to the death of Judas in Acts 1:18, but otherwise, the passage presents an easily understood argument from a general premise applied to a specific example. The passage then goes on from the human example to a botanical one:

⁵⁵⁹ *Gos. Phil.* 82.30–83.30.

τεριξε ον ἡρωην ρωσ ετεφνογνε ρηη φαρτωγω ἡφλερητ ερωατεφνογνε
 σωλπ εβολ φαρειωην ωσογε ται τε θε ριχπο ηημ ετρημκωσμοσ ογ μονον
 ρινητογνηρ εβολ αλλα ρινηθηφ εφροσων γαρ τηογνε ἡτκακια ρηη εχοορ
 εγφωανογωνη δε αςβωλ εβολ εσφωανογωνη δε εβολ αςωχῆ

Thus also with the tree. As long as its root is hidden, it blossoms and grows. If its root is revealed the tree dries up. Thus it is with every offspring in the world, not only the revealed, but also the hidden. For as long as the root of evil is hidden it is strong, but if it is recognised it has died, and if it is revealed it has been destroyed. (*Gos. Phil.* 83.3–11)

As with the human being, so also with the tree. Just as the man dies when his entrails are revealed, so too the tree dies if its root is exposed. From these two examples *Gos. Phil.* concludes that this is the case with every “offspring” (χπο) in the world. The tractate then shifts, rather unexpectedly, from these examples to make a metaphorical connection between the tree and evil. Like the tree, evil thrives when its root is hidden, but dies when its root is revealed. With the hindsight provided by this explicit metaphor, the example of the man who dies when his bowels are exposed becomes a decidedly stronger allusion to the death of Judas. Like the evil Judas died when his entrails came out, evil in general dies when its root is brought out into the open. *Gos. Phil.* then rounds off the first half of the simile with a fitting quotation from Matthew and a general conclusion:

ετβεπαι πλογοσ χω ἡμοσ χεηδη ταζεινη σῆμοντ ατπογνε ἡἡωην
 εσναωωωτ αν πετογναφωατγ παλιν φαρτωγω αλλα εφωρεταζεινη βαλβλ
 επιτη επεσнт φαντεσῆτπογνε ερραι αις δε πορκ ἡτπογνε ἡπμα τηρϥ
 ρῆκοογε δε κατα μεροσ ανον ρωων μαρεπογα πογα ἡρητη μαρεφβαλβε
 ἡσατπογνε ἡτκακια ετῆραι ἡρητη ἡφπορκς ρατεσπογνε ρῆπεφρηт

Therefore the Word says, “Already the axe is laid at the root of the trees.”⁵⁶⁰ It will not (simply) cut—that which will be cut blossoms again—but the axe burrows down beneath until it brings out the root. Jesus plucked out the root completely,⁵⁶¹ but others partly. As for us, let each one among us dig down to the root of the evil that is within him and pluck it out from its root in his heart. (*Gos. Phil.* 83.11–21)

Like Jesus did, then, each and every Christian should dig into his or her own heart and bring evil out into the open and thus remove the

⁵⁶⁰ Matt 3:10.

⁵⁶¹ For this understanding of ἡπμα τηρϥ in an adverbial sense, see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 503, and cf. also *ibid.*, 4, 478; Painchaud, et al., “Le syntagme πμα τηρϥ,” 626.

root of sin.⁵⁶² The quotation from Matt 3:10 is used both to illustrate the destruction of evil, and to make the allegorical point that evil needs to be taken by the root—it is not enough only to cut off its visible manifestations. In order to be able to dig out this root, however, one needs to be aware of it:

εσναπωρκ δε ενωδσογων̄ς ερωπε δε τ̄ννο ν̄ατσοογν̄ ερος σξενογνε
 ρρ[α]ϊ̄ ν̄ρητ̄ν̄ αγω στεγο εβολ̄ ν̄νεσκαρπιος ρραϊ ρ̄π̄π̄ρητ̄ σο ν̄χοεις ερον
 τ̄ννο ν̄ρητ̄ν̄ ν̄αε σ̄ραϊκμαλλω[τ]ῑζε̄ ν̄μον ετρ̄νειρε̄ ν̄νετ̄νογοω[ο]ῡ αν̄
 νετ̄νογοωογ̄ τ̄νειρε̄ ν̄μοογ̄ [αν̄ σ]̄ν̄β̄σομ̄ χ̄εῑπ̄ν̄σογωνας ρω̄ [εωω]οπ̄
 μεν̄ σ̄ρενεργ̄ει

And it will be uprooted when we are aware of it, but if we are ignorant of it, it takes root within us and it produces its fruits in our heart. It rules us, and we are its slaves. It captures us so that we may do what we do [not] want to. Those things that we want to do we do [not].⁵⁶³ [It is] strong because we have not become aware of it. As long as [it exists] it works.

(*Gos. Phil.* 83.21–30)

So, when one becomes aware of the root of evil in one's heart one may remove it, and thus stop it from bringing forth its fruit. *Gos. Phil.* also stresses the point that evil thrives as long as it exists, even though one may not be aware of it—or especially when one is not aware of it.⁵⁶⁴

In the cases discussed above, the revelation of what is hidden is a good thing. This is not always the case, however. There are indeed some things that should remain hidden:

ογ̄ταμος̄ ερωακωκαρηγ̄ αρωωπε̄ ν̄πορνειᾱ αγω̄ τ̄ωελεετ̄ ογ̄ μονον̄
 εσωαχῑπ̄σπερ̄νᾱ ν̄κεροογ̄τ̄ αλλᾱ καν̄ εσωαν̄ρ̄βωλ̄ ν̄πεσκοιτω̄ν̄ ν̄σεν̄αγ̄
 ερος̄ ασπορ̄νεγε̄ μονον̄ μαρεσογ̄ων̄ε̄ εβολ̄ ν̄πεσειω̄τ̄ μ̄ν̄τεσμᾱαγ̄ μ̄ν̄πω̄β̄ηρ̄
 ν̄π̄ν̄γ̄μ̄φῑος̄ μ̄ν̄ν̄ω̄η̄ρε̄ ν̄π̄ν̄γ̄μ̄φῑος̄ ν̄ᾱεῑ εστο̄εῑ ναγ̄ ετ̄ρωβ̄ωκ̄ ε̄ρογ̄ν̄ ν̄μ̄νη̄
 ε̄π̄ν̄γ̄μ̄φ̄ων̄ ν̄κοογ̄ε̄ δε̄ μαρογ̄ρε̄π̄θ̄γ̄μ̄εῑ καν̄ εσωτ̄ν̄ ετεσςμ̄ν̄ ν̄σεραπολαγ̄ε̄
 ν̄πεσσοσ̄ν̄ αγω̄ μαρογ̄σον̄ω̄ εβολ̄ ρ̄ν̄ν̄λεϋ̄ιϋ̄ε̄ ετ̄ρε̄ εβολ̄ ρ̄ιτ̄ραπε̄ζᾱ ν̄θε̄
 ν̄νογ̄ροορ̄ ογ̄ν̄ρ̄ν̄γ̄μ̄φῑος̄ μ̄ν̄ρ̄ν̄γ̄μ̄φ̄η̄ η̄π̄ ε̄π̄ν̄γ̄μ̄φ̄ων̄ μ̄νογ̄ᾱ ν̄αω̄ν̄αγ̄
 ᾱπ̄ν̄γ̄μ̄φῑος̄ μ̄ν̄τ̄ν̄γ̄μ̄φ̄η̄ εῑ μ̄ν̄ [ν̄ω̄]ω̄πε̄ ν̄πᾱεῑ

⁵⁶² Peter Brown reads this passage as referring strictly to the renunciation of sexuality, and connects it with an account of self-castration in the *Acts of John* (see Peter Brown, *The Body and Society: Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity* [Lectures in the History of Religion; New York: Columbia University Press, 1988], 117). For the identification of the evil that is to be removed with sexuality, see also Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 347. There is nothing in the context, however, that connects the evil that is to be uprooted with sexuality.

⁵⁶³ Cf. Rom 7:13–21.

⁵⁶⁴ Cf., however, *Gos. Phil.* 85.21–24.

If a marriage is stripped naked it has become fornication, and not only if the bride receives the seed of another man, but even if she comes out of her bedroom and is seen she has fornicated. Let her only be revealed to her father and her mother and the friend of the bridegroom⁵⁶⁵ and the children of the bridegroom, these to whom it is given to enter the bridal chamber daily. But let the others desire even to hear her voice⁵⁶⁶ and enjoy her ointment, and let them nourish from the crumbs that fall from the table, like the dogs.⁵⁶⁷ Bridegrooms and brides belong to the bridal chamber. No one will be able to see the bridegroom with the bride unless [he becomes] this. (Gos. Phil. 82.10–26)

Gos. Phil. stresses that the inner goings on of the marriage should not be revealed. On the one hand it is pointed out that what takes place in the bedroom between the bridegroom and the bride should not take place outside it, and on the other it is made clear that only a select few are allowed inside the bridal chamber. This is especially understandable on the basis of the logic outlined above concerning the fact that hidden things thrive, while if the hidden things are brought out into the open they die. Thus, if the marriage becomes an open business it becomes adultery and consequently “dies.”

We are given a clue to the identity of the metaphorical target of this marriage in the description of the small benefits that are to befall those on the outside of the bridal chamber. They may feed on the crumbs that fall from the table, and they may enjoy the bride’s “ointment” (κοσμή). This clearly links up with the motif discussed above concerning the oil, ointment, and fragrance. The fragrance and the crumbs that benefit those who stand outside would seem to indicate a kind of general moral obligation on the part of the initiated Christians to provide some kind of benefit to those who are not initiated, whether it be of a spiritual or of a more concrete kind. At the same time, however, we may here, as above, identify the ointment with the chrism and the bride with the Christian initiate, from which it follows that the bridegroom is Christ. The connection between the “ointment” and the chrism moreover primes a sacramental context for the entire simile, making it easy to make the connection between the implied wedding and Christian initiation, and between the bread and the Eucharist. The point that the marriage is

⁵⁶⁵ Cf. John 3:29.

⁵⁶⁶ Cf. John 3:29.

⁵⁶⁷ Matt 15:27; Mark 7:28; Luke 16:21. Tuckett argues that *Gos. Phil.* here refers to Matthew’s version of the saying about the crumbs and the dogs (see Tuckett, “Synoptic Traditions,” 175).

to remain hidden seems in this context to indicate the fact that these Christian mysteries should remain hidden and secret to outsiders and that only insiders are allowed to participate.

3.2.2.5.1. Names, Types, Symbols, and Images

Gos. Phil. devotes considerable space to reflections on themes related to mirror images, copies, names, and symbols, especially with regard to their relationships with their respective originals or referents. *Gos. Phil.*'s main interest in these themes has basically to do with the relationship between absolute truth and its imperfect referents in the material world, and the function of the latter as the means of passage to, and understanding of, the former.⁵⁶⁸

In a tricky but crucial passage, *Gos. Phil.* gives an extended exposition of the important relationship between absolute truth and its manifestations in the world in such a context (I have split up the passage in numbered sections for ease of reference):

ΤΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ ΜΠΕΣΕΙ ΕΠΚΟΣΜΟΣ ΕΣΚΑΚΑΖΗΥ ΑΛΛΑ ΝΤΑΣΕΙ ΖΗΝΤΥΠΟΣ ΜΗΝΕΡΙΚΩΝ
ΦΝΑΧΙΤΕ ΑΝ ΝΚΕΡΗΤΕ

(1) Truth did not come to the world naked, but it came in types and images. It (i.e., the world) will not receive it (i.e., truth) in any other way.

ΟΥΝΟΥΧΠΟ ΝΚΕΣΟΠ ΩΟΟΠ ΜΗΝΟΥΓΡΙΚΩΝ ΝΧΠΟ ΝΚΕΣΟΠ
ΩΩΕ ΑΛΗΘΩΣ ΑΤΡΟΥΧΠΟΟΥ ΝΚΕΣΟΠ ΖΙΤΝΤΕΡΙΚΩΝ

(2a) There is a rebirth and an image of rebirth.⁵⁶⁹
It is truly necessary to be born again⁵⁷⁰ by means of the image!

ΑΩ ΤΕ ΤΑΝΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ ΑΥΩ ΘΙΚΩΝ
ΖΙΤΝΘΙΚΩΝ ΩΩΕ ΕΤΡΕΣΤΩΟΥΝ

(2b) What is the resurrection and the image?
By means of the image it is necessary for it (i.e., the resurrection) to arise.

ΠΝΥΜΦΩΝ ΜΗΘΙΚΩΝ
ΖΙΤΝΘΙΚΩΝ ΩΩΕ ΕΤΡΟΥΕΙ ΕΖΟΥΝ ΕΤΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ
ΕΤΕΤΑΕΙ ΤΕ ΤΑΠΟΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ

(2c) The bridal chamber and the image?
By means of the image it is necessary for them to enter the truth,
that is, the restoration.

⁵⁶⁸ For analyses of this aspect of *Gos. Phil.*, see esp. Koschorke, "Die 'Namen' im Philippusevangelium." Cf. also Rudolph, "Response," 230–232.

⁵⁶⁹ Cf. Titus 3:5.

⁵⁷⁰ Cf. John 3:7.

ΟΥΘΕ ΔΝΕΤΧΠΟ ΔΝ ΜΜΑΤΕ ΜΠΡΑΝ ΜΠΕΙΩΤ ΜΠΩΗΡΕ ΜΠΠΠΒΑ ΕΤΟΥΑΔΒ ΑΛΛΑ
 ΔΥΧΠΟΥ⁵⁷¹ ΝΑΚ ΨΩΟΥ ΕΤΜΟΥΑ ΧΠΟΥ ΝΑΥ ΠΚΕΡΑΝ ΣΕΝΑΦΙΤΥ ΝΤΟΥΤΥ ΟΥΑ ΔΕ
 ΧΙ ΜΜΟΥ ΨΜΠΧΡΙΣΜΑ ΜΠΣΟ . [.] ΝΤΑΥΝΑΜΙΣ ΜΠΣ.Ρ[Ο]Σ ΤΑ[Ε]! ΝΕΝΑΠΟΣΤΟΛΟΣ
 ΜΟΥΤΕ ΕΡΟΣ ΧΕ[ΤΟ]ΥΝΑΜ ΜΝΤΕΨΒΟΥΡ ΠΑΕΙ ΓΑΡ ΟΥΚΕΤΙ ΟΥ[ΧΡΗ]ΣΤ[Ι]ΑΝΟΣ ΠΕ
 ΑΛΛΑ ΟΥΧΡΪ ΠΕ

(3) It is not only necessary for those who acquire the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, but they too have been produced for you. If one does not acquire them for himself, the name will also be taken from him.⁵⁷² But one receives them in the chrism of the [...] of the power of the cross. The apostles called this “[the] right and the left.”⁵⁷³ For this one is no longer a [Christian], but a Christ. (*Gos. Phil.* 67.9–27)

The passage seems to be structured as (1) a basic proposition followed by (2) three examples, two of them in the form of a question and an answer, and (3) a final extended application of some implications of the principles outlined in the previous parts.⁵⁷⁴

Truth did not come naked to the world, but instead of being described as covered in names, as in *Gos. Phil.* 54.13–15, Truth is here clothed in what seems to be sacramental types and images.⁵⁷⁵ This means on the one hand that truth is conveyed through such types and images, and on the other that there is a higher reality behind them. The argument seems to go as follows: (1) Truth is accessible to us in the material world only by means of types and images. (2a) There is a true rebirth and there is an image of it that is available to us in this world. In order to be truly reborn it is necessary to use the image of the rebirth that is available to us in this world. This is a rebirth which, from what we have seen of *Gos. Phil.*'s sacramental theology, is probably to be identified as a combination of baptism and chrismation. (2b) *Gos. Phil.* then asks a rhetorical question concerning the identity of the true resurrection and its image. Instead of answering this question directly, the point that the worldly images are necessary in order to gain access to the heavenly realities is simply restated. (2c) Then follows yet another question that is not answered

⁵⁷¹ Layton emends to Δ(ΝΕΝΤΑ)ΥΧΠΟΥ, “(those who) have produced them” (see Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 174–175).

⁵⁷² Cf. Matt 13:12; Mark 4:25; Luke 8:18.

⁵⁷³ Cf. 2 Cor 6:7.

⁵⁷⁴ Schenke, however, divides the passage into five separate sayings, 67a–e (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 45; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [NHC II,3],” 201), although he does concede that 67a–c and 67d–e form two groups and that 67b–c could almost be regarded as a single unit (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 373–377).

⁵⁷⁵ See Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 375.

directly, this time concerning “the bridal chamber” (ΠΝΥΜΦΩΝ) and its image, and the answer is yet again that “the image” (ΘΙΚΩΝ) is necessary. This example is, however, interesting also in its equation of entry into the bridal chamber with entry into “the truth” (ΤΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ), and its equation of the truth with “the restoration” (ΤΑΠΟΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ). Entry into the true bridal chamber, then, requires entry into its this-worldly type. The three examples thus stress the same point, acquisition of the truth requires the experience of its types and images in this world.

(3) The linguistically difficult final section then seems to argue that one needs to receive not only the names of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, but also in a sense the realities to which these names refer. This takes place in the chrismation, which seems to be accompanied by a Trinitarian formula and probably also the sign of the cross. By means of such a chrismation, then, one becomes “a Christ” (ΟΥΧΡ̄C) only if one has truly received the realities that go with the names.⁵⁷⁶

The point that truth is present in the world in a hidden sense is also expressed elsewhere in the text by means of a botanical metaphor:

ΤΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ CΕCΙΤΕ ἦΜΟC ἦΜΑ ΝΙΜ ΤΕΤΩΟΠΙ ΔΙΝῆΩΡΠΙ ΔΥΩ ΟΥΝΕΔΕ ΝΔΥ ΕΡΟC
ΕΥCΙΤΕ ἦΜΟC ΕἸΚΟΥΕΙ ΔΕ ΕΤΟΥΝΔΥ ΕΡΟC ΕΥΩCΕ ἦΜΟC

Truth, which has been in existence since the beginning, is sown everywhere, and there are many who see it being sown, but there are few who see it being reaped. (Gos. Phil. 55.19–22)

Here the sowing is mapped onto the “types and images,” while the real truth hidden in them is mapped onto the reaping. Thus, by means of this blend several important aspects of the process of gaining insight into the truth are cleverly laid out simultaneously. Among the significant entailments of this blend is the insight that the process of gaining knowledge of the truth is one of maturation; that truth is hidden in the world in a manner analogous to the way a plant or a tree is hidden within a seed; and that the act of apprehending the truth is analogous to harvesting, i.e., to the reaping of a reward, to put it with another metaphorical blend. Moreover, since truth has been sown everywhere since the beginning it has always existed in the world, even though it has been hidden.

Now, who are those few who see the reaping of the truth? *Gos. Phil.* states rather tautologically that to be able to see, one must not be blind:

⁵⁷⁶ See *Gos. Phil.* 64.22–29; 74.13–16.

οὐβ̄λλε μ̄νογα εφναγ εβολ εγ̄ρ̄μ̄πκακε ἡ̄πεςναγ σεωοβε ενογερ̄ηγ αν ροταν
ερωαπογοειν ει τοτε πετναβολ φναναγ επογοειν αγω πετο β̄β̄λλε εφναςω
ρ̄η̄πκακε

A blind person and a seeing one who are both in the dark are not different from each other. When the light comes, then he who sees will see the light, and he who is blind will remain in the dark. (*Gos. Phil.* 64.5–9)

The important point here, then, seems to be the stress on the importance of gaining sight prior to the coming of the light. That is, if one cannot see, one will not benefit from the light when it comes. As long as it is dark, however, there is no difference between the seeing and the blind. The coming of the light may here be interpreted in an eschatological sense, and understood quite simply to refer to the fact that when the light comes, only the Christians will see it and be saved. Another possibility is to map the coming of the light onto the coming of Christ into the world, and thus interpret the seeing person as a representative of all Christians in the world, and the blind one of all the others who are not convinced by the Christian message—they still do not see, even after the coming of the light into the world.

In any case, those who are able to receive this light will themselves not be seen by the hostile powers, neither in this world nor in the next:

πεταχιπογοειν ετ̄μη̄ναγ σεναναγ αν ερω ογτε σεναωμεαζτε αν ἡ̄μοσ αγω
μ̄η̄λααγ ναωρ̄σκαγλλε ἡ̄παει ἡ̄ττειμεινε καν εφ̄ρ̄πολιγεγεςωαι ρ̄η̄πκοσμοσ
αγω οη εφωρει εβολ ρ̄η̄πκοσμοσ η̄δη αφ̄χι ἡ̄ταληθ̄εια ρ̄η̄η̄ρικων πκοσμοσ
αφωωπε ἡ̄ναϊων παιων γαρ εφωωοπ ναγ ἡ̄πληρωμα αγω εφωωοπ ἡ̄ττειρε
φογονη εβολ ναγ ογααφ εφρηπ αν ρ̄η̄πκακε μ̄η̄τογωη αλλα εφρηπ
ρ̄η̄νογρ̄οογ ἡ̄τελειον ἡ̄νογοειν εφογααβ

He who will receive that light will not be seen nor can he be detained, and no one will be able to trouble such a person even while he dwells in the world, and, moreover, when he leaves the world he has already received the truth in the images. The world has become the aeons, for the aeon is for him the fullness, and it is in this way that it appears to him alone. It is not hidden in the darkness and the night, but it is hidden in a perfect day and a holy light.⁵⁷⁷ (*Gos. Phil.* 86.7–18)

Interestingly, this passage, which constitutes the very end of *Gos. Phil.*,⁵⁷⁸ also displays a rather positive view concerning the state of the enlightened person in this world. Not only will he be saved, but he will also

⁵⁷⁷ Cf. 1 Thess 5:5.

⁵⁷⁸ Only the title, πεγαγγελιον πκαταφιλιπποσ, “the Gospel According to Philip” (*Gos. Phil.* 86.18–19), follows it.

perceive the higher realities in the types and images in this world, and is safe with regard to the hostile powers. The goal thus seems to be not only to achieve salvation in the next world, but also to realise that the aeon (the next world or the other world) is reflected already in this world, albeit imperfectly. That is, the fully enlightened Christian will be able to successfully blend, so to speak, the heavenly reality with the earthly. This is achieved by becoming a heavenly being (a Christ) and by being able to see truth in the worldly types and images. The causal relationship between becoming and seeing seems to be blurred in accordance with what we have seen in other passages discussed above.

In the context of the hidden and the revealed, it is interesting to compare the statement at the end of the passage concerning the “undefiled marriage,” discussed above, with that found in the very last sentence just quoted. The first excerpt concerns the “undefiled marriage,” while the second concerns “the aeon”:

ΕΦΗΠ ΔΗ ΕΠΚΑΚΕ Η ΤΟΥΤΩΗ ΑΛΛΑ ΕΦΗΠ ΕΠΕΡΘΟΥ ΜΗΠΟΥΘΕΙΝ

It is not of the darkness or the night, but it is of the day and the light.

(*Gos. Phil.* 82.8–10)

ΕΦΖΗΠ ΔΗ ΖΗΠΚΑΚΕ ΜΗΤΟΥΤΩΗ ΑΛΛΑ ΕΦΖΗΠ ΖΗΝΟΥΖΘΟΥ ΝΤΕΛΕΙΟΝ ΜΗΘΟΥΘΕΙΝ ΕΦΟΥΑΑΒ

It is not hidden in the darkness or the night, but it is hidden in a perfect day and a holy light.

(*Gos. Phil.* 86.16–18)

It is hard to resist the conclusion that the Coptic wordplay created by the use of the words ηΠ (“be counted / belong”) and ζΗΠ (“be hidden / secret”) in these very similar constructions can hardly be accidental. The similarity of the passages also invites us to interpret them together in an intra-textual blend. In the same way as “the undefiled marriage” belongs to the day and the light, “the aeon” is hidden in a perfect day and a holy light. The aeon, the kingdom of heaven, is thus nicely reflected in “the undefiled marriage.” When we connect initiation into Christianity with this undefiled marriage, i.e., the marriage of each initiate with Christ and / or an angel, we see how *Gos. Phil.* describes heaven as being reflected on earth in the Christian sacraments—both in the rituals of initiation and in the repeated eucharistic communion.

3.2.2.5.2. The Works of Christ “In a Mystery”

It is not only the world in general or the sacramental types and images that have a hidden dimension, however, but also the acts of Christ:

ⲁⲓⲪⲬⲟⲉ! [ⲥ ⲣ̅] ⲗⲬⲬⲛⲓⲙ⁵⁷⁹ ⲗ̅ⲛⲛⲟⲩⲙⲩⲥⲧⲏⲣⲓⲟⲛ ⲟⲩⲃⲁ [ⲓⲡ] ⲧⲓⲘⲁ ⲙ̅ⲛⲟⲩⲭⲣⲓⲘⲁ ⲙ̅ⲛⲟⲩⲉⲭⲁⲣ [ⲓⲥⲧ] ⲓⲁ ⲙ̅ⲛⲟⲩⲟⲩⲱⲧⲉ ⲙ̅ⲛⲟⲩⲛⲛⲙⲑⲱⲛ⁵⁸⁰

The Lord [did] everything in a mystery:⁵⁸¹ a baptism and a chrismation and a Eucharist and a redemption and a bridal chamber.

(*Gos. Phil.* 67.27–30)

Described by Hans-Martin Schenke as “eine oder sogar *die* Zentralstelle für die Sakramentslehre des EvPhil,”⁵⁸² this passage has most commonly been understood to refer to a sequence of rituals of consecutively higher importance,⁵⁸³ but there is no consensus among scholars on this point. As we shall see, however, it is actually doubtful that the focus of this passage is on a sequence of rituals.⁵⁸⁴ Among the most difficult problems of this frequently cited passage is the question of what the phrase ⲗⲬⲬⲛⲓⲙ, “everything,” actually refers to, and how to understand the Coptic phrase ⲗ̅ⲛⲛⲟⲩⲙⲩⲥⲧⲏⲣⲓⲟⲛ.⁵⁸⁵ Several scholars have argued convincingly that ⲙⲩⲥⲧⲏⲣⲓⲟⲛ here should not be taken in the sense of a sacrament, and that the phrase ⲗ̅ⲛⲛⲟⲩⲙⲩⲥⲧⲏⲣⲓⲟⲛ should be understood adverbially.⁵⁸⁶ They have, however, differed somewhat with regard to the underlying Greek, and with regard to their overall interpretation of the sentence. Rewolinski suggests that ⲗ̅ⲛⲛⲟⲩⲙⲩⲥⲧⲏⲣⲓⲟⲛ may be a translation of the Greek μυστικῶς, and that it should be understood as “secretly,”

⁵⁷⁹ Another possible reconstruction could perhaps be ⲁⲓⲪⲬⲟⲉ! [ⲥ ⲧ̅] ⲗⲬⲬⲛⲓⲙ.

⁵⁸⁰ The passage is here broken off by a lacuna of between five and ten letters. This means that, in theory at least, another term could follow and conceivably make this passage into a sequence of more than five terms.

⁵⁸¹ Rewolinski suggests Didache 11:11 (ποιῶν εἰς μυστήριον κοσμητὸν ἐκκλησίᾳς; quoted from Aaron Milavec, *The Didache: Text, Translation, Analysis, and Commentary* [Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 2003], 28) as a parallel to this phrase (see Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 101). This parallel seems somewhat tenuous, however.

⁵⁸² Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 381, the emphasis is Schenke’s own.

⁵⁸³ See, e.g., Henry A. Green, “Ritual in Valentinian Gnosticism: A Sociological Interpretation,” *JRH* 12 (1982–1983): 120.

⁵⁸⁴ See Gaffron, *Studien*, 108–109; Einar Thomassen, “*Gos. Philip* 67:27–30: Not ‘In a Mystery,’” in *Coptica—Gnostica—Manichaica: Mélanges offerts à Wolf-Peter Funk* (ed. Louis Painchaud and Paul-Hubert Poirier; BCNH Section “Études” 7; Québec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2006), 925–939 (I thank Professor Thomassen for giving me access to an advance copy of this article).

⁵⁸⁵ Cf. Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 105.

⁵⁸⁶ Cf. Gaffron, *Studien*, 108–109; Sevrin, “Pratique et doctrine,” 289; Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 105; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 381–383; Thomassen, “Not ‘In a Mystery,’” 926–927. As Gaffron points out, “Man darf also nicht behaupten, die fünf genannten Sakramente wären die Mysterien, so daß μυστήριον = Sakrament wäre” (Gaffron, *Studien*, 108).

or ‘mystically,’ i.e., prophetically.”⁵⁸⁷ He concludes that the phrase should be understood “in a broad sense” to refer to the fact that “everything Christ did had a deeper significance,” i.e., that “the actions of Christ have a deeper significance pointing beyond their one time (or more) performance.”⁵⁸⁸ Rewolinski’s overall interpretation seems sound, but is *ḡñnoymcctḥrion* a translation of *μυστικῶς*? Gaffron, later followed by Schenke and Thomassen, has also argued that *ḡñnoymcctḥrion* should be understood in an adverbial sense, but rather as a translation of *μυστηριωδῶς*.⁵⁸⁹ On a general level, Gaffron, Schenke, and Thomassen are of course right to point out that *ḡñnoymcctḥrion* is a possible translation of *μυστηριωδῶς*. I would argue, however, that in the context in which it appears in *Gos. Phil.* it makes more sense to read it as the Coptic equivalent of the Greek *ἐν μυστηρίῳ*.⁵⁹⁰ While the term *μυστηριωδῶς* is not used in the New Testament at all, *ἐν μυστηρίῳ* is found in 1 Cor 2:7, where it is in fact rendered as *ḡñoymcctḥrion* in the Sahidic New Testament.⁵⁹¹

First Corinthians is, as we have seen, an important intertext to *Gos. Phil.* that is both quoted and alluded to throughout the tractate, thus keeping this text at a high level of priming in a reading of *Gos. Phil.* What should directly prompt us to investigate the benefits of reading this *Gos. Phil.* passage intertextually with 1 Cor 2:7 is the fact that this is the only passage in the entire Sahidic New Testament where the phrase *ḡñoymcctḥrion* appears, and it does so as a translation of the Greek *ἐν μυστηρίῳ*. In Greek, the Pauline verse reads: *ἀλλὰ λαλοῦμεν θεοῦ σοφίαν ἐν μυστηρίῳ τὴν ἀποκεκρυμμένην, ἣν προώρισεν ὁ θεὸς πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων εἰς δόξαν ἡμῶν*. The phrase *ἐν μυστηρίῳ* may here be understood adverbially, as in the KJV: “But we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the hidden wisdom, which God ordained before the world unto our glory” (1 Cor 2:7 KJV).⁵⁹² In the Sahidic version,

⁵⁸⁷ See Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 105.

⁵⁸⁸ Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 105.

⁵⁸⁹ See Gaffron, *Studien*, 108–109; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 381–383; Thomassen, “Not ‘In a Mystery.’”

⁵⁹⁰ This is also mentioned as a possibility by Sevrin (see Sevrin, “Pratique et doctrine,” 289).

⁵⁹¹ See Thompson, *Coptic Version*, 121; Horner, *Sahidic New Testament*; Lefort, *Les mots d’origine grecque*, 177.

⁵⁹² Contrary to the KJV translation, however, RSV reads *ἐν μυστηρίῳ* adjectivally: “But we impart a secret and hidden wisdom of God, which God decreed before the ages for our glorification” (1 Cor 2:7 RSV). As Conzelmann points out, it is impossible

the verse reads: ἀλλὰ ἐνώμαδε νόγσοφια ἡτεπινοῦτε ῥῆνογμστηριον ταῖ ἐτρηπ τεπταπινοῦτε πορχῶ εβολ ῥαθη ἡναῖων ἐπενεσοῦ, which may be translated as “But we speak wisdom of God in a mystery, which is hidden, which God set apart before the ages for our glory” (1 Cor 2:7). Here it is also of interest that the preceding verse, 1 Cor 2:6, starts off with the declaration that “it is among the perfect that we speak wisdom, but a wisdom that is not of this age, nor of the rulers of this age, these which will be brought to naught” (ἐνώμαδε δε νόγσοφια ῥῆῆτελειος ογσοφια δε ἐνταπεῖαιων ἀν τε ογδε ἡταῆαρχων ἀν τε ἡπεῖαιων ναῖ ἐτρηλογωσῶ).⁵⁹³

I have chosen to understand ῥῆνογμστηριον in *Gos. Phil.* as an adverbial prepositional phrase modifying εἶπε, specifying the way in which the Lord “did everything” (ῥῆωβ ἡμ), namely that he did everything “in a

to decide whether in 1 Cor 2:7 ἐν μυστηρίῳ should be taken to refer to σοφία or to λαλεῖν (See Hans Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians* [Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975], 56 n. 1). Adverbial uses of ἐν μυστηρίῳ are also found elsewhere in early Christian sources. See, e.g., *Acts Pet.* 38, where it refers to a saying of Jesus with a hidden deeper meaning: περὶ ὧν ὁ κύριος ἐν μυστηρίῳ λέγει, “Concerning this the Lord says in a mystery.” (Greek text quoted from L. Vouaux, *Les actes de Pierre* [Paris: Letouzey & Ané, 1922]; translation quoted from Wilhelm Schneemelcher, “The Acts of Peter,” in *Writings Related to the Apostles; Apocalypses and Related Subjects* [ed. Wilhelm Schneemelcher and R. McL. Wilson; vol. 2 of *New Testament Apocrypha*; rev. ed.; Cambridge: James Clarke, 1992], 271–321). See also Clement, *Strom.* V.12; Justin, *Dial.* 68, 75, 76, 78, 81, 100; Irenaeus, *Haer.* I.25.5.

⁵⁹³ Σοφίαν δὲ λαλοῦμεν ἐν τοῖς τελείοις, σοφίαν δὲ οὐ τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου οὐδὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου τῶν καταργουμένων. In the patristic sources we find many citations of and allusions to 1 Cor 2:7. Interestingly, in the earliest patristic period such citations and allusions to 1 Cor 2:7 crop up almost exclusively in discussions concerning the hidden meaning of Scripture, while later on we also find the verse cited in connection with discussions of secret unwritten teachings regarding Christian ritual practice, as is the case in e.g., Basil of Caesarea, *De spiritu sancto* 27.66, where he says concerning the teachings of the Church that “we have received some from written sources, while others have been given to us secretly (ἐν μυστηρίῳ), through apostolic tradition” (τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῆς ἐγγράφου διδασκαλίας ἔχομεν, τὰ δὲ ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀποστόλων παραδόσεως διαδοθέντα ἡμῖν ἐν μυστηρίῳ παρεδέξαμεθα; Greek text quoted from B. Pruche, *Basile de Césarée: Sur le Saint-Esprit* [2d ed.; SC 17; Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1968]; translation quoted from David Anderson, trans., *St. Basil the Great: On the Holy Spirit* [Crestwood, N.Y.: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1980]). See also the study by Emmanuel Amand de Mendieta, *The ‘Unwritten’ and ‘Secret’ Apostolic Traditions in the Theological Thought of St. Basil of Caesarea* (SJTOP 13; Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1965), and Margaret Barker, *The Great High Priest: The Temple Roots of Christian Liturgy* (London: T&T Clark, 2003), 11. In *Gos. Phil.*, the use of ῥῆνογμστηριον may, and in my view probably does, refer to both of these aspects, namely both the hidden meaning of Scripture and the hidden meaning of ritual.

mystery” (ἐν μυστηρίῳ),⁵⁹⁴ that is, with a hidden meaning.⁵⁹⁵ Now, what does *ῥωβ νιμ* (“everything”) refer to in the *Gos. Phil.* passage? While Schenke takes it to refer strictly to the following five terms (οὐβα[π]τισμα μῆνοχρισμα μῆνογεχαρ[ι]α μῆνογωτε μῆνογνυμφων), Sevrin argues that the five terms are only examples of what is encompassed by *ῥωβ νιμ*.⁵⁹⁶ Gaffron takes *ῥωβ νιμ* to refer to what is revealed in the following five terms understood by him as sacraments,⁵⁹⁷ and Thomassen understands *ῥωβ νιμ* to refer to “the essential soteriological work carried out by the Saviour in his earthly incarnation: the redemption he received at his baptism in the Jordan and in which his followers share through their own baptism.”⁵⁹⁸ I suggest that we understand *ῥωβ νιμ* here as a reference to everything which Jesus did, as related in Scripture, and following Sevrin I understand the five terms to be examples of these important acts.⁵⁹⁹ Of these, “baptism,” “chrismation,” and “Eucharist” seem pretty straightforward. The first two were shown by Jesus in his baptism in the Jordan, while the latter is reported most directly in the institution narratives. “Bridal chamber” may, as we have seen, point to an interpretation of aspects of especially the chrisms and the Eucharist, but it might also be read in this context as an allusion to the wedding at Cana,⁶⁰⁰ where Jesus did things with a deeper meaning, and even, as John relates, manifested his “glory” for the first time.⁶⁰¹ As for “redemption” (ωτε), this

⁵⁹⁴ It is enough to acknowledge the adverbial sense of the prepositional phrase “in a mystery” (as in the KJV translation of 1 Cor 2:7) and no need to change the translation (contrary to Thomassen, “Not ‘In a Mystery’”).

⁵⁹⁵ See Lampe 892b. For a similar understanding of the meaning of *ἐν μυστηρίῳ* in *Gos. Phil.*, although based on the questionable assumption of *μυστηριωδῶς* as the Greek *Vorlage*, see Thomassen, “Not ‘In a Mystery.’”

⁵⁹⁶ See Sevrin, “Pratique et doctrine,” 289.

⁵⁹⁷ See Gaffron, *Studien*, 109. Schenke rightly notes that this interpretation violates Gaffron’s own insight that *ἐν μυστηρίῳ* should be understood adverbially (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 381).

⁵⁹⁸ Thomassen, “Not ‘In a Mystery,’” 934–935. Thomassen suggests the following translation of the passage: “The Lord did everything with a symbolic meaning: baptism, chrisms, Eucharist, redemption, and bridal chamber” (ibid., 934). He also suggests that *ῥωβ νιμ* should be taken to refer exclusively to what Jesus revealed in his baptism in the Jordan. Thomassen is then left, however, with the Eucharist as the odd one out in the sequence, which leads him to propose that perhaps the only reason why the Eucharist is mentioned in the list is because it is a part of the initiation ritual, and not because it has anything to do with what Jesus revealed (see ibid., 934–936).

⁵⁹⁹ See esp. Sevrin, “Pratique et doctrine,” 289.

⁶⁰⁰ John 2:1–11.

⁶⁰¹ John 2:11. Cf. Turid Karlsen Seim, “Descent and Divine Paternity in the Gospel of John: Does the Mother Matter?” *NTS* 51 (2005): 368.

term may refer to the deeper meaning of several acts of Jesus, but might also be understood in a more specific sense as referring to his redemptive death on the cross.⁶⁰²

The hidden meaning of these acts is further to be understood in terms of what Paul refers to in 1 Cor 2:6 as the hidden wisdom of God which is imparted “among the perfect/ mature” (ἐν ἡτελειῶσι). Here we might also recall that *Gos. Phil.* states concerning “the disciple of God” that he shall give food that is proper to the recipients, including bones to the dogs and acorns to the pigs. For the slaves, however, no specific food is mentioned, but rather that “he will give them the first (course)” (ϕῆμα τῆς πρώτης), and “to the children he will give the complete (banquet)” (ἡμεῖς ἡμεῖς τῆς τελείας).⁶⁰³ While I have chosen to translate the passage in a way that keeps it in line with the metaphorical source domain of food and eating, Isenberg’s understanding of this passage is perfectly in line with both *Gos. Phil.* and 1 Cor 2:6 when he freely translates “To the slaves he will give only the elementary lessons, to the children he will give the complete instruction.”⁶⁰⁴

3.2.2.5.3. The Temple

An important motif *Gos. Phil.* utilises in several contexts is the Jerusalem temple. This is also yet another motif that is used to provide framing inputs in different metaphorical blends. We have already seen how the tractate employs temple imagery in an eschatological context and in connection with the effects of the crucifixion. We will now take a closer look at a passage where temple imagery is employed to make quite different points. In an intriguing passage that is unfortunately cut short due to the state of the manuscript, *Gos. Phil.* describes the layout of the Jerusalem temple and its significance:

νεγῆσθοντ ἡνεὶ ἡμα ἡτῆροςφορα εἰς ἡμεῖς ἡμεῖς ἐπιαντε
 εἰς ἡμεῖς ἡμεῖς εἰς ἡμεῖς ἡμεῖς ἐπιαντε εἰς ἡμεῖς ἡμεῖς
 εἰς ἡμεῖς ἡμεῖς εἰς ἡμεῖς ἡμεῖς ἐπιαντε εἰς ἡμεῖς ἡμεῖς
 εἰς ἡμεῖς ἡμεῖς εἰς ἡμεῖς ἡμεῖς ἐπιαντε εἰς ἡμεῖς ἡμεῖς
 εἰς ἡμεῖς ἡμεῖς εἰς ἡμεῖς ἡμεῖς ἐπιαντε εἰς ἡμεῖς ἡμεῖς
 εἰς ἡμεῖς ἡμεῖς εἰς ἡμεῖς ἡμεῖς ἐπιαντε εἰς ἡμεῖς ἡμεῖς

⁶⁰² Cf. Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 382.

⁶⁰³ See *Gos. Phil.* 80.23–81.14. Cf. Layton, who makes a similar decision, translating “if slaves, a first course (that is, a single dish); if children, a complete meal” (Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 350).

⁶⁰⁴ Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 205. Cf. also Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 71; Green, “Ritual in Valentinian Gnosticism,” 119.

ἦνετοῦααβ πε πινυμφων π[βαπτι]σμα⁶⁰⁵ οὐνταφ ἦμαγ ἦταναστα[ις
 εἰπ]ωτε⁶⁰⁶ εἰσωτε εἰπινυμφων [εἰπ]υμφων δε εἰπετχοσε ερω[. . .]⁶⁰⁷

There were three houses of sacrifice in Jerusalem. The one, which is open to the west, is called the holy. The other one, which is open to the south, is called the holy of the holy. The third, which is open to the east, is called the holy of the holies, the place where the high priest enters alone. Baptism is the holy house, [redemption] is the holy of the holy. The holy of the holies is the bridal chamber. [Baptism] contains the resurrection [in] the redemption, the redemption being in the bridal chamber. But [the] bridal chamber is in that which is higher than [. . .] (*Gos. Phil.* 69.14–28)

Contrary to *Gos. Phil.*'s eschatological references to the temple, in the present passage such important features as the veil or the ark of the covenant are not mentioned. The focus of this simile is rather on the three houses of increasing holiness and secrecy. Segelberg has commented that *Gos. Phil.* here makes use of what he calls “the mistaken idea that there were three halls in the temple at Jerusalem.”⁶⁰⁸ The way in which *Gos. Phil.* utilises temple imagery seems to draw heavily upon the epistle to the Hebrews. Indeed, *Gos. Phil.* may even have drawn its tripartite division of the Temple directly from Heb 9, since, after a description of the two tabernacles in Heb 9:1–10, Heb 9:11 introduces “the great perfect tabernacle” (τινος ἰσκηνης εἰδικ εβολ), which is “not of this creation” (ἦταπεεωωντ ἄν), thus indicating not two, but three tabernacles.⁶⁰⁹ Similarly it is stated at Heb 9:24 that Christ did not enter “the holies” (νετοῦααβ), which are only “patterns of the true” (σμοτ νῆμε), but into heaven, indicating the latter as the third, higher, tabernacle. Significantly, his entry into “the holy” by means of his own blood is associated with

⁶⁰⁵ This lacuna may also be restored π[χρη]σμα (“the [chris]m”).

⁶⁰⁶ I follow Schenke's reconstruction of this lacuna (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 48). Layton has ἦταναστα[ις μῆπ]ωτε (Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 180).

⁶⁰⁷ The rest of this passage is unfortunately damaged too severely for us to be able to reconstruct it with any degree of certainty. For an attempt, see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 48.

⁶⁰⁸ Segelberg, “Sacramental System,” 198. Schenke proposes that the imagery may have resulted from “eine ‘Kontamination’ der (drei oder) zwei Teile des Tempelhauses . . . mit den drei Höfen des ganzen Tempelbezirks” (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 404, Schenke's emphases). Rewolinski points out that the Jerusalem temple had three “courts” and translates *nei* in this sense (see Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 125).

⁶⁰⁹ The terminology used in Heb 9 is not the same as in this passage in *Gos. Phil.*, however, as the first two tabernacles are referred to as νετοῦααβ, “the holies” (Heb 9:2) and νετοῦααβ ἦνετοῦααβ, “the holies of the holies” (Heb 9:3). The latter term is, however, used at *Gos. Phil.* 85.19–20.

“redemption” (σωτε).⁶¹⁰ In chapter 10, Hebrews then goes on to describe the entry of the Christians, referred to by the authorial voice as “my brothers” (μαςνηγ), into this place by means of the blood of Jesus,⁶¹¹ and “through the veil which is his flesh” (ρητιπκαταπεταςμα ετεπαϊ πε τεφσαρξ).⁶¹² For a schematic representation of the temple as described in *Gos. Phil.*, see fig. 45.⁶¹³

Now, how are we to understand *Gos. Phil.*'s use of this temple simile? As usual in *Gos. Phil.*, the target input of this metaphorical blend is left unstated. It has been assumed by most scholars that the three houses of the temple here represent successive sacramental stages.⁶¹⁴ This view is suggested by the fact that the first house is identified with baptism. To read the other two houses as representing sacraments, however, then requires the direct identification in this passage of the terms “redemption” (σωτε) and “bridal chamber” (νημφων) with sacraments,⁶¹⁵ but such an identification is problematic. It has usually been supported by reference to the famous list of five terms in *Gos. Phil.* 67.28–30, which includes the terms “bridal chamber” (νημφων) and “redemption” (σωτε) in addition to “baptism” (βαπτισμα), “chrism” (χρισμα), and “Eucharist” (ευχαριστια), but as we have seen, it does not seem likely that this list in fact refers to five sacraments. Moreover, as Segelberg has noted with regard to the temple metaphor, “The question may be asked as to why only three sacraments are thought of in this context. Why not build five rooms in the temple at Jerusalem when the argument at any rate involves the alteration of its actual structure?”⁶¹⁶ Why not indeed? The fact that

⁶¹⁰ Heb 9:12.

⁶¹¹ Heb 10:19.

⁶¹² Heb 10:20.

⁶¹³ For a similar illustration, see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 404. For a different solution, see Schmid, *Die Eucharistie*, 119.

⁶¹⁴ See, e.g., Segelberg, “Sacramental System,” 199; Isenberg, “Introduction,” 136–137; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 403; DeConick, “Entering God’s Presence,” 488; DeConick, “Heavenly Temple Traditions,” 335–338.

⁶¹⁵ For the identification of “redemption” (σωτε) with ἀπολύτρωσις, see, e.g., Pagels, “Irenaeus,” 357. Segelberg connects the second “house” with the chrism, but still identifies σωτε with ἀπολύτρωσις (see Segelberg, “Sacramental System,” 198–200). For the identification of “the redemption” (πρωτε) with the Eucharist, see DeConick, “Entering God’s Presence,” 499–505; DeConick, “Heavenly Temple Traditions,” 337–338. For the various identifications of “the bridal chamber” (νημφων), see discussion above.

⁶¹⁶ Segelberg, “Sacramental System,” 199. Segelberg’s comment is based on the assumption that the description of the temple has been created specifically to fit the simile, but it still points to an important problem with the ritual-sequence interpretation of the simile. Schenke suggests that βαπτισμα may here designate not only baptism, but rather baptism,

the chrismation or the Eucharist is not mentioned in the temple simile seems to me to indicate that it does not here refer to baptism, redemption, and bridal chamber as three rituals.

There are other possibilities that seem to make more sense of the passage. Baptism is identified as “the holy house” (ΠΗΛΙ ΕΤΟΥΧΑΒ), but the other two “houses” do not need to be interpreted as rituals. Instead I would argue that they are better understood as references to successively important aspects of baptism, an interpretation that works from the imagery of the three houses being within each other and being of successively greater importance and mystery. Rather than representing successive rites, the houses may represent successive levels of significance, or successive realities, one within the other, in three levels. At the primary level there is the ritual act of baptism, represented as the holy house. Since one is redeemed through baptism, redemption could be said to constitute the deeper significance of baptism, and hence be represented as “the holy of the holy” (ΠΕΤΟΥΧΑΒ ΉΠΕΤΟΥΧΑΒ), which is hidden within “the holy.” As for “the bridal chamber” (ΠΝΥΜΦΩΝ), we have already seen that the joining of the Logos and the Holy Spirit, Christ and Christian, soul and spirit, are aspects of, at least, the rituals of chrismation and Eucharist, and may be described metaphorically in terms of marriage-related imagery like the “bridal chamber.” If “baptism” is here to be understood as baptism in water and chris, ⁶¹⁷ the “bridal chamber” fits nicely into the scheme as the highest hidden reality of that ritual process. The whole description of the layout of the temple may thus be regarded as a metaphorical description of the effects of the baptism of Jesus in the Jordan, and by extension that of each individual Christian initiate, comprising the closely associated ritual acts of baptism and chrismation.

But what are we to make of the latter part of the passage, which describes baptism as containing the resurrection “[in the] redemption” ([εἰπ]σωτε), and the latter again as being “in the bridal chamber” (εἰππνυμφων)? As we have seen, *Gos. Phil.* holds resurrection to be one of the important effects bestowed by means of the initiatory rituals. It may thus be argued that resurrection is an aspect of the redemptive function of baptism. Baptism may therefore be said to contain the resurrection “[in

chris, and Eucharist, or, alternatively, that βαπτισμα is to be understood as referring to baptism and chris, and σωτε to Eucharist and redemption (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 406).

⁶¹⁷ Cf. Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 406; Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 342 n. 16; *Gos. Phil.* 69.12–14.

the] redemption” ([ῥῆπ]σωτε). As for the statement that “the redemption is in the bridal chamber” (εἰσῶτε ῥῆπνῦμφων), this may be understood in terms of an understanding of redemption as an effect of the joining described in terms of a bridal chamber. In this sense the redemption may be said to be “in the bridal chamber.” Another possible solution would be to shift the focus of the blend at this point and understand the latter use of the term “bridal chamber” once again as a reference to the body of Christ. In that case redemption may clearly be understood as an effect residing in the body of Christ, both in terms of his soteriological work, and in terms of the soteriological potentiality residing in the eucharistic elements.⁶¹⁸

Another interesting aspect of this description of the temple is the focus on the facing of the doors in the three “houses.” It is said that the first one faces west, the second south, and the third east, but what may be the significance of these directions? April DeConick suggests that the directions “may reflect the geography of heavenly journeys in Jewish apocalyptic literature where the hero often visited the farthest corners of the world and heaven,”⁶¹⁹ but there are other possibilities that seem more intuitively relevant in the present context. The outermost house, that of baptism, faces west. Now, the term “west,” ἀμντε, in Coptic also denotes the underworld or death, denotations that resonate with baptismal interpretations having in some way to do with death. Since the interpretation of the descent into the baptismal waters as a descent into death is rejected in *Gos. Phil.* in favour of seeing the ritual as life-giving,⁶²⁰ we may perhaps instead regard the western door as signifying the entry into the holy house *from* the realm of death, that is, one passes from death and into life as one enters into the baptismal rite.⁶²¹

The innermost house, however, “the holy of the holies” (πετοῦααβ ἴνετοῦααβ) or “the bridal chamber” (πνῦμφων), is open towards the east. This direction has several relevant connotations. For one thing,

⁶¹⁸ The identification of the body of Jesus with the temple is of course also found in John 2:21, which is close to other passages alluded to in *Gos. Phil.* (For the body as a temple, see also 1 Cor 3:16–17; 6:19; Eph 2:20–22). As Lars Koen notes, “That the incarnate Christ is called ‘temple’ is a standing term in the eastern fathers from Origen and onward” (Lars Koen, *The Saving Passion: Incarnational and Soteriological Thought in Cyril of Alexandria’s Commentary on the Gospel According to St. John* [Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis: Studia Doctrinae Christianae Upsaliensia 31; Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1991], 74).

⁶¹⁹ DeConick, “Entering God’s Presence,” 488–489.

⁶²⁰ See discussion above.

⁶²¹ In this sense one might also metonymically conceive of the baptistry as this “holy house” (πνεε ετοῦααβ).

“east” (ἀειβτε) is the direction of paradise and may thus point in the direction of *Gos. Phil.*'s overarching sacramental logic of paradise regained. If this passage in *Gos. Phil.* is read intertextually with the description of the heavenly temple in Ezek 43, however, the easterly direction also takes on another special significance. According to Ezekiel 43:4, “the glory of the Lord” (δόξα κυρίου) enters the temple through the door facing east.⁶²²

3.2.2.6. *The Body as Bridal Chamber*

As we have seen, there are several passages in *Gos. Phil.* where the “bridal chamber” imagery may be understood as a metaphor for the body, both the body of Christ and the body of the Christian. We have seen that the body of Christ at the Jordan may be described in terms of a “bridal chamber,” and we saw that the Christian needed to become Christlike by becoming a “bridal chamber.” We shall now consider some related passages:

[ἄ]ϫ[ἡμ]α μπη[ἄ] ἡκαθαρτον οὔνηροογτ ἡρητοῦ οὔνηρῆςριομε ἡροογτ μεν νε ετρκοινῶνει ἀμγχη ετρπολιτεγεςοε ρῆνογςχημα ἡςριμε ἡςριομε δε νε νεττηρ ἡἡνετρηῆνογςχημα ἡροογτ εβολ ριτῆογχιττωτ αγω ἡἡλααυ νααῖρβολ εναει εγεμαρτε ἡμοϫ εϫτῆχι ἡογσομ ἡροογτ ἡἡνογςριμε ετεπνημφιος πε ἡἡτηνημφη ογα δε χι εβολ ρῆπνημφων ἡρικονικος

[The forms] of the unclean spirits include among them male ones and female ones.⁶²³ The male ones are those that have communion with the souls that live in female form, and it is the females who are mixed with those that are in male form—as a result of a lack of mingling—and no one will be able to escape being embraced by these if he does not receive a male power and a female one, which is the bridegroom and the bride, and one receives from the symbolical bridal chamber. (*Gos. Phil.* 65.1–12)

Schenke argues that πνημφων ἡρικονικος (which he translates as “dem abbildhaften Brautgemach”) should be understood as the soul of the initiate,⁶²⁴ and that the passage is here dependent on the idea of the soul as a

⁶²² See Ezek 43:1–5. As for the door facing south, it is difficult to see the significance of this direction in itself, other than as the mid-way direction between west and east.

⁶²³ David Brakke identifies the “forms” (ςχημα) that the souls are said to “live in” (ῆπολιτεγεςοε ρῆ) with the material bodies of the individual souls, and concludes from this that the human beings themselves are regarded as genderless on the level of their souls (see David Brakke, *Demons and the Making of the Monk: Spiritual Combat in Early Christianity* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006], 200).

⁶²⁴ Schenke’s interpretation is based on his belief that the passage presupposes the “Valentinian” myth: “Auf jeden fall müßte gemäß dem betreffenden valentinianischen Mythologumenon vorausgesetzt sein, daß der innerste Mensch, die Braut des Engels, die

bridal chamber in which the individual's "Licht-Selbst" as bride is united with its "himmlischen Paargenossen" understood as its bridegroom.⁶²⁵ He builds this argument on Irenaeus' account in *Adversus haereses* I.13 of the liturgical practices of Marcus the magician.⁶²⁶ Schenke concedes, however, that this interpretation would fit better if the text at *Gos. Phil.* 65.11–12 would read simply εἰπνιγμφων, which would correspond to Irenaeus' ἐν τῷ νυμφῶνι, rather than εβολ εἰπνιγμφων, which instead corresponds to the phrase ἐκ τοῦ νυμφῶνος.⁶²⁷ As a solution to this problem Schenke proposes that "die Vereinigung findet in der Seele statt, aber die dadurch freiwerdende Kraft strömt aus der Seele auf den ganzen Menschen über." I would, however, argue for a simpler solution, using the phrase εἰ εβολ εἰπνιγμφων, which caused Schenke trouble, as a valuable clue.

Schenke himself mentions the fact that the troubling phrase εἰ εβολ εἰπνιγμφων is actually attested in the Sahidic version of 1 Cor 10:17. The passage, which is found in the middle of a Pauline discourse concerning the Eucharist and demons, reads as follows:

παποτ ἡπεσμοῦ εφρανσμοῦ εροϋ μη ἡτκοινωνια αν πε ἡπεσνοϋ ἡπεχῶ·
 ποεικ εφρανποωῳ μη ἡτκοινωνια αν πε ἡπεσμοα ἡπεχῶ· δεοϋοεικ ἡοϋωτ
 πε· οϋσμοα ἡοϋωτ πε ανον τηρῆ· ανον γαρ τηρῆ τῆχι εβολ εἰπποεικ
 ἡοϋωτ·

The cup of blessing that we bless, is it not the communion in the blood of Christ? The bread that we break, is it not the communion in the body of Christ? Because it is one bread, we are all one body, for we all receive from this one bread. (1 Cor 10:16–17)

Paul then continues by arguing that by eating the body of Christ one becomes his "partner" (κοινωνος), while if one eats what has been sacrificed one becomes a "partner" (κοινωνος) of "the demons" (ἡδαλιμονιον). In *Gos. Phil.*, in order not to be possessed by the "unclean spirits" one

pneumatische Kraft zwar schon hat, aber nur der Anlage nach. Zur Entfaltung kommt sie jedenfalls erst durch seine Vereinigung mit dem Engel. Die potentielle weibliche Kraft wird erst real, wenn die männliche Kraft dazukommt" (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 352). Such a complicated interpretation does not seem to be called for by the text, however. See below for a much simpler way of accounting for *Gos. Phil.*'s metaphorical argument at this point.

⁶²⁵ See Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 354.

⁶²⁶ See Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 353–354. There does not seem to be any text-internal reasons for interpreting πνιγμφων ἡρικονικος as the human soul, and this view is also rejected by Gaffron, *Studien*, 213; Sevrin, "Pratique et doctrine," 154.

⁶²⁷ See Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 354 n. 876.

must receive the bridegroom and the bride,⁶²⁸ the male and female powers, and we learn that “one receives from the symbolical bridal chamber” (ΟΥΑ ΔΕ ΧΙ ΕΒΟΛ ΖΗΠΝΥΜΦΩΝ ΝΖΙΚΟΝΙΚΟΣ). In 1 Cor 10:17, the phrase ΛΝΟΝ ΓΑΡ ΤΗΡΝ ΤΗΧΙ ΕΒΟΛ ΖΗΠΠΟΕΙΚ ΝΟΥΩΤ (“for we all receive from this one bread”) clearly refers to the eucharistic body of Christ. In *Gos. Phil.* we may likewise understand ΠΝΥΜΦΩΝ ΝΖΙΚΟΝΙΚΟΣ to refer to the eucharistic representation of the body of Christ, the symbolical manifestation of his real body, the true bridal chamber. The local context in *Gos. Phil.* is important. The bridegroom and bride may be taken to represent the Logos and Holy Spirit respectively, received by means of the Eucharist. It is thus from the Eucharist as the symbolical bridal chamber that one may receive through the bread the male power / bridegroom that is the Logos, and from the cup the female power / bride that is the Holy Spirit. In this way one becomes united with Christ in a symbolical marriage, and thus becomes immune to the “unclean spirits.”

The passage then continues, in a sense, the same theme, but in a somewhat different fashion:

ΖΟΤΑΝ ΕΡΩΑΝΕΖΙΜΕ ΝΑΤΣΒΩ ΝΑΥ ΔΥΖΟΟΥΤ ΕΦΖΜΟΟΣ ΟΥΑΑΦ ΩΑΥΦΩΒΕ
 ΕΡΡΑΙ ΕΧΩΦ ΝΣΕΩΒΕ ΝΗΜΑΦ ΝΣΕΔΟΖΜΕΦ ΤΕΕΙΖΕ ΟΝ ΖΡΡΩΜΕ ΝΑΤΣΒΩ
 ΕΥΩΑΝΝΑΥ ΕΥΣΖΙΜΕ ΕΣΖΜΟΟΣ ΟΥΑΑΤΤ ΕΝΕΩΩΣ ΩΑΥΠΠΘΕ ΗΜΟΣ ΝΣΕΡΒΙΑΖΕ ΗΜΟΣ
 ΕΥΟΥΩΩ ΕΔΟΖΜΕΣ ΕΥΩΑΝΝΑΥ ΔΕ ΔΠΖΟΟΥΤ ΜΗΤΕΦΖΙΜΕ ΕΥΖΜΟΟΣ ΖΑΤΗΝΟΥΕΡΗΥ
 ΜΑΡΕΝΖΙΟΜΕ ΩΒΩΚ ΕΖΟΥΝ ΩΑΠΖΟΟΥΤ ΟΥΤΕ ΜΑΡΕΝΖΟΟΥΤ ΩΒΩΚ ΕΖΟΥΝ
 ΩΑΤΣΖΙΜΕ ΤΑΕΙ ΤΕ ΘΕ ΕΡΩΑΘΙΚΩΝ ΜΗΠ[Α]ΓΓΕΛΟΣ ΖΩΤΡ ΕΝΟΥΕΡΗΥ ΟΥΤΕ
 ΜΗ[ΛΑ]ΔΥ ΝΑΩΡΤΟΛΜΑ ΔΒΩΚ ΕΖΟΥΝ ΩΑΦ[ΖΟ]ΟΥΤ Η ΤΣΖΙΜΕ

Whenever the ignorant women see a man dwelling alone they leap upon him and play with him and defile him. Thus also with ignorant men, when they see a beautiful woman dwelling alone they seduce her and force her, wanting to defile her. But if they see the husband and his wife dwelling together, the women are not able to enter in to the husband, nor are the men able to enter in to the woman. Thus, if the image and the angel join with each other, neither will anyone be able to dare to go in to the [man] or the woman. (*Gos. Phil.* 65.12–26)

Here the antidote is no longer described in terms of receiving a male and a female power, but instead in terms of “the image” (ΘΙΚΩΝ) joining with “the angel” (ΠΑΓΓΕΛΟΣ). The description of the “ignorant” men or women who prey on men and women living alone should therefore probably not be taken as a straightforward continuation of the description of the demons in male and female shapes, but should rather be understood

⁶²⁸ See Sevrin, “Les noces spirituelles,” 154 n. 36, contra Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 121.

metaphorically. That is, in the same way as a normal marriage works as an antidote against becoming the sexual prey of “ignorant” men or women, and thus against the defilement caused by this victimisation, Christian life, conceived of as a marriage of the Christian with Christ, wards off evil spirits in a general sense. As we saw above, the Christians are described elsewhere in *Gos. Phil.* as “you who dwell with the Son of God” (ἸΤΩΤἸ ΔΕ ΝΕΤΩΟΠ ΜΠΩΗΡΕ ΜΠΝΟΥΓΤΕ).⁶²⁹ *Gos. Phil.* makes it clear that when one has been united with Christ, and has thus received the Holy Spirit, no evil spirits or demons can mingle with them:

ΟΥἸΖΟΕΙΝΕ ΕΥ[ΧΩ ἸΜΟΣ ΧΕ]ΔΗΝΟΝ ΖἸΠΙΣΤΟΣ ΖΟΠΩ[Σ Π]ἸἸἸ
 ἸἸ[ΚΑΘΑΡΤΟ]Ἰ ΖΙΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΟΝ ΝΕΥἸΤΑΥ ΓΑΡ ἸΜΑ[Υ] ἸΠἸἸ ΕΤΟΥΑΑΒ ΝΕΜἸΠἸἸ
 ἸἸΑΚΑΘΑΡΤΟΝ ΝΑἸΚΟΛΛΑ ΕΡΟΟΥ

There are some who [say,] “We are faithful,” in order that [... unclean spirit] and demon, for if they had the Holy Spirit, no unclean spirit would join with them. (*Gos. Phil.* 65.36–66.4)

This passage provides us with a nice parallel to the passage discussed earlier concerning those who come up from the baptismal waters claiming to be Christian, but without having received anything, i.e., without having received the Holy Spirit.⁶³⁰ The Holy Spirit is, as we have seen, received both by means of the chrism and by way of the eucharistic cup. The effect of the image joining with the angel is here presented as being the same as the effect of the reception of the Holy Spirit. Could it be that “the image” here represents the Christian, or more specifically the Christian’s Logos-like soul, receiving and joining with the Holy Spirit? In that case “the angel” in this passage could either simply be a reference to the Holy Spirit, or it could indicate the similarity in function between the Holy Spirit and the angels.

3.3. *Implications*

It is now time to summarise some of the implications of the preceding analysis with regard to *Gos. Phil.*’s implied underlying sacramental system and community organisation, as well as its Christology, anthropology, and soteriology.

⁶²⁹ *Gos. Phil.* 78.20–21.

⁶³⁰ This parallel is also noted by Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 358.

3.3.1. *Sacramental System and Community Organisation*

Apart from the issue of *Gos. Phil.*'s composition and textual coherence, the main focus of attention among scholars has been on the sacramental system presupposed by the tractate.⁶³¹ It is *Gos. Phil.* 67.27–30, already discussed above, that has been the starting point for most of these studies:

αΠΧΘΕΙ[C ῤ]ῤΩΒ ΝΙΜ ῤΝΝΟΥΜΥCΤΗΡΙΟΝ ΟΥΒΑ[Π]ΤΙCΜΑ ΜΝΟΥΧΡΙCΜΑ
ΜΝΝΟΥΕΥΧΑΡ[ΙCΤ]Ιῤ ΜΝΝΟΥCΩΤΕ ΜΝΝΟΥΝΥΜΦΩΝ

The Lord [did] everything in a mystery: a baptism and a chrismation and a Eucharist and a redemption and a bridal chamber. (*Gos. Phil.* 67.27–30)

As we have seen, scholars disagree over the number of rituals that are actually referred to by the sequence of terms “baptism” (βαπτισμα), “chrismation” (χρισμα), “Eucharist” (ευχαριστια), “redemption” (σωτε), and “bridal chamber” (νυμφων). The most common solution has been to regard the sequence as referring to five separate sacraments,⁶³² but as we saw above in our previous discussion of this passage there is not much basis for the identification of the latter two terms in the sequence as separate sacraments. As several scholars have argued it is more likely that *Gos. Phil.* simply presupposes three sacraments: baptism, chrismation, and Eucharist.⁶³³ The interpretation of how the last two terms in the sequence then fit in has been disputed.⁶³⁴ We saw above that the terms

⁶³¹ See esp. Segelberg, “Sacramental System”; Tripp, “Sacramental System”; Gaffron, *Studien*; Sevrin, “Pratique et doctrine”; Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language”; Pagels, “Ritual.”

⁶³² Schenke, for instance, has come to the conclusion that the phrase refers to five sacraments, which he sees as constituent parts of a ritual of initiation, that “sind begründet in der Taufe Jesu, in der Verleihung des Geistes *an* und *durch* ihn, in der Einsetzung der Eucharistie, in seiner Kreuzigung und in seiner Auferstehung” (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 382). For the view that *Gos. Phil.* here refers to five sacraments, see also, e.g., Segelberg, “Sacramental System”; Eric Segelberg, “The Baptismal Rite According to Some of the Coptic-Gnostic Texts of Nag-Hammadi,” in *Liturgica, Monastica et Ascetica, Philosophica: Papers Presented to the Third International Conference on Patristic Studies Held at Christ Church, Oxford 1959* (ed. F.L. Cross; StPatr 5; TU 80; Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1962), 117–128; Stroud, “Ritual”; Green, “Ritual in Valentinian Gnosticism,” 120; Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 326; Desjardins, *Sin in Valentinianism*, 95; Buckley and Good, “Sacramental Language,” 2.

⁶³³ Edward Rewolinski concluded that, “The thesis . . . that the GPh holds to a system of five sacramental actions cannot be sustained. There is water baptism, chrismation, and eucharist.” (Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 140). See also, e.g., Tripp, “Sacramental System,” 256–258.

⁶³⁴ David Tripp outlined four possible ways of interpreting the sequence of five terms in relation to *Gos. Phil.*'s sacramental system. Listed in a sequence of increasing probability,

ᾠαῖς and ἡμῶν in this list may simply be regarded as works or deeds done or manifested by Christ in his earthly mission. That *Gos. Phil.* presupposes the ritual actions of baptism, chrismation, and Eucharist is, however, quite clear. It is now time to summarise what we may say concerning the practice and interpretation of the rituals underlying *Gos. Phil.*, on the basis of the present analysis.

3.3.1.1. *Baptism and Chrismation*

Gos. Phil. spends much time on questions relating to the interpretation of baptism and chrismation. The interpretation given by *Gos. Phil.* of these ritual acts is as we have seen profoundly tied up with its views on the baptism of Jesus in the Jordan. It is this paradigmatic event, coupled with the blend THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST, which guides the tractate's interpretation of the baptism of the individual Christian initiate, not only the process Christ himself went through, but also his baptismal preparations, like for instance his act of emptying the water of death and making baptism life-giving.

As for the exact ritual procedure, however, it is taken for granted and not described. In order to glean some insights into the actual ritual practice underlying *Gos. Phil.*'s discourse on the sacraments, we are therefore in most cases left having to decide to what degree the metaphorical descriptions of the rites are to be understood metonymically. With regard

the four possibilities were: i) as a six-phase programme: mystery + baptism + chrim + Eucharist + redemption + bride-chamber; ii) as a five-phase programme, the whole being a "mystery": baptism + chrim + Eucharist + redemption + bride-chamber; iii) as a three-phase programme, or mystery, consisting of baptism + chrim + Eucharist, the whole process being characterized as an act of redemption, and as constituting the scene of spiritual marriage; or iv) as a three-phase programme, or mystery, consisting of baptism + chrim + Eucharist, baptism and chrim together being alternatively described as "redemption" and the Eucharist as "bride-chamber" (see Tripp, "Sacramental System," 256). As we shall see, however, these four alternatives do not exhaust the possible interpretations of the sentence. Rewolinski has argued that as *Gos. Phil.* presents baptism, chrismation, and Eucharist, "the context which immediately suggests itself is that of initiation. The entire ritual is designated under the term of the bridal chamber" (Rewolinski, "Sacramental Language," 140). Thomassen sees initiation as the focus and has linked baptism and chrim closely together as one sacrament, while seeing the "bridal chamber" and the "redemption" as aspects or summaries of that ritual (see Thomassen, "Not 'In a Mystery'"). Thomassen has suggested elsewhere that the reason why "redemption" and "bridal chamber" have been "added to the list of ritual acts in 67:28-30" may be "the fact that the set of physically performed ritual acts is there not distinguished from the number of components in the redemptive process symbolically contained in these acts" (Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 100).

to baptism, about the only direct description of practice is the reference to going down to the water (ΒΟΚ ΕΠΕΧΗΤ ΕΠΜΟΟΥ) and coming up (ΕΙ ΕΞΡΑΪ) again,⁶³⁵ and the tractate's reference to a person who "going down into the water he strips himself naked" (ΕΦΒΗΚ ΕΠΙΤῆ ΕΠΜΟΟΥ ΩΔΑΦΚΑΚΦΑΖΗΥ) in order to put on "the living man" (ΠΡΩΜΕ ΕΤΟΝΕ).⁶³⁶ The rest are more or less metonymically based metaphorical descriptions that have mostly to do with ritual effects, rather than ritual acts.

Gos. Phil.'s use of the metaphor of dyeing, for instance, may indicate that the tractate presupposes a baptismal rite involving full immersion,⁶³⁷ but there is no way we can actually be sure of this. Similarly, although metaphors involving garments are pervasive in *Gos. Phil.*, there is no way we can know whether the underlying rites actually involved ritual dressing in baptismal robes after emersion from the baptismal water.⁶³⁸ It does seem likely, however, from the description referred to above concerning stripping oneself naked when going down to the water in order to put on the living man, that these metaphors are to some degree metonymically motivated and that the rituals actually involved some kind of ritual dressing in baptismal robes.⁶³⁹

Baptism is associated with putting on the body of "the living man," with rebirth, and with resurrection. While the putting on of the living man is most easily mapped onto either the immersion in water or the postbaptismal donning of robes, it would seem that the moment of rebirth and resurrection is most easily mapped onto the emersion from the water.

We have seen that *Gos. Phil.* interprets baptism in profoundly life-giving terms using metaphors of begetting, rebirth, and resurrection, while rejecting an interpretation of the immersion in the baptismal waters as a descent into death. The fact that the text stresses the rejection of the latter interpretation probably indicates that this was a current and well-known interpretation at the time. The tractate's use of canonical Scripture throughout, including Romans, as clearly authoritative texts indicates that *Gos. Phil.* is not engaged in any direct polemic against

⁶³⁵ *Gos. Phil.* 64.23. Cf. Tripp, "Sacramental System," 257.

⁶³⁶ See *Gos. Phil.* 75.21–25.

⁶³⁷ See, e.g., Tripp, "Sacramental System," 257; Isenberg, "Introduction," 137.

⁶³⁸ On the possibility of the use of baptismal robes, cf. Tripp, "Sacramental System," 257; Isenberg, "Introduction," 137; Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 348.

⁶³⁹ If this is the case, then it would seem probable, on the grounds of the dyeing metaphors and the references to becoming like the angels, that these robes were white.

Paul and Romans 6,⁶⁴⁰ but rather against contemporary applications of Romans 6 to the interpretation of the ritual act of baptismal immersion.

Now, what about the chrismation? The relationship between baptism and chrismation in *Gos. Phil.* is an interesting one. Does the tractate presuppose a prebaptismal or postbaptismal chrismation? Scholars have come to different conclusions. Tripp, for example, thinks that the chrismation took place after the ascent from the water and “Perhaps after a long interval for instruction.”⁶⁴¹ As we have seen from the analysis above, chrismation is in *Gos. Phil.* treated as being intimately connected with baptism in water, and it may seem most likely that it took place while the person being initiated was still standing in the water, or that it was closely connected to the emersion from the water. There is no indication in *Gos. Phil.* that baptism in water and chrismation were separated in time, and several indications that they took place more or less simultaneously. Perhaps the clearest indication of this is the mirror-and-light metaphor and the statement of the necessity of “baptising” in both water and chrism.⁶⁴² The dyeing metaphor is another indication, if we map God’s colours / remedies onto the chrism, and the examples we have seen of the effects of the chrismation being referred to as taking place prior to the ascent from the baptismal waters, like for instance the reception of the name, is yet another. While *Gos. Phil.* makes it abundantly clear that the chrism is of higher importance than the water, what is said by *Gos. Phil.* concerning the relationship between baptism and chrismation also stresses the necessity of both baptism in water and anointing with chrism and the close connection between the two. Moreover, the close connection we have seen between the chrism and the resurrection makes an association between the chrismation and emersion from the water a logical possibility.

We also have indications that this chrismation was accompanied by a Trinitarian formula and the sign of the cross,⁶⁴³ and the close connection

⁶⁴⁰ For the view that *Gos. Phil.* is engaged in a polemic against Romans 6, see Franzmann, “A Complete History,” 123.

⁶⁴¹ Tripp, “Sacramental System,” 257. For the view that the chrismation referred to in *Gos. Phil.* took place after the emersion from the water, see also, e.g., Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 349.

⁶⁴² Cf. Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 342.

⁶⁴³ See *Gos. Phil.* 67.19–27. Thomassen holds that the Trinitarian formula was probably “spoken over the candidate during the immersion” (Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 343; see also Pagels, “Ritual,” 282), but it seems to be more closely connected to the chrismation proper and the reception of the name.

between this rite and the bestowal of the name would seem to render it probable that the initiate was signed on the forehead with chrism. From *Gos. Phil.*'s metaphorical references to the chrismation, it would also seem probable that the ointment used for this rite contained some kind of scented olive oil.⁶⁴⁴ As for the interpretation of the chrismation, *Gos. Phil.* connects Jesus' baptismal chrismation with the joining of the Logos and the Holy Spirit, which is also referred to in terms of a "bridal chamber." In summary, the effects that *Gos. Phil.* seem to associate with the chrismation are the reception of the name, the putting on of light, a begetting, becoming a Christ/perfect man, the reception of the resurrection in this life which makes postmortem resurrection possible, the reception of the Holy Spirit, and a unification of Logos and Holy Spirit, or perhaps Logos-like soul and Holy Spirit/angel.

3.3.1.2. *Eucharist*

The Eucharist presupposed by *Gos. Phil.* seems to involve the use of bread (σῆκ) and a mixed cup (ποτήριον) of wine (ἡρη) and water (μοογ).⁶⁴⁵ The bread is as we have seen identified as the flesh of Jesus, which is further identified as the Logos, while the content of the cup is identified with

⁶⁴⁴ See, e.g., Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 480 (who also holds that the ointment consisted of oil and wine), and Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 347. Isenberg, Schenke, and Thomassen have argued on the basis of the fire-symbolism associated with the chrism in *Gos. Phil.* that the chrism might have been heated (see Isenberg, "Coptic Gospel," 308; Isenberg, "Introduction," 137; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 243; Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 347). There is little reason to suppose that this was the case, however, since the connection between fire and chrism does not presuppose heated chrism. There is for example a metonymic relationship between the chrism and fire and light since olive oil was not only used for the chrism, but also as fuel for lamps (cf. Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 243 n. 395). Lamps burn oil and thereby create light, and we have seen that the motif of lighting lamps is used in *Gos. Phil.* in relation to the chrism. The connection between fire and chrism may also simply derive from the connection between the chrism and the Holy Spirit (cf. Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 243), since the connection between the fire and the Holy Spirit is a common one (see, e.g., Brock, *Holy Spirit*, 27–36). Thomassen suggests on the basis of the description of the eschatological chrismation with light in *Gos. Phil.* 85.24–28 that the chrism "was probably poured over the initiate . . . , rather than just applied by hand" (Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 347). It should be noted, however, that the phrase εἶπε εἰς εὐολ εἰς- is in this passage applied to the flowing out of light and is not directly used as a description of chrismation.

⁶⁴⁵ Cf. Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 349. Segelberg finds it "remarkable and interesting to find in [*Gos. Phil.*] a form of eucharist with bread and a mixed cup which appears to correspond entirely to the order of the early Church" (Segelberg, "Sacramental System," 199).

the blood of Jesus, which is the Holy Spirit.⁶⁴⁶ *Gos. Phil.* states that the cup “fills with the Holy Spirit” (ϕμογζ εβολ ζῆπιπῶ ετογᾶβ),⁶⁴⁷ which may indicate that the tractate presupposes some kind of epiclesis of the Spirit upon the elements, or at least upon the cup.⁶⁴⁸ There are also several references in *Gos. Phil.* to the Eucharist being accompanied by prayer. We have already seen how Jesus himself is described as praying in connection with the Eucharist that is associated with the transfiguration,⁶⁴⁹ and we have also seen a direct reference to the eucharistic cup as “the cup of prayer” (πποτηριον ἴπωλη).⁶⁵⁰ Moreover, we have seen indications of an epiclesis and possibly the use of the Sanctus.

Gos. Phil. evinces a close, almost symbiotic, relationship between the ritual effects of baptism / chrismation and Eucharist.⁶⁵¹ One seems to receive the Logos and the Holy Spirit through both baptism / chrismation and the Eucharist, and both rituals seem to be described in terms of marriage- and bridal chamber related imagery.⁶⁵²

⁶⁴⁶ In his *Paedagogus*, Clement of Alexandria offers an interesting interpretation of the figurative meaning of the eucharistic flesh and blood of Christ: “The flesh figuratively represents to us the Holy Spirit; for the flesh was created by Him. The blood points out to us the Word, for as rich blood the Word has been infused into life; and the union of both is the Lord, the food of babes—the Lord who is Spirit and Word” (Clement, *Paed.* I.6.43.2; translation from Maxwell E. Johnson, “The Archaic Nature of the Sanctus, Institution Narrative, and Epiclesis of the Logos in the Anaphora Ascribed to Sarapion of Thmuis,” in *Essays on Early Eastern Eucharistic Prayers* [ed. Paul F. Bradshaw; Collegeville, Minn.: Pueblo/Liturgical Press, 1997], 102). Thus, Clement parallels *Gos. Phil.* in his identification of the Holy Spirit and the Logos with the flesh and blood of Christ. He comes, however, to the complete opposite conclusion as to which is which. While, as we have seen, *Gos. Phil.* identifies the flesh with the Logos and the blood with the Holy Spirit, Clement in this figurative interpretation has it vice versa.

⁶⁴⁷ *Gos. Phil.* 75.18. Cf. Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 456.

⁶⁴⁸ *Gos. Phil.*'s corresponding reference to the eucharistic bread being the Logos may indicate the existence of a corresponding epiclesis of the Logos upon the bread. An epiclesis of the Logos is known from the Egyptian Sacramentary of Serapion of Thmuis. Here the Logos is called upon to make the bread become “the body of the Logos.” The content of the cup is here described as “blood of the truth” (αἷμα τῆς ἀληθείας), but there is no epiclesis of the Spirit, only of the Logos (see M.E. Johnson, “Archaic Nature,” 86. Interestingly, Johnson states that the only parallel he has been able to find to the reference in the Sacramentary of Serapion to “blood of truth” is the reference in *Gos. Phil.* 73.23 to nourishing on truth [see *ibid.*, 104 n. 104]). There is the possibility that *Gos. Phil.* combines an epiclesis of the Logos upon the bread, as seen in the Sacramentary of Serapion, with an epiclesis of the Spirit upon the cup.

⁶⁴⁹ *Gos. Phil.* 58.10–14.

⁶⁵⁰ *Gos. Phil.* 75.14–15. There is also another probable reference to a eucharistic prayer at *Gos. Phil.* 59.27–31, in a passage that is unfortunately riddled with lacunae.

⁶⁵¹ Cf. Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 344–345.

⁶⁵² A close connection between baptism / chrism and Eucharist is a prominent feature

3.3.1.3. *The Bridal Chamber*

In light of the findings of the present study it is interesting to observe how other scholars have treated the bridal chamber imagery in *Gos. Phil.* As we have seen, there are several terms used throughout *Gos. Phil.* that may be translated as “bridal chamber.” These are the Greek words *παστός*, *νυμφών*, and *κοιτών*.⁶⁵³ Scholars have in various ways understood these terms to refer to either a single ritual, a sequence of rituals, or the inner or hidden meaning of one or more rituals, but they have disagreed as to the nature of the ritual or rituals referred to in this way. One of the main dividing lines between scholars in this regard has been to what degree the bridal chamber references have been taken in a literal sense. Dan Merkur here echoes the majority view when he notes that “The motif of the bridal chamber was metaphoric, but likely also pertained to a Gnostic sacrament whose precise ritual details are not fully understood.”⁶⁵⁴ Most scholars have been in line with this view and held that the term refers to a single sacrament and have moreover taken this to be a specifically “gnostic”

of Syrian sacramental theology (see Amanouil-Pataq Siman, “Die pneumatische Dimension der Eucharistie nach der Überlieferung der syrischen Kirche,” *OrChr* 60 [1976]: 131–151), but a close connection between baptism and Eucharist is also emphasised in Egyptian sources, like for instance in the writings of Cyril of Alexandria (see, e.g., Stephen J. Davis, *Coptic Christology in Practice: Incarnation and Divine Participation in Late Antique and Medieval Egypt* (Oxford Early Christian Studies; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 39–40).

⁶⁵³ *παστός*: *Gos. Phil.* 69.1, 37; 70.18, 19, 22, 33; 71.7, 9–10; *νυμφών*: *Gos. Phil.* 65.11–12; 67.5, 16, 30; 69.25, 27; 72.21, 22; 74.22; 76.5–6; 82.18, 24; 86.5; *κοιτών*: *Gos. Phil.* 82.13–14; 84.21–22; 85.21, 33 (in addition there is a fourth term, *ταμείον* [*Gos. Phil.* 68.10], that may be translated as “inner chamber,” or simply as “chamber.” Contrary to *Exeg. Soul*, however, the term *μα ἡραεεετ* is not used in *Gos. Phil.*). When it comes to the basic denotations of these terms, the latter, *κοιτών*, may denote “bed-chamber,” but also “grave” or “nursery” (See LSJ 970b). The word *παστός*, on the other hand, may denote “banqueting-couch,” “woman’s chamber,” “bridal bed,” “embroidered bed-curtain,” and “bridal hymn” as well as “bridal chamber” (See LSJ 1346b; Lampe 1046b), while *νυμφών*, in addition to “bridal chamber,” may also denote “wedding hall” (See BAG 545a). Now, the question is, what, if any, differences may be discerned in *Gos. Phil.*’s use of these terms? The overwhelming majority of scholars have treated *νυμφών* and *παστός* as synonyms in this text (see, e.g., Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 257 n. 18), and most have also taken *κοιτών* in basically the same sense (see, e.g., M.L. Turner, *Gospel According to Philip*, 7 n. 6). I have chosen to translate *κοιτών* throughout as “bedroom,” and both *νυμφών* and *παστός* as “bridal chamber,” but although I translate the latter two terms identically, it is important to keep in mind which of these terms *Gos. Phil.* uses at any one time. For although the semantic fields of these terms overlap to a significant degree, they also have some different additional connotations and different allusive potential.

⁶⁵⁴ Dan Merkur, *Gnosis: An Esoteric Tradition of Mystical Visions and Unions* (SUNY Series in Western Esoteric Traditions; Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1993), 152. Cf., e.g., Sevrin, “Les noces spirituelles,” 192.

one. There has been considerable disagreement among these scholars with regard to the nature of the sacrament, however, both with regard to its ritual enactment and its interpretation.

At the literal end of the spectrum it has been argued that the “bridal chamber” ritual involved a human couple having actual sexual intercourse.⁶⁵⁵ This suggestion has most recently been reiterated by April DeConick,⁶⁵⁶ who in her interpretation couples a theory of “Valentinianism” with an exceedingly literal interpretation of the “bridal chamber” in *Gos. Phil.* DeConick claims that the “spiritual marriage” advocated by *Gos. Phil.* entails a “Valentinian” couple having sexual intercourse while focusing on Christ and spiritual things. Such a “spiritual marriage” would then result in the begetting of actual human children possessing spiritual seed. According to DeConick, procreation of “spiritual children” in this way contributed towards salvation for the “Valentinians” by incarnating spiritual seed needing to be perfected in the material world.⁶⁵⁷

Also at the literal end of the scale, Michael Williams has come to a conclusion that is in a sense both related and contrary to that of DeConick. He is in agreement with DeConick and others who hold the “bridal chamber” to refer literally to a marriage of two human beings, and has argued that “the mystery of marriage” referred to in *Gos. Phil.* “was acted out concretely by couples who were living together.”⁶⁵⁸ Contrary to

⁶⁵⁵ See, e.g., Buckley, “Cult-Mystery”; Jorunn Jacobsen Buckley, “‘The Holy Spirit’ is a Double Name,” in *Female Fault and Fulfilment in Gnosticism* (SR; Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 120–124; Jorunn Jacobsen Buckley, “‘The Holy Spirit is a Double Name’: Holy Spirit, Mary, and Sophia in the *Gospel of Philip*,” in *Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism* (ed. Karen L. King; SAC; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 225; Buckley, “Conceptual Models,” 4170. Elsewhere she characterises the ritual of the bridal chamber as “a kind of spiritualized sex-act” (Jorunn Jacobsen Buckley, “Sex, Suffering, and Incarnation: Female Symbolism in Gnosticism,” in *The Allure of Gnosticism: The Gnostic Experience in Jungian Psychology and Contemporary Culture* [ed. Robert A. Segal; Chicago: Open Court, 1995], 101).

⁶⁵⁶ See April D. DeConick, “The True Mysteries: Sacramentalism in the *Gospel of Philip*,” *VC* 55 (2001): 225–261; DeConick, “Great Mystery of Marriage.”

⁶⁵⁷ In DeConick’s interpretation, “This was the great mystery of their marriages—to conceive a child who would resemble the Lord, a child with a spirit-infused soul. In this way, the pre-existent *pneumatic* seed would be drawn down from the heavens above to sojourn on earth. Here it would mature and finally be harvested at death. Sexual intercourse between Valentinian spouses was to continue until the last spiritual seed was embodied and harvested. On that great day, the Bridal Chamber would open and their spirits would reunite with God. How important was sex to the Valentinians? The coming of the final day and the redemption of God depended on it” (DeConick, “Great Mystery of Marriage,” 342, DeConick’s emphasis. See also DeConick, “Heavenly Temple Traditions,” 338).

⁶⁵⁸ Williams, “Uses of Gender Imagery,” 205.

DeConick, however, Williams focuses on what he interprets as negative depictions of sexuality in *Gos. Phil.* and imagines an ascetic, encratic “spiritual marriage” of continence where the couple lived together, but refrained from sexual intercourse.⁶⁵⁹ The “spiritual children” emerging from such marriages would therefore not be of the literal flesh and blood variety, but would rather have to be understood metaphorically.

Most scholars, however, have held the “bridal chamber” to be a metaphorical reference to some kind of ritual that probably did not involve any kind of ritualised sexual intercourse or actual human marriage. Some, Schenke in particular, have connected it with the ritual kiss,⁶⁶⁰ while others have proposed that it is some kind of sacrament for the dying.⁶⁶¹ Others again have noticed striking similarities with Christian ritual practice. Elaine Pagels for example, even though she insists upon calling it “a secret Gnostic sacrament,” admits that it may have served a function similar to that of a “mainstream” Christian Eucharist.⁶⁶² Others have gone further in this direction and actually identified the “bridal chamber” directly with Christian ritual practice,⁶⁶³ like the Eucharist,⁶⁶⁴ or baptism and/or anointing.⁶⁶⁵ Some have preferred to see “the bridal chamber” as specifically the “inward and hidden aspect” of the ritual, rather than any specific ritual in itself. On this view the “bridal chamber” is not a replacement for baptism, chrism, or Eucharist, nor is it a ritual in addition to these, but instead a term covering the real significance or hidden meaning of any or all of them.

Due to the highly allusive nature of the mystagogical discourses in *Gos. Phil.* and the text’s confusing literary structure, scholars have had difficulty getting to grips with any exact reference for the concept. One

⁶⁵⁹ See Williams, “Uses of Gender Imagery,” 205–211; Williams, *Rethinking “Gnosticism”*, 148–149. This has also been suggested by Rudolph, “Response,” 238.

⁶⁶⁰ See, e.g., Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 5.

⁶⁶¹ See, e.g., Gaffron, *Studien*, 222; Rudolph, *Gnosis*, 245.

⁶⁶² Pagels, “Mystery of Marriage,” 108–110. Later she has argued that the bridal chamber (which she erroneously refers to as $\eta\gamma\mu\phi\omicron\varsigma$ rather than $\eta\gamma\mu\phi\omega\omicron\varsigma$) should be understood as “the whole process through which a Christian who is spiritually ‘mature’ receives these sacraments” (Pagels, “Irenaeus,” 355).

⁶⁶³ See, e.g., Segelberg, “Sacramental System”; Segelberg, “Baptismal Rite”; Tripp, “Sacramental System”; Tripp, “Gnostic Worship”; Thomassen, “How Valentinian”; Thomassen, “Not ‘In a Mystery.’”

⁶⁶⁴ See, e.g., Tripp, “Sacramental System,” 257.

⁶⁶⁵ See Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 263, 266–267. Cf. also Einar Thomassen, “Filipsevangeliet,” in *Gnostiske skrifter* (ed. Ingvild Sælid Gilhus and Einar Thomassen; Verdens Hellige Skrifter; Oslo: De norske bokklubbene, 2002), 205, where he connects the bridal chamber directly to the anointing.

of the main difficulties scholars have had with the kind of kaleidoscopic discourse evident in *Gos. Phil.* is that it has resisted attempts to read into it preconceived notions of its theological or sacramental system. Rewolinski has pointed to “an overly zealous attempt to harmonize the reports of Marcus the Magician and his so-called spiritual marriages,” as reported by Irenaeus, with *Gos. Phil.* to explain why, in his words, “there is scarcely universal consensus on the exact meaning of bridal chamber” in *Gos. Phil.*⁶⁶⁶

It should be clear from this brief overview that there has been no shortage of proposed answers to the question of the identity and significance of the “bridal chamber” in *Gos. Phil.*, but what unites most of these proposals is that they have been attempts to pin down a single referent for this concept and related imagery in the text. Most have regarded the concept as being unambiguous in its reference, and have taken it to refer to ritual actions in one way or another, some preferring to see it as a reference to a single ritual, while others have understood it to cover an entire ritual process comprised of several sub-rituals. The only, minor, exceptions have been those who in various ways have combined the above-mentioned proposals and for instance taken the concept of the “bridal chamber” to simultaneously refer to one or more sub-rituals as well as the ritual process as a whole.

But does the imagery of the “bridal chamber” necessarily refer to the same thing, or the same ritual, or indeed the same concept, throughout the entire tractate? Another explanation that emerges from the analysis of *Gos. Phil.* presented in the present study is that there is in fact no “exact meaning” of the concept of “bridal chamber” to be found in this tractate.

⁶⁶⁶ See Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 132. There have indeed been many attempts to analyse *Gos. Phil.*’s “bridal chamber” references along such lines. As David Tripp has noted, “Irenaeus’ account of followers (apparently) of Marcus, and so, it seems, of the Valentinian school who had special rites of *redemptio* and *sponsale cubiculum* . . . could encourage the view that these terms when found in ‘Philip’ should refer to distinct rites of the initiatory scheme” (Tripp, “Sacramental System,” 256). Tripp concluded, however, that “Irenaeus’s supposed scheme is not found here” (*ibid.*, 257). Rewolinski especially faults Sevrin for this exegetical procedure, and criticises him for first “reconstructing an ideal type of Valentinian bridal chamber mythos and practice” on the basis of the heresiologists and then applying this to his interpretation of *Gos. Phil.* rather than first analysing *Gos. Phil.* on its own merits (see Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 132). Rewolinski’s own solution to the problem of the “bridal chamber” is that it is “not a rite but the complex of initiatory steps marked by ritualized observance which were understood to be effective on the spiritual essence of a person. To enter the bridal chamber is in Philip’s use of the concept to be reborn ritually and nourished by the Perfect Man. Entering symbolically the bridal chamber means to be united with one’s angelic double” (*ibid.*, 139).

Instead, this conceptual domain is used to describe several more or less related but different entities and phenomena. As we have seen, the term “bridal chamber,” as well as other marriage and unification imagery, are employed metaphorically in several different ways throughout the tractate, as these ICMs are used to provide framing inputs to structure our understanding of several different targets. Therefore, when it sometimes seems that *Gos. Phil.* is contradicting itself when it comes to the use of such imagery, this does not necessarily imply that *Gos. Phil.* is a composite text, as has sometimes been assumed, but rather that it may, for rhetorical purposes, be drawing on the same ICMs to provide framing structure to different targets, exploiting different metaphorical entailments in the process. As we have seen at several points in the analyses above, this state of affairs also seems to apply to several of the other terms and motifs that are employed throughout the tractate, even to the point where this practice may be regarded as an important rhetorical principle in *Gos. Phil.* We find that some key metaphors and their intertexts seem to be employed in this tractate to refer to, and shed light on, a wide variety of different issues, in an interlinking and constantly shifting fashion that may indeed frustrate modern readers, and perhaps especially scholars, who would most often like to pin down unambiguous referents for the metaphorical imagery of this and other texts.

It seems clear from the present analysis that we ought not to generalise about *Gos. Phil.*'s use of the terms $\pi\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma$, $\nu\gamma\mu\phi\omega\mu\eta$, and $\kappa\omicron\iota\tau\omega\mu$, but we should rather try to understand them within the contexts they are used, as rhetorical devices for the construction of input spaces in various conceptual and intertextual blends, that is, in integration networks where these inputs are blended with several different, mostly unstated, inputs that may be described as the foci, or targets, of the discourse.

3.3.1.4. *Prayer*

We have seen that *Gos. Phil.* clearly presupposes the use of liturgical prayer. In one passage, however, the text seems to show a negative attitude towards praying, or at least towards “praying in the world”:

$\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\sigma\iota\tau\epsilon$ $\xi\eta\tau\tau\epsilon\omega$ $\omega\gamma\omega\upsilon\varsigma$ $\xi\eta\pi\omega\mu$ $\tau\tau\epsilon\omega$ $\mu\epsilon$ $\pi\kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$ $\pi\omega\mu$ $\mu\epsilon$ $\mu\kappa\epsilon\lambda\iota\omega\mu$
 $\mu\alpha\rho\eta\sigma\iota\tau\epsilon$ $\xi\eta\pi\kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$ $\chi\epsilon\kappa\alpha\lambda\varsigma$ $\epsilon\mu\eta\lambda\omega\upsilon\varsigma$ $\xi\eta\pi\omega\mu$ $\delta\iota\alpha$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$ $\omega\upsilon\epsilon$ $\epsilon\rho\omicron\mu$
 $\epsilon\tau\eta\tau\epsilon\pi\eta\omega\lambda\eta$ $\xi\eta\tau\tau\epsilon\omega$ $\mu\iota$ $\epsilon\beta\omicron\lambda$ $\xi\eta\tau\tau\epsilon\omega$ $\mu\epsilon$ $\mu\omega\mu$ $\epsilon\rho\omega\lambda\omicron\gamma\alpha$ $\delta\epsilon$ $\omega\upsilon\varsigma$
 $\xi\eta\tau\epsilon\pi\omega$ $\epsilon\mu\eta\omega\upsilon\varsigma$ $\alpha\eta$ $\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha$ $\epsilon\mu\eta\alpha\upsilon\lambda\epsilon$

Those who sow in the winter reap in the summer. The winter is the world, the summer is the other aeon. Let us sow in the world so that we may reap in the summer. Therefore it is appropriate for us not to pray in the winter. That which follows the winter is the summer, but if one reaps in the winter he will not reap, but he will pluck out. (*Gos. Phil.* 52.25–32)

It is proper not to pray “in the winter” (ἐντῆρι), and “the winter” is equated with “the world” (ἡκόσμος). Praying “in the world” is thus clearly disparaged, but how are we to understand it?⁶⁶⁷ Is *Gos. Phil.* against the practice of prayer in general?⁶⁶⁸ To help us understand this passage we should read it in conjunction with another passage on prayer later on in the text:

πεχαϳ δεπαειωτ ετρη̅πεθη̅νι πεχαϳ δεβωκ ερουν επεκταμειον η̅γωταμ
η̅πεκρο ερωκ η̅γωληλ απεκειωτ ετρη̅πεθη̅νι ετεπει πε πετρισα νρουν
η̅μοου τηρου

He said, “My Father who is in secret.” He said, “Enter into your closet and shut your door behind you and pray to your Father who is in secret,”⁶⁶⁹ that is, the one who is within them all. (*Gos. Phil.* 68.8–13)

Taken together, these passages do not seem to advocate an end to praying. Rather, the advice not to pray in the world, but instead in “your closet” (πεκταμειον) may be understood to prescribe a practice of inward, silent, prayer. In that case, prayer in the world may be taken to refer to outward, vocalised prayer as opposed to inward, silent prayer. Another significant message in these passages seems to be related to the addressee of the prayer and what one may pray for. It is clear that one is to pray to the Father “who is in secret” (ετρη̅πεθη̅νι). Moreover, the statement that if one reaps in the winter/world one will not be able to reap in the summer/other world seems first and foremost to be an admonition not to try to reap any rewards, or pray for anything, in the material world.

⁶⁶⁷ Thomassen has suggested a connection here with the use of the metaphor of sowing and reaping in Fragments 32–36 by Heracleon (as reported by Origen, *Comm. Jo.*) (see Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 275). However, the way the metaphor is used in the Heracleon fragments differs significantly from its use in *Gos. Phil.* For example, in *Gos. Phil.* those who sow are the Christians themselves, and the metaphor is related to praying, while in the Heracleon fragments it is the Son of Man who sows. The references to sowing in the winter and reaping in the summer, which are also found in Heracleon Fragment 36, are also used differently in *Gos. Phil.* than in Heracleon. In *Gos. Phil.* the focus of the metaphor is on the importance of not trying to reap the harvest prematurely, in the winter, an aspect that is absent from the Heracleon fragments.

⁶⁶⁸ Segelberg, for example, has called this passage “an anti-prayer text” (Segelberg, “Prayer Among the Gnostics,” 56).

⁶⁶⁹ Matt 6:6.

Instead one should be content to reap rewards in the next world, and hence only pray for such things. This interpretation also seems to be supported by another passage in *Gos. Phil.*, where Jesus rebukes a disciple who asks for “a thing of the world” (οὐρανὸν ἢ τέλει κοςμος).⁶⁷⁰

3.3.1.5. *Community Organisation*

Several interpreters have claimed that there is nothing in *Gos. Phil.* which indicates the existence of any ordained clergy or ecclesiastical hierarchy.⁶⁷¹ Eric Segelberg, for instance, has argued that *Gos. Phil.* “does not appear to know of any ministers of religion such as bishop, priest and deacon. Nor is there any indication that this baptism was anything but self-baptism similar to the Jewish baptism of proselytes.”⁶⁷² Contrary to Segelberg’s claim, however, *Gos. Phil.* seems in fact not only to be very keen to contrast Christian initiation with Jewish proselyte initiation, but even to presuppose a hierarchical community organisation. *Gos. Phil.* highlights important differences between Judaism and Christianity having to do with differences in ritual enactment and efficacy. Some of these differences are, as we have seen, described metaphorically in terms of procreation and creation. The tractate points out that the result of a Hebrew creating a Hebrew is a proselyte, and that this proselyte cannot himself create proselytes. The Jews are also presented as having only a mother and no father. The metaphors employed highlight both similarities and differences between Judaism and Christianity, with regard to ritual process, efficacy, and subsequent membership status of the initiated. The description of the Hebrews’ creation of proselytes can be understood as a reference to Jewish proselyte initiation. One of the main target domains for the procreation- and kinship-metaphors discussed above thus seems to be ritual initiation. That is, *Gos. Phil.* contrasts ritual initiation into Christianity with ritual initiation of proselytes into Judaism. Ritual initiation was required of non-Jews seeking to become Jews, but apart from circumcision in the case of males, no initiatory rituals were required of those who were born of Jewish parents. Moreover, as *Gos. Phil.*’s metaphorical comparison indicates, even after initiation, the converts to Judaism would still be counted as mere proselytes, i.e., as Jews of lower status than

⁶⁷⁰ See *Gos. Phil.* 59.23–27.

⁶⁷¹ See, e.g., Segelberg, “Sacramental System”; Stroud, “Ritual,” 32; Pagels, *The Gnostic Gospels*, 134; Buckley, “Conceptual Models”; Buckley and Good, “Sacramental Language.”

⁶⁷² Segelberg, “Sacramental System,” 192.

those of biological Jewish descent.⁶⁷³ According to *Gos. Phil.*, proselytes cannot “create” proselytes, which indicates that they could not initiate other non-Jews into Judaism. *Gos. Phil.* presents such a Jewish system as a contrast to Christianity, where ritual initiation was required of everyone in order to become a Christian. In addition, *Gos. Phil.* stresses that after having been ritually initiated all Christians were in principle of equal status. According to *Gos. Phil.* they were all “Christs,” and everyone seems, at least in principle, to have the potential for spiritual maturation and the attainment of fatherhood. The Jewish proselytes, on the other hand, could never attain the same status as those who were physically born Jews.⁶⁷⁴ *Gos. Phil.*, as we have seen, traces this difference in ritual efficacy back to the lack of a father in Jewish initiation, and the concomitant fact that Jewish proselytes, in contrast to the Christian initiates, are not begotten, but made. The target input for the father-metaphor in this contrasting function in relation to Judaism may be understood as the one who administers the ritual process of rebirth, i.e., the ritual officiant. While the officiant administering the Christian rites of initiation is metaphorically a father who *begets* sons, the Jewish officiant administering the Jewish rites of proselyte initiation is metaphorically an artisan who *creates* proselytes.

Contrary to Segelberg, neither Jewish proselyte initiation nor Christian initiation seems to have been self-administered. The differences delineated by *Gos. Phil.* seem rather to imply that both Jewish proselyte baptism and Christian initiation involved the agency of a ritual officiant of some sort. *Gos. Phil.* infers from the inferior status of the proselyte in relation to full-blown Jews that the Jewish officiants do not, metaphorically speaking, have proper “procreative” powers, but only the powers of an artisan. *Gos. Phil.* can consequently describe Christian initiation in terms of a biological process of begetting and birth, with the officiant as a father, and Jewish proselyte initiation as mere creation (see fig. 46).⁶⁷⁵

⁶⁷³ For a discussion of the inferior status of proselytes in relation to those who were Jews by birth, see, e.g., Cohen, *Beginnings of Jewishness*, 324–340.

⁶⁷⁴ As Thomas M. Finn states it, “To the outsider, the convert became a Jew. But to the insider, or at least to some insiders, converts did not achieve full equality with the native-born: membership in the community, yes; full equality, no” (Thomas M. Finn, *From Death to Rebirth: Ritual and Conversion in Antiquity* [New York: Paulist Press, 1997], 98, see also 99). See also Cohen, *Beginnings of Jewishness*, 324–325.

⁶⁷⁵ The description of proselyte initiation in late antique Judaism as a kind of creation is indeed also attested by some rabbinic sources, most notably *Genesis Rabbah* 39. In a discussion of Gen 12.5 the following is said: “R. Eleazar in the name of R. Yoše b. Zimra: ‘If all of the nations of the world should come together to try to create a single mosquito, they could not put a soul into it, and yet you say, ‘And the soul that they had made’? [They

In light of the present analysis, the reference in *Gos. Phil.* to “the son of the Son of Man,” who is described as “the one who creates through the Son of Man,”⁶⁷⁶ could plausibly be identified with the officiant of the Christian rites of initiation, i.e., a bishop or priest (see fig. 47).⁶⁷⁷ A possible interpretation of this passage would then be that only those who have received from Christ, and ultimately from God, by way of apostolic succession, the ability to beget are able to create new Christians.⁶⁷⁸ The existence of an important post-initiatory hierarchy is implied rather strongly by the additional insistence upon the fact that the newborn son is unable to beget.⁶⁷⁹ The only begetting (απο) they may do is the acquisition / begetting (απο) of brothers.⁶⁸⁰ This distinction between the father’s and the son’s begetting may again be seen in connection with *Gos. Phil.*’s reference to begetting by means of a kiss.⁶⁸¹ The ritual kiss as it was used in early Christianity was exchanged both between initiated Christians on the same level, but also administered, with added significance, by the

could not have created souls.] But this refers to proselytes.’ Then why should not the text say ‘The proselytes whom they had converted.’ Why stress, ‘whom they had made?’ This serves to tell you that whoever brings a gentile close [to the worship of the true God] is as if he had created him anew” (*Gen. Rab.* 39.14; the translation is that of Jacob Neusner, *The Components of the Rabbinic Documents: From the Whole to the Parts: IX. Genesis Rabbah: Part Two: Genesis Rabbah Chapters Twenty-Three Through Fifty* [South Florida Academic Commentary Series 93; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997], 145).

⁶⁷⁶ *Gos. Phil.* 81.14–21.

⁶⁷⁷ The metaphorical use of the term “father” or “parent” to refer to members of the clergy is well attested in early Christianity (see, e.g., 1 Cor 4:15; *M. Polyc.* 12.2; Irenaeus, *Haer.* IV.41.2; Clement, *Strom.* I.1.2–2.1; Eusebius, *Eccl. Hist.* 6.14.9. John Chrysostom, for example, states that “God has bestowed a power on priests greater than that of our natural parents. . . . For our natural parents generate us unto this life only, but the others unto that which is to come” (*De sacerdotio*, 3.6; *NPNF*¹). The bishop is especially often referred to as a father. In the *Apostolic Constitutions*, this fatherhood of the bishop is explicitly connected to the rebirth through water and spirit (II.26.4). See also Lloyd G. Patterson, “Fathers of the Church,” *EEC*: 424–425). According to Edward Kilmartin, “Fourth- and fifth-century patristic writers describe the office of priest as ordered to the ministry of teaching, baptizing, reconciliation of sinners, and eucharist. In virtue of the ministry of education, regeneration, and reconciliation, the priest’s role was conceived as that of spiritual fatherhood.” (Edward J. Kilmartin, “Priesthood,” *EEC*: 948).

⁶⁷⁸ For the parallelism between Christ, apostles, and bishops in the Syrian tradition, see Murray, *Symbols of Church and Kingdom*, 159–204.

⁶⁷⁹ Denise Kimber Buell notes with regard to Clement of Alexandria that by using “the analogy between parent-child relations and divine-human relations (that all Christians are children in relation to God), Clement can argue that Christians are all essentially the same type of being, although they may differ from each other in their respective states of spiritual development.” Buell, *Making Christians*, 117–118.

⁶⁸⁰ See *Gos. Phil.* 58.22–26.

⁶⁸¹ See *Gos. Phil.* 59.2–6.

bishop or priest to the newly initiated.⁶⁸² The passage quoted earlier about the son “acquiring” or “begetting” brothers may thus refer to this dual significance of the kiss. The wordplay in that passage may serve as a reference to both the kiss between members of the clergy and the regular Christians on the one hand, and the kiss exchanged between members of the latter group on the other. It may also signify that the kiss given by the priest or bishop has greater significance or power than the kiss exchanged between “brothers.”⁶⁸³ The kiss between brothers on the one hand and that between fathers and sons on the other is thus elegantly connected by means of a play on the different meanings of the word $\alpha\pi\omicron$.

The reference to the Jews having only a mother and no father may further be taken as an allusion to the matrilineal principle in Judaism. *Gos. Phil.*'s rhetoric would here fit nicely in a context where it was sufficient to be the offspring of a Jewish mother in order to be counted as a Jew.⁶⁸⁴ Here it is not proselyte initiation that is the focus, but rather the normal Jewish system of descent. The contrast created by *Gos. Phil.* could thus be construed here as one between Jews born of a Jewish mother, in whose case their fathers would be of no consequence, versus the Christians who have a bishop or priest as their “father.” In their case the reference to their mother may be regarded as a reference to their biological mothers, but it may also be taken to refer to the Church as mother.

So, what can be said concerning the function of procreation and kinship metaphors in *Gos. Phil.* with regard to community organisation? From the preceding analysis we may conclude that metaphors of kinship and procreation are used throughout *Gos. Phil.* to explain the relationship between Christ—and ultimately God—and the individual Christian, as

⁶⁸² It was strictly something that was restricted to the community of fully initiated Christians, and was for instance not allowed among catechumens. See L. Edward Phillips, “Kiss, Ritual,” in *The New SCM Dictionary of Liturgy and Worship* (ed. Paul F. Bradshaw; London: SCM Press, 2002), 267.

⁶⁸³ “And let the deacon say to all: ‘Greet one another with a holy kiss,’ and the members of the clergy kiss the bishop, the laymen [kiss] the laymen, the laywomen [kiss] the laywomen.” (*Apos. Con.* VIII.11.7–9; Quoted from Taft, *The Great Entrance*, 389).

⁶⁸⁴ See *Gos. Phil.* 52.21–24. On the matrilineal principle in Judaism, see, e.g., Shaye J.D. Cohen, “The Matrilineal Principle in Historical Perspective,” *Judaism* 34:1 (1985): 5–13; Shaye J.D. Cohen, “The Origins of the Matrilineal Principle in Rabbinic Law,” *AJSR* 10:1 (1985): 19–53; Shaye J.D. Cohen, “Was Timothy Jewish (Acts 16:1–3)? Patristic Exegesis, Rabbinic Law, and Matrilineal Descent,” *JBL* 105:2 (1986): 251–268; Shaye J.D. Cohen, “Can a Convert to Judaism Have a Jewish Mother?” in *Torah and Wisdom—Torah ve-Hokhmah: Studies in Jewish Philosophy, Kabbalah, and Halacha: Essays in Honor of Arthur Hyman* (ed. Ruth Link-Salinger; New York: Shengold, 1992), 19–31; Arnold M. Goodman, “Rationale for ‘Matrilineal’ and the Failure of ‘Patrilineal,’” *Judaism* 34:1 (1985): 28–31.

mediated by a clergy in ritual. *Gos. Phil.* traces religious lineage by apostolic succession through the rites of initiation,⁶⁸⁵ with a special focus on the chrismation. Newly initiated Christians do not produce sons, but they produce/acquire brothers, as *Gos. Phil.* punningly states it. Thus, as the conceptual metaphors analysed above indicate, although everyone from the newly initiated Christian to the senior members of the clergy may be regarded as Christs, there is still an important distinction between Christ as son and Christ as father.⁶⁸⁶ Another key passage in this regard is also one of the tractate's clearest references to the Eucharist. As is the case with much of *Gos. Phil.*, this passage is not without its problems of translation and interpretation:

πρωμε ετογααβ φογααβ τηρϥ ψαρραϊ επεϥσωμα εϥχεαϥχι γαρ ἵποεικ
 ϥηααϥ εφογααβ η ποτηριον η πεκεσепε τηρϥ ετϥχι ἵμοοϥ εϥτοϥβο
 ἵμοοϥ αϥω πως ϥηατοϥβο αν ἵπεκεσωμα

The holy man is completely holy, including his body. For if he takes the bread he will make it holy, or the cup or all the other things that he takes and purifies. And how will he not purify the body too?

(*Gos. Phil.* 77.2–7)

“Who this holy man is might be difficult to decide,” states Segelberg, but ends up making the assumption that the holy man is “the man who is fully initiated, the pneumatic; he has so much of the *pneuma* that he in his turn can sanctify.” From this Segelberg draws the conclusion that “we have here a kind of ‘receptionism’ so that the sanctity of the receiver sanctifies the sacrament which then in turn sanctifies the receiver. If this is so there would be no need to have a special priest or bishop—the Gnostics then had as it were a ‘general priesthood.’”⁶⁸⁷ A similar conclusion has been

⁶⁸⁵ This conclusion is thus contrary to that of Trautmann, who has argued that *Gos. Phil.* abolishes the idea of kinship through lineage (Trautmann, “La parenté”).

⁶⁸⁶ Buckley and Good overlook this important relationship between Christ and the Christians when they argue that, “Since Christ performs the sacraments, no minister or priest need serve as conduit for the presence of Christ at the sacrament or as the guarantor of the sacrament’s efficacy” (Buckley and Good, “Sacramental Language,” 2). They claim further that “Absence of human agents distinguishes *Gos. Phil.* from ancient and modern descriptions of sacraments,” and fault “modern translators” for having difficulty with this notion and who “therefore read human agents into the text” (*ibid.*, 2–3). On the contrary, however, *Gos. Phil.* seems indeed, as we have seen, to stress the importance of human agency in ritual initiation.

⁶⁸⁷ Segelberg, “Sacramental System,” 196. Stroud follows Segelberg, stating that “all the members of the community could be holy men,” and also draws the conclusion that the Eucharist was self-administered (Stroud, “Ritual,” 33). For the view that *Gos. Phil.* here implies a general priesthood, see also Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 472 n. 1288. Henry Green, however, rejects Segelberg’s contention that *Gos. Phil.* implies a priesthood

reached by Buckley and Good, who argue that in *Gos. Phil.* “there is an absence of sacramental agents except for Christ.”⁶⁸⁸ They conclude that “the holy man” (πρωμε ετογααβ) in this passage does not refer to a priest or any member of a clergy, but rather to a “holy person,”⁶⁸⁹ contrary to, e.g., Isenberg who even translates πρωμε ετογααβ as “priest” rather than “holy man.”⁶⁹⁰ In stating that there is an absence of sacramental agents apart from Christ in *Gos. Phil.*, however, Buckley and Good overlook the references we have seen to an apostolic succession. We saw that *Gos. Phil.* creates a blend between Father and Son, God and Christ, Christ and the Apostles, and the Apostles and “us,” and we saw that the tractate describes this succession in terms of an anointing. In fact, *Gos. Phil.* states explicitly that “the apostles anointed us,” thus at the very least implying the sacramental agency of the apostles and not just of Christ. Of course, we saw that both initiator and initiated in the implied chain of apostolic succession function as “Christs,” but this does not necessarily mean that the tractate holds the Christlike function of initiatory fatherhood to be available to just anyone. On the contrary, we have seen that there are indications that *Gos. Phil.* makes a clear distinction between the roles of father and son, and that there are special requirements attached to the former role.

Buckley and Good also argue that χ_1 in this passage should not be taken in the sense of “taking” the bread and the cup, but rather in the sense of “receiving.”⁶⁹¹ In arguing this, however, not only do they

of all believers, and comes to the conclusion that *Gos. Phil.* “provides evidence for a Valentinian institutionalized sect with some degree of formalized structure, hierarchy and systematized rituals, that on the surface might appear similar to developing Catholic Christian orthodoxy” (Green, “Ritual in Valentinian Gnosticism,” 121).

⁶⁸⁸ Buckley and Good, “Sacramental Language,” 4, 19.

⁶⁸⁹ Buckley and Good, “Sacramental Language,” 4.

⁶⁹⁰ Isenberg translates the passage as follows: “The priest is altogether holy, down to his very body. For if he has taken the bread, he will consecrate it. Or the cup or anything else that he gets, he will consecrate. Then how will he not consecrate the body also?” (Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 197; cf. Isenberg, “Introduction,” 137). With regard to Isenberg’s translation of πρωμε ετογααβ as “priest,” I share the sentiment of Schenke, who has characterised it as “eine maßlose Überspitzung, die mir aber immer sehr hilfreich als ein wichtiger Hinweis darauf gewesen ist, von welcher Art von Heiligung des Brotes, des Kelches und noch anderer Dinge hier eigentlich geredet wird” (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 472 n. 1288).

⁶⁹¹ See Buckley and Good, “Sacramental Language,” 4–6. For this understanding, see also Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 53, 167; Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 83. Williams chooses to render χ_1 rather freely as both “eat” and “partake” (see Williams, *Rethinking “Gnosticism”*, 136). For the understanding of the term in the sense of “take,” as it is also understood here, see Layton and Isenberg, “Gospel According to Philip,” 197; Schenke, *Das*

overlook the usage in Coptic liturgical texts,⁶⁹² but also 1 Cor 11:23 which in its description of the Last Supper states that Jesus “took the bread” (ⲁⲓ ⲛⲟⲓⲟⲩⲉⲓⲕ / ἔλαβεν ἄρτον), which in the Sahidic New Testament is rendered using exactly this term. The continuation of this Pauline passage is also relevant in the present context, in that Jesus is described in the following verse as blessing and breaking the bread and referring to it as his body.⁶⁹³ The eucharistic context of *Gos. Phil.* 77.2–7 is unmistakable, and the allusion to 1 Cor 11:23–25 is, as we can see, strong. Read together, this intertextual blend creates a counterpart connection between “the holy man” in the *Gos. Phil.* passage and Jesus in 1 Corinthians (see fig. 48). This double-scope blend may give rise to relevant implications for the interpretation of both inputs. Firstly, “the holy man” takes Christ’s place in consecrating the elements of the Eucharist. This is completely in line with the logic of the important underlying THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST blend in *Gos. Phil.*, and there is thus no reason not to take the description in this passage to refer to the consecratory function of the officiant in the eucharistic ritual. We have seen from the analysis above that this function is presented in *Gos. Phil.* as being in principle available potentially to all Christians, but in practice only to those who are regarded as having matured to the level of father. Whether the transition from the level of son to the level of father was subject to hierarchical control and required additional ritual actions is, however, left unstated in this text.⁶⁹⁴

Another potential implication that may be drawn from this intertextual blend comes from understanding “the holy man” as a direct reference to Jesus himself and “the body” (ⲡⲘⲞⲘⲁ) as a reference to his earthly body. In this case, the passage may be understood christologically, to imply that since he makes the bread and the cup holy, then it follows that he also sanctified his assumed material body.⁶⁹⁵ In accordance with

Philippus-Evangelium, 63. The use of exactly the term ⲁⲓ and its dual meaning of “receive” and “take” seems to be rhetorically important both here and elsewhere in *Gos. Phil.* Layton’s translation of the term as “pick up” obscures both the allusion to 1 Cor 11:23 (see below) and ritual action, and the connotations of receiving (see Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 348).

⁶⁹² See, e.g., J. Doresse and E. Lanne, *Un témoin archaïque de la liturgie copte de S. Basile* (Bibliothèque du *Muséon* 47; Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1960), 16, 18.

⁶⁹³ See 1 Cor 11:24.

⁶⁹⁴ For a survey of the early Christian practice of ordination, see Paul F. Bradshaw, *Ordination Rites of the Ancient Churches of East and West* (New York: Pueblo, 1990).

⁶⁹⁵ To this we might compare Athanasius’ statement that Christ “vivified and purified the mortal body” (see Roelof van den Broek, “The Theology of the Teachings of Silvanus,” *VC* 40:1 [1986]: 9).

the THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST blend this entailment may subsequently be applied to the sanctifying power of both the officiating priest and the eucharistic elements themselves with regard to their effect on the communicating Christians.⁶⁹⁶

3.3.2. *Christology, Anthropology, and Soteriology*

Gos. Phil. may be regarded as a sustained meditation upon the implications arising from the Conceptual Integration Network THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST. This network creates inferences that are not only projected back onto the input of the Christian, but also the other way around, so that the Christian's own experience structures his knowledge and understanding of Christ. Thus, in this two-way relation, the Christian's understanding of the rituals is structured by his or her knowledge of Christ, including the scriptural descriptions of Christ's baptism, while at the same time the Christian's experience of his or her own participation in the rituals, i.e., his or her own baptism, likewise structures and enriches this person's knowledge about Christ's baptism, both supplementing and structuring the person's understanding of the scriptural descriptions of this event.

Through the use of intricate conceptual and intertextual blends, *Gos. Phil.* describes the process of Christ's (double) birth, life, death, and resurrection, and the connections between his experiences and actions and those of the individual initiated Christian. The emphasis in *Gos. Phil.* is, however, clearly not on Christ becoming human (there is no discernible doctrine of *kenosis* here), but rather on the deification, or "christification," so to speak, of the Christian. By showing the parallelisms between the actions, experiences, and constitution of Christ, and the ritual actions performed and experienced by the Christians, *Gos. Phil.* maps out the way to salvation by means of the appropriation of divine life obtained by becoming like Christ according to the example set by him, as laid down in Scripture and ritual. Often passages in *Gos. Phil.* seem to be deliberately ambiguous when it comes to whether a passage refers to Christ or the Christian. By keeping this ambiguity in such a high number of passages, the tractate heightens the effect of the parallelism and contributes to a blurring of boundaries between the two conceptual

⁶⁹⁶ For the consecratory effect of the consecrated eucharistic elements on those who consume them, cf. Ephrem, *Carmina Nisibena*, 46,11 (Murray, *Symbols of Church and Kingdom*, 76).

domains. The overall effect of this is a strengthening of the identification of the individual Christian and Christ, where each significant event in the ritual life of the Christian has significance for the understanding of the nature of the Saviour and his actions, at the same time as scriptural and confessional information concerning Christ directly reflects upon the life—especially the sacramental life—of the Christian.

Somewhat surprisingly, considering previous research on the tractate, it transpires that not only are Christ's baptism and resurrection highly important in *Gos. Phil.*'s rhetoric, but the crucifixion and transfiguration seem to be of at least equal significance, aspects that have in fact largely been overlooked in previous scholarship. Moreover, we have seen that in addition to the THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST blend, the related Adam-Christ blend is of profound importance.

I have here tried as far as possible to analyse *Gos. Phil.* primarily on text-internal grounds. I have not tried to give a “gnostic” or “Valentinian” reading of the tractate, but have rather worked from the simple assumption that it is possible to understand the text on its own terms in an inter-textual relationship with Scripture and sacraments. The readings I have given presuppose knowledge of a number of Septuagint and, especially, New Testament Scriptures, but they do not presuppose knowledge of any “gnostic” or “Valentinian” theological system. Such a “gnostic” or “Valentinian” reading would certainly be possible, but would require the additional use of input spaces derived from these conceptual domains.

3.3.3. *Literary Structure and Function*

On the basis of the present analysis, Michel Desjardins' observation that *Gos. Phil.* resembles “the embroidery of God's name and attributes by Muslim calligraphers,” seems an apt one. “In both artistic media,” Desjardins states, “the units of expression, whether consonants and words or metaphors and images, blend into one another to produce variety and unity at the same time.”⁶⁹⁷ But why does *Gos. Phil.* set up all these intricate conceptual blends, and in such a complicated way? Why not explain the meaning and significance of the rituals of Christian initiation in a more simple and straightforward manner? What Régine Charon and Louis Painchaud refer to as the “basic presupposition” in their own work on *Gos. Phil.* seems no less plausible in light of the results

⁶⁹⁷ Desjardins, *Sin in Valentinianism*, 92. Desjardins also considers *Gos. Phil.* to proclaim “a simple and consistent message” (*ibid.*, 91).

of the present study. According to them, “*Gos. Phil.* is a coherent literary work, which does not show any major doctrinal inconsistency, and where the art of allusion and of ellipse, together with the apparent lack of order are aimed at making the reader experience by himself or herself the illumination of true gnosis.”⁶⁹⁸ For it does in fact seem, as Gerald Borchert has put it, that it might have been the intention “to develop a treatise which would give an external appearance of confusion, yet offer to the one who searched behind the external appearance a hidden organization.”⁶⁹⁹ Now *Gos. Phil.* would doubtlessly have seemed much less confused to its intended late antique readers than it does to us, and, as Michael Williams has pointed out, an explanation based on a theory of intentional obscurity would seem to be “unnecessary in light of the rambling style, often just as obscure and confusing, found frequently in rabbinic, New Testament, and Patristic literature.”⁷⁰⁰ Nevertheless, considering the highly complex, allusive and disjointed nature of *Gos. Phil.*, it does seem probable that it would have presented a challenge even to its intended, or model, readers. The structure of the text in fact seems to require at least a second reading in order for the reader to be able to draw some of the inferences suggested by its intricate intratextual connections.

Isenberg has suggested that the probable reason why “the compiler-editor chose to arrange this material strangely: sometimes logically, by means of association of ideas and catchwords, and sometimes illogically, by sprinkling ideas here and there in incoherent patches,” was in order “to heighten the effect of the mysterious.”⁷⁰¹ Whether or not Isenberg is right regarding the actions and intentions, or even existence, of the “compiler-editor,” we may offer the following observation regarding the effects of the arrangement of the material in *Gos. Phil.*: The way the various pieces of discourse are seemingly cut up and distributed throughout the tractate, creates new connections between the various themes through catchwords and thematic associations that would not be apparent if the tractate had been thematically structured in a more coherent way, with the various pieces of discourse neatly reassembled in accordance with Isenberg’s outline of how *Gos. Phil.* would more coherently fit together.⁷⁰²

⁶⁹⁸ Charron and Painchaud, “God is a Dyer,” 43 n. 6.

⁶⁹⁹ Borchert, “Literary Arrangement,” 36; cf. also Painchaud, “La composition,” esp. 63.

⁷⁰⁰ Williams, “Realized Eschatology,” 2.

⁷⁰¹ Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 53.

⁷⁰² See Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel.”

3.3.3.1. *The Title*

The title of the tractate, often dismissed by scholars as merely an unimportant secondary addition to the text,⁷⁰³ may also provide us with a clue to the main thrust of *Gos. Phil.*'s rhetoric. We have seen that the Gospel of John is an intertext of major importance to the tractate—it may even be argued that it is the single most important intertext. If we now take a look at the so-called farewell discourse in the Fourth Gospel, we actually find that it dovetails nicely with what we have seen in the analysis above of *Gos. Phil.*'s Christology and its emphasis on the importance of seeing Christ. Of special importance here are the questions asked first by the apostle Thomas, and then Philip, and the answers given by Jesus. The apostle Philip's question to Jesus follows the latter's answer to a similar question put to him by Thomas:⁷⁰⁴

πεξεφιλιππος ναϋ δεπελοεις ματσαβον επεκειωτ αυω ρω ερον πεξεειϋ
 ναϋ δεπεειογοϊω τηρϋ τ̅νη̅μη̅τη̅ αυω μη̅κ̅σο̅υ̅ων̅τ̅ φιλιππε πενταϋναϋ
 ερωϊ αυναϋ επιωτ αυω η̅το̅κ̅ η̅δ̅ω η̅ρε̅ κ̅χ̅ω η̅μο̅ς̅ δε̅μα̅τ̅σα̅βον̅ επ̅ε̅κ̅ι̅ω̅τ̅
 η̅π̅ι̅σ̅τ̅ε̅υ̅ε̅ αν̅ δε̅αν̅ο̅κ̅ τ̅ρ̅η̅πα̅ι̅ω̅τ̅ αυω πα̅ι̅ω̅τ̅ η̅ρ̅η̅τ̅

Philip said to him, "Lord, show us your father and satisfy us." Jesus said to him, "All this time I have been with you, and you have not known me, Philip? He who has seen me, he has seen the Father. And you, how can you say, 'show us your father'? Do you not believe that I am in my Father and my Father in me?" (John 14:8–10)

We may in fact regard much of *Gos. Phil.* as an extended answer to this question. In order to understand the nature of God the Father, one needs to understand the nature of his Son. Thus, by seeing and understanding Christ one sees and understands, and even becomes Christ, and subsequently also father, the very process of deification we have identified in *Gos. Phil.* The continuation of Jesus' answer to Philip and the other disciples in John 14 is also relevant:

⁷⁰³ See, e.g., M.L. Turner, *Gospel According to Philip*, 9–10. The reason most often given as to why the title should be secondary is the fact that the style of the title as it appears in the manuscript at the end of the text differs from the other titled works in Codex II. This does not necessarily imply anything more than a possible difference in style in the scribe's exemplars which he then copied into Codex II, however, or that something similar may have happened at some earlier point in its transmission, and there is no way for us to know what may have caused the specific style that is here used for the title of *Gos. Phil.* The suggestions that the title is simply a scribal addition, or "a librarian's attempt to identify the work," on the grounds that the apostle Philip is mentioned in the text (see *ibid.*, and cf., e.g., Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 3) do not amount to more than speculation.

⁷⁰⁴ It is worth noting the fact that this sequence is mirrored, intentionally or not, by Codex II having *Gos. Phil.* follow *Gos. Thom.*

ἢπιστεύετε ἂν ἕεανὸκ ἰῆῆπαῖὼτ ἀγὼ παῖὼτ ἢῆῆτ ἢῆαδε ἂνὸκ εἰῆὼ
 ἢῆοὺγ ἢῆῆῆ ἢῆῆῆ ἂν ῆαροῖ μαγῆατ παῖὼτ δε εἰῆοοῖ ἢῆῆτ ῆῆῆ
 ἢῆεῆῆῆῆῆ πῆῆῆῆῆῆ εἢῆῆῆ ἕεανὸκ ἰῆῆπαῖὼτ ἀγὼ παῖὼτ ἢῆῆτ εῆῆῆῆῆῆῆ
 πῆῆῆῆῆῆῆ εἢῆῆῆῆῆῆῆ

Do you not believe that I am in my Father and my Father in me? The words
 I say to you, these I say not from myself alone, but my Father who is within
 me he does his works. Believe me that I am in my Father and my Father is
 in me. If not, believe in his works. (John 14:10–11)

Understanding the relationship between the Father and the Son is of
 prime importance, and one way of gaining insight into this relationship
 is through the works, the works done by the Father through the Son. In
Gos. Phil. as well it is important to understand the hidden deeper mystery
 of the works of Christ, works which indeed constitute important means
 of understanding this fundamental Father-Son relationship. So, in the
 form in which it has come down to us, the title of the tractate, the *Gospel
 of Philip*, corresponds well with its contents and helps strengthen the
 associations, running throughout the tractate, with the Gospel of John.⁷⁰⁵
 This is of course the case regardless of whether this was also the title of
 the hypothetical original or whether it was simply added at some point
 in the text's transmission.

It may here also be noted that the beginning of *Gos. Phil.*, abrupt as
 it is, does set the stage for several of the most important themes that
 are discussed throughout the text. Not only does it strike a polemical
 note towards the Jews, but it also introduces in its very first lines the
 theme of religious kinship and that of making and begetting. At the other
 end of the tractate many of the threads are wrapped up in a longer and
 more coherent section that focuses especially on the aspect of realised
 eschatology⁷⁰⁶ and on how the material world reveals the higher realities
 to the perfect initiated Christian.

A text by the name of the *Gospel of Philip* is mentioned by the late sixth
 century church fathers Timotheus of Constantinople⁷⁰⁷ and pseudo-
 Leontius of Byzantium⁷⁰⁸ both refer to the use of a *Gospel of Philip* among
 Manichaeans, but it is impossible to know whether they refer to the text
 known to us from Nag Hammadi Codex II or to another text altogether.

⁷⁰⁵ Another potential association given by the title of *Gos. Phil.* which fits in well with
 the overall theme of the tractate is to the account of Philip's baptism of the Ethiopian
 eunuch given in Acts 8.

⁷⁰⁶ See Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 194; Williams, "Realized Eschatology."

⁷⁰⁷ *De receptione haereticorum* (PG 86.1.21.C).

⁷⁰⁸ *De sectis* 3.2 (PG 86.1.1213.C).

Epiphanius of Salamis even quotes a passage from a *Gospel of Philip* which he claims to be in use among libertine Gnostics in Egypt in the fourth century,⁷⁰⁹ but the passage he quotes does not correspond to our *Gos. Phil.* from Nag Hammadi.⁷¹⁰

4. SITZ IM LEBEN

“Long after their discovery and laborious publication, the Nag Hammadi Codices continue to betray the hopes of scholars,” states Mark Edwards. “Almost any date is arbitrary, any assignation to a sect is unconvincing.”⁷¹¹ This observation is unfortunately no less true with regard to *Gos. Phil.* than with regard to the other Nag Hammadi texts, but what are the implications of the present analysis with regard to *Gos. Phil.*’s possible *Sitz im Leben*? Although little may be said with any certainty, I will in this section outline some potential implications with regard to polemical and rhetorical context, as well as questions concerning the date, provenance and wider social and religious setting and affiliation of the tractate.

4.1. “Gnosticism” and “Valentinianism”

In much of what has been written concerning *Gos. Phil.*, evidence from the early heresiologists has taken precedence over *Gos. Phil.*’s own internal logic, as scholars have explained (and explained away) various features of *Gos. Phil.* by reference to what these early Church Fathers wrote concerning the views of their opponents. That *Gos. Phil.* can be used as direct evidence of the views of the heresiologists’ opponents has been the starting point of most studies of the text, but scholars have spent precious little ink arguing in favour of this presumption. Moreover, the use of Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria as main sources for *Gos. Phil.*’s theology presupposes a date of the tractate that is not too far removed from them chronologically. But what if *Gos. Phil.* significantly post-dates Clement and Irenaeus?

⁷⁰⁹ *Panarion* 26.13.2–3.

⁷¹⁰ But cf. Schenke, who holds it as possible that all these testimonies may be referring to the same text, namely the one partly preserved in Nag Hammadi Codex II (see Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 1–2).

⁷¹¹ Edwards, “The *Epistle to Rheginus*,” 76. Cf. the discussion in chapter 1 regarding the dating of the Nag Hammadi Codices.

The common presumption of the tractate's "Gnostic" or "Valentinian" character is indeed a factor that may account for many of the problems scholars have had in making sense of *Gos. Phil.* For the tractate has usually been interpreted as a "Gnostic" text, and more often than not with the added specification "Valentinian."⁷¹² Wilson's confident statement in 1962 is representative: "So far as Philip is concerned, the document is definitely Gnostic," and "it can be located with confidence as a work deriving from the Valentinian school."⁷¹³ Jorunn Jacobsen Buckley, who has rightly observed that "it is evident that some scholars wish to localize it immediately upon having first read it,"⁷¹⁴ points out the serious problem with this approach, that "an attempt to establish *Gos. Phil.*'s pedigree will help little toward interpreting it, and a genealogy including 'Valentinian theology' may merely reinforce certain prejudices."⁷¹⁵

No one has stated the assumption that *Gos. Phil.* is a "Valentinian" text more emphatically than Hans-Martin Schenke. "Unser EvPhil repräsentiert eine ganz besondere Art des Christentums," claims Schenke. "Es ist ein gnostischer, und zwar ein valentinianischer Text: von einem Valentinianer für Valentinianer aus valentinianischem Textgut kompiliert, als Evangelium benutzt zunächst von valentinianischen Gemeinden."⁷¹⁶ It is in fact Schenke's introduction to his 1959 German translation of the tractate (which was the first translation of *Gos. Phil.* to be published) and his own subsequent publications on the text, that have been by far the most influential with regard to the labelling of *Gos. Phil.* as a "Valentinian"

⁷¹² Scholars have indeed been quick to label *Gos. Phil.* a "Valentinian" tractate. See, e.g., Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 15, 20, 23; Rudolph, *Gnosis*, 83, 194, 230, 319; Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 325–326; Isenberg, "Introduction," 131, 138; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 8; Thomassen, "How Valentinian"; Pagels, *Beyond Belief*, 130.

⁷¹³ Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 15.

⁷¹⁴ Buckley, "Conceptual Models," 4168.

⁷¹⁵ Buckley, "Conceptual Models," 4168. On a similar note, A.H.C. van Eijk has criticised an excessive focus on what he labels "the full-grown shape gnosticism takes in Manicheism" instead of a greater awareness with regard to *Gos. Phil.*'s similarities with the New Testament and "orthodox" texts (see Eijk, "Gospel of Philip," 97). He especially faults Jacques Ménard for this approach.

⁷¹⁶ Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 8. Schenke also referred to *Gos. Phil.* as one of the "wirklich beziehungsweise unbestritten valentinianische Schriften aus dem Nag-Hammadi-Fund" (Hans-Martin Schenke, "Die Relevanz der Kirchenväter für die Erschließung der Nag-Hammadi-Texte," in *Das Korpus der griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller: Historie, Gegenwart, Zukunft* [ed. Johannes Irmscher and Kurt Treu; TUGAL 120; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1977], 210).

tractate.⁷¹⁷ Since most scholars have subsequently been content with simply referring to Schenke on this point, let us therefore take a closer look at his arguments. As Schenke himself noted at the outset, *Gos. Phil.* “enthält zwar keine Kosmogonie, auch keine Topographie der oberen Welt, die die besten und sichersten Kriterien für die Zuweisung eines Textes zu einer bestimmten Gruppe von Gnostikern abgeben würden.”⁷¹⁸ Still, Schenke argued that certain passages in the text showed that *Gos. Phil.* had a “Valentinian” origin: “Die Charakterisierung des EvPhil als valentinianisch ergibt sich daraus, daß sich in ihm eindeutig valentinianische Theologumena finden bzw. daß das Charakteristischste und sozusagen Profilbestimmende der sich in ihm findenden Lehren und Vorstellungen valentinianisch ist.”⁷¹⁹ In summary, Schenke (1) finds presupposed the “Valentinian” doctrine of the Saviour as the bridegroom of the lower Sophia, and the angels of the Saviour as the bridegrooms of the seed of the lower Sophia.⁷²⁰ (2) He further argues that the names Echamoth and Echmoth discussed by *Gos. Phil.* should be identified with the “Valentinian” higher and lower Sophia.⁷²¹ (3) Furthermore he sees references to a specifically “Valentinian” “Mysterium des Brautgemaches,”⁷²² and (4) to the relative redemption of the “Valentinian” psychic Demiurge.⁷²³ In addition to these points, Schenke claims that “there are many other sections which only take on colour on a Valentinian interpretation.”⁷²⁴

⁷¹⁷ Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959]”; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960]” (this is a slightly revised version of the article published in 1959); Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip”; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*.

⁷¹⁸ Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 2.

⁷¹⁹ Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 8. See also Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 2. Gaffron has expressed profound agreement with Schenke’s views in this matter: “Das EvPh ist in seinem Grundstock valentinianisch. Aus valentinianischer Sicht sind auch alle diejenigen Vorstellungen und Darlegungen des Ph zu exegesieren, die spezifisch jüdischen oder christlichen Hintergrund zeigen, da der Verfasser als Valentinianer sie nicht anders verstehen konnte” (Gaffron, *Studien*, 69). Gaffron does not argue specifically for the “Valentinianism” of *Gos. Phil.* other than by referring to the analyses of Schenke, Wilson, and Ménard (see *ibid.*, 68).

⁷²⁰ Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 3–4; Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 186.

⁷²¹ Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 3; Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 186.

⁷²² Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 5; Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 186.

⁷²³ Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 3; Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 186.

⁷²⁴ Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 186. See also Thomassen, “Notes pour la délimitation,” 243–259, esp. 249–251, 258, where Thomassen classifies *Gos. Phil.* among the

With regard to the fourth point, Schenke himself changed his mind in his 1997 critical edition, where he argued against seeing a reference to the Demiurge in the passage in question, and with regard to all four points, we have seen in the present analysis that the passages Schenke refers to may well be interpreted without recourse to specifically “Valentinian” theology.

While Schenke has been of the opinion that *Gos. Phil.* contains material from several different “Gnostic” groups,⁷²⁵ and that it “cannot be traced back to, or identified with, a particular Valentinian school,”⁷²⁶ some scholars have tried to locate the text more precisely. Roelof van den Broek, following Jean-Daniel Kaestli,⁷²⁷ has characterised *Gos. Phil.* as belonging to the Eastern branch of “Valentinianism” on the grounds of its Christology. Whereas the “Western” branch of “Valentinianism” is supposed to have held that Christ’s body was of a psychic substance, the “Eastern Valentinians” are supposed to have taught that Christ had a spiritual body, which is what van den Broek finds in *Gos. Phil.*⁷²⁸ As we have seen above, however, it is difficult to pigeonhole *Gos. Phil.* according to these criteria since Christ here seems to take on a material, earthly body, while his true, internal, body consists of the Logos (his flesh) and the Holy Spirit (his blood).⁷²⁹ The tractate thus resists being classified as a representative of either Eastern or Western “Valentinianism” on the grounds of the nature of Christ’s body.⁷³⁰

Nag Hammadi texts included under the label “Provenance valentinienne certaine, ou très probable,” on the grounds of its soteriology and the “bridal chamber” imagery in particular.

⁷²⁵ See, e.g., Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 3; Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 186.

⁷²⁶ Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 186.

⁷²⁷ Kaestli, “Valentinisme,” 391–403, esp. 399.

⁷²⁸ See Roelof van den Broek, “The Present State of Gnostic Studies,” *VC* 37:1 (1983):

54.

⁷²⁹ Since, as we have seen, the Logos functions on the level of the soul, it seems that we, if we were to classify the text according to this criterion, we could just as well classify it as a “Western Valentinian” text.

⁷³⁰ More recently, Einar Thomassen has also come to the conclusion that *Gos. Phil.* has affinities with “eastern Valentinianism,” mainly on the grounds of what he regards as its “soteriology of mutual participation” (see Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, esp. 90–102, esp. 102). See also Thomassen’s article “How Valentinian is the *Gospel of Philip*?” where he tries by means of what he calls a “Valentinian interpretation” to find out what kind of “Valentinianism” *Gos. Phil.* is an example of, and how the various features of the text would fit into a “Valentinian” framework. Thomassen has also suggested that certain additional features of the text “indicate a Valentinian provenance for *Gos. Phil.*,” namely a “relatively optimistic cosmology”; the interpretation of the Eucharist; the notion

In the present study I have refrained from employing heresiological and/or modern scholarly (re)constructions of “Gnosticism” or “Valentinianism” in my analysis. I have not assumed from the outset that *Gos. Phil.* is “Gnostic” or “Valentinian” and have therefore not read “Gnostic” or “Valentinian” myth or theology into it. Instead I have attempted to work my way out from the poetics of the text itself, as it has come down to us in its Coptic Nag Hammadi Codex II incarnation, to an evaluation of its doctrinal contents.⁷³¹ Another major implication of labelling *Gos. Phil.* as a “Gnostic” tractate has been the way it has led scholars to use the tractate mainly as a source for documenting Christianity’s opponents, rather than as a source of late antique Christianity in itself. A few examples should suffice.

Borchert, for example, has seen *Gos. Phil.* as a work of “a Gnostic who claims to be a Christian,”⁷³² and as a representative of the “Gnostic threat” towards Christianity. In his view *Gos. Phil.* “exhibits a consistent theology which is in direct confrontation with Christianity,”⁷³³ and he even goes so far as to characterise the message of the tractate as “an insidious warping of the Christian message.”⁷³⁴ Such a document as *Gos. Phil.*, Borchert claims, was a grave threat towards Christianity and “gave the heresiologs

of the Son as the Name of the Father; the use of the metaphor of sowing and reaping at *Gos. Phil.* 52.25–33 which is also attested in Fragments 32–36 by Heracleon as reported by Origen; and possible echoes of the fragments of Valentinus as quoted by Clement of Alexandria and Hippolytus (see Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 273–276). None of these arguments are persuasive, however. A “soteriology of mutual participation” is for instance something we find in prominent orthodox Christian sources of the fourth and fifth centuries (see, e.g., Athanasius and Cyril of Alexandria), and the same can of course be said with regard to *Gos. Phil.*’s “relatively optimistic cosmology.” Moreover, the sowing and reaping metaphor is used differently in *Gos. Phil.* than in the Heracleon fragments and as for the other features brought forward by Thomassen we find closer parallels elsewhere.

⁷³¹ As Rewolinski has rightly emphasised in a critique of what he sees as Sevrin’s method of first constructing a theory of “Valentinianism” and then reading it into *Gos. Phil.*, “We must first attempt to glean what can be gleaned from the GPh itself and only then turn towards the comparative approach which was Sevrin’s first step in his exegetical procedure” (Rewolinski, “Sacramental Language,” 132).

⁷³² Gerald Leo Borchert, “Insights Into the Gnostic Threat to Christianity as Gained Through the Gospel of Philip,” in *New Dimensions in New Testament Study* (ed. Richard N. Longenecker and Merrill C. Tenney; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1974), 92. Cf. also Kasser, “Bibliothèque gnostique,” 15, who states concerning *Gos. Phil.* that “nous avons là, comme dans l’Évangile selon Thomas, un authentique gnosticisme; mais, comme certains de ses prédécesseurs, le rédacteur final de cet ouvrage a tenu à le revêtir d’une terminologie chrétienne (ou qu’il croyait telle).”

⁷³³ Borchert, “Gnostic Threat,” 84.

⁷³⁴ Borchert, “Gnostic Threat,” 85.

(sic) nightmares.”⁷³⁵ Indeed, several scholars have suggested that *Gos. Phil.* is only superficially Christian, but really “Gnostic.” Kurt Rudolph, for example, notes concerning the eucharistic theology of *Gos. Phil.* that “it appears outwardly ‘Church Christian,’ but within the framework of the text as a whole it is manifestly gnostic.”⁷³⁶ Isenberg provides us with another example, stating that, “since ‘Christian’ in the gnostic glossary normally designates the psychic rather than the pneumatic, *Gos. Phil.* is offering the psychic the chance to rise to the pneumatic level—by sacramental means.”⁷³⁷ Seeing *Gos. Phil.* as a “Gnostic” document, Isenberg overlooks the possibility that the term “Christian” as it is used in *Gos. Phil.* could simply refer to “Christian” in the same way as in standard early Christian usage. Isenberg dismisses the fact that *Gos. Phil.* does not mention “psychics” or “pneumatics,” or indeed any tripartite division of humanity, with the understatement that “the tripartite division of humanity—fleshly, psychic, pneumatic—is not emphasised.”⁷³⁸

Based on the premise that *Gos. Phil.* is “Valentinian,” and on what he perceives as its many parallels with “Catholic” Christian practice as we know it from patristic sources, David Tripp asserts that the tractate “belongs to a Valentinian tradition still in close, if not amicable, contact with ‘Catholic’ Christians.”⁷³⁹ Tripp also suggests that *Gos. Phil.* “belongs to a time when some Christians did not anoint,” but holds that “some whom later Catholics could recognize as orthodox” must have done so, “for if the usage had been always a Valentinian or otherwise sectarian peculiarity it could hardly have won acceptance in Catholic churches.”⁷⁴⁰ But what if *Gos. Phil.* is not a “Valentinian” text, but instead is rather closer to early Christian “orthodoxy”? The polemic of *Gos. Phil.* does not seem to be directed against “the Great Church,” but rather against several different groups against which it defines its own viewpoints.

Robert M. Grant has claimed that *Gos. Phil.*’s references to the “holy kiss” is “quite out of harmony with the mind of the Church as a whole,”⁷⁴¹ but is this really the case? A ritual kiss is frequently mentioned in the

⁷³⁵ Borchert, “Gnostic Threat,” 85.

⁷³⁶ Rudolph, *Gnosis*, 241.

⁷³⁷ Isenberg, “Philip, Gospel of,” 313.

⁷³⁸ Isenberg, “Philip, Gospel of,” 313. In my reading of *Gos. Phil.* there is no evidence of any tripartite division of humanity into fleshly, psychic, and pneumatic.

⁷³⁹ Tripp, “Sacramental System,” 258.

⁷⁴⁰ Tripp, “Sacramental System,” 258.

⁷⁴¹ Grant, “Mystery of Marriage,” 140.

patristic sources.⁷⁴² An especially interesting discussion is found in John Chrysostom's *Homily on Second Corinthians*. Here Chrysostom refers to 2 Cor 13:12 in order to explain the significance of this particular liturgical practice. The kiss, according to Chrysostom, is given in order

that it may be fuel unto love, that it may kindle the disposition, that we may so love each other, as brothers brothers, as children parents, as parents children; yea, rather even far more. For those things are by nature, as disposition implanted by nature, but these by spiritual grace. Thus our souls bound unto each other. And therefore when we return after an absence we kiss each other, our souls hastening unto mutual intercourse.

(*Hom. 2 Cor.*, 30.2; *NPNF*¹)

Chrysostom then continues by setting up a metaphorical blend between the body of the Christian and a temple, and in the process connects the ritual kiss to the Eucharist. According to Chrysostom,

we are the temple of Christ; we kiss then the porch and entrance of the temple when we kiss each other. See ye not how many kiss even the porch of this temple, some stooping down, others grasping it with their hand, and putting their hand to their mouth. And through these gates and doors Christ both had entered into us, and doth enter, whensoever we communicate. Ye who partake of the mysteries understand what I say.⁷⁴³

(*Hom. 2 Cor.*, 30.2; *NPNF*¹)

There is nothing in *Gos. Phil.*'s allusions to the ritual kiss that would seem to be fundamentally at odds with the kind of practice or interpretation of it Chrysostom gives here.⁷⁴⁴

Grant claimed that the "Valentinians" he saw behind *Gos. Phil.* "were making use of Christian materials but were exaggerating some elements and neglecting others. They were laying unusual emphasis on the uniquely Christian doctrine of the union of Christ with his Church and were 'literalizing' the metaphors used by the Christians."⁷⁴⁵ From the present

⁷⁴² See, e.g., L. Edward Phillips, *The Ritual Kiss in Early Christian Worship* (Joint Liturgical Studies 36; Cambridge: Grove, 1996); Michael Philip Penn, *Kissing Christians: Ritual and Community in the Late Ancient Church* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005); Bradshaw, et al., *The Apostolic Tradition*, 42.

⁷⁴³ See also the treatment of this passage in Stephen Benko, *Pagan Rome and the Early Christians* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 83–84, 99 n. 17; Penn, *Kissing Christians*, 40–41.

⁷⁴⁴ Cf. Pagels who describes the kiss referred to in *Gos. Phil.* 59.2–6 as a "eucharistic 'kiss of peace'" where the members of "the pneumatic church" express "their oneness with one another" (Pagels, "Adam and Eve, Christ and the Church," 169; Pagels, "Pursuing the Spiritual Eve," 204). Cf. also Penn, *Kissing Christians*.

⁷⁴⁵ Grant, "Mystery of Marriage," 139–140.

analysis, however, it seems rather like it is Grant and others who have literalised the metaphors used in *Gos. Phil.* and interpreted them in ways that make the tractate seem much less like a representative of “mainstream” Christian theology than what may now seem to have been the case.

Literalising interpretation is not the only interpretive strategy that has made *Gos. Phil.* conform to preconceptions of it being an aberration in early Christianity, however. There has also been a strong tendency towards allegorising its metaphors and similes in conformity with theories of “Gnostic,” and especially “Valentinian,” teaching. Thus, as we have seen, rather than, e.g., treating Joseph as Joseph, he has been interpreted as representing the “Valentinian” Demiurge, references to the Holy Spirit have been taken to refer to Sophia, and the serpent in paradise has been equated with Ialdabaoth. To Schenke’s assertion that there are many sections in *Gos. Phil.* “which only take on colour on a Valentinian interpretation,”⁷⁴⁶ one might reply that *Gos. Phil.* indeed only takes on a specifically “Valentinian” colour by reading it in the light of “Valentinian” theologoumena. One may certainly interpret *Gos. Phil.* as a “Gnostic” or “Valentinian” text, but it should be noted that such a reading requires an allegorical interpretation of the tractate on the basis of an a priori notion of “Gnosticism” or “Valentinianism.” Such a reading would require the recruitment of additional input spaces taken from “Valentinian” practices and mythologoumena to contribute to our interpretive blends, enabling us to regard, for example, *Gos. Phil.*’s reference to Joseph the carpenter as a reference to the “Valentinian” demiurge. I hope, however, to have demonstrated in the present analysis that it is perfectly possible to read *Gos. Phil.* without resorting to such an exegetical strategy, and I thus hope to have given a simpler, more straightforward, and historically more likely, interpretation of the text than what has been the result of the “Valentinian” and “Gnostic” interpretations of it. Below I will outline some alternative possibilities regarding the religious affiliation and polemical setting of the text, which brings us first to the important, but difficult, question of the tractate’s date and provenance. As we shall see, conclusions based on circular reasoning regarding the tractate’s “Gnostic” or “Valentinian” character have also been used to date the tractate. The “Gnostic” or “Valentinian” character of *Gos. Phil.* is, however, at best far too vague to allow us to use it as a criterion for dating.

⁷⁴⁶ Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 186.

4.2. *Date and Provenance*

Most scholars have tentatively placed the composition of *Gos. Phil.* in Syria,⁷⁴⁷ with the main argument being its explicit discussions of certain Syriac terms. As Kendrick Grobel put it in his review of Wilson's edition of the text,

Why the interest in Syriac? Why, indeed, unless the author's brand of "Christianity" had come down to him in the Syriac language? Perhaps more—perhaps he even wrote this book in Syriac. Then was there a Greek intermediary translation between the hypothetical Syriac and the Coptic? Not necessarily. The many Greek words in the Gospel of Philip prove nothing: Coptic can no more be written free of Greek than can English free of Latin or French-Latin. Of course a Syriac original and a Greek version may have been used together ...⁷⁴⁸

Although few scholars have actually argued that the text was most likely composed in Syriac,⁷⁴⁹ many have held the presence of discussions of Syriac words in the text to indicate a probable origin in Syria.⁷⁵⁰ The majority of those who have placed *Gos. Phil.* in Syria on such grounds have held it to have been written in Greek in a Greek-Syriac bilingual milieu, Antioch or Edessa being the favoured locations.⁷⁵¹

However, *Gos. Phil.* in fact not only discusses the meaning of words in "Syriac" (𐤀𐤍𐤏𐤓𐤕𐤓𐤐𐤕), but also mentions explicitly the languages "Hebrew"

⁷⁴⁷ See, e.g., Segelberg, "Antiochene Background"; Eric Segelberg, "The Antiochene Origin of the 'Gospel of Philip,'" *BSAC* 19 (1967–1968): 207–210; Ménard, "Beziehungen"; Isenberg, "Coptic Gospel," 347–348; Isenberg, "Introduction," 131, 134; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 5; Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 350; Schmid, *Die Eucharistie*, 14.

⁷⁴⁸ Grobel, review of Wilson, 318. The translation of Syriac texts directly into Coptic is attested by the recent discovery of bilingual Syriac-Coptic manuscripts in the Dakhleh Oasis (see Iain Gardner, ed., *Kellis Literary Texts*, vol. 1 [Oxbow Monograph 69, Dakhleh Oasis Project Monograph 4; Oxford: Oxbow, 1996], and cf. also the comments by Sebastian P. Brock, "Syriac Culture, 337–425," in *The Late Empire, AD 337–425* [ed. Averil Cameron and Peter Garnsey; CAH 13; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], 710 n. 7).

⁷⁴⁹ For this view, see Murray, *Symbols of Church and Kingdom*, 25–26.

⁷⁵⁰ See, e.g., Segelberg, "Antiochene Background"; Segelberg, "Antiochene Origin"; Gaffron, *Studien*, 64–65; Isenberg, "Coptic Gospel," 347; Isenberg, "Introduction," 131, 134; Isenberg, "Philip, Gospel of," 312; Ménard, "Beziehungen"; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 5.

⁷⁵¹ For west Syria and Antioch, see, e.g., Segelberg, "Antiochene Background"; Segelberg, "Antiochene Origin"; Gaffron, *Studien*, 65–66, 69, 220; Tripp, "Sacramental System," 258. For east Syria and Edessa, see, e.g., Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 325; Schenke, "The Gospel of Philip," 183; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 5.

(ⲙⲏⲏⲧⲉⲃⲣⲁⲓⲟⲥ) and “Greek” (ⲙⲏⲏⲧⲟⲩⲁⲅⲓⲁⲛⲓⲛ).⁷⁵² The fact that Syriac, Greek, and Hebrew words are explicitly discussed as such, would to the present author not primarily indicate a Syrian origin of the text.⁷⁵³ Instead, the fact that *Gos. Phil.* feels the need to discuss the meaning of certain words in these languages would rather indicate that at least these parts of the tractate were not actually composed in any of them. The most probable setting for such a discussion would rather seem to be a Coptic-speaking one.⁷⁵⁴ In a Coptic text directed to a Coptic audience it is quite appropriate to discuss the meaning of certain words of theological importance in Syriac, Hebrew, and Greek.

Moreover, as Grobel and others have rightly noted, the presence of Greek words does not indicate a Greek original,⁷⁵⁵ nor, necessarily, does the identification of possible wordplays or catchword connections in the hypothetical Greek original. Such features do not necessarily indicate anything more than that the tractate makes use of ideas or sources that may have originated in Greek- or Syriac-speaking milieus.⁷⁵⁶ There does not seem to be any hard evidence, then, that *Gos. Phil.* cannot have been composed in Coptic in the first place. A Coptic-speaking milieu would also seem to be indicated by the Coptic wordplays we have discussed at several points in the analyses above, which would seem to indicate that even if *Gos. Phil.* was indeed in the main translated from a Greek original or originals, which it might well have been, substantial changes were made in its translation into Coptic and/or in its subsequent Coptic phase(s) of transmission. The fact that some catchword connections and puns seem to work only in Coptic increases the likelihood of this possibility. Such a transmission history, however, does not in any way decrease the value of the present text as a complete Coptic document in its own right attesting to the milieu where its latest substantial modifications were made, i.e., where the text assumed more or less the shape of the exemplar contained in Nag Hammadi Codex II.

⁷⁵² See *Gos. Phil.* 56.8–9; 62.13–14.

⁷⁵³ Cf. Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 400 n. 16.

⁷⁵⁴ I think Gaffron’s claim that the author of *Gos. Phil.* “muß jedenfalls eine Grundkenntnis des Syrischen gehabt haben” (Gaffron, *Studien*, 65) is too strong. The knowledge of etymologies of certain words in another language does not presuppose any direct knowledge of that language as such.

⁷⁵⁵ See Grobel, review of Wilson, 318; L.-Th. Lefort, “Gréco-Copte,” in *Coptic Studies in Honor of Walter Ewing Crum* (ed. Michel Malinine; Bulletin of the Byzantine Institute 2; Boston: Byzantine Institute, 1950), 66–67; Reintges, *Coptic Egyptian*, 4.

⁷⁵⁶ Cf. M.L. Turner, *Gospel According to Philip*, 165–166.

The other main argument for a Syrian provenance for *Gos. Phil.* has been its perceived affinities with Syrian or generally Eastern sacramental practice and interpretation.⁷⁵⁷ Isenberg argues that the fact that *Gos. Phil.* seems to presuppose only a single anointing suggests an Eastern provenance, but he neglects to take into consideration the fact that *Gos. Phil.*'s anointing does not seem to be a prebaptismal one, as is the case with early Eastern practice, making this an argument of dubious value.⁷⁵⁸ Isenberg's appeal to parallels to *Gos. Phil.* in the ritual interpretation on display in Eastern catecheses of the fourth and fifth centuries⁷⁵⁹ carries more weight, but for this period there are also interesting parallels to be found not only in Eastern, but also in Western and Egyptian sources that are not mentioned by Isenberg.⁷⁶⁰

Our sources for Egyptian ritual practice are scarce and little is known for the pre-Nicene period,⁷⁶¹ but it is worth noting that, as Maxwell Johnson has shown, most elements of the early Egyptian initiation rites and their accompanying theology seem to have had their closest parallels in the Syrian tradition.⁷⁶² As Johnson puts it, "Although the sources for the rites of Christian initiation in Egypt are neither as numerous nor

⁷⁵⁷ See, e.g., Segelberg, "Sacramental System"; Isenberg, "Coptic Gospel," 347–348; Isenberg, "Introduction," 134.

⁷⁵⁸ For a refutation of this argument by Isenberg, see Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 400–401 n. 16.

⁷⁵⁹ See, e.g., Isenberg, "Coptic Gospel," 348.

⁷⁶⁰ See, e.g., Finn, *Italy, North Africa, and Egypt*; Thomas M. Finn, trans., *Quodvultdeus of Carthage: The Creedal Homilies: Conversion in Fifth-Century North Africa* (ACW 60; New York: Newman Press, 2004); Maxwell E. Johnson, *The Prayers of Sarapion of Thmuis: A Literary, Liturgical, and Theological Analysis* (OrChrAn 249; Rome: Pontificio Istituto Orientale, 1995), 405–442; Maxwell E. Johnson, "Baptism as 'New Birth *ex aqua et spiritu*': A Preliminary Investigation of Western Liturgical Sources," in *Comparative Liturgy Fifty Years After Anton Baumstark (1872–1948): Acts of the International Congress, Rome, 25–29 September 1998* (ed. Robert F. Taft and Gabriele Winkler; OrChrAn 265; Rome: Pontificio Istituto Orientale, 2001), 787–807; Craig Alan Satterlee, *Ambrose of Milan's Method of Mystagogical Preaching* (Collegeville, Minn.: Pueblo/Liturgical Press, 2002).

⁷⁶¹ See, e.g., Paul F. Bradshaw, "Baptismal Practice in the Alexandrian Tradition, Eastern or Western?" in *Essays in Early Eastern Initiation* [ed. Paul F. Bradshaw; Alcuin/GROW Liturgical Study 8, Grove Liturgical Study 56; Nottingham: Grove Books, 1988]; Maxwell E. Johnson, *Liturgy in Early Christian Egypt* (Alcuin/GROW Joint Liturgical Studies 33; Cambridge: Grove Books, 1995), 15; Maxwell E. Johnson, *The Rites of Christian Initiation: Their Evolution and Interpretation* (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1999).

⁷⁶² See Johnson, *Liturgy in Early Christian Egypt*, 15; Maxwell E. Johnson, *The Rites of Christian Initiation: Their Evolution and Interpretation* (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1999), 51.

as clear as they are for the early Syrian tradition, it would appear that both these traditions shared a great deal in common.⁷⁶³ Among these common features, Johnson lists an understanding of initiation modelled on Jesus' own baptism, and an interpretation of it in terms of begetting and birth.⁷⁶⁴ In neither the Syrian nor the Egyptian sources does Johnson find any evidence of postbaptismal anointing in the early period, but rather a prebaptismal one. In fact, in both the Syrian and the Egyptian material he sees "a ritual sequence in which no postbaptismal ceremonies are present other than participation in the Eucharist."⁷⁶⁵

The ritual interpretation on display in *Gos. Phil.* seems to be closer to that of Syria and Egypt than to that of North Africa or Rome. Jesus' baptism in the Jordan is central and the anointing is closely connected with the reception of the Holy Spirit and is of a higher importance than the baptism in water. Baptism is primarily interpreted in terms of begetting and birth and John 3 rather than death and resurrection and Romans 6. Moreover, we do not find any clear traces in *Gos. Phil.* of any prebaptismal rites of renunciation, purification, exorcism, or strengthening. In these respects, then, *Gos. Phil.* is closest to what we know of Syrian and Egyptian practice.⁷⁶⁶

There are certain features of *Gos. Phil.*, however, that do not fit very well with this picture of Syrian and Egyptian practice. As we have seen, the chrismation presupposed by *Gos. Phil.* does not seem to be a prebaptismal one, and there is no evidence for a postbaptismal anointing in Syria in the pre-Nicene period.⁷⁶⁷ So, perhaps *Gos. Phil.* is not of Syrian provenance,⁷⁶⁸ nor Egyptian, after all? It is important to remember, however, that we are here speaking about the pre-Nicene period. In the post-Nicene period of the fourth and fifth centuries, on the other hand,

⁷⁶³ M.E. Johnson, *Rites of Christian Initiation*, 59.

⁷⁶⁴ See M.E. Johnson, *Rites of Christian Initiation*, 59.

⁷⁶⁵ See M.E. Johnson, *Rites of Christian Initiation*, 60. For the pre-Nicene period Johnson finds evidence of a ritual sequence in Syria and Egypt of anointing-baptism-Eucharist, in contrast with the North African sequence of baptism-anointing-handlaying-Eucharist, and the Roman pattern of baptism-anointing-handlaying-anointing-Eucharist (see M.E. Johnson, *Rites of Christian Initiation*, 85–86).

⁷⁶⁶ Cf. M.E. Johnson, *Rites of Christian Initiation*, 86–87.

⁷⁶⁷ See, e.g., Thomas M. Finn, *Early Christian Baptism and the Catechumenate: West and East Syria* (Message of the Fathers of the Church 5; Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1992), 20. As Thomassen rightly observes, however, there may have been greater variety in Syrian practice in this period than is evident in the extant sources (see Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 400).

⁷⁶⁸ See Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 400.

postbaptismal anointing with chrism is also found in the West Syrian and Egyptian rites.⁷⁶⁹ A date for *Gos. Phil.* in this period would thus better fit the evidence of Eastern and Egyptian sacramental practice.⁷⁷⁰

With regard to such conclusions regarding eastern or western ritual practices it is worth noting that the picture is becoming increasingly blurred. Maxwell Johnson has for instance recently shown in an overview of western evidence that it no longer seems possible to sustain the common view that the interpretation of baptism in terms of rebirth and John 3 is specifically eastern.⁷⁷¹ Johnson even goes so far as to conclude that “baptism as ‘new birth *ex aqua et spritiu*’ is part of the ancient, common, and ecumenical liturgical heritage of the Church, both East and West.”⁷⁷² It thus seems that we cannot after all use *Gos. Phil.*’s emphasis on an interpretation of ritual initiation in terms of begetting and birth to argue for an Eastern provenance of the tractate. However, there does seem to be more of a christological focus in the understanding of initiation in the Syrian sources than in the Western,⁷⁷³ and this aspect certainly fits in with the understanding of *Gos. Phil.* according to the findings of the present study.

Finally, Isenberg has argued for a Syrian provenance on the basis of what he regards as *Gos. Phil.*’s “enkratitic emphasis on virginity and continence.”⁷⁷⁴ However, it does not seem necessary to regard *Gos. Phil.* as a tractate that is inherently ascetic or enkratitic in outlook, and Isenberg’s appeal to Tatian, Aphrahat, and Ephrem notwithstanding,⁷⁷⁵ this seems in any case to be a far too general argument to allow us to use it to identify the text’s geographical provenance. Isenberg himself shows awareness of this fact when he suggests that the reason why *Gos. Phil.* “came, by

⁷⁶⁹ See M.E. Johnson, *Rites of Christian Initiation*, 113; cf. also Brock, *Holy Spirit*, 209; Finn, *West and East Syria*, 21–22. In East Syria there is no evidence of any postbaptismal anointing prior to the seventh century (see M.E. Johnson, *Rites of Christian Initiation*, 113).

⁷⁷⁰ Thomassen suggests that the ritual sequence attested by *Gos. Phil.* may “reflect an earlier Syrian practice than those third century texts that attest the order anointing-baptism” (Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, 400), but does not consider the possibility that it may reflect Syrian practice of the fourth or fifth century.

⁷⁷¹ See M.E. Johnson, “Baptism as ‘New Birth.’”

⁷⁷² M.E. Johnson, “Baptism as ‘New Birth,’” 806–807. Moreover, as Paul Bradshaw has pointed out, “we cannot really speak of two principal liturgical traditions in the early Church—Eastern and Western—but should rather acknowledge that there was instead a variety of local practices” (Bradshaw, “Baptismal Practice,” 17).

⁷⁷³ See Bradshaw, *Search for the Origins*, 155.

⁷⁷⁴ See Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 347; cf. Isenberg, “Introduction,” 134.

⁷⁷⁵ See Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 347–348.

the end of the fourth century, to exist in Coptic clothes, is probably due to the sympathetic reading it could get among Egyptian Gnostic desert ascetics.⁷⁷⁶

The Nag Hammadi Codices were most probably manufactured sometime in the fourth or early fifth century,⁷⁷⁷ and certainly in Egypt, were they were also discovered some sixteen centuries later. Acknowledging the fact that the codices and their place of discovery constitute the only certain historical context we have with regard to the texts contained in them, and the fact that the language of these codices is Coptic, fourth–fifth-century Egypt would seem to present itself as a rather obvious context within which to study them. It is therefore all the more surprising that comparisons of Nag Hammadi texts with issues that were current in fourth-century Egyptian Christianity and Coptic sources have been few and far between in Nag Hammadi scholarship.

Scholarly interpretations of *Gos. Phil.* illustrate the point. They have focussed not so much on trying to understand the text that has actually been preserved in Nag Hammadi Codex II, but rather on a text we in fact do not have, namely its hypothetical Greek original supposedly written 100–300 years earlier. Since scholars have had this focus, the chronological spotlight has been pointed primarily at the second and third century, rather than at the fourth or early fifth. That is not to say that fourth-century contexts have not been invoked to shed light on the codices and those who manufactured and used them. This has in fact been an issue of debate since the very beginning of Nag Hammadi research.⁷⁷⁸ What has hardly been done at all, however, is to *interpret the texts* from such a perspective, and to use comparative material from the Egyptian milieu contemporary with the manuscripts to shed light on their contents. As Tito Orlandi has pointed out, “all sorts of ideas and religious sects have been called forth to comment upon the [Nag Hammadi] corpus and to explain, it seems, everything except what was common in the Nile valley in the fourth and fifth centuries AD.”⁷⁷⁹

⁷⁷⁶ Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 349.

⁷⁷⁷ See the discussion in chapter 1.

⁷⁷⁸ See chapter 1.

⁷⁷⁹ Orlandi, “A Catechesis,” 85. Orlandi elsewhere notes that “it may be observed that the scholars interested in [Nag Hammadi] texts tend to neglect Coptic literature” (Tito Orlandi, “Nag Hammadi Texts and the Coptic Literature,” in *Colloque international “l’Évangile selon Thomas et les textes de Nag Hammadi”: Québec, 29–31 mai 2003*, ed. Louis Painchaud and Paul-Hubert Poirier, BCNH, Études 8 [Québec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2007], 326).

Now, what *was* “common in the Nile valley in the fourth and fifth centuries,” to use Orlandi’s phrase? About the only thing we may say with certainty is that the picture is very diverse indeed. The fourth and fifth centuries were rife with doctrinal debate, and it was a time of major ecumenical councils delineating the boundaries of accepted Scripture, doctrine and practice. Moreover, in contrast to the situation with regard to the preceding centuries, there is an abundance of sources available to us from this period, making a thorough comparative study of the Nag Hammadi texts within the context of fourth and fifth-century Egypt anything but a trivial undertaking. There are, to put it bluntly, quite a few Egyptian fourth-century contexts to choose from.⁷⁸⁰ As we saw in chapter 3, however, it is possible to single out one particular context which seems especially relevant with regard to the Nag Hammadi codices, namely monasticism. Since the manuscripts were discovered in the vicinity of the sites of several Pachomian monasteries, in an area where also so-called “Melitian” and other monastic groups and individuals were active, and also not far from the location of Shenoute’s monastic community, the potential relevance of a monastic context for the Nag Hammadi texts should be apparent.⁷⁸¹ Moreover, when we, as outlined above, disregard the category of “Gnosticism,” “burdened as it is with misleading stereotype and confusion,”⁷⁸² and reconsider these writings as constituent parts of early Christianity, a fourth- or fifth-century contextualisation of *Gos. Phil.* no longer needs to be approached from the point of view of a simple dichotomy between the Nag Hammadi texts as simply representatives of heresy on the one hand, and sources that have customarily been classified as belonging on the right side of the orthodoxy/heresy divide on the other. It thus becomes easier to

⁷⁸⁰ As David Brakke puts it, “Christianity in fourth-century Egypt was characterized by diverse and conflicting modes of social identity and spiritual formation.” Brakke singles out in particular “study groups led by charismatic teachers, Melitian communities centered around the veneration of martyrs, and the emerging structure of imperial orthodoxy headed by Athanasius,” all of whom “presented themselves as legitimate expressions of Christian piety” (David Brakke, “Canon Formation and Social Conflict in Fourth-Century Egypt: Athanasius of Alexandria’s Thirty-Ninth *Festal Letter*,” *HTR* 87:4 [1994]: 396). See also C. Wilfred Griggs, *Early Egyptian Christianity from Its Origins to 451 C.E.* (3rd ed.; Coptic Studies 2; Leiden: Brill, 1993), 117–231; Stephen J. Davis, *The Early Coptic Papacy: The Egyptian Church and Its Leadership in Late Antiquity* (The Popes of Egypt 1; Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2004), 43–84; Davis, *Coptic Christology*, 13–152.

⁷⁸¹ Cf. Desjardins, “Rethinking the Study of Gnosticism,” 379–380. See also the discussion in chapter 3.

⁷⁸² Williams, “Was There a Gnostic Religion,” 78.

see the similarities as well as the differences between these texts and other fourth- and fifth-century sources, and consequently to take fully into consideration the diversity of doctrines and religious expressions represented by the Nag Hammadi material as a whole.

While it does not seem possible to place *Gos. Phil.* geographically with any confidence, neither does there seem to be any good reason why *Gos. Phil.* could not have had its origin in Egypt, or been significantly edited, or even composed, in Coptic. There is, for instance, evidence from the fourth and fifth centuries that there was regular contact between monks in Syria and Egypt.⁷⁸³ Such contact would seem to make it feasible that a tractate that may show extensive awareness of Syrian ideas and sacramental interpretation might also have been composed in Egypt, and even in Coptic, and that the favoured view that *Gos. Phil.* was originally composed in Greek in Syria is only one possibility among many.

In most attempts to place *Gos. Phil.* chronologically or geographically, questions concerning language and translation have indeed been central. An unfortunate aspect of these discussions, however, is that it has mostly been assumed, in the majority of cases without any attempt to argue the case, that the original version of *Gos. Phil.* was composed in Greek and that the present document is a more or less direct, although not very good, translation of the Greek into Coptic.⁷⁸⁴ This assumption has in turn led to a tendency to focus the analysis on the hypothetical Greek original and to overlook, or explain away, possible puns or catchword connections in Coptic, and has often been accompanied by the tacit assumption that since our Coptic text is a translation of a Greek document it must have been translated and copied into our preserved manuscript at least

⁷⁸³ See, e.g., Fred Ledegang, "Anthropomorphites and Origenists in Egypt at the End of the Fourth Century," in *Origeniana Septima: Origenes in den Auseinandersetzungen des 4. Jahrhunderts* (ed. W.A. Bienert and U. Kühneweg; BETL 137; Leuven: Leuven University Press/Peeters, 1999), 377.

⁷⁸⁴ Segelberg, for instance, states without any argument that "There is hardly any doubt about it that Greek is the original language" (Segelberg, "Antiochene Background," 223). Isenberg states at one point in his introduction to the critical edition that *Gos. Phil.* "must have been composed in Greek," and at another that it "was presumably composed in Greek" (Isenberg, "Introduction," 131, 134). In his entry on the text in the *Anchor Bible Dictionary* he states that it was "very likely a translation of an original Greek document" (Isenberg, "Philip, Gospel of," 312). Schenke simply states that "Die uns in einer Kopie erhaltene koptische Fassung des EvPhil dürfte—wie es für die koptische Literatur die Regel ist—eine Übersetzung aus dem Griechischen darstellen. Und das Griechische ist dann wohl auch als die Ursprache, in der das EvPhil abgefaßt worden ist, anzusehen" (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 4). He takes this for granted and does not attempt to argue it. Cf. also, e.g., Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures*, 325–327.

decades after the production of the original Greek. Why the translation process would have had to take so long is somewhat mysterious to the present author, but it is an implicit argument that has often been used by scholars to move the *terminus ante quem* for the supposed Greek original back into the third century.

Let us take a closer look at the arguments that have been brought forward in favour of a Greek original. First there is the argument from the Greek words used in the tractate. Walter Till pointed to the fact that *Gos. Phil.* in many instances uses Greek words even in cases where equally good Coptic ones were readily available, like for instance its use in many instances of ΔΙΑ ΤΟΥΤΟ instead of ⲉⲧⲃⲉⲡⲁⲓ, and ΔΛΗΘΕΙΑ instead of ⲙⲉ. From this Till drew the conclusion that the original document must have been composed in Greek.⁷⁸⁵ This is, however, an argument that flies in the face of the evidence we have of indigenous Sahidic Coptic writings of the period roughly contemporary with the Nag Hammadi Codices. A quick glance at the writings of Shenoute, for instance, which constitute the largest corpus of indigenous Sahidic texts, shows quite clearly that he did not hesitate to use Greek expressions even when equally good Coptic ones could have been used.⁷⁸⁶

The second argument, also used by Till, has to do with the fact that the New Testament quotations in *Gos. Phil.* in several cases diverge from the wording of the “standard” Sahidic New Testament, especially with regard to the use of Greek or Coptic words. Till mentions in particular the quotation of Matt 3:10 where *Gos. Phil.* uses the Greek word ἄζειν⁷⁸⁷ rather than the Coptic ⲕⲉⲗⲉⲃⲓⲛ which is used in the Sahidic New Testament.⁷⁸⁸ There are several problems with this argument, however. Firstly, we do not have any manuscript attestation for Coptic New Testament translations prior to the fourth century, and it is only from the late fourth and into the fifth century that there is any substantial manuscript attestation for most of the New Testament texts, and even from this period the evidence represents a variety of dialects and independent

⁷⁸⁵ See Till, *Das Evangelium nach Philippos*, 6. See also Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 19–20; Stroud, “Problem of Dating,” 228. It should be noted, however, that *Gos. Phil.* does not exclusively employ these Greek terms, but that it also uses the native Coptic terms ⲉⲧⲃⲉⲡⲁⲓ and ⲙⲉ.

⁷⁸⁶ See also the refutation of this argument in Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 13; Grobel, review of Wilson, 318.

⁷⁸⁷ See *Gos. Phil.* 83.12–13.

⁷⁸⁸ See Till, *Das Evangelium nach Philippos*, 6. This argument is supported by Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 13.

traditions.⁷⁸⁹ As Frederik Wisse has pointed out, this indicates “that the early history of transmission of the Coptic text of the NT long remained fluid and haphazard.”⁷⁹⁰ Moreover, as Wisse has argued, the Coptic text of the New Testament “was open to continuing influence of the Greek text to a much greater degree than the Latin and Syriac versions.”⁷⁹¹ Therefore, even though we do not have manuscript evidence of the Greek word ἀζεινη being used in the Coptic translation of Matt 3:10, this does not mean that there were no translations of Matthew into Coptic that retained this Greek word. Our knowledge of the early translations of the New Testament into Coptic is far too incomplete to allow us to argue that differences from the known Sahidic translations of Matthew in *Gos. Phil.*'s quotations of the New Testament imply a Greek original. Another possibility could be a Coptic-Greek bilingual author writing in Coptic who used the Greek New Testament, rather than any specific Coptic translation of it, and rendered his quotations and paraphrases in Coptic as he saw fit, or the word may have been changed from κελειν to ἀζεινη at some point in the transmission of the Coptic text.⁷⁹² In any case, the use of a Greek word rather than its Coptic equivalent can hardly be used to prove a Greek original for *Gos. Phil.*

Till also argued for a Greek original on the basis of the idea seen in *Gos. Phil.* 71.16–18 that Adam came into being from two virgins, namely from “the spirit” (πῑπῑῑ) and “the virgin earth” (πκαζ ῑπαρῑῑ). The text must have been composed in Greek, Till claims, since “earth”

⁷⁸⁹ See Wisse, “The Coptic Versions,” 133. On the Coptic New Testament manuscripts, see also Metzger, *The Early Versions*, 99–141.

⁷⁹⁰ Wisse, “The Coptic Versions,” 133. Tito Orlandi notes that, “a translation may have been conceived and executed by a single translator or a small group of translators, sometimes even for individual use. On the other hand, it may have been produced on the basis of one or more preexistent texts, in the same or in different dialects. It may also have been revised through the use of a Greek text, which may or may not have been the same type as that used in the previous translations. Translations may also have been revised simply to improve the Coptic form, or to make it more correct in comparison with a Greek text that seemed better” (Tito Orlandi, “Coptic Literature,” in *The Roots of Egyptian Christianity* [ed. Birger A. Pearson and James E. Goehring; SAC; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986], 54). Moreover, there are problems with regard to “the date of the translations, the question of dialectical priority, and the relation between ‘official’ and ‘private’ translations” (ibid., 55).

⁷⁹¹ Frederik Wisse, “After the *Synopsis*: Prospects and Problems in Establishing a Critical Text of the Apocryphon of John and in Defining Its Historical Location,” in *The Nag Hammadi Library After Fifty Years: Proceedings of the 1995 Society of Biblical Literature Commemoration* [ed. John D. Turner and Anne McGuire; NHS 44; Leiden: Brill, 1997], 132.

⁷⁹² For such changes in transmission, see Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 13.

in Greek (γῆ) is feminine, while it is masculine in Coptic (καρ).⁷⁹³ A problem with this argument, however, is the fact that “spirit” (πνεῦμα) is not actually feminine in Greek, but neuter. We need to look to the Semitic languages Hebrew or Syriac / Aramaic in order to find “spirit” as a feminine noun.⁷⁹⁴ It seems to me that while the idea that Adam came into being from these two virgins would most probably have had its origins in a Semitic-speaking milieu, there is no reason why it could not have been employed just as well by an author writing in Coptic as one writing in Greek, and without its author actually being directly in touch with a Semitic language. We need to distinguish between the origins of ideas and motifs used in the tractate and the composition of the tractate itself, which uses a wide range of ideas, motifs, allusions and metaphors for its own purposes.

Finally it has been argued that the text is stylistically different from indigenous Coptic writings,⁷⁹⁵ but here again the comparative material for this period is sparse, and of debatable value as proof that the Coptic *Gos. Phil.* is a translation. Now, I am not arguing that *Gos. Phil.* must have been originally composed in Coptic, only that this possibility cannot be excluded,⁷⁹⁶ and deserves to be taken fully into consideration. What does seem likely on the basis of the present analysis of *Gos. Phil.*, however, is that if it was not originally composed in Coptic, then at least some parts of the text have undergone significant revision in its Coptic phase(s) of transmission.

As for the starting point of its transmission, there is at present no consensus on *Gos. Phil.*'s date of composition.⁷⁹⁷ Suggestions have ranged from the middle of the first century⁷⁹⁸ to the first half of the fourth,⁷⁹⁹ with the majority of scholars dating the text to the late second or early

⁷⁹³ See Till, *Das Evangelium nach Philippos*, 6. This argument is supported by Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 12; Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 21.

⁷⁹⁴ *Ruah* or *ruha* respectively (see Gedaliahu G. Stroumsa, “Le couple de l’Ange et de l’Esprit: Traditions Juives et Chrétiennes,” *RB* 88 [1981]: 46).

⁷⁹⁵ See, e.g., Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 12–13.

⁷⁹⁶ For the difficulty of proving the original nature of a Coptic text, see Peter Nagel, “Gespräche Jesu mit seinen Jüngern vor der Auferstehung: zur Herkunft und Datierung des ‘Unbekannten Berliner Evangeliums,’” *ZNW* 94 (2003): 234–235.

⁷⁹⁷ Cf. Schmid, who states rather pessimistically that with the exception of certain Scriptural citations “gibt es keine sicheren Anhaltspunkte für eine Datierung des EvPhil” (Schmid, *Die Eucharistie*, 11).

⁷⁹⁸ See Barbara Thiering, “The Date and Unity of the Gospel of Philip,” *Journal of Higher Criticism* 2:1 (1995): 102–111.

⁷⁹⁹ Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 349.

third century.⁸⁰⁰ Let us take a closer look at the arguments that have been brought forward for a second-century date, taking those proposed by Wilson as our point of departure.⁸⁰¹ Wilson's first argument was based on his perception of a general agreement between *Gos. Phil.* and "Valentinianism" as it is presented in Irenaeus' *Adversus Haereses* and Clement of Alexandria's *Excerpta ex Theodoto*.⁸⁰² Wilson stopped short of arguing that Irenaeus knew *Gos. Phil.*, but claimed that the tractate "certainly reflects the Valentinian theory as he knew it,"⁸⁰³ without, however, offering any arguments in favour of this assessment. Gaffron, for his part, went one step further and claimed that *Gos. Phil.* presupposes "das voll ausgebildete valentinianische System," and that the date of the tractate would therefore have to be *as late as* the second half of the second century.⁸⁰⁴ Schenke likewise preferred such a date on the grounds of what he regarded as the text's affinities with "Valentinianism." He chose 138–158 as the earliest possible date, since this was the time when Valentinus was active.⁸⁰⁵ As for the latest possible date, Schenke has put this around 250,⁸⁰⁶ or 200,⁸⁰⁷ without in either case bothering to bring forward any arguments to support these dates. Gaffron, however, argued for the latter date as the latest possible on the grounds that "zu jener Zeit . . . tiefgreifende Wandlungen vollzogen und sich die Fronten zwischen Kirche und Gnosis verhärteten."⁸⁰⁸ A date subsequent to this would for Gaffron evidently not fit with the tractate's Christian self-understanding and lack of emphatic polemics against "der Großkirche."⁸⁰⁹

⁸⁰⁰ See, e.g., Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 3–5 (late second century); Gaffron, *Studien*, 70 (composition of original Greek in the late second century, Coptic translation in the third century [ibid., 220]); Schmid, *Die Eucharistie*, 13–14 (late second century, but possibly early third); Klaus Koschorke, "Die Polemik der Gnostiker gegen das kirchliche Christentum: Skizziert am Beispiel des Nag-Hammadi-Traktates *Testimonium Veritatis*," in *Gnosis and Gnosticism: Papers Read at the Seventh International Congress on Patristic Studies (Oxford, September 8th–13th 1975)* (ed. Martin Krause; NHS 8; Leiden: Brill, 1977), 43–49 (turn of the third century).

⁸⁰¹ Most scholars have in fact not felt the need to argue for their preferred date for the tractate.

⁸⁰² See Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 3. For this argument, cf. also Schenke, "The Gospel of Philip," 182–183; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 4–5.

⁸⁰³ Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 3–4.

⁸⁰⁴ Gaffron, *Studien*, 70.

⁸⁰⁵ See Schenke, "The Gospel of Philip," 182–183; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 4–5.

⁸⁰⁶ See Schenke, "The Gospel of Philip," 182–183.

⁸⁰⁷ See Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 5.

⁸⁰⁸ See Gaffron, *Studien*, 70.

⁸⁰⁹ See Gaffron, *Studien*, 65, 70.

Wilson's second argument involved the presence of certain similarities in *Gos. Phil.* with ideas found in the writings of the Apostolic Fathers.⁸¹⁰ His identification of orthodox ideas in *Gos. Phil.* and the text's professed Christianity led Wilson to argue, on the basis of the belief that "the Gnostics remained fairly close to the 'orthodox' Church down to about 180," and that "some at least of them were, or professed to be, Christians," that *Gos. Phil.* probably originated in the second century.⁸¹¹ According to this logic, a "Gnostic" document like *Gos. Phil.* would not have professed to be a Christian document, and would not have been so close to orthodox beliefs as *Gos. Phil.* seems to be, if it had been written significantly later than the second century.

Wilson's third argument focussed on the state of the canon that emerges from *Gos. Phil.*'s use of Scripture. His assessment was that "it is clear that for the author of Philip the greater part of our New Testament was known and recognized as authoritative," which Wilson found to be "consistent with a date in the second century."⁸¹² However, this is once again only an argument for the *earliest possible* date of the text. Evidence of the use of "the greater part of our New Testament" is of course common in later sources.

Wilson's fourth argument was not really an argument, but simply an appeal to "the general atmosphere" of *Gos. Phil.* which Wilson found, still without arguing the case, to be "rather that of the second century than of the third,"⁸¹³ offering the rather vague assertion that in *Gos. Phil.* "the Gnostic system has not yet been dissipated into fantasy as in some other later texts."⁸¹⁴

Clearly these arguments are not very strong and can hardly be used to argue anything other than an earliest possible date, and as Wilson himself rightly noted, "there is of course nothing to prevent the use of second-century ideas by men of the third century or even later."⁸¹⁵ The possibility that the text may retain certain second-century ideas but have been composed later, has, however, not been the focus of much scholarly

⁸¹⁰ See Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 4.

⁸¹¹ See Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 4.

⁸¹² See Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 4–5.

⁸¹³ See Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 5. Wilson admits that "This last factor is admittedly rather more subjective, since it is a matter of the impression formed by the individual scholar on the basis of his knowledge of the period" (*ibid.*).

⁸¹⁴ Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 4. Why a more "fantastic" and more mythological document would have had to be dated later is not explained.

⁸¹⁵ Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 3.

attention.⁸¹⁶ There has indeed been a marked tendency in scholarship to focus on establishing the *earliest possible* date of *Gos. Phil.*⁸¹⁷ Once this earliest possible date has been established to the individual scholar's satisfaction, the preferred *probable* date of composition has generally ended up close to the earliest possible one. Few attempts have been made to establish whether the document could plausibly have originated as late as the fourth century, let alone how it may have functioned in a setting roughly contemporary with the fourth- or fifth-century manuscript it is a part of.⁸¹⁸

A notable exception to this rule, however, is constituted by Wesley Isenberg's unfortunately unpublished doctoral dissertation.⁸¹⁹ Based on what he considered to be the date of Codex II, namely the late fourth or early fifth century, Isenberg argued for a *terminus ante quem* for the Greek original of *Gos. Phil.* of around 350–375.⁸²⁰ He then proceeded to argue

⁸¹⁶ William Joseph Stroud's 1970 dissertation focussed specifically on the question of the dating of *Gos. Phil.* (Stroud, "Problem of Dating"). Stroud came to the conclusion that *Gos. Phil.* was written between the years 150 and 200, and even went so far as to claim that the evidence he adduced was "strong enough to make this statement without qualification" (ibid., 228). The arguments Stroud put forward in support of this conclusion were highly questionable, however, and the endeavour was also marred by an almost exclusive focus on establishing the earliest possible date. The most questionable aspect of Stroud's thesis, however, lay in his methodology. His stated method was to build on what he admitted to be the rather weak arguments for such a dating already made by a handful of scholars but encompassed by those enumerated by Wilson (cf. ibid., 2–14, esp. 13–14). The fact that Stroud reached the conclusion that *Gos. Phil.* was written in the second half of the second century is no wonder, seeing as this was what he set out to prove from the beginning. Stroud candidly admits at the beginning of his study that his purpose is "to account for a second century date for the original composition of GP" (ibid., 14, and cf. also 3). Considering the fact that Stroud did not really consider other possibilities in his dissertation, it is clear that his whole endeavour was intrinsically circular.

⁸¹⁷ "It would appear that several mistaken assumptions have guided the scholarly reconstruction of the composition phase of the Nag Hammadi tractates," states Frederik Wisse. "The first is the tendency to work on the basis of the earliest possible date of a text. In view of the date of the codices, however, and the translation phase some decades earlier, composition could have been as late as the early fourth century. Since the estimated date of composition often has far reaching implications, proper historical method (based on the *simplicior potior* rule) demands that one starts with the latest possible date and move to an earlier one only if there is sufficient internal or external evidence to warrant this" (Wisse, "After the *Synopsis*," 149).

⁸¹⁸ See chapter 1 for a discussion of the date of the manuscript.

⁸¹⁹ Isenberg, "Coptic Gospel."

⁸²⁰ See Isenberg, "Coptic Gospel," 348. Why Isenberg puts his latest possible date at 375 when he argues that the manuscript may date from the early fifth century is not stated, but one suspects that it is in order to allow time for the supposed Greek original to be translated into Coptic. Why this process would have to take several decades, however, is not stated.

for a probable dating of the original quite close to this latest possible date. Isenberg argued on the basis of extensive parallels to patristic sources that *Gos. Phil.* is best understood in light of the developed catechumenate of the fourth century, and suggested 300–350 as the most probable time of origin.⁸²¹ What is especially intriguing, however, is the fact that Isenberg also showed interesting correspondences that may indicate an even later date for the tractate. Isenberg pointed out that although we do not find any explicit credal formulations in *Gos. Phil.*, we do find “pieces of paragraphs which reflect the possible content of discussions of various articles of a creed.”⁸²² In other words, there are indications that there is an important credal intertext to many of *Gos. Phil.*'s discussions, and that doctrinal controversy might be an important context. “One has the distinct impression,” states Isenberg, “that *Philip* is concerned with credal content and may be reflecting the well-known doctrinal difficulties of the Eastern Church during the Fourth Century.”⁸²³ But what might such a creed underlying *Gos. Phil.* look like? Isenberg argued that the tractate seems to allude to a creed similar to the Constantinopolitan one of 381.⁸²⁴ His main argument was based on the sequence of terms in *Gos. Phil.* 53.23–35. These are the terms “God,” “Father,” “Son,” “Holy Spirit,” “Life,” “Light,” “Resurrection,” and “Church.” *Gos. Phil.* states that these terms are deceptive and likely to be misunderstood unless one is taught their correct meaning. Isenberg points out that these are all “credal” terms, and that the only early creed that contains them all is in fact the Constantinopolitan Creed of 381.⁸²⁵ Based on his assessment of

⁸²¹ See Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 349. Isenberg’s somewhat understated response to Gaffron’s dating of *Gos. Phil.* to the second century is also instructive: “it is possible to identify in *GP* many verbal and conceptual similarities to third and fourth century orthodox Christian sacramental catecheses, especially those of John Chrysostom, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and Cyril of Jerusalem. If these are appropriate parallels, then perhaps a date later than AD 200 ought to be considered for this document. A possible dependence in 114:29–115:1 on the *Apocalypse of Paul*, usually dated ca. AD 250, also suggests a later date” (Wesley W. Isenberg, review of Hans-Georg Gaffron, *Studien zum koptischen Philipusevangelium unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Sakramente*, *JBL* 91:1 [1972]: 126). With a few notable exceptions there has indeed been surprisingly little focus on non-heresiological patristic parallels to the themes and theology of *Gos. Phil.* apart from Isenberg’s dissertation (notable exceptions include Segelberg, “Sacramental System”; Eijk, “Gospel of Philip”; Tripp, “Sacramental System”).

⁸²² Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 289.

⁸²³ Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 290.

⁸²⁴ See Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 289–290, and the discussion below.

⁸²⁵ See Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 289–290. Isenberg states that “although no complete creed rises to the surface in Philip, certain ‘credal’ words do, and these . . . are all found only in the Constantinopolitan Creed of 381 AD” (*ibid.*, 348).

a *terminus ante quem* of 375, however, Isenberg concluded that 381 “is too late a date to suggest that *Philip* was influenced by this creed,”⁸²⁶ and suggested that it might instead indicate “knowledge of an earlier local form of this creed,”⁸²⁷ which might have been “a local declaratory creed which is no longer extant but which was an earlier relative of the Creed of 381.”⁸²⁸ But is this date really out of bounds with regard to *Gos. Phil.*? We saw in chapter 1 that the *terminus ante quem* of the manuscript may indeed be well into the fifth century, and there is evidence that Greek texts were quickly translated into Coptic in this period, a fact that is relevant if *Gos. Phil.* is indeed a translation from Greek.⁸²⁹

However, even though he argued convincingly for the probability of a fourth-century date in his doctoral dissertation, Isenberg for some reason only mentions the arguments for an earliest possible date of the tractate in his introduction to the critical edition, where he instead ends up suggesting a late third-century date for *Gos. Phil.* on the rather vague grounds that such a date “would suit the many parallels to Gnostic and Christian literature.”⁸³⁰ This argument is somewhat odd in light of the fact that the many patristic parallels Isenberg showed in his dissertation were mainly from the fourth and fifth centuries.⁸³¹ I believe, however, that Isenberg’s suggestion of a possible fourth-century date has been undeservedly overlooked and that it still deserves a hearing.

In this regard it may also be noted that a handful of scholars have in fact seen indications in certain other Nag Hammadi writings that they may have been composed, or at least revised, in the fourth century. In the tractate known as the *Concept of Our Great Power* (NHC VI,4), for example, we actually find a condemnation of the Anomoeans,⁸³² one of the neo-Arian heresies, which places at least this particular text, and Codex VI which contains it, no earlier than the middle of the fourth century. And, as Mark Edwards has pointed out, “If it is accepted that some Nag Ham-

⁸²⁶ Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 290. Isenberg specifies that “381 seems a date too late to have this creed be influential on the Greek *Philip*” (ibid., 348–349).

⁸²⁷ Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 348–349.

⁸²⁸ Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 290. See below for further discussion of the possibility of a credal intertext to *Gos. Phil.*

⁸²⁹ See Orlandi, “Coptic Literature,” 74.

⁸³⁰ Isenberg, “Introduction,” 134–135.

⁸³¹ Isenberg thus shifted, without explanation, his estimate from a probable date of 300–350 to one of 250–300.

⁸³² *Great Pow.* 40.5–9 (see Frederik Wisse and Francis E. Williams, “The Concept of Our Great Power: VI,4:36,1–48,15,” in *Nag Hammadi Codices V,2–5 and VI with Papyrus Berolinensis 8502, 1 and 4* [ed. Douglas M. Parrott; NHS 11; Leiden: Brill, 1979], 304).

madi treatises were grounded in disputations of the fourth century, there is nothing to preclude the composition of other treatises in the light of a Church consensus of that time.⁸³³ Edwards himself has indeed argued in favour of a possible fourth-century date for the *Treatise on the Resurrection* (NHC I,4).⁸³⁴ Raoul Mortley has done likewise with regard to the *Gospel of Truth* (NHC I,3). On the basis of an analysis of its treatment of the issue of “the name of the father,” Mortley concludes that *Gos. Truth* “seems to bespeak a sophistication in Trinitarian matters which is not characteristic of second century Christianity. The Gospel of Truth responds to a problem which has arisen, and belongs to a period in which the problem has been clearly identified.”⁸³⁵ The period Mortley refers to is the period of the Arian debate around the middle of the fourth century. This does not necessarily mean that the text in its entirety derives from this period, but Mortley argues that there is a possibility that *Gos. Truth* “was first written in about 170, subjected to revision and development in later periods, and that the Nag Hammadi text constitutes a version which includes a response to the Arian debate, coming from the period 320–360 AD.”⁸³⁶ A similar case is constituted by the *Teachings of Silvanus* (NHC VII,4), which Roelof van den Broek has dated to the second to third decades of the fourth century on the basis of what he has identified as anti-Arian polemics in that text,⁸³⁷ and Alberto Camplani has argued such a case with regard to the *Tripartite Tractate* (NHC I,5).⁸³⁸ Keeping in mind Mortley, Edwards, van den Broek, and Camplani’s arguments for a fourth-century date for *Gos. Truth*, *Treat. Res.*, *Teach. Silv.*, and *Tri. Trac.* respectively,⁸³⁹ and Isenberg’s suggestions with regard to *Gos. Phil.*, it seems we may indeed look more closely into the possibility of a fourth-century date for the latter.

Since it is well nigh impossible to date the hypothetical original version of *Gos. Phil.*, what we may do instead is to evaluate *the date of the latest*

⁸³³ Edwards, “The *Epistle to Rheginus*,” 78.

⁸³⁴ See Edwards, “The *Epistle to Rheginus*.”

⁸³⁵ Raoul Mortley, “‘The Name of the Father is the Son’ (Gospel of Truth 38),” with an afterword by Michel Tardieu, in *Neoplatonism and Gnosticism* (ed. Richard T. Wallis and Jay Bregman; Studies in Neoplatonism: Ancient and Modern 6; Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 249.

⁸³⁶ Mortley, “The Name of the Father,” 249.

⁸³⁷ See Broek, “The Theology.”

⁸³⁸ See Alberto Camplani, “Per la cronologia di testi valentiniani: il *Trattato Tripartito* e la crisi ariana,” *Cassiodorus* 1 (1995): 171–195.

⁸³⁹ See Mortley, “The Name of the Father”; Edwards, “The *Epistle to Rheginus*”; Broek, “The Theology”; Camplani, “Per la cronologia.”

significant revision made to it in the course of its transmission to the version preserved in Nag Hammadi Codex II. This means that rather than peeling away layers of possible, or even probable, interpolations to get as close as possible to “the original,” we may instead ask whether there are any aspects of the text, whether interpolations or not, which could hardly have been present at a date significantly earlier than the period of the manuscript’s production. That is, we may look for datable evidence of fourth- or fifth-century revision or redaction and evaluate claims of a significantly earlier date of composition from that perspective.⁸⁴⁰ For, as Larry Hurtado has pointed out, “*Gos. Phil.* may well preserve some beliefs and practices that characterized Valentinian Christians, and perhaps other Christians as well, from various points diachronically down through the late fourth century.”⁸⁴¹

4.3. *Polemics and Doctrinal Debate*

As we have noted at several points in the preceding analysis, *Gos. Phil.* contains several openly polemical passages in addition to a great deal of implicit polemic. But who are the tractate’s polemics directed against?⁸⁴² We have already discussed a handful of passages that refer to Jews/Hebrews in a less than positive sense, but are these passages directed against actual Jews, or against other Christians? And what about the passages that speak about others who “are wrong” in professing this or that point of view? Are they directed against a specific opponent or opponents, or are they simply literary devices used rhetorically in order to get *Gos. Phil.*’s doctrinal points across, without actually being directed against anyone in particular?

4.3.1. *Inner-Christian Polemics*

“Behind the arguments of the *Gospel of Philip* stands its polemic against the official Christianity of the masses,” claims Kurt Rudolph,⁸⁴³ a sentiment that has been echoed by a significant number of schol-

⁸⁴⁰ Cf. Wisse, “After the *Synopsis*,” 149.

⁸⁴¹ Hurtado, *Lord Jesus Christ*, 538.

⁸⁴² As Isenberg somewhat anachronistically puts it, “the original author . . . carries on a polemic against ‘some who say’ things he opposes . . . but who are not present in his classroom to respond,” and suggests that these people “are perhaps orthodox church leaders” (Isenberg, “Introduction,” 134).

⁸⁴³ Rudolph, “Response,” 231.

ars.⁸⁴⁴ In *Gos. Phil.*'s discourse on the relationship between names, types, or images and the realities they refer to, Rudolph sees a polemic "directed against the official church and its understanding of Christian tradition," an "official church which uses wrong, false notions and names in order to confuse the believers."⁸⁴⁵ But is this really an apt description of the target(s) of *Gos. Phil.*'s polemics? As we have seen in the discussion above, the tractate seems rather to be engaged in outlining the relationship between the ultimate realities and the names, types, and images that are needed to gain any kind of access to them in this world. That *Gos. Phil.* stresses the need for instruction in order to learn the proper meaning of Christianity's key symbols is not in any way at odds with what we find in other Christian sources in the period when *Gos. Phil.* may have been produced, and especially if we compare it with sources from the fourth or fifth centuries.

One of the key passages that have been used to argue that *Gos. Phil.* is a "Gnostic" text that has a polemical edge against Christianity is the one which proclaims that the correctly initiated Christian, i.e., the one who has received the name by means of the chrismation, has become a Christ.⁸⁴⁶ Commenting on this passage, Borchert asks "who could wish for more? But what true Christian would not be troubled by such a wish?"⁸⁴⁷ Similarly, Pagels claims that "those who expected to 'become Christ' themselves were not likely to recognize the institutional structures of the church—its bishop, priest, creed, canon, or ritual—as bearing ultimate authority."⁸⁴⁸ But are these scholars right in understanding these passages in *Gos. Phil.* as having a polemical edge against "conventional Christians" and institutional structures? As I have shown above, the passage in question is better understood as an argument for the importance of receiving the Holy Spirit in connection with baptism, and especially the effects of the chrismation, but without any specific polemical edge

⁸⁴⁴ See, e.g., Borchert, "Gnostic Threat"; Franzmann, "A Complete History," 120–121.

⁸⁴⁵ Rudolph, "Response," 231.

⁸⁴⁶ See *Gos. Phil.* 67.19–27.

⁸⁴⁷ Borchert, "Gnostic Threat," 93.

⁸⁴⁸ Pagels, *The Gnostic Gospels*, 134. Cf. also PHEME PERKINS, who claims that "The sacramental catechesis in *Gos. Phil.* insists that its rites transform the initiate into Christ in contrast to those of conventional Christians which merely lend the name Christian at interest." PHEME PERKINS, "Identification with the Savior in Coptic Texts from Nag Hammadi," in *The Jewish Roots of Christological Monotheism: Papers from the St. Andrews Conference on the Historical Origins of the Worship of Jesus* (ed. Carey C. Newman, et al.; JSJSup 63; Leiden: Brill, 1999), 183. Cf. also *ibid.*, 177, where she claims that "*Gos. Phil.* criticizes conventional baptismal practices."

against “conventional Christians.” I have also shown above how this passage works within a rhetoric that in fact seems to argue in favour of a hierarchical community organisation. Moreover, what we know of ritual interpretation from the first Christian centuries does not support the identification of these views exclusively with “heretical” or “fringe” groups, since these are viewpoints that are attested in the writings of decidedly “orthodox” Church Fathers, overlooked by Borchert, Pagels and others. The notion that the initiated Christians in a sense became Christs is indeed widely attested in patristic sources.⁸⁴⁹

As Gaffron has noted, “es besteht kein Zweifel, daß Ph und seine Gemeinde sich als Christen verstanden haben, und zwar völlig harmlos und ohne das Pathos anderer Gnostiker gegenüber den ‘Psychikern’ der Großkirche.”⁸⁵⁰ Moreover, Gaffron observed that “die gelegentlichen Polemiken gegen Lehrmeinungen anderer christlicher oder gnostischer Gruppen lassen sich jedenfalls nicht auf die Formel bringen: hie Orthodoxie—hie Häresie.”⁸⁵¹ Granted, *Gos. Phil.* does engage in a polemic against those who falsely call themselves Christian, those who have merely borrowed the name, but in this it is no different from other patristic sources, and hence it does not necessarily imply any polemic specifically directed against the “orthodox / catholic / mainstream” Church.⁸⁵² It seems more likely that *Gos. Phil.* is simply engaged in a polemic against certain other interpretations of key Christian theologoumena, rituals, and symbols, but the identity of the Christian groups or individuals that are the targets of its polemics are difficult to decide. I will nevertheless point out some possibilities below, without in any way claiming this to be a comprehensive overview.

⁸⁴⁹ For the identification of the initiated Christian as “Christ,” see, e.g., Tertullian, *On Baptism* 7 (see Finn, *Italy, North Africa, and Egypt*); Cyril of Jerusalem, *Baptismal Catechesis* 3 (see Finn, *West and East Syria*, 49–50); Kilian McDonnell and George T. Montague, *Christian Initiation and Baptism in the Holy Spirit: Evidence from the First Eight Centuries* (2nd rev. ed.; Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1994), 210.

⁸⁵⁰ Gaffron, *Studien*, 65.

⁸⁵¹ Gaffron, *Studien*, 65.

⁸⁵² As Wilson has noted, “It is a striking fact that some of the closest parallels to the Gnostic Gospel of Philip are to be found not in Gnostic texts but in Irenaeus, and not in his extracts from Gnostic documents but in his own Demonstration of the Christian faith” (Robert McL. Wilson, “Gnosis, Gnosticism and the New Testament,” in *Le Origini dello Gnosticismo: Colloquio di Messina 13–18 Aprile 1966: Testi e Discussioni* [ed. Ugo Bianchi; SHR 12; Leiden: Brill, 1967], 525 n. 2).

4.3.1.1.1. *Creed*

We noted earlier that there might very well be an important credal intertext to *Gos. Phil.*, and the suggestion by Isenberg that this might be an earlier relative of the Constantinopolitan creed of 381. Let us now look closer at some of the indications that there may indeed be a credal intertext to *Gos. Phil.*, focussing here first and foremost on Christology. It is outside of the scope of the present study to conduct any in-depth analysis of *Gos. Phil.*'s relationship to early Christian creeds, so I will limit myself to a few remarks on a couple of issues pertinent to the analyses conducted above.

In the words of Gabriele Winkler, "Christological disputes resulted in considerable efforts to clarify Jesus' relationship to his Father."⁸⁵³ Questions included whether Christ was to be regarded as pre-existent, whether he was made or begotten, whether he received his sonship from his birth from the Virgin Mary or from baptism, and of the relationship between his human and divine elements. Some, for example, "stressed the beginning of Jesus' Divine Sonship at the river Jordan: Jesus became the Christ and was proclaimed the Son of God only by virtue of the Spirit who descended on Jesus at his baptism," while others "insisted on the pre-existence of the Logos and his miraculous birth by the Virgin Mary through the power of the Holy Spirit."⁸⁵⁴ These are of course, as we have seen, exactly the kind of issues that are discussed in *Gos. Phil.*

4.3.1.1.1.1. "Begotten, Not Made"

An especially conspicuous element in *Gos. Phil.* with regard to a possible credal intertext and a clue to the tractate's polemical context is its emphasis on the crucial differences between begetting and creating, and its focus on the christological point that Christ was not made, but begotten. This is indeed, as we have seen, a highly important aspect of *Gos. Phil.*'s rhetoric since, by means of the blend THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST, it underlies most of *Gos. Phil.*'s argument with regard to the efficacy of the Christian rites of initiation. The relationship between the Father and the Son and the subsequent father-son relations perpetuated through apostolic succession, where each generation of Christians is begotten and reborn as

⁸⁵³ Gabriele Winkler, "A Remarkable Shift in the 4th Century Creeds: An Analysis of the Armenian, Syriac, and Greek Evidence," in *Studia Patristica 17: The 8th International Conference on Patristic Studies met in Oxford from 3 to 8 Sept. 1979* (ed. Elisabeth A. Livingstone; *StPatr* 17:3; Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982), 1399.

⁸⁵⁴ Winkler, "A Remarkable Shift," 1399.

Christs by one of Christ's successors, who are all begotten as sons and beget as fathers, are without doubt of fundamental importance to the sacramental theology of *Gos. Phil.*, and as such among the tractate's main themes throughout, connecting its Christology and anthropology with its mystagogy.

"Begetting" and "creating" were key terms in the Arian controversy of the fourth century.⁸⁵⁵ In the early phases of the trinitarian debates of the fourth century the focus was not so much on the trinity per se, as it was on the relationship between the Father and the Son. One particularly important aspect of the controversy was the question of whether the Son could be described as *created* by the Father, and the famous statement that the Son was "begotten, not made" (γεννηθέντα οὐ ποιηθέντα / ενταυχπου νταταμιου αν) was introduced in the Nicene Creed especially to counter the "Arian" view which was anathematised at this council.⁸⁵⁶ The matter was not finally settled by the decisions at Nicea, however, but the debate raged on for the remainder of the century, with shifting fortunes for those involved, in a historical process of baffling complexity.⁸⁵⁷ It should be clear by now how this is relevant to *Gos. Phil.*, for we have seen that the question of begetting versus creating is of central importance to this text. Indeed, the principle of "begotten, not made" is in fact applied to a range of issues not confined to the simple relationship between God, the Father, and Christ, the Son. While a figure like Athanasius, for example, focused on the relation between the first and the second person of the trinity (God the Father, and Christ the Logos) and argued against the Arians that Christ was not created, but begotten, and hence was not a creature, but an offspring, *Gos. Phil.* takes this one step

⁸⁵⁵ Isenberg pointed out this in his doctoral dissertation (see Isenberg, "Coptic Gospel," 348). On Arianism and the Arian controversy, see, e.g., Richard P.C. Hanson, *The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy, 318–381* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988); Rowan Williams, *Arius: Heresy and Tradition* (rev. ed.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2002); Lewis Ayres, *Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Grillmeier, *From the Apostolic Age*; J.N.D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines* (5th revised ed.; London: A & C Black, 1977).

⁸⁵⁶ See, e.g., Grillmeier, *From the Apostolic Age*, 267; Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, 237. For the Coptic text of the Nicene creed, see M. Eugène Revillout, *Le concile de Nicée, d'après les textes coptes et les diverses collections canoniques* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1881).

⁸⁵⁷ See, e.g., Hanson, *The Search*; R. Williams, *Arius*; Ayres, *Nicaea and Its Legacy*; Grillmeier, *From the Apostolic Age*; Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines*.

further. While being in agreement with a position like that held by Athanasius with regard to the relationship between the Father and the Son, *Gos. Phil.* also applies this relationship to that between Christ and the Christians, and to an interpretation of the rites of initiation, arguing that a proper Christian initiation involves the begetting of new offspring, new Christians, by a Father. In order to become a proper Christian, which in this text involves an important element of deification, it is crucial that when one becomes “a Christ” one must be begotten, not made, by way of a line of apostolic succession by means of ritual initiation stretching all the way back to Christ’s baptism in the Jordan—a baptism that is also interpreted in terms of a begetting.

In addition, the passage *Gos. Phil.* 81.21–26, which discusses the difference between begetting (ⲁⲓⲛⲟ) and creating (ϭⲟⲛⲧ) at length,⁸⁵⁸ seems not only quite clearly to be dependent on the delineation of these important terms in the Arian debate, but we indeed find a close parallel in an unidentified anti-Arian Coptic fragment in the Pierpont Morgan collection.⁸⁵⁹ The preserved fragment begins as follows:

ⲁⲛⲞⲚ ⲁⲈ ⲁⲛⲞⲚ ϩⲈⲛϭⲞⲛⲧ ⲁϥⲱ ⲛⲈⲦⲁϥⲱⲉⲛⲉ ⲈⲐⲐⲟⲟⲛ ϩⲈⲛϭⲞⲛⲧ
 ⲛⲈ ϩⲛⲓⲛⲟϥⲧⲈ ⲁⲈ ⲛⲁⲦϭⲞⲛⲧϥ ⲟϥϭⲞⲛⲧ ⲁⲛ ⲛⲈ ⲛⲈϥϭⲁⲛⲟ ⲈⲱϭⲈⲛⲧⲁϥϭⲁⲛⲟ
 ⲈⲘⲛⲧⲁϥϭⲞⲛⲧ ⲁⲛ ⲈⲱϭⲈⲛⲛⲛϭⲁⲛϭⲞⲛⲧ ⲁⲈ ⲁϥϭⲁⲛⲟ ⲛⲁⲱ ⲛⲈⲈ ⲛⲈⲦⲁϥϭⲞⲛⲧϥ
 ⲛⲱⲟⲣⲛ ⲁϥϭⲁⲛⲟϥ ⲛⲛⲛϭⲟϥ

But as for us, we are creatures and those who have come into being through us are creatures, but in God, the uncreated, his offspring is not a creature. If he begat, then he did not create, but if he begat after the creation, how was he created first and begotten afterwards?⁸⁶⁰ (M706b)

While this fragment does not draw the mystagogical and deificatory implications from the christological “begotten, not made”-principle as *Gos. Phil.* does, it does give us a discussion of the differences between creating and begetting in highly similar terms and, as becomes clear from the fragment as a whole, in a context where the anti-Arian nature of this particular discussion and the post-Nicene date of the text is not in doubt.⁸⁶¹

⁸⁵⁸ See the discussion above.

⁸⁵⁹ This is Pierpont Morgan Library Coptic Manuscript M706b, published by Leo Depuydt in 1993 as entry No. 82, an unattributed *Homiletic Fragment* (Depuydt, *Catalogue*, 1:163).

⁸⁶⁰ *Homiletic Fragment* (Depuydt, *Catalogue*, 1:163).

⁸⁶¹ The text also makes reference to questions central to the Nestorian debate of the fifth century.

By implication, then, since, while Origen, for example, did hold the Son to be begotten, the “theology of Origen’s day had not yet established the distinction between creation and generation that was to prove so crucial to the triadological debates of the following century,”⁸⁶² it does seem likely that this aspect of *Gos. Phil.* should not be dated earlier than the Arian debate of the fourth century. Moreover, since this distinction is of key importance in several of *Gos. Phil.*’s most central discussions, one might indeed go so far as to say that there is an anti-Arian strand running deep throughout *Gos. Phil.*

With regard to the use of begetting-imagery in *Gos. Phil.* it is also worthy of note that it also describes “the children of the perfect man” (ἄωρη ἰππελειος ῥωμε) as “these who do not die, but are always begotten” (ναει εμαγμογ αλλα σεχπο ἴμοογ ογοειω νιμ),⁸⁶³ a statement that looks very much like a reference to the doctrine of the eternal begetting of the Son, a doctrine that is found especially in Origen and in the Nicene Creed.⁸⁶⁴ *Gos. Phil.* seems to apply this doctrine not only to Christ, but also, in accordance with the underlying THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST blend, to each individual Christian, who as we have seen are identified as “sons / children of the perfect man.”

4.3.1.1.2. The Virgin Birth

We have seen that *Gos. Phil.* is adamant that the Virgin Mary did not conceive by the Holy Spirit. How does this stack up against the main early Christian creeds? Most early Western creeds mention Christ’s birth from the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary, but there were different ways of putting it. Christ was either born “from the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary” or “from the Holy Spirit, from the Virgin Mary.”⁸⁶⁵ Especially interesting with regard to *Gos. Phil.*, however, is the reading, first attested by Jerome to have been used at Rimini in 359, which stated that Christ

⁸⁶² Alexander Golitzin, *Et introibo ad altare dei: The Mystagogy of Dionysius Areopagita, with Special Reference to Its Predecessors in the Eastern Christian Tradition* (Analekta Vlatadon 59; Thessaloniki: Patriarchikon Idryma Paterikon Meleton, 1994), 271. As L.G. Patterson notes, the distinctions in meaning between creating and begetting “begin to become crucial with Athanasius” (L.G. Patterson, *Methodius of Olympus: Divine Sovereignty, Human Freedom, and Life in Christ* [Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1997], 210 n. 14, and cf. 45).

⁸⁶³ *Gos. Phil.* 58.20–22. Cf. also *Gos. Phil.* 64.10–12, where Christ’s pre-existence is stressed.

⁸⁶⁴ See, e.g., Grillmeier, *From the Apostolic Age*, 175–176, 230.

⁸⁶⁵ The phrase used is mainly *qui natus est de Spiritu sancto et Maria virgine*, as in the Milanese creed we know from Augustine, or *qui natus est de Spiritu sancto ex Maria*

“was conceived by the Holy Spirit, born from the Virgin Mary.”⁸⁶⁶ This is exactly the kind of interpretation of Christ’s virgin birth that is explicitly rejected by *Gos. Phil.*, and our tractate was by no means alone in rejecting an interpretation along these lines. Rufinus, in his *Commentary on the Apostles’ Creed*, stresses that Christ was “born by the Holy Spirit from the Virgin,” and is adamant, like *Gos. Phil.*, that this did not in any way involve any defilement.⁸⁶⁷ The role of the Holy Spirit in this, according to Rufinus, appealing to Ezek 44.2, was to construct a temple for the Son in the womb of Mary.⁸⁶⁸ In the Eastern creeds, on the other hand, we do not find any close connection between the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary prior to the Constantinopolitan Creed of 381. The Nicene creed does not even mention the Virgin Mary, and the Council of Antioch, early in 325, simply stated that the “Son, the divine Logos,” was “born in flesh from Mary the Mother of God and made incarnate.”⁸⁶⁹

We may thus conclude that *Gos. Phil.* is not in line with the kind of addition made to the *Apostles’ Creed* in Rimini in 359, but it would not have contradicted the Eastern type of creed on this point, and its position may well have been compatible with Rufinus’ interpretation of the nativity.

4.3.1.1.3. The Resurrection of the Flesh

We have seen that the resurrection occupies a prominent position in *Gos. Phil.* and we saw in the analysis of *Gos. Phil.*’s views on the resurrection that, although it interprets it in a less than intuitive fashion, *Gos. Phil.* seems to take special pains to describe the resurrection in terms of the exact phrase “in this flesh” (ἐν τῷ σαρκί). But why does *Gos. Phil.* employ the language of arising “in this flesh” when what it is really advocating is a resurrection in the flesh of Christ? We saw that the fact that *Gos. Phil.* does not formulate its position that one must rise in the flesh of Christ more clearly would seem to suggest that the wording “in this flesh” was important in itself, which would again indicate that *Gos. Phil.* may be referring to an important authoritative intertext. Could there in fact be a credal formula underlying the use of this phrase in *Gos. Phil.*?

virgine, as in the Milanese creed of Ambrose and in the creeds of Aquileia, Ravenna, and Turin (see Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, 173–174), and indeed in the *Apostolic Tradition* (see Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, 114).

⁸⁶⁶ See Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, 376.

⁸⁶⁷ See Rufinus, *Symb.*, 9 in Kelly, *Rufinus*, 42.

⁸⁶⁸ See Rufinus, *Symb.*, 9 in Kelly, *Rufinus*, 42–43.

⁸⁶⁹ See Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, 210.

Granted, as all commentators on *Gos. Phil.* have duly noted, the resurrection was a hot topic in the doctrinal debates of the second century. What has been largely ignored, however, is the fact that the topic returned with a vengeance in the late fourth century, under the aegis of the Origenist controversy, and continued to be of great importance well into the fifth.⁸⁷⁰ The question of the resurrection of the flesh became an especially important point of contention in the Origenist controversy around the end of the fourth century and the beginning of the fifth. In a letter targeting his former friend Rufinus in 399, Jerome states that

There are some who believe, they say, in the resurrection of the body. This confession, if only it be sincere, is free from objection. But as there are bodies celestial and bodies terrestrial . . . they use the word ‘body’ instead of the word ‘flesh’ in order that an orthodox person hearing them say ‘body’ may take them to mean ‘flesh,’ while a heretic will understand that they mean ‘spirit.’⁸⁷¹ (Jerome, *Ep.* 84.5)

Rufinus, for his part, replies that what rises in the resurrection “will be this very flesh in which we now live. We do not hold, as is slanderously reported by some men, that another flesh will rise instead of this; but this very flesh.”⁸⁷² In relation to these views, then, it is interesting to note that *Gos. Phil.* actually affirms the resurrection “in this flesh” while in fact holding that what rises is really another flesh—exactly the kind of redefinition, then, that Rufinus is accused of and tries to defend himself against.

J.N.D. Kelly suggests that the reason why many creeds refer to the resurrection of the flesh rather than to the resurrection of the dead, the form preferred by the New Testament, was in order to “counter anti-realist interpretations of the doctrine of the resurrection.”⁸⁷³ Although

⁸⁷⁰ See, e.g., Clark, *The Origenist Controversy*. Dechow notes that among Egyptian monastics “the doctrine of resurrection still seems to have been in flux before Shenoute’s time, despite Epiphanius’ polemic and the opposition from simpler Coptic monks to speculative eschatologies” (Dechow, *Dogma and Mysticism*, 231–232). See also D.W. Young, “The Milieu of Nag Hammadi.” For examples of the fifth-century discussions of this topic in Coptic, see, e.g., Shenoute, *I Am Amazed*, 389–390, 401–404; Shenoute, *There is Another Foolishness*; Shenoute, *God is Holy*; Shenoute, *Who Speaks Through the Prophets*; Shenoute, A19.

⁸⁷¹ English translation from Joanne E. McWilliam Dewart, *Death and Resurrection* (Message of the Fathers of the Church 22; Wilmington, Delaware: Michael Glazier, 1986), 145.

⁸⁷² Rufinus, *Apology*, 3–4; English translation from Dewart, *Death and Resurrection*, 146.

⁸⁷³ Kelly, *Rufinus*, 149 n. 258.

the Nicene creed does not treat the resurrection of the dead at all, a statement concerning the resurrection of the flesh is included in a number of other fourth- and fifth-century creeds both Eastern and Western. According to Kelly, however, the addition of “this” before “flesh” “is peculiar to the Aquileian creed,” used by Rufinus.⁸⁷⁴ In his *Commentary on the Apostles’ Creed*, Rufinus refers to this wording in order to argue in favour of the resurrection of the material body. “The word ‘this,’” Rufinus states, “refers to the actual flesh of the Christian who recites the creed.”⁸⁷⁵ Could it be that *Gos. Phil.* is actually referring to a credal formula with the same wording,⁸⁷⁶ which was originally introduced to counter the interpretation that it is not the material body that rises, in order to argue exactly the opposite? This seems to be a distinct possibility, for it would not seem to be necessary for *Gos. Phil.* to emphasise the need to rise in “this flesh” if such a wording was not authoritative in itself, and thus taken for granted, since the most intuitive interpretation of that phrase would run counter to the one actually given by *Gos. Phil.* If we accept this conclusion, *Gos. Phil.* may actually be trying to counter the intended effects of the introduction of the demonstrative “this” in the phrase “this flesh” by affirming that of course we must rise “in this flesh,” while at the same time reinterpreting the phrase to suit its own interpretation of the resurrection that does not, after all, involve the material flesh. The tractate might, in other words, be engaged in a polemic against others who, like Rufinus claims to be doing, use such a credal formula to argue in favour of the resurrection of the material flesh.

A.H.C. van Eijk, however, argues that while *Gos. Phil.* expresses agreement with the formulas “σαρκὸς ἀνάστασις and ἀνάστασις ἐν (τῇ) σαρκί,” which he acknowledges “were accepted by the ‘orthodox’ church,”

⁸⁷⁴ See Kelly, *Rufinus*, 150 n. 268.

⁸⁷⁵ Rufinus, *Symb.* 43, quoted from Kelly, *Rufinus*, 81. See also *Symb.* 45 (Kelly, *Rufinus*, 83–84). Kelly notes that one of the Origenist errors Rufinus was accused of was the rejection of the resurrection of the flesh (see Kelly, *Rufinus*, 150 n. 268). This prompted Rufinus to state elsewhere that “I have made mention not only of the body, as to which cavils are raised, but of the flesh; and not only of the flesh, but I have added ‘this flesh.’ Further, I have spoken not only of ‘this flesh,’ but of ‘this natural flesh.’ I have not even stopped here, but have asserted that not even the completeness of the several members will be lacking. I have only demanded that, in harmony with the Apostle’s words, it should rise incorruptible instead of corruptible, glorious instead of dishonoured, immortal instead of frail, spiritual instead of natural; and that we should think of the members of the spiritual body as being without taint of corruption or frailty” (Rufinus, *Apol. Orig.*, I.9, quoted from Kelly, *Rufinus*, 150–151 n. 268).

⁸⁷⁶ See Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, 174.

the tractate also criticises these formulas.⁸⁷⁷ I think, however, that it is unnecessary to postulate any criticism of the formula itself on the part of *Gos. Phil.* Instead, it is probably more correct to say that the tractate takes pains to *interpret* the formula in a way that fits its overall theological system, while taking the formula itself for granted, even attacking those who would deny it. It is diverging interpretations of the formula, and especially attempts to use it to argue in favour of the resurrection of the material flesh (which was indeed its intention) that is criticised.⁸⁷⁸ One indeed gets the impression that *Gos. Phil.* is here in a sense sailing under false flag, giving the impression of affirming the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh, and thus conforming to accepted dogma, while arguing what in reality amounts to the opposite. In the context of the late fourth and early fifth century, this may, however, be quite understandable in light of the increasing importance of being in line with the authoritative statements on key doctrinal issues. What we may be witnessing in *Gos. Phil.* may thus be an act of redefinition of the doctrinal statement concerning resurrection “in this flesh” in order to make it suit its own quite distinct theological agenda.

As for *Gos. Phil.*'s interpretation of Scripture in its statements concerning the resurrection flesh, van Eijk noted in his 1971 article on the resurrection in *Gos. Phil.* that the tractate “offers an interesting and original interpretation” of 1 Cor 15:50, “by linking the flesh and blood in 1 Cor 15,50 with the flesh and blood of John 6,53–56.”⁸⁷⁹ The reason why he found this interpretation to be original was “because this surprising link appears nowhere in the Christian (incl. gnostic) literature on the resurrection up to the end of the third century.”⁸⁸⁰ Since van Eijk assumed that *Gos. Phil.* should be dated significantly earlier, he argued that because “the link between the Eucharist and the resurrection appears in no other Christian document before the third century, we may assume that the

⁸⁷⁷ See Eijk, “Gospel of Philip,” 95.

⁸⁷⁸ Dwight Young has shown that Shenoute of Atripe was also engaged in polemics regarding the resurrection of the flesh in ways corresponding to *Gos. Phil.* Commenting on the similarities between a letter of Shenoute directed against “foolish notions” and “senseless ideas” concerning the resurrection, Young notes that *Gos. Phil.*'s statement concerning the necessity of rising in this flesh “was just as timely in Shenoute's day as it was when first written. The same argument was still taking place in communities along the Nile” (see D.W. Young, “The Milieu of Nag Hammadi,” 130–131). This leads Young to conclude that “It may be the case that Shenoute was not aware of the existence of *Philip*, but we need not dismiss the possibility” (ibid., 131).

⁸⁷⁹ Eijk, “Gospel of Philip,” 96.

⁸⁸⁰ Eijk, “Gospel of Philip,” 96.

author of *Ev.Phil.* when putting John 6,53 and 1 Cor. 15,50 together, drew his awareness of the existence of such a link directly from the text of John 6.⁸⁸¹ It is worth noting, however, that if we redate the text to the fourth or fifth century, *Gos. Phil.* is not particularly original on this point at all.

4.3.2. *Anti-Judaism and Associative Anti-Judaism*

Isenberg has claimed that *Gos. Phil.* “does not engage in any rhetorical invective against the Jews.”⁸⁸² But is this really the case? We have seen repeatedly in the discussions above that there indeed seems to be a noticeable polemic against Judaism throughout *Gos. Phil.* First and foremost, the initiation procedure of the Christians is contrasted with that of the Jews. Borchert has rightly noted that in *Gos. Phil.*’s statement that “he who has not received the Lord is a Hebrew still” (ΠΕΝΤΑΡΧΙΠΛΟΕΙΣ ΔΗ Ο ΝΗΖΕΒΡΑΙΟΣ ΕΤΙ),⁸⁸³ “the term Hebrew is probably regarded as a derogatory title implying incompleteness or non-transformation.”⁸⁸⁴ According to this tractate the Jewish initiation rites are inferior to the Christian ones on a number of counts. Not only do the Jews not receive the Lord, but neither do they receive the Holy Spirit in initiation. In *Gos. Phil.* the reception of the Holy Spirit is closely connected to the chrismation interpreted in terms of a father’s begetting of sons, and regarded as something that bestows the quality of being a Christ. The Hebrews do not have a father, and consequently they do not receive the Holy Spirit, nor do they become Christs. And, as we have seen, due to this lack in their initiation rites *Gos. Phil.* implies that like earthenware vessels cannot be remade, the Jews will not be resurrected.

What *Gos. Phil.* seems to be doing is to highlight some important aspects of Christian initiation and community organisation using Judaism rhetorically as the “other” by which it defines itself.⁸⁸⁵ Procreation- and kinship-metaphors are in *Gos. Phil.* used to present Christianity as patrilineal against the matrilineality of Judaism, and also to contrast

⁸⁸¹ Eijk, “Gospel of Philip,” 101.

⁸⁸² Isenberg, “Coptic Gospel,” 193 n. 1.

⁸⁸³ *Gos. Phil.* 62.5–6.

⁸⁸⁴ Borchert, “Literary Arrangement,” 182. Although Borchert suggests that “it may have been used as a reference to ‘orthodox’ Christians, who did not receive the Lord in the manner which Philip advocates,” he concedes that the passage “could be interpreted without any Gnostic premises” (*ibid.*, 182–183).

⁸⁸⁵ Cf. Perkins, *Gnosticism and the New Testament*, 184.

the begetting and birth of potentially “fertile” Christians through ritual initiation, over against Judaism’s mere creation of “infertile” proselytes. Moreover, the Hebrews/Jews represent not only contemporary Jews, but also Judaism as the state prior to Christianity, both in a historical and in an individual sense, and Judaism is thus presented as having been superseded by Christianity. The differences between Jews and Christians are also discussed in an unfortunately badly damaged part of the manuscript:

εβολ ρη̄νιογδ[αι] ἰχριστιανος ακ[.]ω αχμογτε
 ανεεμα[.] πγενος ετσοτπ ἰππ[.] αχω παληθεινος ρρωμε
 αχω παρηρε ἰπρωμε αχω πσπερμα ἰπρωρε ἰπρωμε ππειγενος ἰαλληθεινον
 σερονομαζε ἰμογ ρἰπκοςμος ναει νε πμα ετογωροοπ ἰμαγ ἰβιῶωρη
 ἰππνημφων

from the Jews [...] the Christians [...] these places are called [...] the chosen race of [...] and the true man and the Son of Man and the seed of the Son of Man. This true race is renowned in the world. These are the places where the children of the bridal chamber⁸⁸⁶ dwell.

(*Gos. Phil.* 75.33–76.6)

The “children of the bridal chamber” must here be understood as the Christians, and they seem to be contrasted with the Jewish people. Although the passage is riddled with lacunae, it seems probable that *Gos. Phil.* is here referring to the Christians as a “true race” (γενος ἰαλληθεινον) in direct polemics against the Jews who claim to be “the chosen race” (πγενος ετσοτπ).

We have also seen that *Gos. Phil.* connects the (old) Tree of Knowledge, which brought death, with the Jewish law, and that the tractate rejects the Jewish dietary restrictions. Interestingly, *Gos. Phil.* not only sets up a dichotomy of the old and new trees of knowledge, the one being the Jewish law and the other being identified with the cross and Christianity, however, but the same dichotomy is also presented in terms of wisdom:

κεογα πε εχαμῶθ αχω κεογα πε εχμῶθ εχαμῶθ τε τσοφια ραπλωσ εκμῶθ
 δε τε τσοφια ἰππομγ ετεται τε τσοφια {ἰππομγ ετεται τε} ετσοογν
 ἰππομγ ται ετογμογτε ερος χετκογει ἰσοφια

Echamoth is one thing and Echmoth is another. Echamoth is simply Wisdom, but Echmoth is the wisdom of death, which is the wisdom which knows death, this which is called the little Wisdom.

(*Gos. Phil.* 60.10–15)

⁸⁸⁶ Cf. Matt 9:15; Mark 2:19; Luke 5:34.

In light of how *Gos. Phil.* presents the old and the new knowledge, then, we see here how the wisdom of death is similarly contrasted with the true wisdom, the former thus being easily identified with Judaism, and the latter with Christianity.⁸⁸⁷ This contrast between the old and new wisdom is also reflected elsewhere in the tractate, in slightly different terms. We are told twice that wisdom is “barren” (στῆρα),⁸⁸⁸ the second time in highly allusive terms:

ἮΤΟΣ ΤΕ ΤΜΑΑ[Υ ΝῆΑΓ]ΓΕΛΟΣ

The wisdom that is called the barren, she is the [mother of the an]gel[s]
(*Gos. Phil.* 63.30–32)

Scholars have come to different conclusions regarding the identity of these angels.⁸⁸⁹ It is important, however, to note that the passage evokes Isa 54:1, especially as this passage is quoted and interpreted by Paul in Galatians. Paul quotes Isa 54:1 at Gal 4:27:

ῬΗΧῆ ΓΑΡ ΔΕΕΥΦΡΑΝΕ ΤΑΣΡΗΝ ΕΤΕΜΕΣΜΙΣΕ ΩΨ ΕΒΟΛ ἩΤΕΑΩΚΑΚ ΤΕΤΕΜΕΣΤ-
ΝΑΑΚΕ ΔΕΝΑΩΕΨΗΡΕ ἩΤΕΤΕΜῆΤῚΡΑΪ ΕΡΟΥΕΤΕΤΕΥῆΤῚΠΡΑΪ⁸⁹⁰

For it is written: Rejoice, barren one⁸⁹¹ who does not bear; cry out and call out, you who do not give birth, for she who does not have a husband has many more children than she who has a husband. (Gal 4:27)

⁸⁸⁷ This passage has most often been interpreted in terms of the “Valentinian” doctrine of the higher and lower Sophia’s (see, e.g., Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1959],” 3; Schenke, “Das Evangelium nach Philippus [1960],” 35; Schenke, “The Gospel of Philip,” 186; Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 8), but as Thomassen has rightly noted, “*Gos. Phil.* merely comments on the Aramaic form of a commonly used term, just as it does elsewhere with several other items of theological vocabulary,” and he also points out that the distinction made here “does not correspond very well with the way the two Sophias are described” in the heresiological sources (see Thomassen, “How Valentinian,” 276; cf. also George W. MacRae, “The Jewish Background of the Gnostic Sophia Myth,” *NovT* 12:2 [1970]: 95).

⁸⁸⁸ *Gos. Phil.* 59.31–32; 63.30–32.

⁸⁸⁹ Schenke, struggling to make the passage conform to his notion of “Valentinianism,” comes to the conclusion that the angels must be the archons, on the basis of the following argument: “Denn, da ja dieser Satz irgendwie in die valentinianischen Grundkategorien hineinpassen muss, können die Engel diese Kinder nicht sein. Von den Engeln des Soter, die die Bräutigame der Geistseelen und also natürlich auch selbst pneumatisch sind, ist sie nicht die Mutter, und die Engel, als deren Mutter sie gelten kann, nämlich der Demiurg und die übrigen Archonten, sind nicht pneumatisch. Gleichwohl können hier mit den Engeln nur diese Archonten gemeint sein” (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 335). In the same vein, Wilson identifies these angels with “planetary powers” (see Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 115).

⁸⁹⁰ γέγραπται γάρ, Εὐφράνθητι, στείρα ἢ οὐ τίκτουσα, ὄψουσα καὶ βόησον, ἢ οὐκ ὀδίνουσα: ὅτι πολλὰ τὰ τέκνα τῆς ἐρήμου μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ἐχούσης τὸν ἄνδρα.

⁸⁹¹ ἄσρη is the Coptic equivalent of στείρα.

Both of these intertexts resonate well with the passage in *Gos. Phil.*, but especially the way Paul interprets the barren woman in Isa 54.⁸⁹² In Isaiah it is Jerusalem who is the barren woman, and Isa 54.1 is a promise of the future restoration of the city.⁸⁹³ In other words, there will come a time when the barren woman will have many more children than she who is now doing well, who probably represents Babylon.⁸⁹⁴ Paul, however, uses this verse in an allegorical interpretation of the story of Sarah and Hagar in Genesis. In Paul's interpretation the barren woman represents Sarah and the other woman Hagar. Moreover, in Paul's interpretation Hagar further represents the old covenant and Sarah the new.⁸⁹⁵ Taking our cue from the interpretation of the old and new wisdom / knowledge elsewhere in *Gos. Phil.*, where the old wisdom represents Judaism, and the new wisdom represents Christianity, and blending it with Paul's allegorical interpretation in Galatians of the two women in Isa 54:1 as the old and new covenant, Judaism and Christianity, the barren wisdom who bears the angels according to the passage in *Gos. Phil.* may plausibly be taken to represent Christianity. The identity of the angels may then logically be understood as a reference to the Christians. This makes sense in light of what we have seen above concerning both the Christians and Christ being like the angels, and the passage also becomes yet another example of *Gos. Phil.*'s anti-Jewish polemics, where the Christians, in full accordance with Paul's intertextual exegesis of Genesis in Gal 4 in light of Isa 54:1, have taken the place of the Jews as God's chosen people, the "true race" (γενος ἡαληθῆιμον) as *Gos. Phil.* puts it. It is thus Christianity that is the new wisdom, which is giving birth to the angelic race of Christians, while Judaism by implication is obsolete as the old redundant wisdom and covenant, as Judaism paradoxically becomes identified with Hagar and Christianity with Sarah.⁸⁹⁶

⁸⁹² On Paul's interpretation of Isa 54, see, e.g., Martinus C. de Boer, "Paul's Quotation of Isaiah 54.1 in Galatians 4.27," *NTS* 50 (2004): 370–389; Joel Willitts, "Isa 54.1 in Gal 4.24b–27: Reading Genesis in Light of Isaiah," *ZNW* 96 (2005): 188–210; Richard B. Hays, "Who Has Believed Our Message? Paul's Reading of Isaiah," *SBLSP* (1998): 205–225; Richard B. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 118–121.

⁸⁹³ See Boer, "Paul's Quotation," 371.

⁸⁹⁴ See Boer, "Paul's Quotation," 371.

⁸⁹⁵ See Boer, "Paul's Quotation," 375.

⁸⁹⁶ Cf. the analysis of Paul's exegesis in Boer, "Paul's Quotation," 375–389. Boer argues that Paul is engaged in a polemic mainly directed against the Jewish Christians of the Jerusalem community of James. *Gos. Phil.*, however, seems to use Paul's exegesis in a polemical delineation of Christianity and Judaism.

Elsewhere, *Gos. Phil.* also engages in a rhetoric in favour of the Christian idea of the ultimate sacrifice of Christ on the cross, making pagan and Jewish sacrificial customs obsolete. *Gos. Phil.* points out that the practice of animal sacrifice belongs to the pre-Christian era, and gives a rather unique explanation:

αὐτὸ νεῦτα λεῶν ἑρραῖ ἡ δὲ δυναμὶς νε[ρ]ῆ[θ]ῆριον γὰρ νε νετοῦτελο
 ἑρραῖ κα[γ] νεῦτελο μεν ἡμοοῦ ἑρραῖ εἶονε ἡ τὰροῦτελοοῦ δε ἑρραῖ ἀγμοῦ
 πρῶμε ἀτελοῦ ἑρραῖ ἡπποῦτε εἶμοοῦτ ἀὐτ ἀφῶνε

And animals were offered up to the powers, for those who were offered up to were animals (themselves). They were offered up alive, but when they were offered up they died. Man was offered up to God dead, and he lived.
 (*Gos. Phil.* 54.36–55.5)

Once again *Gos. Phil.*'s mirror-logic is at work. The reason why people previously sacrificed animals was because they sacrificed to animals, and not to gods. The tractate also returns to this theme at a later stage in the text where it presents God as the opposite of the “animal” powers to whom people previously sacrificed. Contrary to these, states *Gos. Phil.*, God does not eat animals:

πποῦτε οὐ γὰρ ἡμε πε δια τοῦτο σε[φ]ω[ω]τ ἡπρω[ε] καὶ εἰτερε
 εἰπατοῦωωτ ἡπρωμε νεφωωτ ἡρῆνηριον ἡρῆνηριον γὰρ ἀν νε καε
 ετοῦωωτ καγ

God is a man-eater. Therefore man is [sacrificed] to him. Before man was sacrificed, animals were sacrificed. For those to whom they sacrificed were not gods. (*Gos. Phil.* 62.35–63.4)⁸⁹⁷

God eats man, and that is why man was sacrificed to him. Man is here of course to be understood as “the perfect man,” Christ, and the sacrifice is the crucifixion. It should be noted that the use of the imagery of eating in this passage also effectively identifies the crucified Jesus with food, and, especially taken together with the rest of *Gos. Phil.*'s discourse around food and eating, links this sacrifice firmly with the Eucharist. Understood within *Gos. Phil.*'s logic of deification and succession, within the general framework of the THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST blend, when one eats the eucharistic sacrifice one is in a sense on the level of Christ, and by extension God, as a perfect man consuming the perfect.

⁸⁹⁷ Cf. also *Gos. Phil.* 71.35–72.4: πποῦτε τὰ μεῖερω[με] . . . ῆρω[με] τὰ μεῖερω[ν]οῦ[τ]ε
 τὰε τε ἡε ῆπκομοε εἰρω[ν]ε τὰ μεῖερω[τε] ἀὐτ σεοῦωωτ ἡπρωτὰμιο νεφω
 ετρεῖηρω[τε] οὐφωτ ἡρρω[με] (“God makes [man . . . men] make God. Thus in the world
 men make gods and they worship their creations. It would be appropriate for the gods to
 worship the men”).

In these passages, then, *Gos. Phil.* employs several by now familiar motifs. Interestingly, it also turns this anti-sacrificial polemic⁸⁹⁸ into yet another argument for the soteriological effects of the Christian sacraments, using its strategy of subverting the meaning of the concepts of life and death. While the animals that were sacrificed were alive when they were sacrificed and ended up dead, Christ was in a sense dead, i.e., not yet alive, when he was crucified, since it was his “death” on the cross that actually led to life. Furthermore, the individual Christian is not fully alive until he has experienced “the power of the cross” through the christ-mation and the Eucharist—both of which are life-giving sacraments that are linked to the crucifixion and the resurrection.

This reinterpretation of sacrifice, which basically rejects animal sacrifice in favour of Christ’s once-and-for-all sacrifice and its eucharistic re-enactment, can be said to have a polemical edge towards contemporary pagan practice while at the same time presenting itself as superseding the old and now obsolete Jewish sacrificial practices. It should be noted, however, that the chronological opposition of before and after Christ is elsewhere in *Gos. Phil.* explicitly connected to the Hebrew-Christian dichotomy, a fact that would easily bestow an anti-Jewish flavour to its discourse concerning the old and the new mode of sacrifice as well.

So, *Gos. Phil.* is acutely aware of the fact that Christianity sprang out of Judaism and makes a point of presenting the latter as an earlier stage of history that has now been superseded by the former. That this should also mean that the apostles of Christ were in fact at one stage Hebrews is also acknowledged:

ΜΑΡΙΑ ΤΕ ΤΠΑΡΘΕΝΟΣ ΕΤΕΪΠΕΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ ΧΑΡΜΕΣ ΕΣΩΟΠ ΠΝΟΥΝΟΣ ΠΝΑΝΟΥ
 ΠΝΗΒΡΑΙΟΣ ΕΤΕΝΑΠΟΣΤΟΛΟΣ ΝΕ ΔΥΩ [Π]ΑΠΟΣΤΟΛΙΚΟΣ

“Mary is the virgin whom no power defiled.”⁸⁹⁹ It is a great oath of the Hebrews,⁹⁰⁰ who are the apostles and [the] apostolic.

(*Gos. Phil.* 55.27–30)

Scholars have had trouble with this identification of the Hebrews, which is clearly a negative term in the rest of the tractate, with the apostles,

⁸⁹⁸ This polemic is clearly based on Hebrews 9–10.

⁸⁹⁹ For the phrase “the virgin whom no power defiled” (ΤΠΑΡΘΕΝΟΣ ΕΤΕΪΠΕΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ ΧΑΡΜΕΣ), cf. also *Hyp. Arch.* 92.2–3, where a highly similar phrase is used of Norea, the daughter of Eve.

⁹⁰⁰ Cf. Luke 1:28, 42.

who are clearly presented positively elsewhere in the text.⁹⁰¹ The usual understanding of the passage, along the lines of Isenberg's translation "She is a great anathema to the Hebrews, who are the apostles and [the] apostolic men,"⁹⁰² has caused scholars trouble, since it, quite out of step with the rest of *Gos. Phil.*, seems to give a negative evaluation of the apostles. Scholars have usually tried to account for this by appealing to the tractate's supposedly composite nature and by regarding it as an interpolation.⁹⁰³ The passage may correspond to the rest of the tractate, however, if we take it to refer to "the apostles" (ναποστολος) and "the apostolic" ([ἄ]ναποστολικος) as the good Hebrews, that is, those Hebrews who were the first to become Christians. We have already seen that the criterion for no longer being a Hebrew is to "receive the Lord." Being the first to "receive the Lord," the Virgin Mary thus becomes in effect the first Christian. However, what is meant by *Gos. Phil.*'s reference to Mary as οὔνοσ ἡνανου ἡἡεβραιος remains unclear. The main problem is how to understand the otherwise unattested term ἄνου. At present there seems to be no better solution than to understand this as an unattested variant spelling of ἄναου.⁹⁰⁴ If we understand ἄναου in its primary meaning of "oath," we may perhaps regard the entire phrase "Mary is the virgin whom no power defiled" as an oath—understood as a powerful statement of doctrine by the apostles and the apostolic? I thus take εϭ- in εϭουον to refer not strictly to Mary, but to the entire phrase, or simply to the dogma of Mary as a virgin undefiled by the powers.⁹⁰⁵

⁹⁰¹ This is in no small part due to the common translation of ἄνου as "anathema." See note above for discussion. Siker claims that the use of the term "Hebrews" here refers to "non-gnostic Christians" (Siker, "Gnostic Views," 277).

⁹⁰² See Layton and Isenberg, "Gospel According to Philip," 151.

⁹⁰³ See, e.g., Thomassen, "How Valentinian," 279.

⁹⁰⁴ The likelihood of this is supported by the spellings χορμεϭ and χορμουϭ at 55:32 and 33 instead of χαρμεϭ and χαρμουϭ respectively (although we do find the spelling χαρμεϭ at 55:28). Giversen instead suggests reading ἡνανουϭ not as ἡν-ἄνουϭ, but as ἡ-να-νουϭ, understanding nouϭ as the plural qualitative of αουαι, rather than reading ἄνουϭ as an unattested variant of ἄναουϭ, and translates "idet hun er herre over dem, der tilhører hebræernes mængder, det vil sige apostlene og de apostoliske" (see Giversen, *Filipsevangeliet*, 47 n. 7; Crum 22b). Kasser has suggested that ἄνουϭ should be understood here as "crown" (See Rodolphe Kasser, *Compléments au Dictionnaire Copte de Crum* [Bibliothèque d'études coptes 7; Cairo: Publications de l'Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1964], 2–3).

⁹⁰⁵ Cf. Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 215. Schenke's overall solution is somewhat different, however, translating: "Maria ist die Jungfrau, die keine Macht besudelt hat.—Für die Hebräer, das heißt (für) die Apostel und die Apostelanhänger, ist es in höchstem Maße verdammungswürdig" (Schenke, *Das Philippus-Evangelium*, 23, 215).

Finally, we may also recall that *Gos. Phil.* reinterprets circumcision, by understanding Abraham's circumcision as simply a call to "destroy the flesh,"⁹⁰⁶ and there may possibly be a critique of Jewish Sabbath practices underlying the badly damaged section *Gos. Phil.* 52.32–35. In summary it seems quite clear that *Gos. Phil.* devotes much space to discourses delimiting Christianity from Judaism, both with regard to ritual practice, ritual efficacy, historical destiny, and soteriology. Now, the question is, to what degree are the anti-Jewish polemics of *Gos. Phil.* directed specifically towards the Jews themselves? The fact that *Gos. Phil.* polemicalises against Judaism and Jewish practices in a polemic that may have other Christians both as its primary intended audience and its main targets does not automatically make the tractate's descriptions of Jews simply into descriptions of other Christians.⁹⁰⁷ *Gos. Phil.*'s anti-Jewish polemics would for instance be easily understandable in a hypothetical general milieu in which there was a relatively strong Jewish presence, that is, in an environment where actual Jews and Judaism would be well known to the Christian audience. Perhaps one might even suggest the presence of a certain competition between Judaism and Christianity underlying some of the rhetoric of *Gos. Phil.*, and consequently a need to argue the case for the supersession of the former by the latter? There are many possible locations that would fit such a description, as there were strong Jewish communities all over the Roman empire and beyond, the greatest number being in Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor, and Rome.⁹⁰⁸ There was close contact between Christians and Jews well into the fifth century,⁹⁰⁹ and thus throughout the period of *Gos. Phil.*'s possible authorship, and we know that as late as the late fourth century, many Christians even attended Jewish synagogues.⁹¹⁰

⁹⁰⁶ See *Gos. Phil.* 82.26–29.

⁹⁰⁷ Contrary to Siker, "Gnostic Views."

⁹⁰⁸ See, e.g., Robert L. Wilken, *Judaism and the Early Christian Mind: A Study of Cyril of Alexandria's Exegesis and Theology* (Yale Publications in Religion 15; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 9.

⁹⁰⁹ See Wilken, *Judaism*, 36.

⁹¹⁰ See Robin Darling Young, "Judaism and Christianity," *EEC*: 635. It may also be noted that the *Adversus Iudaeos* genre was popular in the fourth century and beyond, especially in the east where the Jewish presence was strongest. As Young states it, church leaders in this period tried to "dissuade Christians from an apparently customary association with Jews, including participation in Jewish festivals, consultation of rabbis, and reverence for Jewish scriptures" (*ibid.*, 636). On this genre, see, e.g. A. Lukyn Williams, *Adversus Iudaeos: A Bird's-Eye View of Christian Apologiae Until the Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935).

However, there are also strong indications that *Gos. Phil.*'s anti-Jewish polemics are at least not exclusively directed against the Jews themselves. By reading *Gos. Phil.* in the context of the Arian crisis of the fourth century, we see that Arianism is easily called to mind by way of the pervasive focus in *Gos. Phil.* on begetting versus creating, which is subsequently connected to Judaism by the tractate's explicit contrasting of Christianity (i.e., its own brand of Christianity) with Judaism on this very issue. This does not mean, however, that *Gos. Phil.* refers only to other Christians and not to Jews or Judaism, as some scholars have suggested.⁹¹¹ What it means is that the text's explicit references to Jews and Judaism may easily have been read as simultaneously associating contemporary inner-Christian opponents with the practices and beliefs of the Jews, with all the negative implications entailed by such an identification.

Association of Arians and other Christian heretics with Jews was in fact a common rhetorical strategy in patristic literature. Athanasius, for example, often attacked the Arians by way of anti-Jewish polemics.⁹¹² David Brakke shows how Athanasius had no problems lumping together "Jews, Arians, Melitians, and all other 'heretics'" in the same box and thus often polemicalises against these groups at the same time.⁹¹³ A good example of this is when Athanasius in his 37th *Festal Letter* connects the Jews who mock Christ, asking him to come down from the Cross if he really is the Son of God, with the Arians and the Melitians, stating that "the Arians and their parasites the Melitians envied these evils, for they procured for themselves the ignorance of the Jews."⁹¹⁴

Brakke tries to contextualize Athanasius' polemics even more specifically, suggesting that with the Jewish quarter being not far from the church where Arius was ministering, "Athanasius' polemical associations of the Arians with the Jews may have had additional force within the topography of urban Alexandria."⁹¹⁵ Certainly, in such a historical context, we may safely assume that the possibility of associating the Arians

⁹¹¹ See e.g. Siker, "Gnostic Views."

⁹¹² For instance, Athanasius argues that in making Christ a creature and denying his divinity, the Arians also deny the resurrection, leaving Christ dead. Thus, Athanasius argues, the Arians manage to do what the Jews had hoped to accomplish, thus making the two groups equivalent (see David Brakke, "Jewish Flesh and Christian Spirit in Athanasius of Alexandria," *JCS* 9:4 [2001]: 471).

⁹¹³ Brakke, "Jewish Flesh," 454.

⁹¹⁴ See Brakke, "Jewish Flesh," 477.

⁹¹⁵ Brakke, "Jewish Flesh," 465.

with the Jews would spring easily to mind. However, the presence of actual Jews in the vicinity is of course not a necessary precondition for the rhetorical effectiveness of the Judaism / Arianism connection, for the association of one's opponents with Jews was common practice in Christianity from a very early stage. Miriam Taylor calls it "associative anti-Judaism," which she defines as "the adaptation of anti-Judaic symbols by the writers of the early church in attempts to discredit views within the church which they oppose."⁹¹⁶ She states further that "in associating an opponent with Jewish faults or characteristics, the authors of the church symbolically associated a position with the typical traits known from salvation history as characteristic of that which was archetypically obsolete and typically wrong."⁹¹⁷ This is a practice that is evident in the writings of Athanasius, and other patristic authors, and it is also what we find in *Gos. Phil.*, whose anti-Jewish polemics would certainly reflect badly on the ritual practices of those who did not share its own christological and mystagogical views. Indeed, the way in which *Gos. Phil.* presents a dichotomy between proper Christian initiation where there takes place a begetting of new Christians (presented as Christs, even), and Jewish proselyte initiation, which is presented in terms of creating, rather than begetting, could very well be read as disparaging the efficacy of Arian ritual practice—in effect stating that their ritual initiation, like Jewish proselyte initiation, only amounts to creation, and is thus not proper Christian initiation. Indeed, such a polemical inference would suggest that any apostolic succession claimed by Arians and their supporters would be null and void. It would thus amount to a rather strong criticism of their ritual practice argued as a consequence of their Christology.

5. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

We have seen throughout this chapter that the parallelism between Christ and the initiated Christian is fundamental to the sacramental theology of

⁹¹⁶ Miriam S. Taylor, *Anti-Judaism and Early Christian Identity: A Critique of the Scholarly Consensus* (StPB 46; Leiden: Brill, 1995), 177. Taylor's concept of "associative anti-Judaism" is indebted to Efroymson's notion of rhetorical anti-Judaism (see David P. Efroymson, "Tertullian's Anti-Jewish Rhetoric: Guilt by Association," *USQR* 36:1 [1980]: 25–37). Efroymson discusses Tertullian's "rhetorical device of associating an opposing position, and his opponents themselves, with Judaism" (*ibid.*, 29).

⁹¹⁷ Taylor, *Anti-Judaism*, 181.

Gos. Phil. Its Christology is reflected in its anthropology and vice versa. So, to sum up, what may we say about the Christology, anthropology, and sacramental soteriology of *Gos. Phil.*?

5.1. *Christology and Anthropology*

First of all, we saw that Christ, or at least the Logos and the Holy Spirit, is pre-existent. Secondly, *Gos. Phil.* affirms the virgin birth of Jesus from Mary, but this is probably not to be understood as a birth of the complete Saviour, which seems to require a second, baptismal, birth in the river Jordan. The Logos, however, is seemingly born from Mary in a material body, a material body that derives from the Virgin and Joseph. At his subsequent baptism in the Jordan, the Logos is then united in a baptismal anointing with the Holy Spirit who is described as “the virgin who came down” (ΠΑΡΘΕΝΟΣ ΝΤΑΡΕΙ ΔΠΙΤῆ), at which point his true body comes into being. Christ thus seems to consist of the Logos, referred to as his flesh, and the Holy Spirit, referred to as his blood, within a material body. By all accounts the Logos-flesh of Jesus seems to take on the role of his true flesh and “glory” which is revealed at his transfiguration on the mountain. This Logos-flesh also seems in a way to be equivalent to his soul, or at least to be presented as a counterpart of Adam’s soul. This constitution lasts from the Jordan baptism until the crucifixion, where Christ’s divinity is separated from his humanity, i.e., when the Logos-Holy Spirit pair is separated from the material body. This separation on the cross may also be interpreted as a resurrection, but is also crucially interpreted as a life-giving death, which is intimately connected to an interpretation of the Eucharist as both the food of immortality, the acquisition of the perfect man, a unification and mingling with the divine, and a perfect life-giving sacrifice that supersedes previous sacrificial cult.⁹¹⁸

In its basic outline, the Christology of *Gos. Phil.* thus corresponds to statements put in Jesus’ mouth in a text witnessed by a small parchment fragment from Upper Egypt and recently published by Charles

⁹¹⁸ This is in stark contrast to Wilson, who claims that the Christ of *Gos. Phil.* “comes not to save the world by giving his life but to restore things to their proper places and become the father of a redeemed progeny. Deliverance comes through knowledge, not through the sacrifice of Calvary” (Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 13–14). As in other Christian sources all of these aspects are of crucial importance in *Gos. Phil.*, and there is rather less focus on “knowledge” as such than on the crucifixion.

Hedrick.⁹¹⁹ In this fragment, referred to by Hedrick as a “revelation discourse,” Jesus describes himself in the following terms:

ἦτα εἰεῖ ἐπεικοσμος ἐνοῦρημ ἐμο[γ] ταμνῆνοῦτε ἤρητ σωματικος
 ἡπεσπαρῶ εταμνῆτρωμε νοῦρικε ἦβαλ ἀνοκ πε πωροῖ ἡλογοσ ἦταφεί
 ἐβολ ρῖπείωτ †ωροῖτ ἡἡπαείωτ ραθ ἡχρονοσ ἡἡμ ταμεῖτρωῦτε ἡρητ
 εσρηπ ρε πασα ἡροῦν . ἡπεσπαρῶ εταμνῆτρωμε νοῦρικε ἦβαλ ἀσαῖἡἡκε ἡμοῖ
 φαντενοῦ[Δ]ἡ ταλοῖ επεσῶρῶσ

I came to this world to save from [death]. My bodily divinity within did not separate from my humanity for a twinkling of an eye. I am the first Logos which came from the Father. I am with my Father before all time, my divinity within being hidden as my inside. It did not separate from my humanity for a twinkling of an eye. It was constant in me until the Jews lifted me up on the cross.⁹²⁰

Just as in *Gos. Phil.*, the Logos is pre-existent. Just as in *Gos. Phil.*, his divinity is hidden inside his humanity and only separates at the crucifixion, and just as in *Gos. Phil.*, Jesus has “come to this world to save from [death]” (εἰ ἐπεικοσμος ἐνοῦρημ ἐμο[γ]).

But it is not only the combination of Christ’s divinity with his humanity that is important in *Gos. Phil.*, but also the composition of the divinity itself, that is, the union of the Logos and the Holy Spirit. Interestingly, the Holy Spirit is, as we have seen, described both as Christ’s mother and his partner,⁹²¹ an idea that is paralleled by *Gos. Phil.*’s description of the Virgin Mary and Mary Magdalene:

νεοῦἡνωμτε μοοφε ἡἡπχοεῖσ οῦοεῖω ἡἡμ ἡαρια τεφμααῦ αῦω τεσσῶνε
 αῦω ἡαγδαλῡἡἡ ταεῖ ετοῦἡνοῦτε εροσ χετεφκοῖνωμοσ ἡαρια γαρ τε
 τεφῶνε αῦω τεφμααῦ τε αῦω τεφρωτρε τε

There were three who walked with the Lord always: Mary, his mother, and her sister and Magdalene,⁹²² who is called his companion. For Mary was his sister and his mother and his partner.⁹²³ (*Gos. Phil.* 59.6–11)

⁹¹⁹ Charles W. Hedrick, “A Revelation Discourse of Jesus,” *Journal of Coptic Studies* 7 (2005): 13–15.

⁹²⁰ These are lines 5–15 in the fragment published by Hedrick (see Hedrick, “A Revelation Discourse,” 14). The translation is my own.

⁹²¹ The idea of the Holy Spirit as mother is also found in the *Gospel of the Hebrews* (the relevant passage is cited in Origen, *Comm. Jo.*, 2.12; *Hom. Jer.*, 15.4; Jerome, *Comm. Micah*, 7.6; *Comm. Is.*, 40.9; *Comm. Ezek.*, 16.13; see Vielhauer and Strecker, “Jewish-Christian Gospels,” 177, and cf. Margaret Barker, *The Great Angel: A Study of Israel’s Second God* [Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 1992], 206), and is widespread in the Syrian tradition (see, e.g., Murray, *Symbols of Church and Kingdom*, 142–150; Brock, *Holy Spirit*, 16–28).

⁹²² Cf. John 19:25; Matt 27:55–56; Mark 15:40–41.

⁹²³ Either the text is here corrupt and we should emend the first reference to a sister

Antti Marjanen has argued that “the triple function of Mary shows that no historical person is meant. She is to be seen as a mythical figure who actually belongs to the transcendent realm but who manifests herself in the women accompanying the earthly Jesus.”⁹²⁴ A major problem with this conclusion, however, is that it ignores the fact that a similar blending of the Marys is also found in patristic sources.⁹²⁵ Ephrem the Syrian, for example, can state that:

It is clear that Virginity is greater
and nobler than ‘Holiness’,
for it was she who bore the Son
and gave him milk from her breast;
it was she who sat at his feet
and did him service by washing;
At the cross she was beside him,
and in the resurrection she saw him.⁹²⁶ (HArm. 5, 70–73)

In this way Ephrem blends the Virgin Mary with Mary Magdalene, Mary of Bethany and the sinful woman in Luke 7.⁹²⁷ There is thus no reason to assume that *Gos. Phil.* disregards the historicity of the Marys. Instead it seems more likely that the tractate is once again pointing out some of the deeper meanings inherent in the details of Jesus’ earthly life. In this case the deeper meaning seems to be that just as Jesus has Mary as mother, companion, and sister, so also he has the Holy Spirit as mother, companion, and sister.

The anthropology and soteriology of *Gos. Phil.* seem to correspond closely to its Christology. Just as Jesus did not become the complete Christ until his reception of the Holy Spirit in his baptismal anointing, when his body truly came into being, so too the Christian only becomes a Christ upon receiving the Holy Spirit by means of a baptismal chrismation. Then

from $\tau\epsilon\sigma\sigma\omega\mu\epsilon$ (“her sister”) to $\tau\epsilon\sigma\sigma\omega\mu\epsilon$ (“his sister”), or *Gos. Phil.* holds Jesus’ sister Mary to also have been his mother’s sister. The latter is in fact a possibility that is attested in certain later patristic writers, who has Mary the sister of Jesus marry Joseph’s brother, and her uncle, Clophas, and thus also become the sister of Jesus’ mother (see Richard Bauckham, “Salome the Sister of Jesus, Salome the Disciple of Jesus, and the Secret Gospel of Mark,” *NovT* 33:3 [1991]: 248 n. 16).

⁹²⁴ Marjanen, *The Woman Jesus Loved*, 161.

⁹²⁵ See, e.g., Murray, *Symbols of Church and Kingdom*, 146–148, 329–335.

⁹²⁶ Translation quoted from Murray, *Symbols of Church and Kingdom*, 330.

⁹²⁷ Cf. Murray, *Symbols of Church and Kingdom*, 330 n. 3. Such a blending of the Marys is not peculiar to Ephrem, but is also found in other Syrian sources (see Murray, *Symbols of Church and Kingdom*, 146).

he becomes “a perfect man”—“a Christ.”⁹²⁸ In this process the soul of the initiate, like the Logos of Christ, unites with the Holy Spirit that is given as a gift and receives “the name.” And corresponding to the way in which Christ’s divinity, his true flesh and blood, is separated from the material body at the crucifixion, so too the material body of the Christian dies, while it is the Christlike resurrection body consisting of Logos-flesh and Holy Spirit-blood that rises.

5.2. *Transformation and Deification*

Crucially connected to the parallelism between Christ and the individual Christian is also the deificatory focus of *Gos. Phil.*’s sacramental soteriology. As *Gos. Phil.* describes the rituals of baptism, chrismation, and Eucharist, their primary effect is the transformation of the individual into a Christ and unity with him. Transformation into Christ is the goal, and the rituals of baptism, chrismation, and Eucharist are the means.

Gos. Phil. summarises important aspects of both the goal and the means in its description of Christ’s transfiguration before his disciples on the mountain. In what amounts to a prefiguration of the resurrection, he there shows himself in his glory to the disciples by making them great so that they will be able to see him as he truly is. There is an important logic of reciprocity at work here, where one becomes what one sees and sees what one has become, which is also mirrored in *Gos. Phil.*’s eucharistic theology where one becomes what one eats and eats what one has become. Another expression of this is the description of the fact that one joins, unites, and has communion with what one has become, and likewise becomes what one joins, unites, or has communion with. Another aspect of the logic of reciprocity in *Gos. Phil.* is that of paradoxical inversion, most notably the bringing of life through death to counter the original establishment of death through life, and the reunification of the original separation that is itself achieved by means of a separation.

⁹²⁸ Gabriele Winkler has noted that “even at the epiclesis of a number of Syrian anaphoras, the Holy Spirit manifests himself *par excellence* at Jesus’ baptism, and at the same time the text of the epiclesis is silent about the role of the Holy Spirit at Jesus’ incarnation!” (Winkler, “A Remarkable Shift,” 1398–1399). This corresponds to what we find in *Gos. Phil.* where the Holy Spirit does not play any role in relation to Jesus’ birth from the Virgin Mary, but only comes into the picture at his baptism.

This logic of reciprocity is balanced by the equally important logic of procreation and kinship, and succession through descent. The transformation of new converts into Christs / Christians is perpetuated through a system of apostolic succession through ritual procreation and the simultaneous establishment of a kinship with Christ, God, and other ritually initiated Christians. It is the exposition, by means of a wide range of complex conceptual and metaphorical blends, of the function and significance of the Christian rites of baptism, chrismation, and Eucharist in this process of ritual generation and transformation that is the central focus of *Gos. Phil.*

In sum it seems quite clear from the analysis in the present chapter of how *Gos. Phil.* presents its complicated sacramental soteriology, here outlined in terms as simple as possible, that Wilson's early assessment that *Gos. Phil.* "gives the impression of being the work of one who knows the language without having penetrated very deeply into the content of Christian thought,"⁹²⁹ cannot be sustained.

⁹²⁹ Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 12.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION: THE EXEGESIS ON THE SOUL AND THE GOSPEL OF PHILIP COMPARED

All that an interpretation may do is to render the pattern of meaning insightful. To the intense oscillation of sense and sensibility it cannot really do full justice and must necessarily remain poor and superficial in comparison to the text and its reading experience. That is why readers feel they have to return to the text itself and experience its richness over and over again.¹

1. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE PRESENT STUDY

At an early stage of Nag Hammadi research Robert M. Grant drew a parallel to the study of the New Testament, stating that “just as we now suppose that Matthew, for example, had not only scissors and paste, but a mind of his own, so even a Gnostic evangelist had some idea of what he was trying to say; his work deserves to be treated as a whole before it is excavated for sources.”² The aim and method of the present study has indeed been to treat the two selected Nag Hammadi texts as far as possible on their own terms as complete and coherent literary expressions. In studies of the Nag Hammadi texts, including *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul*, the texts themselves and their own internal logic have often come to play second fiddle to the wealth of comparative material, mostly heresiological, that has been adduced to shed light upon them. In this study I have therefore chosen instead to focus on the internal logic of *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul*, and have thus tried to analyse how they

¹ Willie van Peer, “Hidden Meanings,” in *Contextualized Stylistics: In Honor of Peter Verdonk* (ed. Tony Bex, et al.; DQR Studies in Literature 29; Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), 47.

² Grant, “Two Gnostic Gospels,” 10–11.

make sense on their own terms, that is, in a reading that takes seriously the production of meaning that arises from the interplay with Scripture created by the quotations and allusions that pervade them.

In line with this approach I have also chosen not to try to explain the various features of *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul* on the basis of other Nag Hammadi texts, not wanting to explain one unknown quantity on the basis of another. What I will do, however, in this final chapter, is to compare *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul* with each other. The analysis in the preceding chapters have implicitly brought to light both similarities and differences between these two texts, many of which were not apparent prior to this analysis. So, from the perspective of the preceding analysis, what are the similarities and differences between them?

2. LITERARY STRUCTURE

First of all, the obvious difference in literary structure must be mentioned. While *Exeg. Soul* is a text which has a relatively clear narrative structure, starting with a mythological story that runs through most of the text, interspersed with long scriptural quotations, before ending in an extended paraenetical section, *Gos. Phil.* sports no narrative structure, indeed no easily discernible literary structure at all. Moreover, while *Exeg. Soul's* interplay with Scripture is dominated on the surface by a significant number of extended Old Testament quotations, *Gos. Phil.* has only a limited number of short quotations. Both texts are soaked through with especially New Testament allusions, however. The tone of the two texts is also decidedly different. *Exeg. Soul* is most of all paraenetical, with no discernible polemics,³ while *Gos. Phil.*, on the other hand, has a clear polemical edge against what seems to be several opposing groups and / or points of view. Moreover, contrary to *Exeg. Soul's* pervasive focus on repentance, there is no single discernible focus in *Gos. Phil.*, but rather a selection of different threads of discourse that are woven unpredictably but suggestively together throughout the course of the text.

³ Cf. Sevrin, *L'Exégèse de l'âme*, 56; Kasser, "La gnose," 26.

3. CONCEPTUAL AND INTERTEXTUAL BLENDING

We saw in chapters 3 and 4 that *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* are structured around different overarching conceptual blends. In *Exeg. Soul* THE SOUL IS A WOMAN underlies the whole mythological narrative and paraenetic discourse, while in *Gos. Phil.* THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST serves a similar function, being the vital principle that unites the various strands of this complex and multi-faceted text. A significant difference between these two conceptual blends, which also contributes to the significant difference in complexity between the two texts, is the fact that while THE SOUL IS A WOMAN is a single-scope blend, where the WOMAN input structures the SOUL input, THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST is a double-scope blend where the two inputs mutually structure each other. In *Exeg. Soul* the concept and life of the soul is presented in terms of the ICM of WOMAN, but *not* vice versa. In *Gos. Phil.* one is led to understand the life and ritual practice of the Christian as structured by the knowledge of Christ, but *also* the other way around, its Christology is informed by knowledge of the Christian life and liturgy.

4. BODILY BASED COGNITIVE MODELS

We have seen that both *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* base much of their rhetoric on conceptual blends grounded in embodied experience. In both texts conceptual blends relating to sexuality and procreation are central features, as is related imagery of marriage, adultery and prostitution. In *Exeg. Soul* the soul is described as a woman who leaves her father's house and a stable marriage for a life of prostitution and adultery, losing her virginity and attaining physically masculine properties in the process. The soul's way to salvation involves regaining her perfect femininity and virginity and re-marrying her perfect husband. In order to be eligible for the marriage with Christ the soul needs to be feminised, and once married to him, she must stay as his wife. The soul's repentance and return to complete devotion to Christ is thus described as a process of feminisation, and is possibly to be understood, at least partly, as a metaphorical description of ritual initiation. Life without total devotion to Christ is, on the other hand, described in *Exeg. Soul* as prostitution and adultery.

Exeg. Soul also plays on the soul's metaphorical femininity to exploit the imagery of birth in several ways. Not only is the soul's conversion and

renewal described in terms of her being reborn, but the seed received by the soul in her communion with Christ also causes her to bear good children, in contrast to the imperfect offspring she bore as a result of her communion with the adulterers. The soul not only gives birth to good children, however, but also to herself, which may be understood in terms of the internal effort of the soul that is needed also after the reception of Christ, the bridegroom, and the spirit / seed, in order to attain salvation. And salvation, mirroring the primordial fall, is described in terms of an ascent back into Heaven.

In *Gos. Phil.*, by contrast, salvation does not come about by feminising the soul, quite the contrary. To be able to unite with Christ, which is also a major goal in *Gos. Phil.*, one is instead required to become *like* Christ, who is described as the “perfect man” (πτελιος ῥωμε), and to become a Christ one must go through rituals first revealed / performed by Christ “in a mystery” (ἁποκρυφιστηριον). In a sense, then, we may say that while in *Exeg. Soul* the soul is turned into a perfect bride, in *Gos. Phil.* it becomes the perfect bridegroom. While in *Exeg. Soul* the soul is described as a bride marrying Christ the bridegroom, in *Gos. Phil.* the bridegroom appears to be the Logos and the bride the Holy Spirit. In addition, however, *Gos. Phil.* also uses the ICM of MARRIAGE to shed light on the union between the individual Christian and Christ, as respectively bride and bridegroom, in order to highlight the need to stay faithful to Christ as opposed to having one’s heart (ἡντ) set on the world (πκοσμος), metaphorically understood as an adulterer (νοεκ). In this sense *Gos. Phil.* comes close to the kind of rhetoric employed in *Exeg. Soul*, presenting unfaithfulness to Christ in terms of adultery and prostitution. In *Gos. Phil.*, however, this is not the major point it is in *Exeg. Soul*.

For its part, *Gos. Phil.* focuses more on the contrast between begetting and creating, and on begetting in the context of kinship and succession, than on the specific event of birth, but does nevertheless also refer to the latter in a metaphorical description of ritual initiation. Moreover, as is the case with the soul who in *Exeg. Soul* bears bad children with the adulterers and good children with Christ, in *Gos. Phil.* as well one’s offspring resemble their father. Children emerging from communion with Christ resemble Christ, while communion with others, or even mental focus on others, makes for children resembling them instead. In both texts, then, the need for total faithfulness to Christ is stressed, by means of metaphors of marriage, procreation, and adultery.

5. CHRISTOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY

The connection between Christology and anthropology is, as we have seen, a major concern in *Gos. Phil.* But how does *Gos. Phil.*'s anthropology and Christology compare with those underlying *Exeg. Soul*? Now, the latter text does not really focus on Christology, making it difficult to compare the two texts in this regard, but some comments are nevertheless in order.

The focus in *Exeg. Soul* is on the soul's life in the body, her repentance, conversion, and marriage with Christ. The anthropology presupposed by this text seems quite simple. There is a material body and a soul, but no mention of any spirit or *nous* as a part of the human constitution prior to initiation into Christianity. A "life-giving spirit" is given by Christ as a seed, however, being his crucial gift to the soul facilitating her salvation, and the tractate subsequently refers to praying to the Father with the "spirit which is within" (πνεῦμα ἐπίσω νεοῦν).⁴ The soul in *Exeg. Soul* is pre-existent, however, existing from the beginning in a male-female symbiotic relationship with her husband, identified with Adam in Genesis. When she leaves him, she falls into a material body. Her conversion involves becoming a perfect submissive virgin bride, thus enabling her to marry her true bridegroom, Christ, who is presented as the new Adam. Salvation then follows his gift of the spirit to the soul and is described in terms of birth, rebirth, renewal, resurrection, and ascent.

As we have seen, *Exeg. Soul* is not overly concerned with christological matters, being content to describe Christ as a bridegroom and the new Adam, saving the female soul by marrying her and impregnating her with the lifegiving spirit. This is a long way from the complex Christology of *Gos. Phil.*, which stresses the point that Christ, as he is manifested in the material world, is constituted by a union of the Logos and the Holy Spirit, within a material body. In *Exeg. Soul* on the other hand, there is no mention of a Logos, and the relationship between Christ and the Holy Spirit is rather vague. However, in both texts the reception of the spirit is crucial for salvation. *Exeg. Soul* describes it as a gift given by Christ, but does not specify when it is given, and describes its effects simply as life-giving and renewing. *Gos. Phil.*, on the other hand, connects the gift of the spirit crucially with chrismation, as an important part of the baptismal ritual, and with the Eucharist, more specifically the

⁴ *Exeg. Soul* 135.6–7.

contents of the eucharistic cup. Chrismation in *Gos. Phil.* also transforms the Christian into a Christ, making the human constitution Christlike, which seems to involve a Logos-like soul united with the Holy Spirit, and enabling the communion with Christ in the Eucharist.

In neither of the texts is it easy to gain a clear picture of the role of the Holy Spirit. In *Exeg. Soul* it is associated with Old Testament prophecy,⁵ but it also appears to be given to the soul by Christ, when it is described as “the seed” (πνεῦμα) “that is the lifegiving spirit” (ἐτεππῆδ πε εττῆρο). In *Gos. Phil.*, on the other hand, it is a part of Christ, together with, and seemingly on the same level as, the Logos. In both texts the spirit is something that is given to the Christian initiate, and which does not appear to be part of the human constitution prior to ritual initiation.

6. TRANSFORMATIONAL SOTERIOLOGY

In both texts salvation entails a marriage with Christ. While in *Exeg. Soul* the requirement for this marriage involves repentance and conversion through baptism, which makes the soul into Christ’s complementary female half, *Gos. Phil.*, on the contrary, requires one to become like Christ oneself in order to unite with him. In this sense the soteriologies of the two texts are quite different. In both texts conversion and initiation entail a transformation, but while the crucial transformation in *Exeg. Soul* entails a transformation of the soul from male into female, in *Gos. Phil.* it is a process of deification making the initiated Christian into a Christ. While in *Exeg. Soul* the stress is on the submission, difference, and hierarchical complementarity of the soul of the Christian and Christ, in *Gos. Phil.* there is on the contrary a stress upon the *identification* of the initiated Christian with Christ. There is thus an important aspect of deification in *Gos. Phil.* that does not seem to be present in *Exeg. Soul*.

Here we may also note the crucial difference between the two texts in that the soul in *Exeg. Soul* is transformed from being improperly male-like into a proper female bride, while in *Gos. Phil.* the soul becoming Logos-like implies its maleness, since it is to be united with the female spirit. So, while in *Exeg. Soul* the soul is female and receives Christ as its bridegroom and the spirit as a life-giving seed, the soul (or a part of the soul) in *Gos. Phil.* is male and receives the female spirit as a bride. In both

⁵ See *Exeg. Soul* 129.6–8; 135.30–31.

texts the reestablishment of the primal unity of male and female, based on an exegesis of Gen 1:26–27 together with 2:21–23, is important, but while in *Exeg. Soul* this entails a reunification of the female soul, representing Eve, with Christ, representing Adam, in *Gos. Phil.* it is the male soul, representing Adam, that receives the female spirit representing Eve. In contrast to *Gos. Phil.*, then, the Christian is in *Exeg. Soul* not identified with Adam or Christ, but in a sense with Eve (see Fig. 49). We might thus even say that while Christ in *Gos. Phil.* comes to save Adam, in *Exeg. Soul* he comes to save Eve. In both cases, the primordial unity of the prelapsarian Adam/ἄνθρωπος needs to be reestablished.

7. RITUALS AND MYSTAGOGY

Baptism plays a major role in both *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul*, but in different ways. As we saw in the analysis of *Exeg. Soul* in chapter 3, the references to rituals in this text may well be understood metaphorically, but, however this may be, baptism is connected with purification and conversion. By way of its cleansing and converting function, baptism is in *Exeg. Soul* presented as a necessary preparation for the communion with Christ, which may or may not be understood as a reference to the Eucharist.

In *Gos. Phil.*'s interpretation, however, as we saw in chapter 4, baptism is primarily given a life-giving, rather than a cathartic, function, and is connected with the donning of the “living man” (πρώμε ετονη). Baptism in *Gos. Phil.* is not the important ritual it appears to be in *Exeg. Soul*, however, for the former lays great emphasis on the superiority of chrismation over baptism. While *Gos. Phil.* stresses at length the relatively higher importance of chrismation in relation to baptism, there is no direct evidence in *Exeg. Soul* of any chrismation at all. Although this does not necessarily mean that the initiation process that is presupposed by *Exeg. Soul* did not involve an anointing with chrism, one would expect such a rite to be at least mentioned if it were of equal significance to the one referred to in *Gos. Phil.*

As for postbaptismal rites, a dressing in postbaptismal garments may be presupposed by both tractates, and it seems in both cases to be interpreted in a manner that is closely related to the tractates' respective interpretations of baptism, being connected to conversion and cleansing in *Exeg. Soul*, and deification in *Gos. Phil.* Moreover, *Gos. Phil.* also refers to what seems to be a ritual kiss, but no such kiss is discernible

in *Exeg. Soul*. The Eucharist is definitely a ritual of major importance in *Gos. Phil.*, and it is interpreted by means of several different conceptual blends, relating to food, sexuality, marriage, and procreation. In *Exeg. Soul*, the Eucharist is not explicitly mentioned, but seems nevertheless to be presupposed at important points in the text.

Now, what about rituals that were not performed by the Christian “mainstream”? We have seen in the preceding chapters that there is no simple referent for the concept of the “bridal chamber” in *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* Simply put, *Exeg. Soul*’s references to μα ἵθαλεετ and νῦμφων, and *Gos. Phil.*’s to νῦμφων, παστος, and κοιτων, do not refer to the same target or focus concept throughout. The focus inputs in blends involving these terms may in some cases be ritual practice, and in other cases the body of the Christian, the body of Christ, or ritual space. It is only in *Gos. Phil.*, however, that the body of Christ is a focus input, which in this case follows from the overarching blend THE CHRISTIAN IS A CHRIST. As for the potential focus inputs from ritual practice, it must be said that in neither text is it necessary to postulate any rituals other than baptism, chrismation, or Eucharist, as well as that of a ritual kiss in the case of *Gos. Phil.* In both texts, however, there is also the possibility that the actual ritual space wherein these rituals were performed may serve as a focus for these framing inputs. No single referent, then, neither as focus nor framing input, may be identified behind the abovementioned Greek and Coptic terms used in *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* that are usually translated as “bridal chamber.” It should also be stressed that as these blends function in *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul*, the framing inputs referred to by these terms seem primarily to be based upon associated scriptural intertexts rather than on an ICM or ICMs based simply on current social practice.

Lastly, while in *Exeg. Soul* the rituals may conceivably be understood as framing inputs in metaphorical blends with other focus inputs, *Gos. Phil.* uses a whole host of framing inputs to shed light on the rituals of baptism, chrismation, and Eucharist, but at no point seems to refer to rituals as metaphors of something else.

8. METAPHORS AND ONTOLOGY

Both *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* describe Christian initiation in terms of rebirth, both of them employing the conceptual blend CHRISTIAN INITIATION IS BIRTH. At the same time, however, *Gos. Phil.* tells us that “there is a

rebirth (ἄπο ἄκροῦ) and an image of rebirth (ἐκ τῶν ἄπο ἄκροῦ)⁶ The “image of rebirth,” seems, as we have seen in chapter 4, to refer first and foremost to the rituals of initiation. But the use of the concept of birth in this way as a metaphor for initiation is only the first stage. For when *Gos. Phil.* speaks of initiation not only as rebirth, but as an image of rebirth, it implies a change in the ontological status of the input spaces. Not only is initiation simply to be understood metaphorically in terms of birth, but the tractate goes one stage further and identifies this ritual rebirth as only an image of the true rebirth. The ritual acts understood in terms of physical birth, an understanding arising from a blended space, has in this way become an image of the true level of reality it may itself only be an imperfect representation of. In this way, the blend that makes it possible to understand the ritual acts in terms of the ICM of BIRTH is in *Gos. Phil.* in a sense reinterpreted by being ontologically turned on its head when the tractate presents the blend itself as the more concrete mental space that sheds light upon what amounts to an ontologically higher form of the original framing input, that of birth. Moreover, the blend is understood as a necessary means of attaining this higher reality, for “it is truly necessary to be reborn by means of the image,” (ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀτροῦ ἄπο ἄκροῦ ἐκ τῶν ἄπο ἄκροῦ)⁷ as *Gos. Phil.* puts it.

9. THE USE OF SCRIPTURE

We have seen how both *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* in important ways operate in constant dialogue with Scripture, relying to a great extent upon links with various key biblical intertexts in interweaving webs of conceptual and intertextual mental spaces. Both *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* betray an awareness of an extensive range of Old and New Testament Scriptures, and while the former is an important reference in both, and especially in *Exeg. Soul*, it is in both cases their interpretation of the New Testament that ultimately determines their use of the Old.

Of the Synoptic Gospels, Matthew and Luke are employed in both texts, but there is a notable lack of clear references to the Gospel of Mark. Both *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* also use the Gospel of John, but only in the latter text does this gospel permeate the entire discourse. In *Gos. Phil.*, as we have seen, the Gospel of John seems in a way to be the main hypotext,

⁶ *Gos. Phil.* 67.12–13.

⁷ *Gos. Phil.* 67.13–14.

to borrow a term from Gérard Genette,⁸ for in a way we may read *Gos. Phil.* as an extended interpretation of the Gospel of John. As we have seen, even the title of the work may hint at this by pointing us to the apostle Philip's dialogue with Jesus in John 14.

As for Old Testament Scriptures, the first chapters of Genesis constitute a crucially important intertext to both *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* First and foremost the account of the creation of man at 1:26–27 and that of the creation of woman at 2:21–24 are central. In addition *Gos. Phil.* also refers to the second account of the creation of man at Gen 2:7 and also makes extensive use of the references to the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge, and of the fall and punishment of Adam and Eve, passages that are not referenced in *Exeg. Soul*. On the other hand, the latter's use of Old Testament Scripture is more extensive.

So, both texts display a wide knowledge and use of both Old and New Testament Scripture, and it probably does not hurt to state the rather obvious fact that although there are certain biblical texts we have not found references to in these texts, this cannot be used to argue that these were not known by those who produced or used *Exeg. Soul* or *Gos. Phil.*⁹

10. ETHICS AND WAY OF LIFE

The ethical implications of the two texts also appear to be somewhat different. In *Exeg. Soul*, the emphasis seems to be on the proclivities of the human soul, i.e., on the internal life of the Christian, stressing the need for total devotion to Christ. What such a devotion to Christ is supposed to entail in daily life is, however, left unstated, with the important exception of the strong emphasis on the necessity of constant prayer. *Exeg. Soul's* focus is in this sense relatively introverted.

By contrast, *Gos. Phil.* does deal in several passages with the Christian's relations with the world and other people, and does not seem to advocate isolationism. Instead the benefits of being in the vicinity of the fully initiated Christians are highlighted, and the tractate appears to advocate interaction with, and a certain social responsibility towards, other people

⁸ See Gérard Genette, *Palimpsests: Literature in the Second Degree* (trans. Channa Newman and Claude Doubinsky; Stages 8; Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997).

⁹ Cf., e.g., Robert McL. Wilson, "The Gnostics and the Old Testament," in *Proceedings of the International Colloquium on Gnosticism, Stockholm, August 20–25, 1973* (ed. Geo Widengren; Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1977), 165.

of lower spiritual levels, perhaps even non-Christians. *Gos. Phil.* even advocates some kind of universal salvation, and thus seems far removed from the rather more stark impression we get from *Exeg. Soul*.

As for the tractates' attitudes towards the material world, *Gos. Phil.* seems to evince the more positive view of the two, stressing the, albeit imperfect, reflection of the heavenly realities in the earthly, and seems to advocate indifference rather than hatred towards the material body. *Exeg. Soul* seems more one-sidedly negative in this sense, with its focus on the need for the soul to escape the world and the body. It is of course possible that this impression may simply be a result of *Exeg. Soul's* rhetorical focus on the internal life of the soul and its advocacy of repentance and devotion to Christ, rather than a direct reflection of an underlying ethical stance. In neither *Exeg. Soul* nor *Gos. Phil.* is the material body destined for salvation. In *Exeg. Soul* the material body is what the soul has fallen into and needs to escape from, while in *Gos. Phil.* it is the part of the human constitution that will not rise in the resurrection. In *Exeg. Soul* the soul is saved by her marriage with Christ, and may thus turn away from the body, while in *Gos. Phil.* one is saved by becoming Christ and wearing *his* body.

Exeg. Soul, as we have seen, stresses the necessity of repentance, weeping, and prayer, but the prayer that is advocated might very well be of the silent variety, since it is the prayer of the soul, the inward prayer, that is explicitly emphasised in contrast to the outward prayer of the lips. *Gos. Phil.*, while clearly presupposing the use of liturgical prayer, also shows a negative attitude towards "praying in the world," and, as we have seen, might be understood to be advocating a similar practice of inward prayer as seen in *Exeg. Soul*. With regard to non-liturgical prayer, then, *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul* may well be in agreement.

11. REFLECTIONS ON METHODOLOGY

Commenting on the usefulness of applying theories developed within cognitive linguistics to biblical exegesis, Leo Noordman has recently pointed out that cognitive linguistics makes us sensitive to pervasive textual phenomena related to mental models and processes, and provides us with theories to both describe and analyse them.¹⁰ He emphasises,

¹⁰ See Noordman, "Some Reflections," 334.

however, that his advocacy of cognitive linguistics “should not be interpreted as implying that cognitive linguistics has developed ready made tools that can simply be applied in other disciplines, for instance, in exegesis.”¹¹ Acknowledging the truthfulness of Noordman’s comments, this study has been an attempt to adapt and combine some existing tools into something that would prove to be useful in a study of both conceptual and intertextual blending in texts like *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* I hope to have shown that to attain to the questions of conceptual and intertextual blending in the study of these Nag Hammadi tractates is not of mere peripheral importance, but indispensable if we want to provide analyses that do justice to the many-layered complexities of these intriguing texts, and I hope to have shown the usefulness of the outlined Cognitive Poetics methodology in performing this task. In other words, I hope to have demonstrated the usefulness of this theoretical framework in making us aware of the complexities of the texts while at the same time helping us understand how they make sense.

In addition, cognitive poetics is helpful when it comes to the historical contextualisation of the analysed texts. As we have seen, we can employ inputs from previously historically contextualized knowledge experimentally in our Cognitive Poetic analyses of an ancient text, like the ones from Nag Hammadi, in order to analytically map out its meaning potential within that particular historical context. Cognitive Poetics may here help us delineate rhetorical structures within a text, that may more clearly show us its possible polemical edges and thus help us tentatively place the text within an historico-cultural context. For instance, as we have seen, the cognitive poetic analysis of *Gos. Phil.* showing the pervasive emphasis on begetting in opposition to creating, seems to indicate that we could fruitfully read this kind of polemic in light of the Arian crisis of the fourth century. Secondly, a Cognitive Poetic analysis may be used as a basis for a comparison with other sources with a more secure historical context. In such analyses we may consciously choose to refrain from reading certain cognitive models and historically contextualized information into the text from the beginning, in order to level the ground between the sources that are to be compared.

How can Cognitive Poetics help us analyze the possible functions of texts within an historical context? In hypothesising possible functions of a text within specific historico-cultural contexts, a methodology based

¹¹ Noordman, “Some Reflections,” 334.

on Cognitive Poetics may in several ways help make us aware of different interpretive possibilities. A Cognitive Poetic study of how Scripture is interpretively recontextualized by way of intertextual allusions or quotations in a reading of a given text, may again serve as a prelude to the study of how this text may again have functioned within different hypothetical historical contexts. The hypothetical historical contexts we choose to apply in such experimental analyses should of course not be arbitrarily chosen, but rather be selected on the basis of clues within the texts, or from external information, like for instance the date and provenance of the material remains in which the texts have been preserved. Such clues trigger contextual inputs from our existing historical knowledge together with the cognitive models that seem most relevant to the text at hand.

The groundwork is thus laid for a comprehensive comparative analysis that has been outside the scope of the present study. As for the evaluation of the results of such analyses, the only criterion I think is theoretically warranted is to what degree the resulting interpretations make sense to us and our peers. For when it comes to what it is that in the final analysis makes an interpretation sensible, I think Stanley Fish has argued convincingly that this has much less to do with the texts we are trying to interpret themselves, than with the socially constrained evaluation of such interpretations made by one interpretive community or another.¹² For what yields the most coherent and persuasive overall interpretation of a text will always be relative to the existing conventions within the respective interpretive communities.

12. THE PLACE OF *EXEG. SOUL* AND *GOS. PHIL.* IN THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY

Nearly fifty years ago Robert M. Grant argued that “the new gospels from Nag-Hammadi deserve a welcome because they will help show what Christianity is not, and what our canonical gospels are not,” and added that “They may conceivably help us to see what our gospels are, but the differences will remain more important than the similarities.”¹³ I hope, however, to have demonstrated in the present study that these texts should not be seen as evidence of what Christianity was not, but rather of

¹² See Fish, *Is There a Text?*

¹³ Grant, “Two Gnostic Gospels,” 10.

what it was. *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul* should be seen as parts of the fabric of early Christianity, and hence as sources for what early Christianity was like, rather than as contrasts to Christianity in its formative period. I also hope to have shown that in order to properly understand *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul*, they need not and should not be approached from the perspective of a predetermined category of “Gnosticism.” By eschewing this category, these early Christian texts suddenly appear less as aberrations of early Christianity than as parts of it,¹⁴ and we may more easily focus on the similarities between these texts and other early Christian sources, rather than on the differences.

It seems that a reading of these texts thoroughly *within* the many-faceted fabric of early Christian discourse promises to yield insights into the fascinating corpus of writings constituted by the Nag Hammadi Codices, and on their place in the history of Christianity, that have hitherto eluded us. For, as Karen King has rightly pointed out, “if we only reproduce the discursive and interpretive position of the ‘orthodox’ winners, we will never understand adequately what was at stake in the early Christian controversies that shaped what has come to be one of the most influential religious traditions the world has yet known.”¹⁵

Moreover, in such an analysis we should not simply assume that these Nag Hammadi texts are straightforward translations into Coptic of significantly older Greek originals, but rather be open to the possibility that many of these texts should be regarded as “living literature”¹⁶ that may also have undergone significant rewriting in their Coptic phase(s) of transmission, without this fact precluding their status as coherent literary statements. We should consequently be wary of assuming that what we find in these texts can be used as sources for the state of Christianity at a stage long before the production of our preserved Coptic manuscripts.

The great manuscript discoveries of the 20th century, not least the discovery of the Nag Hammadi Codices, forcefully brought home the fact that our puzzle of early Christianity had lacked a great number of pieces, and still does. As Rowan Greer observed already at the Yale conference on “Gnosticism” in 1978, the new pieces soon called into question “the lines along which the puzzle was previously being solved.”¹⁷

¹⁴ For, as Wisse has correctly pointed out, “few pagan or Christian religious writings of the first three centuries of our era are immune to being interpreted as showing the influence of Gnosticism or as including a polemic against it” (Wisse, “On Exegeting,” 68).

¹⁵ King, *Secret Revelation of John*, x.

¹⁶ See Bradshaw, “Liturgy and ‘Living Literature’” and the discussion in chapter 1.

¹⁷ Rowan A. Greer, “The Dog and the Mushrooms: Irenaeus’s View of the Valentinians

Greer rightly noted that it is “tempting to suppose that when new pieces of a puzzle are discovered they can simply be added to the ones already arranged.”¹⁸ Despite Greer’s perceptive comments to the effect that the new pieces do not actually fit into the old puzzle, the Nag Hammadi tractates have still been used mainly as pieces in a puzzle that was already being laid according to the heresiological writings of Irenaeus, Clement, Hippolytus, Tertullian, and Epiphanius.

Keith Hopkins has strikingly illustrated “how hazardous conventional inductive procedures are, when scholars so carefully reconstruct church history only from surviving sources,” by pointing out that if fifty Christian communities wrote on average two letters per year in the period 50 to 150CE, this would add up to ten thousand letters, “of which barely fifty survive.”¹⁹ From this he drew the obvious conclusion that the sources from this period are appallingly unrepresentative.²⁰ If we extrapolate from this calculation to the whole period up until the time of the production of the Nag Hammadi Codices, taking also the massive growth in the number of Christian communities into consideration, it becomes quite apparent that we still lack a large proportion of the pieces to this puzzle, and that it is far from clear where the diverse Nag Hammadi texts fit in among the thousands of lost documents of early Christianity. It is therefore of utmost importance for the interpretation of the virtually contextless Nag Hammadi texts what categories, contexts, metanarratives, and intertexts we choose to invoke in an effort to make sense of them.

It seems clear from the present study, however, that the puzzle pieces constituted by *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* do not readily fit in with previous attempts to assemble the puzzle on the basis of theories of “Gnosticism.” The critique of this particular scholarly category, that has been forcefully fronted by Michael Williams²¹ and Karen King,²² seems at least on the basis of the present study to have been vindicated. On the basis of the present analysis there are reasons to believe that *Exeg. Soul* and especially *Gos. Phil.* have persistently and forcibly been used as pieces in puzzles where they most probably do not belong. I hope to have shown, however,

Assessed,” in *The School of Valentinus* (ed. Bentley Layton; vol. 1 of *The Rediscovery of Gnosticism: Proceedings of the International Conference on Gnosticism at Yale, New Haven, Connecticut, March 28–31, 1978*; SHR 41; Leiden: Brill, 1980), 146.

¹⁸ Greer, “The Dog and the Mushrooms,” 146.

¹⁹ Keith Hopkins, “Christian Number and Its Implications,” *J ECS* 6:2 (1998): 200.

²⁰ Hopkins, “Christian Number,” 200.

²¹ See Williams, *Rethinking “Gnosticism”*.

²² See esp. King, *What is Gnosticism*, but see also King, *Secret Revelation of John*, viii–x.

that it may be possible to see *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* as reflecting quite different theological discussions and polemical contexts than those that are reflected in the works of the earliest heresiologists.

What remains to be done, then, apart from a comparison with other related Nag Hammadi texts, which should ideally be based on detailed internal analyses of these other texts, is an extended comparative analysis of *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul* with other Christian sources. Such a comparative analysis should start with the approximate period of the production of the Nag Hammadi Codices and work backwards from there, rather than the other way around. By analysing *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul* also in light of sources from the approximate period of the creation and use of the codices themselves, we may gain a better foundation from which to answer questions concerning the possible identities of the late antique users of these texts, and also that of the manufacturers and users of the codex that contains them, regardless of what conclusions we may come to with respect to the authorship and date of the hypothetical originals.²³

Early Egyptian monastic sources, from the fourth and fifth centuries, remain a promising avenue of comparative analysis that has not yet been fully exploited. While, as we have seen, neither *Exeg. Soul* nor *Gos. Phil.* seem to require an ascetic or monastic reading, both texts do seem to lend themselves rather easily to such readings, which would make them compatible with a monastic way of life, and a monastic milieu would appear to be a probable *Sitz im Leben* for both texts in their present form. Indeed, if we also take fully into consideration the possibility of more “orthodox” readings of texts like *Gos. Phil.* and *Exeg. Soul* than we have been accustomed to, and compare them systematically with sources from the fourth and fifth century, we may perhaps find that James Goehring might have been rather close to the mark when he stated that, for the monks of Egypt, “it was not impossible for one to support Athanasius and to read the Nag Hammadi texts.”²⁴ In any case, to study these texts “as part of a gnostic, rather than monastic, trajectory,” seems, as Michel Desjardins has put it, “peculiar at best.”²⁵

²³ See Emmel, “Religious Tradition,” 37.

²⁴ James E. Goehring, “New Frontiers in Pachomian Studies,” in *The Roots of Egyptian Christianity* (ed. Birger A. Pearson and James E. Goehring; SAC; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 247.

²⁵ Desjardins, “Rethinking the Study of Gnosticism,” 380.

FIGURES

FIGURES




Fig. 1. Basic Conceptual Integration Network




Fig. 2. The Eucharistic Elements




Fig. 3. The Nativity




Fig. 4. The Soul is a Woman

FIGURES




Fig. 5. The Original State of the Soul




Fig. 6. The Fall of the Soul




Fig. 7. Communion with Christ vs. Communion with the adulterers




Fig. 8. Baptism is Washing

FIGURES




Fig. 9. The Soul is a Garment and a Woman




Fig. 10. Baptism is Washing




Fig. 11. Christian Life is a Marriage with Christ




Fig. 12. Christian Initiation is a Wedding

FIGURES




Fig. 13. The Place of Marriage




Fig. 14. Salvation Through Rebirth




Fig. 15. Metonymical and Metaphorical Relations (1)




Fig. 16. Metonymical and Metaphorical Relations (2)




Fig. 17. Salvation Through Rebirth




Fig. 18. The Christian is a Christ




Fig. 19. John 1:14a + 6:53-54




Fig. 20. John 1:1-14 + John 6:48-58

FIGURES




Fig. 21. Adam and Christ




Fig. 22. Hebrew-Proselyte vs. Father-Son




Fig. 23. Anointer–Anointed Relationships (1)




Fig. 24. Anointer–Anointed Relationships (2)

FIGURES




Fig. 25. Christian Initiation is Begetting




Fig. 26. Anointer-Anointed Relationships (3)




Fig. 27. The Baptism of Christ and the Baptism of the Christians




Fig. 28. The Tree of Knowledge and the Law




Fig. 29. The Tree of Knowledge




Fig. 30. The Two Trees of Knowledge




Fig. 31. Joseph the Carpenter




Fig. 32. The Cross as the Tree of Life




Fig. 33. The Cross, the Tree of Life, and the Chrism




Fig. 34. The Cross as the Tree of Knowledge and the Tree of Life




Fig. 35. The Rending of the Veil and the Separation of Christ




Fig. 36. The Christian is a Christ

FIGURES




Fig. 37. Blood and Water




Fig. 38. The Body is a Garment




Fig. 39. The Earthly and the Heavenly Garments




Fig. 40. Baptism is Dyeing

FIGURES




Fig. 41. Baptism and the Mirror




Fig. 42. Body of Christ as Bridal Chamber




Fig. 43. The Eucharist as Bridal Chamber




Fig. 44. Eating and Death




Fig. 45. The Temple




Fig. 46. Jewish Proselyte Initiation is Creating




Fig. 47. Christian Initiation is Begetting




Fig. 48. The Eucharist




Fig. 49. Different Genesis Interpretations

APPENDIX

TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS

The following transcriptions of the Coptic text of *Exeg. Soul* and *Gos. Phil.* are based on a reading of the *Facsimile Edition* of Nag Hammadi Codex II together with the main critical editions. All divergences in the Coptic text from the editions of Layton, Sevrin, Krause, and Kulawik, in the case of *Exeg. Soul*, and of Layton, Schenke, Ménard, and Till in the case of *Gos. Phil.*, are noted in the apparatus, as well as selected suggestions from other Scholars were I have deemed it relevant. For other variants, see the major critical editions. Only divergences from the Coptic text utilised in the present study are noted in the apparatus. The translations are my own. Rather than offering the most fluent English texts possible, I have aimed to provide relatively literal translations of the Coptic, and have also in some cases chosen to show more than one possible translation of certain words, in order to highlight potential wordplays or to indicate instances where it has not been possible to decide between different translations. The page numbers follow the *Facsimile Edition*, while the plate numbers in parantheses in Appendix B refer to Labib, *Coptic Gnostic Papyri*, which is the numbering scheme referred to in early studies of *Gos. Phil.* The sigla used in the apparatus are as follows:

Appendix A. THE EXEGESIS ON THE SOUL

- Bethge Bethge, Hedda. "Die Exegese über die Seele: Die sechste Schrift aus Nag-Hammadi-Codex II: Eingeleitet und übersetzt vom Berliner Arbeitskreis für koptisch-gnostische Schriften." *TLZ* 101:2 (1976): 93–104.
- Browne Browne, Gerald M. "Textual Notes on the Exegesis on the Soul." *BASP* 12 (1975): 1–8.
- Kasser Kasser, Rodolphe. "L'Histoire de l'Âme (ou Exégèse de l'Âme, NH II,6) en langue copte saïdique: passage controversé (132,27–35) soumis à un nouvel examen." *Göttinger Miszellen: Beiträge zur ägyptologischen Diskussion* 147 (1995): 71–78.
- Krause Krause, Martin, and Pahor Labib, eds. *Gnostische und hermetische Schriften aus Codex II und Codex VI. Abhandlungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts Kairo, Koptische Reihe* 2. Glückstadt: J.J. Augustin, 1971.
- Kulawik Kulawik, Cornelia. *Die Erzählung über die Seele (Nag-Hammadi-Codex II,6): Neu herausgegeben, übersetzt und erklärt.* TUGAL 155. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2006.

- Layton Layton, Bentley, ed., William C. Robinson, Jr., trans. "The Expository Treatise on the Soul." Pp. 144–169 in *On the Origin of the World, Expository Treatise on the Soul, Book of Thomas the Contender*. Vol. 2 of *Nag Hammadi Codex II, 2–7 Together with XIII, 2**, *Brit. Lib. Or.4926(1)*, and *P. Oxy. 1, 654, 655*. Edited by Bentley Layton. NHS 21. Leiden: Brill, 1989.
- Nagel Nagel, Peter. "Die Septuaginta-Zitate in der koptisch-gnostischen 'Exegese über die Seele' (Nag Hammadi Codex II)." *APF* 22 (1973): 249–269.
- Sevrin Sevrin, Jean-Marie. *L'Exégèse de l'âme (NH II, 6): Texte établi et présenté*. BCNH 9. Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1983.
- Wisse Wisse, Frederik. "On Exegeting 'The Exegesis on the Soul'" Pp. 68–81 in *Les Textes de Nag Hammadi: Colloque du Centre d'Histoire des Religions (Strasbourg, 23–25 octobre 1974)*. Edited by Jacques-É. Ménard. NHS 7. Leiden: Brill, 1975.

Appendix B. THE GOSPEL OF PHILIP

- Giversen Giversen, Søren. *Filipsevangeliet: Indledning, studier, oversættelse og noter*. Copenhagen: Gads, 1966.
- Layton Layton, Bentley, ed., Wesley W. Isenberg, trans. "The Gospel According to Philip." Pp. 142–215 in *Gospel According to Thomas, Gospel According to Philip, Hypostasis of the Archons, and Indexes*. Vol. 1 of *Nag Hammadi Codex II, 2–7 Together with XIII, 2**, *Brit. Lib. Or.4926(1)*, and *P. Oxy. 1, 654, 655*. Edited by Bentley Layton. NHS 20. Leiden: Brill, 1989.
- Ménard Ménard, Jacques-É. *L'Évangile selon Philippe: Introduction, Texte—Traduction, Commentaire*. 2d ed. Gnostica. Paris: Cariscript, 1988.
- Schenke Schenke, Hans-Martin. *Das Philippus-Evangelium (Nag Hammadi-Codex II, 3): Neu herausgegeben, übersetzt und erklärt*. TUGAL 143. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1997.
- Till Till, Walter C. *Das Evangelium nach Philippos*. PTS 2. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1963.

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18 ΤΕΞΗΓΗΣΙΣ ΕΤΒΕΤΨΥΧΗ

- ἀνσοφος ετψοοп зιτῆνεζη αγ†ο
 20 νομασια ετΨΥΧΗ ἡνογραν ἡςζιμε
 οητῶс οη зῆτεςφγςιс ογςζιμε τε
 ογῆταс ἡμαγ ζωωс ἡτεςμητρα ζωωс
 мен εсψοοп ογaaтс ζωηῆπειωт
 ογπαρεенос те αγω ογζογтсζιμε те
 25 зῆпесεиε зотан δε εсψαηζαεиε
 епитῆ εсωма ἡси епееивиос тоте ас
 ζωεиε азототογ ἡζαζ ἡληстнс αγω ἡ
 зγв[рi]стнс агнозс етоотογ ἡноγερηγ
 αγ[.]ос ζωεиε мен агхрω
 30 ηὰс з[ἡноγви]а зῆкooγе δε εγπειθε
 ἡмос зῆ[ο]γαпaтн ἡΔωρ[ο]η ζωααз
 ζωπλωс агχoзmс ас[. тесmῆ]т

127.28 Krause, Sevrin: зγ[вpи]стнс || 29 Krause: αγ[ω агχωρημ ἡμ]ος; Sevrin: α[γχωρῆ
 ἡμ]ος; Kulawik: αγ[ω агβωλχ ἡμ]ος || 30 Krause: з[ἡноγви]а; Sevrin: з[ἡноγви]а || 31
 Krause: зῆ[ο]γαпaтн ἡΔωρ[ο]η ζωααз; Sevrin: зῆ[ο]γαпaтн ἡΔωρ[ο]η ζωααз || 32 Krause:
 ас†[ογω ἡτεςμηт]; Sevrin: ас†[ογω ἡτεςμη]т; Kulawik: ас†[теко ἡτεςμη]т.

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18 The Exegesis on the Soul

The wise who lived before us
 20 named the soul with a feminine name.
 Indeed, in her nature she is a woman.
 She even has her womb. While
 being alone with the Father
 she was a virgin, and she was male-female
 25 in her likeness,¹ but when she fell
 down to a body and came to this life, then she
 fell into the hands of many robbers, and the
 wanton men tossed her into each other's hands,
 and they [...]. Some used
 30 her [by force], while others persuaded
 her by deception with a gift.
 In short, they defiled her, and she [... her]

¹ Cf. Gen 1:26–27; 2:21–24.

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- 1 παρθένος ἀγῶ ἀσπορνέγε ῥῆ̄π̄ε̄ς
 σῶμα ἀγῶ ἀσταὰς ἦ̄τοοτῶ οἶον ἠ̄ιμ
 ἀγῶ πετσαβολᾶς ἦ̄μοϋ ε̄σμε̄ε̄γε
 χε̄πε̄ς̄ρᾱεῑ πε̄ ρο̄πο̄τε̄ ἦ̄τᾱστᾱας̄ ἦ̄
- 5 τῶοτοῦ ἦ̄ρῆ̄μο̄ῑχο̄ς ἦ̄ρῆ̄β̄ρῑς̄τ̄η̄ς ἦ̄α
 π̄ῑς̄το̄ς̄ ἀ̄τ̄ροῦ̄ρ̄χ̄ρω̄ νᾱς̄ το̄τε̄ ἀ̄σᾱω̄ε̄ρο̄ν
 ε̄μᾱτε̄ ἀγῶ ἀ̄σ̄με̄τᾱνο̄εῑ πᾱλῑν̄ ε̄σ̄ω̄ᾱ(ἦ̄)
 κ̄τε̄πε̄ς̄ρο̄ ε̄βο̄λ̄ ἦ̄νε̄εῑμο̄ῑχο̄ς̄ τ̄ᾱσ̄π̄ω̄τ̄
 ε̄ροῦ̄ν̄ ε̄ρῆ̄κο̄ο̄γε̄ ἦ̄σε̄ρᾱνᾱγκ̄ᾱζε̄ ἦ̄μο̄ς̄
- 10 ἀ̄τ̄ρε̄σ̄ω̄π̄ε̄ ἦ̄ἠ̄μᾱγ̄ ἦ̄σ̄ρ̄ε̄μ̄ε̄ᾱλ̄ νᾱγ̄
 ἦ̄θε̄ ἦ̄ἦ̄χ̄ο̄ε̄ῑς̄ ρ̄ῑχ̄ἦ̄πο̄γ̄μᾱ ἦ̄γκ̄ο̄τ̄κ̄
 ε̄βο̄λ̄ ἄ̄ε̄ ἦ̄π̄ω̄π̄ε̄ οὔ̄κε̄τῑ νᾱσ̄το̄λ̄μᾱ
 ε̄κᾱᾱγ̄ ἦ̄σ̄ω̄ς̄ ἦ̄το̄οῦ̄ ἄ̄ε̄ τ̄ᾱγᾱπᾱτᾱ ἦ̄
 μο̄ς̄ ἦ̄ἠ̄οῦ̄νο̄ς̄ ἦ̄χ̄ρο̄νο̄ς̄ ἦ̄θε̄ ἦ̄ἠ̄ε̄ᾱ
- 15 ε̄ῑ ε̄τῆ̄ρο̄τ̄ ἦ̄ρῆ̄ἠ̄ῑμε̄ ρ̄ω̄ς̄ ε̄ω̄χ̄ε̄ε̄γ̄τῑμᾱ
 ἦ̄μο̄ς̄ ε̄μᾱτε̄ ἀγῶ ε̄ρ̄ᾱν̄ ἦ̄νᾱεῑ τ̄η̄ροῦ̄
 τ̄ᾱγ̄κᾱᾱς̄ ἦ̄σ̄ω̄οῦ̄ ἦ̄σε̄β̄ω̄κ̄ ἦ̄το̄ς̄ ἄ̄ε̄ τ̄ᾱ
 ρ̄ε̄σ̄ω̄π̄ε̄ ἦ̄χ̄η̄ρᾱ ἦ̄η̄κ̄ε̄ ἦ̄ε̄ρ̄η̄μο̄ς̄
 ε̄ἠ̄ἦ̄τᾱσ̄β̄ο̄η̄θ̄ε̄ιᾱ ἦ̄μᾱγ̄ οὔ̄δ̄ε̄ τ̄ᾱγ̄μᾱ
- 20 ἄ̄ε̄ ἠ̄ἦ̄τᾱ [q]c̄ ε̄βο̄λ̄ ῥῆ̄π̄ε̄ς̄ἠ̄κᾱε̄ ἦ̄
 πε̄σ̄ε̄ἦ̄ρ̄η̄γ̄ γ̄ᾱρ̄ ἠ̄λᾱᾱγ̄ ἦ̄το̄οῦ̄τοῦ̄ ε̄ῑ ἠ̄
 τῑ ἀ̄η̄χ̄ω̄ε̄ ἦ̄ἦ̄τᾱγ̄τᾱᾱγ̄ νᾱς̄ ῥῆ̄π̄τ̄ροῦ̄ρ̄
 κο̄ῑνω̄ν̄ε̄ῑ ἦ̄ἠ̄μᾱς̄ ἀγῶ ἠ̄ε̄ἦ̄τᾱσ̄χ̄πο̄
 οὔ̄ ε̄βο̄λ̄ ῥῆ̄ἦ̄μο̄ῑχο̄ς̄ ἦ̄κ̄ω̄φο̄ς̄ ἠ̄ε̄ ἀγ̄
- 25 ω̄ ῥῆ̄β̄ἠ̄λᾱᾱγ̄ ἠ̄ε̄ ἀγῶ σ̄ε̄ο̄ ἦ̄ρῆ̄ἠ̄λᾱᾱ
 λ̄ε̄χ̄ πο̄γ̄η̄τ̄ πο̄ω̄ς̄ ρ̄ο̄τᾱν̄ ἄ̄ε̄ ε̄ρ̄ω̄ᾱ(ἦ̄)
 π̄ε̄ω̄τ̄ ε̄τῆ̄π̄σᾱ ἠ̄τ̄πε̄ σ̄ἠ̄πε̄σ̄ω̄π̄ε̄ ἦ̄
 φ̄σ̄ω̄τ̄ ε̄π̄τῆ̄ ε̄χ̄ω̄ς̄ ἦ̄φ̄νᾱγ̄ ε̄ρο̄ς̄ ε̄σε̄
 ω̄ε̄ρο̄ν̄ ἠ̄ἦ̄νε̄σ̄π̄ᾱθ̄ο̄ς̄ ἠ̄ἦ̄τᾱσ̄χ̄η̄μο̄
- 30 σῦ̄νη̄ ἀγῶ ε̄σ̄με̄τᾱνο̄εῑ ε̄χ̄ἦ̄τε̄σ̄πο̄
 ρ̄ε̄ιᾱ ἦ̄τᾱσᾱας̄ ἀγῶ ἦ̄σᾱρ̄χ̄ε̄ῑ ἦ̄ἠ̄ρε̄
 π̄κᾱλ̄ε̄ῑ {ἦ̄ρ̄ε̄π̄κᾱλ̄ε̄ῑ} ε̄ρ̄ρᾱῖ̄ ε̄π̄[ε̄φ̄ρ]ᾶ̄ν̄
 ἀ̄τ̄ρε̄φ̄ρ̄β̄ο̄η̄θ̄ε̄ῑ νᾱς̄ ε̄[σ̄ π]ε̄ς̄
 ρ̄η̄τ̄ τ̄η̄ρ̄φ̄ ε̄σ̄χ̄ω̄ ἦ̄ἠ̄ο̄[σ̄ χ̄ε̄μᾱ]τ̄οῦ̄χ̄ο̄
- 35 ε̄ῑ π̄ᾱε̄ῑω̄τ̄ χ̄ε̄ε̄ῑς̄ρ̄η̄η̄τ̄ε̄ †ἠ̄ᾱ†λο̄γο̄ς̄
 [ἠ̄ᾱκ̄ χ̄ε̄ᾱρ̄ικ̄ω̄] ἦ̄σ̄ω̄ε̄ῑ ἠ̄πᾱν̄ε̄ῑ ἀγῶ

128.2 Sevrin: <ἦ>οἶον ἠ̄ιμ || 24 Sevrin: <ρ̄>ἦ̄κ̄ω̄φο̄ς̄ || 32 Krause, Sevrin: ε̄ρ̄ρᾱῖ̄; Sevrin: ε̄π̄[ε̄φ̄ρ]ᾶ̄ν̄ || 33 Krause: ε̄[σ̄ε̄ω̄ε̄ρο̄ν̄ ῥῆ̄π̄]ε̄ς̄; Sevrin: ε̄[σ̄ᾱω̄ε̄ρο̄ν̄ ῥῆ̄π̄]ε̄ς̄; Kulawik: ε̄[σ̄ω̄λ̄η̄ ο̄ν̄ ῥῆ̄π̄]ε̄ς̄ || 34 Krause, Sevrin: ἠ̄ἠ̄[ο̄ς̄ χ̄ε̄μᾱ]τ̄οῦ̄χ̄ο̄ || 35 Krause: ε̄ῑ [π̄]ᾱε̄ῑ[ω̄]τ̄; Sevrin: ε̄ῑ [π̄]ᾱε̄ῑ[ω̄]τ̄; Krause, Sevrin: †ἠ̄ᾱ†λο̄γο̄ς̄.

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1 virgin[ity], and she prostituted herself in her
 body, and she gave herself to everyone,
 and whomever she would embrace she considered
 to be her husband. When she gave herself
 5 to the hands of faithless wanton adulterers
 for them to use her, then she sighed
 very much and she repented. Again, when she
 turns her face from these adulterers she runs
 to others and they force her
 10 to sleep with them and to slave for them
 upon their bed as if they are the masters,
 but out of shame she no longer dares
 to leave them. And as for them, they deceive
 her for a long time as if they are
 15 true trustworthy husbands, as if valuing
 her greatly. And at the end of all these things
 they leave her behind and go. But she for her part
 becomes a poor barren widow
 without help, not even a
 20 (small) measure did she have from her suffering.
 For she did not gain anything from them except
 the defilements they gave her when they had
 communion with her. And those whom she bore
 from the adulterers are dumb and
 25 blind and sickly
 and mentally disturbed. But when
 the Father who is above visits her
 and looks down upon her and sees her
 sighing in her passions and
 30 disgrace and repenting for her
 prostitution which she did, and she began to
 call upon [his name]
 for him to help her [...]

all her heart, saying, "Save
 35 me, Father, for behold, I will give account
 [to you, for I have left] my house behind and

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- 1 ἀριπῶτ εἰς ἡπαρῶντων παλι(ν)
 τκτοεὶ φάροκ ῥοταν ἐφῶλμναγ ἐρος
 ἐσῶοοπ ἡπείσμοτ τοτε φναρκρίνε
 αας ἡαζιος ἀτρεφνα нас хенааџе ἡμοκρς
- 5 ἡταρὶ ἐχῶς χεακκῶ ἡπеснеи ἡсῶс ἐχῆ
 тпорниа σε ἡтγχхн чпрофнтее ἡ
 ραρ ἡна ἡспепῆа етоγαав πεχαq
 γαρ ῥῆερнмιαс пепрофнтнс χεῖροτα(н)
 ерῶапραι τογείεтеqрime αγῶ ἡс
- 10 βωκ ἡсхикеога мн снакотѣ ероq χин
 теноу мн ρῆоугῶρμ ἡпесχῶρμ
 ἡсйтесрime етῆмаγ αγῶ ἡто арепор
 неџе мῆρар ἡῶсс αγῶ арекоте φа
 роеи πεχαq ἡсплχοеис qi ἡневал еρ
- 15 ραῖ епсооγтῆ αγῶ ἡтенаγ χеῆтаре
 порнеџе тῶн мн нереρμοос аη ρῆне
 ρин ереχῶρμ ἡпкаρ ρῆнепорниа
 мῆнекакиа αγῶ арехиρар ἡῶсс еγ
 χроп не арεῶωπε ἡатῶпe мῆоу
- 20 он мнм ἡпемоγте еρраῖ ероеи ρῶс
 ρῆῆнеи η ρῶс еиῶт η архнгос ἡте
 мῆтпаρθенос παλιν qснρ ρῆῶсне
 пепрофнтнс χεамнеитῆ χιρап мн
 тетῆмааγ χеснаῶωпе наеи аη ἡρi
- 25 ме αγῶ аηок тнаῶωпе нас аη ἡρa
 еи тнаqi ἡтеспорниа ἡмаγ ἡпамῆто
 евол αγῶ тнаqi ἡтесмоихеиа ρῆ
 тмнтe ἡнескиве тнакаас ескака
 ρнγ ἡῶе ἡφοоγ ἡтаγχпос ἡмоу αγ
- 30 ω т[н]аас ἡερнмос ἡῶе ἡоγкаρ емῆ
 м[ооγ ἡρнтq а]γῶ тнаас ἡатῶнре
 ρῆно[γеиве т]нана аη ἡнесῶнре χе
 ρῆῶнре [н]е ἡпорнеиа χεаτογмааγ
 ρпорнеџе αγῶ астῶ[пe ἡнесῶ]нр[е]

129.30 Krause, Sevrin: †[н]аас ἡερнмос || 31 Krause, Sevrin: η[ооγ ἡρнтq а]γῶ || 32
 Krause: ρη[ογеиве т]нана; Sevrin: ρῆно[γеиве т]нана || 33 Krause: ἡпорнеиa; Sevrin: [не]
 мпорнеиa χе[ατ]ογмааγ || 34 Krause: астῶ[пe ἡнесῶ]нр[е]; Sevrin: астῶ[пe ἡнесῶ]нρ[е].

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1 I have run away from my virgin's quarters.
 Return me again to you!" When he sees her
 like this, then he will judge
 her worthy for him to have mercy on her, for many were the sufferings
 5 that came upon her because she abandoned her house. Concerning
 the prostitution of the soul, then,
 the Holy Spirit prophecies in many places. For he says
 in Jeremiah the prophet: "When
 the husband divorces his wife and she
 10 goes and takes another one, shall she return to him from
 now on? Has not that woman become defiled
 with defilement? And as for you, you have
 prostituted yourself to many shepherds and you have returned
 to me says the Lord. Lift your eyes
 15 up to the uprightness and see
 where you have prostituted yourself. Did you not sit in the
 streets defiling the land with your prostitutions
 and your wickednesses? And you have taken many shepherds as
 obstacles for yourself, and you have become shameless with
 20 everyone, and you have not called up to me as
 a kinsman or as a father or guide of your
 virginity."² Again it is written in Hosea
 the prophet: "Come! Go to law with
 your mother, for she will not become a
 25 wife for me, and as for me, I will not become a
 husband for her. I will take away her prostitution from my presence
 and I will take away her adultery from
 between her breasts. I will place her
 naked as the day she was born, and
 30 I will make her barren like a land without
 [water], and I will make her childless
 with [a thirst. I] will not have mercy upon her children, for
 they are children of prostitution, because their mother
 prostituted herself and she [put her children to shame].

² Jer 3:1-4.

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- 1 $\chi\epsilon\alpha\varsigma\chi\omicron\omicron\upsilon\upsilon$ $\chi\epsilon\uparrow\eta\alpha\pi\omicron\rho\eta\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon$ $\mu\bar{\eta}\eta\eta\epsilon\tau$
 $\mu\epsilon$ $\bar{\eta}\mu\omicron\epsilon\iota$ $\eta\epsilon\tau\bar{\eta}\mu\alpha\gamma$ $\eta\epsilon\gamma\uparrow$ $\eta\alpha\epsilon\iota$ $\bar{\eta}\mu\alpha$
 $\omicron\epsilon\iota\kappa$ $\mu\bar{\eta}\mu\alpha\mu\omicron\omicron\upsilon$ $\mu\bar{\eta}\eta\alpha\omega\tau\eta\eta\eta$ $\mu\bar{\eta}\eta\alpha$
 $\gamma\upsilon\omicron\omicron\varsigma$ $\mu\bar{\eta}\mu\alpha\eta\rho\iota$ $\mu\bar{\eta}\mu\alpha\eta\eta\gamma$ $\mu\bar{\eta}\gamma\omega\upsilon\upsilon$
- 5 $\eta\eta\mu$ $\epsilon\tau\bar{\rho}\omega\alpha\gamma$ $\eta\alpha\epsilon\iota$ $\Delta\iota\alpha$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon\gamma\tau\omicron$ $\epsilon\iota\varsigma\gamma\eta\eta\eta\tau\epsilon$
 $\Delta\eta\omicron\kappa$ $\uparrow\eta\alpha\omega\tau\alpha\mu$ $\bar{\eta}\mu\omicron\omicron\upsilon$ $\chi\epsilon\eta\epsilon\varsigma\omega\upsilon\sigma\bar{\eta}$
 $\omicron\omicron\mu$ $\bar{\eta}\mu\omega\tau$ $\bar{\eta}\varsigma\alpha\eta\epsilon\varsigma\eta\omicron\epsilon\iota\kappa$ $\alpha\gamma\omega$ $\epsilon\varsigma\omega\alpha$
 $\omega\upsilon\eta\epsilon$ $\bar{\eta}\varsigma\omega\omicron\upsilon\gamma$ $\bar{\eta}\varsigma\tau\bar{\eta}\sigma\bar{\eta}\tau\omicron\upsilon\gamma$ $\varsigma\eta\alpha\chi\omicron\omicron\varsigma$
 $\chi\epsilon\uparrow\eta\alpha\kappa\omicron\tau$ $\epsilon\mu\alpha\gamma\alpha\epsilon\iota$ $\chi\iota\eta\omega\sigma\tau\iota$ $\chi\epsilon\eta\epsilon$
- 10 $\epsilon\iota\bar{\rho}\omega\alpha\gamma$ $\bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\gamma\omicron\omicron\upsilon\gamma$ $\epsilon\tau\bar{\eta}\mu\alpha\gamma$ $\bar{\eta}\gamma\omicron\gamma\omicron$ $\Delta\tau\epsilon$
 $\eta\omicron\upsilon\gamma$ $\mu\alpha\lambda\iota\eta$ $\mu\epsilon\chi\alpha\upsilon$ $\gamma\bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\epsilon\zeta\epsilon\kappa\iota\eta\lambda$ $\chi\epsilon\alpha\varsigma$
 $\omega\upsilon\omega\mu\epsilon$ $\mu\bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\varsigma\alpha\gamma\alpha\gamma$ $\bar{\eta}\kappa\alpha\kappa\iota\alpha$ $\mu\epsilon\chi\alpha\upsilon$ $\bar{\eta}\sigma\iota$
 $\mu\chi\omicron\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ $\chi\epsilon\alpha\rho\epsilon\kappa\omega\tau$ $\eta\epsilon$ $\bar{\eta}\omicron\upsilon\gamma\mu\omicron\rho\eta\iota\omicron\eta$
 $\alpha\gamma\omega$ $\alpha\rho\epsilon\tau\alpha\mu\epsilon\iota\omicron$ $\eta\epsilon$ $\bar{\eta}\omicron\upsilon\gamma\tau\omicron\mu\omicron\varsigma$ $\bar{\eta}\varsigma\alpha\epsilon\iota$
- 15 ϵ $\gamma\bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\mu\mu\alpha\tau\epsilon\alpha$ $\alpha\gamma\omega$ $\alpha\rho\epsilon\kappa\omega\tau$ $\eta\epsilon$ $\bar{\eta}\gamma\bar{\eta}$
 $\mu\omicron\rho\eta\iota\omicron\eta$ $\gamma\iota\gamma\iota\eta$ $\eta\eta\mu$ $\alpha\gamma\omega$ $\alpha\rho\epsilon\tau\epsilon\kappa\omicron$ $\bar{\eta}$
 $\tau\epsilon\bar{\eta}\eta\tau\varsigma\alpha\epsilon\iota\epsilon$ $\alpha\gamma\omega$ $\alpha\rho\epsilon\omega\tau$ $\bar{\eta}\eta\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\rho\eta\tau\epsilon$
 $\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\lambda$ $\epsilon\chi\bar{\eta}\gamma\iota\eta$ $\eta\eta\mu$ $\alpha\gamma\omega$ $\alpha\rho\epsilon\tau\alpha\omega\gamma\omicron$ $\bar{\eta}\tau\epsilon\mu\omicron\rho$
 $\eta\eta\alpha$ $\alpha\rho\epsilon\mu\omicron\rho\eta\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon$ $\mu\bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\omega\mu\eta\epsilon$ $\eta\kappa\eta\eta\epsilon$
- 20 $\eta\alpha\epsilon\iota$ $\epsilon\tau\omicron$ $\bar{\eta}\tau\epsilon\omega\epsilon$ $\eta\alpha$ $\eta\alpha\eta\eta\eta\omicron\varsigma$ $\bar{\eta}\varsigma\alpha\rho\gamma$ $\eta\eta\mu$
 $\Delta\epsilon$ $\eta\epsilon$ $\bar{\eta}\omega\mu\eta\epsilon$ $\bar{\eta}\kappa\eta\eta\epsilon$ $\eta\alpha\eta\eta\eta\omicron\varsigma$ $\bar{\eta}\varsigma\alpha\rho\gamma$
 $\epsilon\iota$ $\eta\eta\tau\iota$ $\alpha\eta\varsigma\alpha\rho\kappa\iota\kappa\omicron\eta$ $\alpha\gamma\omega$ $\bar{\eta}\alpha\iota\varsigma\omicron\eta\tau\omicron\eta$
 $\mu\bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\gamma\upsilon\eta\epsilon$ $\bar{\eta}\mu\mu\alpha\gamma$ $\eta\alpha\epsilon\iota$ $\bar{\eta}\tau\alpha\tau\uparrow\gamma\chi\eta$
 $\chi\omega\gamma\bar{\eta}$ $\bar{\eta}\gamma\eta\tau\omicron\upsilon\gamma$ $\bar{\eta}\eta\epsilon\epsilon\iota\mu\alpha$ $\epsilon\varsigma\chi\iota\omicron\epsilon\iota\kappa$ $\bar{\eta}$
- 25 $\tau\omicron\omicron\tau\omicron\upsilon\gamma$ $\epsilon\varsigma\chi\iota\eta\rho\iota$ $\epsilon\varsigma\chi\iota\eta\eta\gamma$ $\epsilon\varsigma\chi\iota\gamma\upsilon\omicron$
 $\omicron\varsigma$ $\alpha\gamma\omega$ $\tau\kappa\epsilon\phi\lambda\omicron\iota\alpha\rho\iota\alpha$ $\epsilon\tau\bar{\eta}\mu\mu\alpha$ $\eta\upsilon\omicron\lambda$
 $\bar{\eta}\kappa\omega\tau\epsilon$ $\bar{\eta}\mu\mu\alpha$ $\eta\alpha\epsilon\iota$ $\epsilon\tau\varsigma\mu\epsilon\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon$
 $\chi\epsilon\varsigma\epsilon\bar{\rho}\omega\alpha\gamma$ $\eta\alpha\varsigma$ $\tau\upsilon\epsilon\iota\mu\omicron\rho\eta\eta\alpha$ $\Delta\epsilon$ $\Delta\eta\alpha$
 $\mu\omicron\sigma\tau\omicron\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ $\bar{\eta}\mu\mu\alpha\tau\eta\rho$ $\mu\alpha\rho\alpha\gamma\epsilon\iota\lambda\epsilon$ $\chi\epsilon$
- 30 $\alpha\rho\epsilon\gamma$ $\epsilon\rho\omega\tau\bar{\eta}$ $\epsilon\rho\omicron\varsigma$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon\gamma\upsilon\epsilon\tau\eta\gamma\tau\bar{\eta}$ $\epsilon\rho\omicron\varsigma$
 $\epsilon\gamma\omega\alpha\chi\epsilon$ $\epsilon\tau\mu\omicron\rho\eta\eta\alpha$ $\omicron\gamma\alpha\alpha\tau\varsigma$ $\Delta\eta\eta$ $\bar{\eta}\mu\mu\alpha$
 $\eta\alpha$ $\Delta\eta\lambda\lambda\alpha$ $\tau\alpha\tau\uparrow\gamma\chi\eta$ $\bar{\eta}\gamma\omicron\gamma\omicron$ $\epsilon\tau$ $[\upsilon\epsilon\mu\mu]\alpha\epsilon\iota$
 $\bar{\eta}\alpha\mu\omicron\sigma\tau\omicron\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ $\epsilon\gamma\varsigma\gamma$ $[\Delta\bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\epsilon\kappa\kappa\lambda\eta\varsigma\iota\alpha]$ $\bar{\eta}$
 $\mu\mu\omicron\gamma\tau\epsilon$ $\omega\upsilon\eta\alpha$ $\chi\epsilon\eta\epsilon$ $[\gamma\upsilon\mu\eta\gamma]\epsilon$ $\bar{\eta}\tau\upsilon\epsilon\iota$
- 35 μ $[\iota]\eta\epsilon$ $\omega\upsilon\omega\mu\epsilon$ $\gamma\rho\alpha\bar{\iota}$ $\bar{\eta}\gamma\eta\tau$ $[\bar{\eta}]$ $\Delta\eta\lambda\lambda\alpha$ $\mu\mu\omicron\varsigma$
 $[\bar{\eta}\alpha\gamma\omega\eta\epsilon\omega]\omicron\omicron\tau$ $\epsilon\tau\upsilon\epsilon\tau\mu\omicron\rho\eta\eta\alpha$

130.1 Sevrin, Kulawik: $\alpha\varsigma\chi\omicron\omicron(\varsigma)$ || 20 Nagel: $\eta\alpha\{\eta\alpha\}\eta\eta\eta\omicron\varsigma$ || 32 Krause: $\bar{\eta}\gamma\omicron\gamma\omicron$ $\epsilon\tau$ $[\upsilon\epsilon\mu\mu]\alpha\epsilon\iota$; Sevrin: $\bar{\eta}\gamma\omicron\gamma\omicron$ $\epsilon\tau$ $[\upsilon\epsilon\mu\mu]\alpha\epsilon\iota$; Kulawik: $\bar{\eta}\gamma\omicron\gamma\omicron$ || 33 Krause: $\epsilon\gamma\varsigma\gamma$ $[\Delta\eta\chi\epsilon\quad]$; Schenke: $\epsilon\gamma\varsigma\gamma$ $[\Delta\eta\chi\epsilon\tau\eta\varsigma\omicron\mu\mu\bar{\varsigma}]$; Wisse: $\epsilon\gamma\varsigma\gamma$ $[\iota\bar{\eta}\tau\epsilon\kappa\kappa\lambda\eta\varsigma\iota\alpha]$; Browne, Sevrin: $\epsilon\gamma\varsigma\gamma$ $[\Delta\eta\bar{\eta}\tau\epsilon\kappa\kappa\lambda\eta\varsigma\iota\alpha]$ || 34 Krause: $\chi\epsilon\eta$. $[\quad]$. ; Browne: $\chi\epsilon\eta\epsilon$ $[\gamma\upsilon\mu\eta\gamma]\alpha$ $\eta\tau\upsilon\epsilon\iota$; Layton, Kulawik: $\chi\epsilon\eta\epsilon$ $[\gamma\upsilon\mu\eta\gamma]\alpha$ $\bar{\eta}\tau\upsilon\epsilon\iota$; Schenke, Wisse, Bethge: $\chi\epsilon\eta\epsilon$ $[\bar{\eta}\gamma\upsilon\eta\gamma]\epsilon$ || 35 Krause, Schenke, Sevrin: μ $[\iota]\eta\epsilon$; Krause, Browne, Sevrin: $\bar{\eta}\gamma\eta\tau$ $[\varsigma]$; Schenke: $\bar{\eta}\gamma\eta\tau$ $[\eta]$ || 36 Krause: $[\bar{\eta}\alpha\gamma\omega\eta\epsilon\omega]\omicron\omicron\tau$; Schenke, Bethge: $[\bar{\eta}\rho\omicron\omicron\gamma\omega\epsilon\omega]\omicron\omicron\tau$.

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- 1 For she said, 'I will prostitute myself to those who
love me. They have given me my
bread and my water and my garments and my
clothes and my wine and my oil and
5 everything that is useful to me.' Therefore, behold,
I will make her unable
to pursue her adulterers, and when she
seeks them and does not find them she will say,
'I will return to my original husband, for
10 I was better off in those days than
now."³ Again he says in Ezekiel: "It
happened after many evils, said
the Lord, that you built yourself a brothel
and you made yourself a beautiful place
15 in the squares and you built yourself
brothels on every street and you destroyed
your beauty and you spread your legs
on every street and you multiplied your
prostitution. You prostituted yourself to the sons of Egypt,
20 those who are your neighbours, those great of flesh."⁴
But who are "the sons of Egypt, those great of flesh"
except the fleshly and the perceptible
and the things of the earth, in which the soul
have defiled herself in these places, by receiving
25 bread from them and receiving wine and receiving oil and receiving
clothes and the other nonsense on the outside
surrounding the body, these which she thinks
are useful for her? But concerning this prostitution the
apostles of the Saviour commanded:
30 "Guard yourselves against it! Cleanse yourselves of it!"⁵
speaking not only of the prostitution of the
body, but especially that of the soul. Therefore
the apostles [write to the churches] of
God, so that [things] like
35 this may not happen among us, but the great
[struggle] concerns the prostitution

³ Hos 2:2-7.

⁴ Ezek 16:23-26.

⁵ Cf. Acts 15:20, 29; 21:25; 1 Thess 4:3; 1 Cor 6:18; 2 Cor 7:1.

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- 1 ἄτϣχἡ εβολ ἡρητῶ φαρетπορνια ἡ
 πεссωμα ωωπε δια τοϋτο παγλος εφ
 ςραῖ ἡγκοριῆος πεχαφ δεδειςραῖ ἡη
 τῆ ρῆτεπιστολη δεἡἡῖρτωρ ἡἡπορ
- 5 нос оϥ παντωс ἡἡῖρнос ἡἡεεικος
 нос ἡ πλεονεκτηс ἡ ἡρεφτωρἡ ἡ ἡ
 реφωἡωειδωλον επει ара тетῆἡἡἡ
 εει εвол ρῆἡἡκοςмос таει τε θε εφωα
 δε πνευματικωс δεἡἡἡαγων ωωοп
- 10 ἡἡἡ ἡἡ оϥвесаρз ρисноϥ кагаθε εἡ
 таφχοос ἡἡἡ оϥве ἡἡкосмоκρατωρ
 ἡἡεεικαке ἡἡἡἡἡνευματικон ἡἡἡἡ
 ἡἡἡἡ φαρзоἡἡ ἡεἡ εφοоϥ ετϣχἡ
 πἡт ἡса εса εсκοἡἡἡἡἡ ἡἡἡετсна
- 15 τωἡт еροϥ εсхаωρἡ сωοоп ραпас
 ха ἡἡετсἡἡἡἡ εтρεсхитоϥ ρотἡἡ δε
 εсωαρἡисθαἡε ἡἡἡκορз εтсῆρηтоϥ
 аϣω ἡсрἡε ερраῖ επειωт ἡсметаἡо
 ει тоте φἡἡἡἡ ἡас ἡсἡπειωт ἡἡκкто
- 20 ἡἡεсἡἡтра εвол ρῆἡἡἡса ἡвол παλι(ἡ)
 ἡἡкктос ερзоἡἡ ἡтетϣχἡ χἡ ἡἡεс
 мерἡἡон εϣωοоп гаρ ἡἡ ἡἡε ἡἡεῖἡ
 оἡе ἡἡἡтра гаρ ἡἡсωἡἡ εϣωοоп
 ἡἡφоἡἡ ἡἡсωἡἡ ἡἡε ἡἡкеἡαῖт τἡἡ
- 25 тра ἡἡтоϥ ἡἡτϣχἡ εскаωте ἡἡса ἡвол
 ἡἡе ἡἡφϣсἡἡон ἡἡφооϥт εϣωοоп
 ἡἡвол ерωατἡἡтра се ἡἡτϣχἡ
 тктос ρῆἡпоϣωω ἡἡπειωт еἡса ἡ
 ρоἡἡ φαρесῖβαπтize аϣω ἡἡтоϥ
- 30 ноϥ φασтоϣво еἡхаωρἡ ἡἡса ἡ
 во[λ] παει εἡтаϣавϥ εχωс ἡἡе ἡἡἡ
 ω[τἡἡ εϣ]ωα[λ]ωωἡ φαγτελοоϥ ε
 π[ἡооϥ аϣω ἡс]εтктооϥ φἡἡтоἡἡтоϥ
 λαἡἡ[ε εвол] аϣω ἡсεтоϣво πтоϣво
- 35 δε ἡἡτϣχἡ πε χἡεсἡἡἡт[в]ῖ[р]ε оἡ

131.3 Sevrin: ἡγκορι(ἡ)ῆιος; Kulawik: ἡγκορι(ἡ)ῆιος || 5 Sevrin: ἡ(ἡ)π(ο)ρἡος; Kulawik: ἡἡ(ο)ρἡος; Wisse suggests ἡἡρ(τωρ ἡἡἡπορ)нос || 6 Bethge: (ἡ)πλεονεκτηс || 22 Kulawik: ε(с)ωοоп || 31 Sevrin: во[λ] || 32 Krause: ω[τἡἡ εωαϣλ]ωωἡ || 33 Krause: π[χωκἡ εἡἡооϥ]; Schenke, Bethge: π[εἡω εтρεἡἡραρ]εт ктооϥ; Wisse: π[ωἡε аϣω ἡс]εтктооϥ || 34 Krause, Sevrin: λαἡἡ [εвол]; Krause: аϣω || 35 Krause: ἡἡτϣχἡ; Sevrin: ἡἡτϣχἡ; Krause: χἡεсἡἡἡт[вῖῖ]ε таἡ; Sevrin: χἡεсἡἡἡт[в]ῖ[р]ε [ο]ἡ.

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1 of the soul. From it comes the prostitution of
 the body too. Therefore Paul,
 writing to the Corinthians, said: "I wrote
 to you in the letter: 'Do not mix with
 5 prostitutes,' by no means (meaning) the prostitutes of this
 world or the greedy or the robbers or the
 idolators, since then you would have
 to leave the world."⁶ Thus he is
 speaking spiritually, "for our struggle is
 10 for us not against flesh and blood,"⁷ as
 he said, "but against the world rulers
 of this darkness and the spirits of
 wickedness."⁸ As long as the soul
 runs around and has communion with whomever she may
 15 meet, becoming defiled, she suffers
 what she deserves, but when
 she becomes aware of the afflictions she is in
 and weeps to the Father and
 repents, then the Father will have mercy on her and turn
 20 her womb from the outside and
 he will again turn it inside, and the soul will receive her
 particular nature. For these are not like the
 women, for the womb of the body is
 on the inside of the body like the other internal organs,
 25 but the womb of the soul is turned outside
 like the genitals of the male which are
 on the outside. So, when the womb of the soul
 turns itself, by the will of the Father, to the
 inside, she is baptised and
 30 immediately she is cleansed of the defilement of
 the outside, this which was pressed upon her, like
 [garments when they are filthy] are lifted into
 the [water and] are turned until their
 dirt [is] brought [out] and they are cleansed, but the cleansing
 35 of the soul is to receive again her [new]ness

⁶ 1 Cor 5:9–10.

⁷ Eph 6:12.

⁸ Eph 6:12.

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- 1 ἡ̄πεσφύσῑκον ἡ̄φωρπ ἡ̄σ̄κτος ἡ̄κε
 σοп па̄еи пе̄ п̄с̄ва̄п̄т̄ӣс̄ма̄ то̄т̄е̄ с̄на̄
 ῥ̄ᾱρ̄х̄е̄ῑ ἡ̄β̄ω̄λ̄κ̄ ε̄ρο̄с̄ ο̄γ̄ᾱᾱτ̄ ἡ̄ε̄ ἡ̄н̄ε̄т̄
 φ̄ᾱγ̄η̄с̄ӣс̄ε̄ ἡ̄т̄ε̄γ̄η̄νο̄γ̄ ε̄γ̄φ̄ᾱᾱχ̄п̄ε̄п̄ε̄φ̄η̄р̄е̄
 5 φ̄ᾱγ̄κο̄το̄γ̄ ε̄ρο̄ο̄γ̄ ο̄γ̄ᾱᾱγ̄ ῥ̄ἡ̄но̄γ̄β̄λ̄к̄е̄
 а̄л̄л̄а̄ ε̄п̄е̄ӣ ο̄γ̄с̄ῥ̄ӣм̄е̄ т̄е̄ ἡ̄ἡ̄β̄ο̄м̄ а̄т̄р̄ε̄с̄ᾱχ̄п̄е̄
 φ̄η̄р̄е̄ ο̄γ̄ᾱᾱτ̄ а̄п̄е̄ӣω̄т̄ т̄ἡ̄н̄ᾱγ̄ н̄а̄с̄ ε̄β̄ο̄λ̄
 ῥ̄ἡ̄т̄п̄е̄ ἡ̄п̄ε̄с̄ῥ̄ο̄ο̄γ̄т̄ ε̄т̄ε̄п̄ε̄с̄с̄ο̄н̄ п̄е̄
 φ̄ω̄р̄р̄п̄ ἡ̄μ̄ӣс̄ε̄ то̄т̄е̄ а̄п̄ῥ̄ἡ̄φ̄ε̄л̄ε̄ε̄т̄ ε̄ӣ
 10 а̄п̄т̄ἡ̄ φ̄ᾱᾱχ̄ε̄л̄ε̄ε̄т̄ а̄с̄к̄ω̄ м̄ε̄н̄ ἡ̄с̄ω̄с̄ ἡ̄
 т̄ε̄с̄п̄ο̄р̄н̄ӣа̄ ἡ̄φ̄ω̄р̄п̄ а̄с̄т̄ο̄γ̄β̄ο̄с̄ а̄н̄ᾱω̄ῥ̄ἡ̄
 ἡ̄ἡ̄н̄ο̄ε̄ӣк̄ а̄с̄ῥ̄β̄ῥ̄р̄е̄ а̄ε̄ а̄γ̄η̄н̄т̄φ̄ε̄л̄ε̄ε̄т̄
 а̄с̄т̄ο̄γ̄β̄ο̄с̄ ῥ̄ἡ̄н̄а̄ ἡ̄φ̄ε̄л̄ε̄ε̄т̄ а̄с̄м̄а̄ῥ̄q̄ ἡ̄с̄т̄
 н̄ο̄γ̄q̄ε̄ а̄с̄ῥ̄η̄ο̄ο̄с̄ ἡ̄ῥ̄ο̄γ̄η̄ ἡ̄ῥ̄η̄т̄q̄ ε̄с̄ω̄ω̄т̄
 15 ε̄β̄ο̄λ̄ ῥ̄η̄т̄q̄ ἡ̄п̄ῥ̄ἡ̄φ̄ε̄л̄ε̄ε̄т̄ ἡ̄μ̄е̄ ο̄γ̄к̄ε̄т̄ӣ
 с̄п̄η̄т̄ ῥ̄ἡ̄т̄а̄γ̄ο̄р̄а̄ ε̄с̄к̄ο̄ӣν̄ω̄н̄е̄ӣ ἡ̄ἡ̄п̄ε̄т̄
 ο̄γ̄ο̄ω̄q̄ а̄л̄л̄а̄ а̄с̄ω̄ ε̄с̄ω̄ω̄т̄ ε̄β̄ο̄λ̄ ῥ̄η̄т̄q̄
 ᾱε̄ᾱω̄ ἡ̄ῥ̄ο̄ο̄γ̄ ε̄φ̄ἡ̄н̄η̄γ̄ ε̄с̄ῥ̄ῥ̄ο̄т̄е̄ ῥ̄η̄т̄q̄
 н̄ε̄с̄с̄ο̄ο̄γ̄η̄ γ̄а̄р̄ а̄н̄ ἡ̄п̄ε̄q̄ε̄ӣе̄ ο̄γ̄к̄е̄
 20 т̄ӣ с̄ῥ̄п̄м̄ε̄ε̄γ̄ε̄ ᾱӣп̄ο̄γ̄ο̄ε̄ӣω̄ ἡ̄т̄а̄с̄ῥ̄ε̄ ε̄
 β̄ο̄λ̄ ῥ̄ἡ̄п̄ӣе̄ӣ ἡ̄п̄ε̄с̄ε̄ӣω̄т̄ ῥ̄ἡ̄п̄ο̄γ̄ω̄φ̄ε̄
 а̄ε̄ ἡ̄п̄е̄ӣω̄т̄ а̄с̄п̄ῥ̄ε̄р̄ε̄а̄с̄ο̄γ̄ а̄ε̄ ε̄ρο̄q̄ ἡ̄ε̄
 ἡ̄н̄ӣῥ̄ӣο̄μ̄е̄ ε̄т̄η̄е̄ ἡ̄н̄ӣῥ̄ο̄ο̄γ̄т̄ то̄т̄е̄ с̄ε̄
 п̄ῥ̄ἡ̄φ̄ε̄л̄ε̄ε̄т̄ к̄ᾱт̄а̄п̄ο̄γ̄ω̄φ̄ ἡ̄п̄е̄ӣω̄т̄
 25 а̄q̄е̄ ε̄п̄т̄ἡ̄ φ̄ᾱρ̄ο̄с̄ ε̄ῥ̄ο̄γ̄η̄ ε̄п̄η̄а̄ ἡ̄φ̄ε̄
 λ̄ε̄ε̄т̄ ε̄т̄с̄β̄т̄ω̄т̄ а̄q̄к̄ο̄с̄μ̄е̄ӣ а̄ε̄ ἡ̄п̄η̄γ̄η̄
 φ̄ω̄н̄ ε̄п̄γ̄а̄μ̄ο̄с̄ γ̄а̄р̄ ε̄т̄ἡ̄μ̄а̄γ̄ ε̄q̄ω̄ο̄ο̄п̄
 а̄н̄ ἡ̄ε̄ ἡ̄п̄γ̄а̄μ̄ο̄с̄ ἡ̄с̄а̄ρ̄к̄ӣк̄ο̄с̄ н̄ε̄т̄а̄р̄
 к̄ο̄ӣν̄ω̄н̄е̄ӣ ἡ̄ἡ̄н̄ο̄γ̄ε̄р̄η̄γ̄ φ̄ᾱγ̄с̄ӣ ἡ̄т̄к̄ο̄ӣ
 30 н̄ω̄н̄ӣа̄ ε̄т̄ἡ̄μ̄а̄γ̄ а̄γ̄ω̄ ἡ̄ε̄ ἡ̄н̄ӣε̄т̄п̄ω̄
 φ̄ᾱγ̄к̄ω̄ ἡ̄с̄ω̄ο̄γ̄ ἡ̄т̄ε̄н̄ω̄ᾱχ̄η̄с̄ӣс̄ [ἡ̄]т̄ε̄
 п̄η̄ο̄γ̄μ̄ε̄ӣа̄ а̄γ̄ω̄ ἡ̄с̄ε̄т̄q̄[т̄ο] ἡ̄[н̄ο̄γ̄ῥ̄ο̄ ε̄β]ο̄λ̄
 ἡ̄н̄ο̄γ̄ε̄р̄η̄γ̄ а̄л̄л̄а̄ п̄ε̄ε̄ӣ[.] . [α]н̄ п̄ε̄
 п̄ε̄ε̄ӣγ̄а̄μ̄ο̄с̄ а̄л̄л̄а̄ ε̄γ̄φ̄ᾱη̄[п̄]ῥ̄ἡ̄ῥ̄ω̄т̄ῥ̄
 35 а̄н̄[ο]γ̄[ε̄р̄η]γ̄ φ̄ᾱγ̄ω̄φ̄ε̄ а̄γ̄ω̄η̄ῥ̄ ο̄γ̄ω̄т̄

132.13 Bethge, Sevrin, Layton, Kulawik: ῥἡ(п)μα || 16 Bethge: <не>спт || 20 Bethge: <ε>сῥпмееε || 22 Layton, Kulawik: ἡπειωт < - - - > асῥῥе || 31 Sevrin: [н]те || 32 Krause: ἡсεт[ηειο ἡсεῤῥῡε]α; Wisse, Sevrin: ἡсεтη[порχογ εβ]ολ; Schenke, Bethge: ἡсεтη[ноγῥἡ εβ]ολ; Kasser: ἡсεтη[ε]ἡ[ко сε εβ]ολ || 33 Krause: пееи[смот] аη пе; Schenke, Bethge, Kulawik: пееи[рηте ῥωω]q [α]η пе; Sevrin: пееи [.] . η пе; Layton: пееи[.] . [.]η пе; Kasser: (η)пееи[смот γа]р аη пе || 34 Krause, Browne: εγφαη[εи] аἡῥωтῥ; Schenke, Bethge: εγφα[пω]ῥ ἡῥωтῥ || 35 Krause: [.] . [.] . [. . .] φαγωφε; Sevrin: аη[ο]γ[εрη]γ.

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1 of her original nature⁹ and to turn herself
 again, this is her baptism. Then she will
 start to rage at herself like those
 who give birth.¹⁰ Immediately when they give birth to the child
 5 they turn upon themselves in anger.
 But since she is a woman unable to engender
 children on her own, the Father sent her from
 heaven her husband who is her brother,
 the firstborn. Then the bridegroom came
 10 down to the bride. She abandoned
 her former prostitution, and she cleansed herself of the defilements
 of the adulterers, and she became renewed to be suitable as a bride.
 She cleansed herself in the place of marriage, filled it with
 perfume, and sat within it waiting for
 15 the true bridegroom. No longer does she
 run around in the marketplace¹¹ having communion with whomever she
 wants, but she continued waiting for him,
 “When is he coming?”¹² fearing him,¹³
 for she did not know what he looked like.
 20 No longer does she remember, since the time she fell
 from the house of her Father. But by the will
 of the Father she dreamt a dream of him like
 women who love men. So then,
 according to the will of the Father, the bridegroom
 25 came down to her into the place of
 marriage which was prepared,¹⁴ and he adorned the
 bridal chamber.¹⁵ For that marriage is
 not like the fleshly marriage. (In the fleshly marriage,) those who will have
 communion with each other have enough of
 30 that (fleshly) communion and like burdens
 they leave behind them the annoyance [of] the
 desire and they [turn their faces from]
 each other, but this [...] is [not]
 this marriage, but when they unite
 35 with [each other] they become a single life.

⁹ Cf. 2 Pet 1:4.

¹⁰ Cf. Gen 3:16.

¹¹ Cf. Cant 3:2.

¹² Cf. Matt 25:13.

¹³ Cf. Eph 5:33.

¹⁴ Cf. Matt 22:4, 8; 25:10; Rev 19:7.

¹⁵ Cf. Matt 22:10–14.

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- 1 ετ̄βε̄πᾱεῑ πε̄χᾱᾱ ν̄σῑπε̄προ̄φ̄η̄τῑς
 ετ̄βε̄π̄ω̄ρ̄π̄ ῥ̄ρω̄με̄ μ̄ῑτ̄ω̄ρ̄π̄ ἡ̄ς̄ρῑ
 με̄ χ̄ε̄σε̄νᾱω̄π̄ε̄ ᾱγ̄σᾱρ̄ξ̄ ο̄γ̄ω̄τ̄ η̄ε̄γ̄
 ρ̄ο̄τ̄Ὶ γ̄αρ̄ ε̄νο̄γε̄ρ̄η̄γ̄ ἡ̄ω̄ρ̄π̄ ρ̄ᾱρ̄τ̄Ὶ̄πεῑω̄τ̄
- 5 ε̄μ̄πᾱτε̄τ̄ς̄ρῑμε̄ σ̄ω̄ρ̄μ̄ ἡ̄φ̄ο̄ο̄γ̄τ̄ ε̄τε̄
 πε̄σ̄σον̄ πε̄ πᾱλῑν̄ ο̄ν̄ ἀ̄πεῑγᾱμο̄ς̄
 σο̄ο̄γ̄ρ̄ο̄γ̄ ε̄ρ̄ο̄γ̄ν̄ ε̄νο̄γε̄ρ̄η̄γ̄ ᾱγ̄ω̄ ᾱτ̄γ̄γ̄
 χ̄η̄ ρ̄ω̄τ̄Ὶ̄ ε̄ρ̄ο̄γ̄ν̄ ε̄πε̄σ̄με̄ρε̄ῑτ̄ νᾱμε̄ πε̄ς̄
 φ̄γ̄ς̄ῑκο̄ς̄ ἡ̄χ̄ο̄ε̄ῑς̄ κᾱτ̄ᾱθ̄ε̄ ε̄τ̄χ̄ς̄η̄ ρ̄ε̄π̄χ̄ο̄
- 10 ε̄ῑς̄ γ̄αρ̄ ἡ̄τ̄ε̄ς̄ρῑμε̄ πε̄ πε̄ς̄ρ̄ᾱῑ ᾱς̄σο̄γ̄ω̄ν̄ᾱ
 Δ̄ε̄ ω̄ν̄μ̄ ω̄ν̄μ̄ ᾱγ̄ω̄ ᾱς̄ρᾱω̄ε̄ ρ̄ῖ̄κε̄σο̄π̄ ε̄ς̄ρῑ
 με̄ ρ̄ᾱτ̄ο̄ο̄τ̄γ̄ ἡ̄τ̄ᾱρε̄ς̄ῤ̄μ̄ε̄ε̄γ̄ε̄ ἡ̄τ̄ε̄ς̄ᾱς̄
 χ̄η̄μ̄ο̄ς̄γ̄ν̄η̄ ἡ̄τ̄ε̄ς̄μ̄ἡ̄τ̄η̄ρ̄ᾱ ἡ̄ω̄ρ̄π̄
 ᾱγ̄ω̄ ᾱς̄κο̄ς̄μ̄ε̄ῑ ἡ̄μ̄ο̄ς̄ ἡ̄ρ̄ο̄γ̄ο̄ ω̄ν̄ᾱ ε̄ς̄
- 15 νᾱρε̄νᾱᾱ ν̄σ̄ω̄ ρ̄ᾱτ̄ο̄ο̄τ̄ς̄ πε̄χᾱᾱ Δ̄ε̄ ἡ̄σῑ
 πε̄προ̄φ̄η̄τῑς̄ ρ̄ῖ̄ἡ̄ψ̄ᾱλ̄μο̄ς̄ χ̄ε̄σω̄
 τ̄Ὶ̄ τᾱω̄ε̄ρε̄ ἡ̄τ̄ε̄νᾱγ̄ ἡ̄τε̄ρῑκε̄ ἡ̄πε̄μᾱ
 ᾱχ̄ε̄ ἡ̄τε̄ρ̄ῤ̄ω̄ω̄ ἡ̄πο̄γ̄λᾱο̄ς̄ μ̄ἡ̄π̄νεῑ
 ἡ̄πεῑω̄τ̄ χ̄ε̄ᾱπ̄ῤ̄ρο̄ ε̄πῑθ̄ο̄γ̄μ̄ε̄ῑ ε̄πο̄γ̄σᾱ
- 20 ε̄ῑε̄ χ̄ε̄ἡ̄τ̄ο̄γ̄ πε̄ πο̄γ̄χ̄ο̄ε̄ῑς̄ φ̄ῤ̄ᾱζ̄ῑο̄γ̄ γ̄αρ̄
 ἡ̄μ̄ο̄ς̄ ᾱτ̄ρε̄ς̄κ̄τε̄ πε̄ς̄ρ̄ο̄ ε̄βολ̄ ἡ̄πε̄ς̄
 λᾱο̄ς̄ μ̄ἡ̄π̄μ̄ν̄η̄ω̄ε̄ ἡ̄νε̄ς̄μο̄ῑχο̄ς̄ νᾱ
 ε̄ῑ νε̄ς̄ρ̄ῖ̄τ̄ο̄γ̄μ̄η̄τε̄ ἡ̄ω̄ρ̄π̄ νε̄ς̄ῤ̄π̄ρ̄[ο̄]ς̄
 ε̄χε̄ ἀ̄πε̄ς̄ῤ̄ρο̄ ο̄γ̄ᾱᾱτ̄γ̄ πε̄ς̄φ̄γ̄ς̄ῑκο̄ς̄
- 25 ἡ̄χ̄ο̄ε̄ῑς̄ ᾱγ̄ω̄ ἡ̄ς̄ῤ̄ῤ̄ω̄ω̄ ἡ̄π̄νεῑ ἡ̄πεῑ
 ω̄τ̄ ἡ̄π̄κᾱρ̄ πᾱεῑ ε̄νε̄ς̄ω̄ο̄ο̄π̄ ρ̄ᾱτ̄ο̄ο̄τ̄γ̄
 κᾱκ̄ω̄ς̄ ἡ̄ς̄ῤ̄ῤ̄μ̄ε̄ε̄γ̄ε̄ ἡ̄τ̄ο̄γ̄ ἡ̄πε̄σε̄ῑω̄τ̄
 ε̄τ̄ρ̄ῖ̄ἡ̄π̄η̄γ̄ε̄ τ̄ε̄ε̄ῑ ο̄ν̄ τε̄ θ̄ε̄ ε̄ν̄τᾱγ̄χ̄ο̄
 ο̄ς̄ ἡ̄ᾱβ̄ρᾱρ̄ᾱμ̄ χ̄ε̄ᾱμ̄ο̄γ̄ ε̄βολ̄ ρ̄ῖ̄π̄ε̄κ̄
- 30 κᾱρ̄ μ̄ἡ̄τε̄κ̄ς̄γ̄ν̄ε̄νε̄ῑᾱ ᾱγ̄ω̄ ε̄βολ̄ ρ̄ῖ̄
 π̄η̄[ε̄]! ἡ̄π̄ε̄κεῑω̄τ̄ τᾱεῑ τε̄ θ̄ε̄ ἡ̄τ̄ᾱρε̄τ̄γ̄γ̄
 χ̄[η̄ ρ̄κ̄]ο̄[ς̄]μ̄ε̄ῑ ἡ̄μ̄ο̄ς̄ ρ̄ῖ̄ἡ̄τε̄ς̄μ̄ἡ̄τ̄ς̄ᾱεῑε̄
 ο̄ν̄ [πᾱλῑν̄ ᾱς̄τ̄]μ̄ε̄ε̄τε̄ ε̄πε̄ς̄με̄ρε̄ῑτ̄
 ᾱγ̄ω̄ ἡ̄[τ̄ο̄γ̄ ρ̄ω̄]ω̄ᾱ ᾱμ̄ε̄ρε̄ῑτ̄ς̄ ᾱγ̄ω̄ ἡ̄
- 35 τᾱρε̄ς̄ῤ̄κο̄[ῑ]η̄ω̄μ̄ε̄ῑ ἡ̄μ̄μᾱᾱ [Δ̄.]ς̄χ̄ῑ ἡ̄

133.31 Krause: πῆ[ε]! || 32 Krause: χ[η κ]ο[ς]μ̄ε̄ῑ || 33 I follow Wisse's reconstruction; Krause: ο[η ατγγχη] μ̄ε̄ε̄τε; Browne: οη[τως οη ας]μ̄ε̄ε̄τε; Schenke, Bethge: [ᾱς̄ω̄ε̄π̄η̄ ε̄τ̄]μ̄ε̄ε̄τε; Sevrin: [πᾱλῑν̄ ᾱς̄]μ̄ε̄ε̄τε; Layton: [.]μ̄ε̄ε̄τε; Kulawik: [ᾱς̄ρᾱω̄ε̄ ε̄]μ̄ε̄ε̄τε || 34 Krause: ἡ̄[τ̄ο̄γ̄ ρ̄ω̄]ω̄ᾱ || 35 Krause: τᾱρε̄ς̄ῤ̄κο̄ῑη̄ω̄μ̄ε̄ῑ ἡ̄μ̄μᾱᾱ [Δ̄.]ς̄χ̄ῑ; Sevrin: ἡ̄μ̄μᾱᾱ [Δ̄.]ς̄χ̄ῑ.

133

- 1 Therefore the prophet says
concerning the first man and the first
woman: "They shall become a single flesh."¹⁶
For they were at first united with each other beside the Father,
5 before the woman lost the husband who
is her brother.¹⁷ Again this marriage
has brought them together and the
soul has united with her true love, her
natural master, as it is written,
10 "for the master of the woman is her husband."¹⁸ And she recognised him
little by little and she rejoiced again, weeping
before him when she remembered her
disgraceful conduct of her former widowhood,
and she greatly adorned herself so that it
15 might please him to stay with her. And
the Prophet says in the Psalms:
"Listen, my daughter, and see and turn your
ear and forget your people and the house
of your father, for the king has desired your
20 beauty, for he is your master."¹⁹ For he expects
her to turn her face away from her
people and the multitude of her adulterers,
in whose midst she previously was, and to
devote herself to her king only, her natural
25 master, and to forget the house of the
earthly father with whom she was
maltreated, and to remember him, her Father
in heaven. Thus also it was
said to Abraham: "Come forth from your
30 land and your kin and from
the house of your father!"²⁰ Thus, when the soul
[adorned] herself again in her beauty,
[she] attain[ed] her beloved
and [he also] loved her. And
35 when she had communion with him she receive[d]

¹⁶ Gen 2:24; cf. Matt 19:5; Mark 10:8; 1 Cor 6:16; Eph 5:31.

¹⁷ Cf. Gen 1:26–27; 2:21–24.

¹⁸ Cf. Gen 3:16; 1 Cor 7:4; 11:3; Eph 5:23.

¹⁹ Ps 44:11–12 LXX.

²⁰ Gen 12:1.

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- 1 πεσπερμα εβολ ριτοοτῆ̄ ετεππῖᾱ
 πε εττῆ̄ρο φαντεςχπο ἡ̄ρῆ̄ωρη
 εβολ ἡ̄ρητῆ̄ ενανογῶ ἡ̄σανογῶγ
 παει γαρ πε πνοσ̄ ἡ̄τελειον ἡ̄θαγμα
 5 ἡ̄χπο ρωστε πεειγamos εφχωκ εβολ
 ρῆ̄πογῶω ἡ̄πειωτ φωε δε ατρετῆ̄γ
 χη χποσ ογαατῆ̄ ἡ̄σῶωπε οη ἡ̄τες
 ρε ἡ̄ωορη τῆ̄γχη σε φαρескиη ογα
 ατῆ̄ λῶω αсχιπῶειον ἡ̄τῆ̄πειωτ α
 10 треср̄вр̄ре δεκααс οη εῆ̄ναχιτῆ̄ ε
 пма енес̄маχ χιηωορη ταιε τε
 танастасис ετῶορη εβολ ρῆ̄νηετμο
 οῆ̄τ παει πε πωτε ἡ̄ταιχμαλωсια та
 ει τε танавасис ἡ̄βωк ερραῖ εтпе тαιе
 15 те θοαос ἡ̄βωк εрраῖ φapaiωт δια
 τοῆ̄το πεχεπεпрофитис χεταῆ̄γ
 χη ериεγлогει ἡ̄πχοεις λῶω напса (η)
 ροῆ̄η τηροῆ̄ ἡ̄πεφραη ετογαав таῆ̄γ
 χη ериεγлогει ἡ̄πпоγте пентаρкω
 20 εβολ ἡ̄νε[[η]]аномια τηροῆ̄ пентаρтал
 со ἡ̄νεῶωне τηροῆ̄ пентаρсωте
 ἡ̄πεῶωη εβολ ρῆ̄ πμογ пентаρ†
 [κ]λον εχω ρῆ̄ογῆ̄α петт(с)еио ἡ̄тееп
 [θ]γῆ̄mia ρῆ̄ἡ̄гаθон теηηткоγει на
 25 р̄вр̄ре ἡ̄οε ἡ̄таογαεтос есφар̄вр̄ре
 се снавωк εрраῖ ессмоγ еπειωт
 ἡ̄ἡ̄пессон παει ἡ̄тасογχαιε εβολ
 ριτοοτῆ̄ тαιε те θе ἡ̄тῆ̄γχη еснаογ
 χαιε ριτῆ̄πεχπο ἡ̄кесοη παει δε
 30 εβολ ρῆ̄ἡ̄φαχε аη ἡ̄аскнсис еφαφ
 ει ογδε εβολ аη ρῆ̄ἡ̄техηη ογ[Δ]ε ρῆ̄
 сβω ἡ̄сраῖ аλλα тхар!с] ἡ̄π[. . . т]ε
 аλλα тдωρεа ἡ̄πп[.]ае
 πεειρωв γαρ ογειει πε ἡ̄[пса] ἡ̄тпе δια
 35 τοῆ̄το φ[а]ωкак εβολ ἡ̄οпсωтηρ

134.9 Bethge: λῶω (ω)αсχιπῶειον || 23 Krause: петт(с)еио; Sevrin: петт(с)еио || 31 Krause: ογ[Δ]ε ρῆ̄; Wisse, Sevrin: ογ[Δ]ε ἡ̄ || 32 Krause: ἡ̄[πпоγт]ε; Schenke, Bethge: ἡ̄т[ε]ιос т]ε; Sevrin, Kulawik: ἡ̄π[ε]! [ωт т]ε; Layton: ἡ̄π[. . . т]ε || 33 Krause: ἡ̄πп[ογте те ἡ̄пρω]με; Schenke, Bethge, Sevrin: ἡ̄πп[εγμαткηη ηт]με; Kulawik: ἡ̄πп[ογте те етп]ае || 34 Krause: η̄ . [.]πε; Schenke, Bethge, Sevrin: ἡ̄[πепп̄]а̄ пе || 35 Krause: τῶ[γ]το [α]φωкак εβολ ἡ̄οпсωтηρ; Sevrin: τῶ[γ]το [α]φωкак εβολ ἡ̄οпсωтηρ.

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- 1 the seed from him that is
 the life-giving spirit,²¹ so that she gave birth to good children
 from it and nourished them.
 For this is the great perfect marvel
 5 of birth,²² as it is by the will of the Father
 that this marriage is fulfilled. But it is necessary for the
 soul to give birth to herself and to become once again as she
 was before. So, the soul moves
 by herself, and she received the divinity from the Father
 10 for her to be renewed, so that she may also be taken to
 the place where she was from the beginning. This is
 the resurrection from the
 dead. This is the redemption from captivity.
 This is the ascent up to heaven. This
 15 is the way to go up to the Father.
 Therefore the prophet says: "My
 soul, praise the Lord and all those
 within his holy name. My
 soul, praise God, who has
 20 forgiven all your lawlessnesses, who has
 healed all your diseases, who has saved
 your life from death, who has
 crowned you with mercy, who satisfies your
 desire with the good. Your youth will
 25 be renewed like that of an eagle."²³ So, when she becomes renewed
 she will ascend, praising the Father
 and her brother, this one by whom she was saved.
 Thus the soul will
 be saved through the rebirth.²⁴ But this
 30 comes not from ascetic words
 nor from skills nor from
 written teaching, but the grace of [...],
 but the gift of [...].²⁵
 For this thing is heavenly.
 35 Therefore the Saviour cries out:

²¹ Cf. John 6:63; 1 Cor 15:45.

²² Cf. John 3:7.

²³ Ps 102:1–5 LXX.

²⁴ Cf. Matt 19:28; 1 Tim 2:15; Titus 3:5.

²⁵ Cf. Eph 2:8–9.

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- 1 $\chi\epsilon\mu\bar{\eta}\lambda\lambda\alpha\gamma\ \eta\alpha\omega\epsilon\iota\ \omega\alpha\rho\omega\epsilon\iota\ \epsilon\iota\mu\eta\tau\iota\ \bar{\eta}$
 $\tau\epsilon\pi\alpha\epsilon\iota\omega\tau\ \sigma\omega\kappa\ \bar{\eta}\mu\omicron\sigma\ \bar{\eta}\eta\eta\tau\bar{\iota}\bar{\gamma}\ \eta\alpha\epsilon\iota$
 $\lambda\gamma\omega\ \bar{\eta}\omicron\kappa\ \rho\omega\ \bar{\tau}\eta\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\gamma\eta\sigma\omicron\varsigma\ \rho\bar{\eta}\mu\phi\rho\lambda\epsilon\ \bar{\eta}$
 $\rho\omicron\omicron\gamma\ \omega\omega\epsilon\ \sigma\epsilon\ \epsilon\omega\lambda\eta\lambda\ \epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\omega\tau\ \bar{\eta}\bar{\tau}\bar{\eta}\bar{\mu}\omicron\gamma$
 5 $\tau\epsilon\ \epsilon\rho\alpha\bar{\iota}\ \epsilon\rho\omicron\gamma\ \rho\bar{\eta}\bar{\tau}\bar{\eta}\bar{\psi}\bar{\gamma}\chi\eta\ \tau\eta\rho\bar{\tau}\ \rho\bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\bar{\sigma}\rho\omicron$
 $\tau\omicron\gamma\ \lambda\eta\ \bar{\eta}\rho\sigma\alpha\ \eta\upsilon\omicron\lambda\lambda\alpha\ \rho\bar{\eta}\bar{\mu}\bar{\rho}\eta\epsilon\gamma\mu\alpha$
 $\epsilon\tau\rho\iota\bar{\rho}\sigma\alpha\ \eta\rho\omicron\gamma\eta\ \rho\epsilon\eta\tau\alpha\rho\iota\ \epsilon\upsilon\omicron\lambda\ \rho\bar{\eta}\bar{\mu}\bar{\nu}\alpha$
 $\theta\omicron\sigma\ \epsilon\eta\epsilon\omega\epsilon\rho\omicron\mu\ \epsilon\eta\bar{\rho}\eta\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\eta\omicron\epsilon\iota\ \epsilon\chi\bar{\eta}$
 $\rho\upsilon\iota\omicron\varsigma\ \bar{\eta}\bar{\tau}\alpha\rho\bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\alpha\alpha\gamma\ \epsilon\eta\bar{\rho}\epsilon\zeta\rho\omicron\mu\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\epsilon\iota$
 10 $\bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\bar{\nu}\omicron\upsilon\epsilon\ \epsilon\eta\lambda\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\eta\epsilon\ \epsilon\tau\bar{\rho}\lambda\alpha\eta\eta\ \epsilon\tau\omega\omicron\gamma$
 $\epsilon\iota\tau\ \tau\alpha\epsilon\iota\ \eta\epsilon\eta\omega\omicron\omicron\bar{\rho}\ \bar{\eta}\rho\eta\eta\bar{\tau}\bar{\tau}\ \lambda\gamma\omega\ \lambda\tau\sigma\iota\omicron\gamma$
 $\Delta\eta\ \epsilon\tau\omega\omicron\gamma\epsilon\iota\tau\ \epsilon\eta\bar{\rho}\eta\mu\epsilon\ \bar{\eta}\theta\epsilon\ \eta\epsilon\eta\omega\omicron\omicron\bar{\rho}$
 $\rho\bar{\eta}\bar{\mu}\bar{\rho}\kappa\alpha\kappa\epsilon\ \bar{\mu}\bar{\eta}\bar{\phi}\omicron\epsilon\iota\mu\ \epsilon\eta\bar{\rho}\bar{\rho}\eta\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\ \eta\lambda\eta$
 $\omicron\gamma\alpha\lambda\eta\ \chi\epsilon\kappa\alpha\alpha\varsigma\ \epsilon\upsilon\eta\eta\eta\lambda\alpha\ \eta\lambda\eta\ \epsilon\eta\mu\omicron\sigma\tau\epsilon$
 15 $\bar{\eta}\bar{\mu}\bar{\mu}\omicron\eta\ \bar{\eta}\theta\epsilon\ \epsilon\tau\bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\bar{\rho}\eta\eta\bar{\tau}\bar{\tau}\ \tau\epsilon\eta\omicron\gamma\ \rho\alpha\lambda\iota\eta$
 $\rho\epsilon\chi\alpha\gamma\ \bar{\eta}\bar{\sigma}\bar{\rho}\bar{\iota}\sigma\omega\tau\eta\rho\ \chi\epsilon\rho\bar{\eta}\bar{\mu}\bar{\eta}\kappa\alpha\rho\iota\omicron\varsigma$
 $\eta\epsilon\ \eta\alpha\epsilon\iota\ \epsilon\tau\bar{\rho}\eta\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\ \chi\epsilon\bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\bar{\tau}\omicron\omicron\gamma\ \rho\epsilon\ \epsilon\tau\omicron\gamma\eta\alpha$
 $\eta\alpha\ \eta\alpha\gamma\ \rho\bar{\eta}\bar{\mu}\bar{\eta}\kappa\alpha\rho\iota\omicron\varsigma\ \eta\epsilon\tau\rho\kappa\alpha\epsilon\iota\tau\ \chi\epsilon\bar{\eta}$
 $\tau\omicron\omicron\gamma\ \rho\epsilon\ \epsilon\tau\eta\alpha\sigma\epsilon\iota\ \rho\alpha\lambda\iota\eta\ \rho\epsilon\chi\alpha\gamma\ \chi\epsilon\epsilon\bar{[}\rho\bar{]}$
 20 $\tau\bar{\eta}\bar{\mu}\bar{\omicron}\gamma\alpha\ \eta\epsilon\sigma\tau\epsilon\tau\epsilon\gamma\bar{\psi}\bar{\gamma}\chi\eta\ \kappa\eta\alpha\omega\omicron\gamma\rho\lambda\alpha\gamma$
 $\lambda\eta\ \bar{\eta}\sigma\omega\epsilon\iota\ \tau\alpha\rho\chi\eta\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \bar{\eta}\rho\omicron\gamma\chi\alpha\epsilon\iota\ \rho\epsilon\ \tau$
 $\eta\epsilon\tau\alpha\eta\omicron\iota\alpha\ \Delta\iota\alpha\ \tau\omicron\gamma\bar{\tau}\omicron\ \rho\alpha\tau\epsilon\rho\eta\ \bar{\eta}\bar{\tau}\bar{\rho}\alpha$
 $\rho\omicron\gamma\sigma\iota\alpha\ \bar{\eta}\rho\epsilon\chi\rho\bar{\tau}\ \alpha\gamma\iota\ \bar{\eta}\bar{\sigma}\bar{\iota}\bar{\omega}\rho\alpha\eta\eta\eta\varsigma\ \bar{[}\epsilon\gamma\bar{]}$
 $\kappa\eta\rho\gamma\varsigma\epsilon\ \bar{\eta}\rho\bar{\nu}\alpha\bar{\rho}\iota\tau\iota\sigma\alpha\ \bar{\eta}\bar{\tau}\eta\eta\epsilon\tau\alpha\eta\omicron\iota\alpha$
 25 $\tau\eta\epsilon\tau\alpha\eta\omicron\iota\alpha\ \Delta\epsilon\ \omega\alpha\sigma\omega\omega\bar{\rho}\epsilon\ \rho\bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\bar{\omicron}\gamma\lambda\gamma\eta\eta$
 $\bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\bar{\omicron}\gamma\bar{\eta}\kappa\alpha\rho\ \bar{\eta}\rho\eta\bar{\tau}\ \rho\epsilon\iota\omega\tau\ \Delta\epsilon\ \omicron\gamma\mu\alpha\epsilon\iota$
 $\rho\omega\mu\epsilon\ \rho\epsilon\ \bar{\eta}\alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\omicron\sigma\ \lambda\gamma\omega\ \epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\omega\tau\bar{\eta}\ \lambda\tau$
 $\bar{\psi}\bar{\gamma}\chi\eta\ \epsilon\tau\rho\epsilon\bar{\rho}\kappa\alpha\lambda\epsilon\iota\ \epsilon\rho\alpha\bar{\iota}\ \epsilon\rho\omicron\gamma\ \lambda\gamma\omega\ \bar{\eta}\gamma$
 $\tau\bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\alpha\gamma\ \eta\alpha\varsigma\ \bar{\eta}\rho\omicron\gamma\omicron\epsilon\iota\ \bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\bar{\omicron}\gamma\chi\alpha\epsilon\iota\ \Delta\iota\alpha$
 30 $\tau\omicron\gamma\bar{\tau}\omicron\ \rho\epsilon\chi\alpha\gamma\ \rho\iota\bar{\tau}\bar{\eta}\bar{\rho}\epsilon\bar{\rho}\eta\bar{\eta}\bar{\Delta}\ \bar{\eta}\bar{\rho}\epsilon\bar{\rho}\bar{\rho}$
 $\bar{\phi}\bar{[}\eta\eta\bar{\tau}\bar{]}\eta\varsigma\ \chi\epsilon\chi\omicron\omicron\sigma\ \bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\bar{\omega}\eta\bar{\rho}\epsilon\ \bar{\eta}\bar{\rho}\alpha\lambda\alpha\omicron\varsigma$
 $\chi\bar{[}\epsilon\epsilon\rho\bar{\omega}\bar{]}\eta\bar{[}\alpha\bar{]}\eta\epsilon\bar{\tau}\bar{\eta}\bar{\eta}\bar{\nu}\omicron\upsilon\epsilon\ \omega\omega\bar{\rho}\epsilon\ \epsilon\gamma\omicron\gamma\eta\omicron\gamma$
 $\chi\bar{[}\eta\bar{\rho}\kappa\alpha\rho\ \omega\alpha\bar{\tau}\bar{]}\rho\epsilon\ \lambda\gamma\omega\ \epsilon\gamma\omega\alpha\omega\bar{\rho}\epsilon$
 $\epsilon\gamma\bar{\tau}\bar{\rho}\bar{[}\omega\bar{\rho}\bar{]}\omega\ \bar{\eta}\theta\epsilon\ \bar{\eta}\rho\kappa\omicron\kappa\omicron\varsigma\ \lambda\gamma\omega$
 35 $\epsilon\gamma\kappa\eta\eta\ \bar{\eta}\rho\omicron\gamma\omicron\ \epsilon\gamma\sigma\omicron\bar{[}\omicron\bar{]}\gamma\bar{[}\eta\epsilon\ \lambda\gamma\bar{]}\omega\ \bar{[}\bar{\eta}\bar{\tau}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{]}$

135.3 Krause, Sevrin, Layton, Kulawik: <Δ>ηοκ || 4 Bethge: ε(τρην)ωληη || 10 Layton: ηη(η)ηοβε || 17 Sevrin: ετογηα || 20 Krause, Sevrin: κηαωογρλαγ || 23 Krause, Sevrin: ιωρληηης || 31 Krause, Sevrin: φ[ηη]ης || 32 Krause: χ[εεωωρπε ηετ]ηηοβε; Sevrin: χ[εερωα]ηε[τ]ηηοβε || 33 Krause, Sevrin: χ[ηηκκαρ ωαη]πε || 34 Krause: εγτρ[εωρα]ω; Browne: εγτρ[εωρα]ω; Sevrin: εγτρ[εωρα]ω || 35 Krause: εγκηη ηρογο εγσο[ο]γ[ηε εγω ητε]; Sevrin: εγκηη ηρογο εγσο[ο]γ[ηε εγω ητε].

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- 1 “No one will be able to come to me unless
 my Father draws him and brings him to me
 and I too will raise him on the last
 day.”²⁶ It is therefore appropriate to pray to the Father and for us to
 5 call up to him with all our soul,
 not with the external lips, but with the spirit
 within, the one which came from the
 deep,²⁷ sighing²⁸ and repenting for
 the life we have led, confessing
 10 the sins, perceiving the empty error
 we were in and the
 empty haste, weeping like we were
 in the darkness and the wave, mourning
 ourselves so that he may have pity on us, hating
 15 ourselves as we are now. Again
 the Saviour says: “Blessed
 are those who mourn, for it is they who shall be
 pitied. Blessed are those who hunger, for
 it is they who shall be filled.”²⁹ Again he says:
 20 “If one does not hate his own soul he will not be able to follow
 me.”³⁰ For the beginning of salvation is
 repentance. Therefore, “before the
 arrival of Christ, John came,
 preach[ing] the baptism of repentance.”³¹
 25 And repentance comes about in pain
 and grief.³² But the Father is a
 good philanthropist and he hears the
 soul who calls up to him and he
 sends her the saving light.
 30 Therefore he says through the spirit in the
 prophet: “Say to the children of my people:
 ‘If your sins become extended
 [from the earth to] heaven and if they become
 [red] like scarlet and
 35 blacker than a [sack, and]

²⁶ John 6:44.

²⁷ Cf. 1 Cor 2:10–13.

²⁸ Cf. Rom 8:26.

²⁹ Matt 5:4 + 7, 6; cf. Luke 6:21.

³⁰ Cf. Luke 14:26.

³¹ Cf. Acts 13:24.

³² Cf. John 16:20–22; 2 Cor 7:10.

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- 1 τῆκοττηγτῆ φαροει ρῆτετῆψγχι
 τηρῶ αγω ῆτετῆχοοο ερραῖ εροει δε
 παειωτ †ηασωτῆ ερωτῆ ῆοε ῆνογ
 λαοο εφογααβ παλιν κεμα ρχω ῆμοο
- 5 ῆτεειρε ῆσιπχοεις πετογααβ ῆτεπι
 ρραηλ δεροταν εκωακτοκ ῆκεωερομ
 τοτε κναογδαει αγω κναειμε δενεκτω(η)
 ῆροογ εκναρτε ανηπετωογειτ παλιν
 πεχαρ ῆκεμα δεθειερογσαληη ρῆογ
- 10 ριμε ασριμε δεναηαει φηαηα ῆτεςμη
 ῆπεριμε αγω ῆταρεφμαγ αρσωτῆ ερο
 αγω πχοεις ηα† ηητῆ ῆογοεικ ῆθλι
 †ηο μῆηνογμοογ ῆλωαε σεηασωτε αν
 χιητεηογ ετρογτρηο ερογ ηο ῆσι
- 15 πετῆπλαηα ηεβαλ ηαηαγ ανετῆπλαηα
 ῆμο ρωστε ωρε αρπροσεγχεσθαι ε
 πηογτε ῆτογωη μῆηπεροογ εμπαρω
 ῆῆσιχ ερραῖ εροφ ῆοε ῆηηετῆηηητε
 ῆθαλασσα ετπλαε φαγωληη επηογ
- 20 τε ρῆηπογρητ τηρη ρῆηηογρηγποκρηοις
 αν δεηετπροσεγχεσθαι ρῆηηογρη
 ποκρηοις εγαπατα ῆηηοογ ογατογ ε
 πηογτε γαρ θωωτ ῆσαῆθλατε αγω
 εφημογωτ ῆφηη ετῆηπα ηπιτῆ
- 25 ετρεφειμε επαζιοο ῆηηογδαει ηῆλα
 αγ γαρ οει ῆαζιοο ῆηπογδαει ετι εφμε
 ῆηηποποο ῆηηεπλαηη δια τογτο ρχηρ
 ρῆηηοηηηηοο δεοαγσεεγς ηεφρημοοο
 ρηηηογε εφριμε αγω εφληπει εφκτο
- 30 ῆηηεφρο εβολ ῆῆωαδε ῆκαληγω
 ηῆηηεσαπατη εφειθγμει ετρεφμαγ
 επεφτμε αγω εγκαημοο εφηη[ηγ] ε
 βολ ῆηηογ αγω σαβη[λ] ε[εαφχι ῆηηογ]βο
 ηθεια εβολ ρῆηηηη η[εφηαω]ρη[τγ] ε(η)
- 35 επεφτμε παλιν τηεε[ελε]ηη εςχω
 [ῆημοο δε]πα[ρη]ηη αηκτογ ῆηηοοτ παλι(η)

136.4 Bethge: παλιν (η)κεμα || 15 Sevrin, Kulawik: (η)ετῆπλαηα || 20 Sevrin: [τ]ε || 23 Krause; [π]ηογτε; Sevrin: [πη]ογτε || 24 Krause: [η]ηηογωτ; Sevrin: [ῆη]ηογωτ || 32 Krause: εφη[ηγ]; Sevrin: εφη[ηηη] || 33 Krause: σαβη[λ] ηκαημοο ογ[βο]; Schenke: σαβη[λ] δεηεγῆηαγ[βο]; Sevrin: σαβη[λ] δεαφχι ηηογ[βο] || 34 Krause: η[ρηη]ηη παλι(η); Browne: η[εφηαω]ηα[γ] ε(η); Wisse: η[εφηαω]ρη[τγ] αν; Schenke, Bethge: η[εφηαω]ρη ο[η] ε; Sevrin: η[εφηαω]ρη || 35 Krause, Sevrin: επεφτμε; Krause: τηε[ηγ]χη εςχω || 36 Krause: [ῆημοο δεπαροογ]ηη αηκτογ ηηοοτ πα[ληη]; Bethge: [ῆημοο δεπαηηη]η; Sevrin: [ῆημοο δεπαρη]ηη αηκτογ ηηοοτ.

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- 1 you turn yourselves to me with all your soul
and you say to me,
'My Father, I will listen to you like a
holy people.'³³ Again in another place,
5 "the Lord, the Holy One of
Israel, says: 'When you turn yourself and sigh,
then you will be saved and you will know where you were,
on the day when you trusted the emptinesses.'³⁴ Again
he says in another place: "Jerusalem
10 wept profusely: 'Have mercy on me!' He will have mercy on the voice
of your weeping and when he saw he listened to you.
And the Lord will give you bread of
affliction and water of oppression. Those
who deceive will not return from now on
15 to approach you. Your eyes will see those who deceive
you.'³⁵ So it is appropriate to pray to
God night and day, stretching
our hands up to him like those who are sailing in the midst
of the sea. They pray to
20 God with all their heart without hypocrisy,
for those who pray hypocritically
deceive only themselves.
For God looks at the kidneys and
he examines the heart below
25 in order to know whether they are worthy of salvation.
For no one is worthy of salvation who still loves
the place of error. Therefore it is written
in the Poet: "Odysseus sat
on the island weeping and grieving, turning
30 his face from the words of Calisto
and her deceptions, desiring to see
his village and smoke [com]ing
from it. And had [he not received]
help from heaven, [he would not have been able to return]
35 to his village."³⁶ Again, [Helen] too says:
"My heart has turned itself from me. Again

³³ 1 *Clem.* 8:3.

³⁴ *Isa* 30:15.

³⁵ *Isa* 30:19–20.

³⁶ Cf. Homer, *Od.* 1.48–59; 4.558.

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- 1 εβιογωϖ βωκ επανει несаѡεζομ γαρ
 εс.χω ἴμος χεαφροδιτη тентαε̄ρα
 πατα ἴμοει δснτ̄ εβολ ἴπα†με таѡρ̄
 ογοοτ̄с азикааδс ἴсѡει αγω παραει
- 5 εтпапоуϑ ῥ̄рм̄ηεηт ἴсаειε ζοταν
 γαρ ерѡант̄ψγχη κω ἴсѡс ἴпесε̄ра̄
 ἴтелеиос етветапаги ἴтаφροдеиτη
 таеи етѡоо̄п ε̄ἴпεχпо ἴпееиμα το
 те сна̄р̄вλαптесѡаи есѡанаѡεζομ
- 10 Δε ἴс̄р̄метаноει сенактос εζογ̄н епес
 неи каигар писранл ἴпоγ̄σ̄ἴпεϑѡиε
 ἴѡорп етרוγ̄ἴт̄̄̄ εβολ ε̄ἴпκαε̄ ἴкнме
 ε̄ἴп̄п̄еи ἴт̄н̄ἴт̄ε̄μ̄ε̄лл̄ εим̄н̄т̄и χεаϑε
 ѡεζομ εε̄ра̄ἴ еп̄поγ̄те аε̄р̄иε ἴп̄л̄ѡχ̄ε̄
- 15 ἴнеϑε̄в̄н̄γе̄ παλιν ϑснε̄ ε̄ἴἴψαλμοс
 χεаειε̄иε̄ ема̄те̄ ε̄ἴпааѡεζομ †на
 χωκ̄ἴ ἴпаб̄лоб̄ ἴἴпа̄р̄п̄ηϑ̄ кага̄ογ̄
 ѡн̄ ε̄ἴна̄р̄ἴ̄не̄ӣн̄ аз̄ӣр̄ас̄ ε̄ра̄ἴ ε̄ἴна̄.χ̄[а]
 χε̄ т̄н̄ρογ̄ саε̄ε̄т̄н̄γ̄т̄ἴ̄ εβολ ἴμοει ο[γ̄]
- 20 οн̄ н̄ӣм̄ е̄т̄р̄ε̄ѡв̄ е̄та̄но̄м̄ӣа̄ χε̄е̄ис̄ п̄х̄ο̄
 еис̄ а̄ϑс̄ѡт̄ἴ̄ е̄па̄ѡ̄ка̄к̄ ἴпа̄р̄ӣε̄ а̄γ̄
 ѡ̄ а̄п̄χ̄ο̄е̄ис̄ с̄ѡт̄ἴ̄ е̄па̄с̄ο̄п̄с̄̄ е̄ѡ̄п̄[ε̄]
 т̄на̄р̄метаноει на̄ме̄ п̄поγ̄те̄ на̄
 с̄ѡт̄ἴ̄ е̄рон̄ р̄ε̄а̄р̄ѡε̄η̄т̄ а̄γ̄ω̄ па̄п̄нос̄
- 25 ἴ̄на̄ на̄е̄ӣ е̄те̄п̄ѡϑ̄ п̄ε̄ п̄ε̄οογ̄ ѡ̄а̄ӣε̄
 не̄ε̄ ἴ̄не̄ε̄ε̄ε̄ ε̄ам̄н̄н̄:
- 27 т̄ε̄χ̄н̄г̄н̄с̄ис̄ е̄т̄в̄ε̄т̄ψ̄γ̄χη̄

137.17 Krause, Sevrin: ογ̄ || 18 Krause, Sevrin: ε̄ἴна̄[χ̄а] || 20 Krause, Sevrin: п̄х̄[ο];
 Kulawik: п̄х̄ο || 23 Sevrin: ἴ̄поγ̄те̄ н̄[а]; Kulawik: п̄поγ̄те̄ на̄ || 25 Sevrin, Kulawik: ⟨π⟩а̄е̄ӣ.

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- 1 I want to go to my house.”³⁷ For she sighed
 and said: “It was Aphrodite who
 deceived me. She brought me out from my village. My
 only daughter I have left behind me and my
 5 beautiful, wise, good husband.”³⁸
 For when the soul leaves her
 perfect husband because of the deception of Aphrodite,
 which consists in the begetting in this place,
 she will be hurt. But if she sighs
 10 and repents she will return to her
 house. For indeed, Israel would not have been visited
 in the first place so as to be taken out from the land of Egypt,
 from the house of slavery, except because it
 sighed to God and wept for the oppression
 15 of its work. Again it is written in the Psalms:
 “I have been greatly troubled in my sighing. I will
 wash my bed and my mattress at
 night with my tears. I have become old among
 all my enemies. Get away from me,
 20 everyone who does lawlessness, for behold, the
 Lord has heard the call of my weeping
 and the Lord has heard my prayer.”³⁹ If
 we will truly repent, God will
 hear us, the patient and abundantly
 25 merciful to whom is the glory in
 all eternity. Amen.
- 27 The Exegesis on the Soul

³⁷ Cf. Homer, *Od.* 4.260–261.

³⁸ Cf. Homer, *Od.* 4.261–264.

³⁹ Ps 6:7–10 LXX.

51 (= Plate 99)

οὐρβεραιος ῥῥωμε [ω]ἀϋταμιε ρεβραι
 30 ος ἀγω φαγνογτε [ενα]ει ἦττειμινε
 χεπρочηλγτος ογπ[ρочη]λγτος δε μαϋ
 ταμιεπρочηλγτος [.] . ε με(η)
 σεφωοπ ἦθε ετογω[.]
 ἀγω σεταμειο ἦρῆκοο[γε]

51.30 Till, Ménard: [ερω]ϋ || 32 Ménard: πρочηλγτο[с ῥῥωμε μμ]ηε; Schenke: [χεροει]ηε ||
 33 Ménard: ετογω[οοп χινφωοп]; Schenke: ετογω[ωπε ἦρηηтс] || 34 Ménard: ἦρῆκοο[γε
 δε εγφωοп]; Schenke: ἦρῆκοο[γε νικοογε].

51 (= Plate 99)

A Hebrew man creates Hebrew,
30 and [those] of this sort are called
“proselyte,” but a p[rose]lyte does not
create proselyte [...]
they are like [...]
and they create others [...]

52 (= Plate 100)

- 1 [. .] μονο[ν . .]ρωφε εροοϋ ρινα εϋνα
 ρωπε π[ρμ]ρ̄λλ̄ μονον εφωινε αρ̄ε
 λεῡερο[ς] μαφωινε δε̄ η̄κατοϋγια
 η̄πεφ̄χο[ει]ς̄ πωιηρε δε̄ οϋ̄ μονον̄ χε̄
- 5 φο̄ η̄ωιηρε̄ αλλᾱ τκληρονομειᾱ η̄πει
 ωτ̄ ωαφσαρ̄ς̄ η̄σωφ̄ νετ̄ρκληρονομει
 η̄νετμοοϋτ̄ η̄τοοϋ̄ ρωοϋ̄ σεμοοϋτ̄
 αϋω̄ εϋκληρονομεῑ η̄νετμοοϋτ̄ νε
 τ̄ρκληρονομεῑ η̄πετοη̄ρ̄ η̄τοοϋ̄ σεωη̄ρ̄
- 10 αϋω̄ σε̄ρκληρονομεῑ η̄πετοη̄ρ̄ μ̄η̄νετ
 μοοϋτ̄ νετμοοϋτ̄ μᾱρ̄κληρονομεῑ
 λλααϋ̄ π̄ως̄ γαρ̄ πετμοοϋτ̄ φνακληρονο
 μεῑ πετμοοϋτ̄ εφωακληρονομεῑ η̄
 πετοη̄ρ̄ φναμοϋ̄ αν̄ αλλᾱ πετμοοϋτ̄
- 15 εφναωη̄ρ̄ η̄ρ̄οϋ̄ οϋ̄ρ̄θε̄νικος̄ ρ̄ρω̄
 με̄ μαφμοϋ̄ η̄πεφωη̄ρ̄ γαρ̄ ε̄νερ̄ ρινᾱ
 εφναμοϋ̄ πενταρ̄πιστεϋε̄ ε̄τμε̄ αϋ
 ωη̄ρ̄ αϋω̄ πᾱῑ φ̄σ̄η̄δ̄ῡνεϋε̄ εμοϋ̄ φ̄ωη̄ρ̄
 γαρ̄ χ̄ῑμ̄η̄ρ̄οοϋ̄ η̄ταπ̄χ̄ς̄ εῑ σε̄σω̄η̄τ̄ η̄
- 20 π̄κοσμος̄ σε̄ρ̄κοσμεῑ η̄η̄πολεις̄ σε̄
 φ̄ῑ η̄πετμοοϋτ̄ εβολ̄ η̄ρ̄οοϋ̄ νε̄νω̄ω̄
 οπ̄ η̄ρ̄εβραιος̄ νε̄νω̄ η̄ορ̄φανος̄ νεϋ̄
 η̄ταν̄ η̄τ̄η̄μααϋ̄ η̄ταρ̄η̄ω̄πε̄ δε̄ η̄
 χρ̄η̄στ̄ιανος̄ δε̄ιω̄τ̄ ριμααϋ̄ ρωπε̄ νᾱ(η̄)
- 25 νετ̄σιτε̄ ρ̄η̄τ̄πρω̄ ω̄αϋω̄ρ̄ ρ̄η̄π̄ω̄ω̄η̄
 τ̄πρω̄ πε̄ π̄κοσμος̄ π̄ω̄ω̄η̄ πε̄ π̄κεᾱι
 ω̄η̄ μαρ̄η̄σιτε̄ ρ̄η̄π̄κοσμος̄ χ̄εκαᾱς̄
 ε̄ῑνναω̄ρ̄ς̄ ρ̄η̄π̄ω̄ω̄η̄ δ̄ιᾱ τοϋ̄το̄ ω̄ω̄ε̄
 ε̄ρον̄ ε̄τ̄η̄τ̄ρ̄η̄ω̄λη̄ ρ̄η̄τ̄πρω̄ η̄ εβολ̄
- 30 ρ̄η̄τ̄πρω̄ πε̄ π̄ω̄ω̄η̄ ε̄ρω̄αοϋ̄ᾱ δε̄ ω̄ς̄ρ̄
 ρ̄η̄τ̄ε̄πρω̄ εφναω̄ς̄ρ̄ αν̄ αλλᾱ εφναρ̄ω̄
 λε̄ ρ̄ω̄ς̄ πᾱε̄[ῑ η̄]̄τ̄ε̄εῑμ̄εῑνε̄ εφνατεϋ̄
 εκαρ̄πος̄ [. . .] αν̄ οϋ̄̄ μονον̄ εφ̄η̄νη̄ϋ̄
 ε̄βο[λ̄] αλλᾱ ρ̄η̄π̄κεσαββᾱτον̄
- 35 [. ο]̄γ̄ατ̄καρ̄πος̄ τε̄ απ̄ε̄χ̄ρ̄ς̄ εῑ

52.1 Ménard: [ρ̄]ρ̄μ̄[με φ]ρωφε; Layton, Schenke: [δε] μονο[ν ες]ρωφε || 32 Ménard: πατ[ο η̄]τ̄ε̄εῑμ̄εῑ || 33 Ménard: καρ̄πος̄ [σε] αν̄; Layton: καρ̄πος̄ [μαφ] αν̄; Schenke: καρ̄πος̄ [. . .] αν̄ || 34 Ménard: ε̄βο[λ̄ ρ̄η̄π̄μᾱ αν̄] αλλᾱ || 35 Till: [τεφειωρε οϋ]ατκαρπος; Ménard: [τεφ̄ο̄ω̄ οϋ]ατκαρπος.

52 (= Plate 100)

- 1 [...] only [...] suffice for them so that they may
 come into being. The slave only seeks to be
 free, but he does not seek the property
 of his master. But the son, not only
 5 is he son, but he ascribes to himself
 the inheritance of the father.⁴⁰ Those who inherit
 the dead, they too are dead
 and they inherit the dead. Those
 who inherit the living, they are alive
 10 and they inherit the living and the
 dead. The dead do not inherit
 anything, for how will the dead inherit?
 If the dead inherits
 the living he will not die, but the dead
 15 will rather live!⁴¹ A gentile
 man does not die, for he has never lived so that
 he may die. He who has believed in the truth, he has
 lived,⁴² and this one is liable to die, for he is alive
 since the day Christ came. The world
 20 is created, the cities are organised,
 the dead is carried out. When we were
 Hebrews we were fatherless.
 We had our mother, but when we became
 Christians we got (both) father and mother.
 25 Those who sow in the winter reap in the summer.
 The winter is the world, the summer is the other
 aeon. Let us sow in the world so that
 we may reap in the summer. Therefore it is appropriate
 for us not to pray in the winter. That
 30 which follows the winter is the summer, but if one reaps
 in the winter he will not reap, but he will pluck out.
 Just like such a person he will not produce
 fruit [...] not only does he come
 forth [...] but on the Sabbath too
 35 [...] it is fruitless. Christ came

⁴⁰ Cf. Gal 4:1–2, 7.

⁴¹ Cf. Matt 19:29; Mark 10:17; Luke 10:25; 18:18; cf. also Tit 3:7.

⁴² Cf. John 3:15–16; 5:24–25; 6:40; 11:25–26; 20:31; 1 John 5:13.

53 (= Plate 101)

- 1 ροεινε μεν ετρεφτοογς[ε ρ]ἡκοογε
 δε ετρεφναρμογ ρἡκοογε ετρεφσο
 τογ νετο ἡωῆμο ἡταφτοογσε αφα
 αγ ἡνετενογφ νε αγω αφνογρ
- 5 ἡἡετενογφ ηαι ἡταφκααγ ἡνεογ
 ω ρἡπεφογωω ογ μονον δεἡταρεφ
 ογωηρ εβολ αφκω ἡτῆγχι ἡταρεφ
 ογωω αλλα χιμφοογ επκοσμοσ ωο
 οπ αφκω ἡτῆγχι ἡπσοп ετεφογ
- 10 ωω τοτε αφει ἡωορп εφναφιτῆ επει
 ἡταγκααс ἡνεογω αсωωπε ρανλη
 стнс αγω αγφιτῆ ἡαιχμαλωτοс αφноρ
 μεс δε αγω νετῆανογογ ρἡπκοсμοс
 αφсотоγ αγω νεθooγ πογοειν ἡἡκα
- 15 κε πωηρ ἡἡπμογ ἡογῆαμ ἡἡῆρβογρ
 ἡсннγ νε ἡноγερηγ ἡἡсoм ἡсепωρχ
 аноγερηγ εтвеπαει ογτε νετῆανογ
 ογῆανογογ ογτε νεθooγ сερooγ
 ογτε πωηρ ογωηρ пе ογτε πμογ ογ
- 20 μογ пе δια τογτο πογα πογα ηαωωλ
 εβολ ατεφαρχη χιηωοрп νεт.сoсe
 δε аπκοсμοс ρἡηατωωλ εβολ νε
 ρἡωαεηερ νε ἡран ετογт ἡμοογ α(η)
 κοсμικοс ογἡтеγ ἡηαγ ἡογῆoс ἡ
- 25 πλανη сепωωῆ гар ἡпоγρηт εβολ
 ρἡἡετсмонт ερογἡ εηετсмонт
 аη αγω πεтсωтἡ επпоγτε εφно
 ει аη ἡπεтсмонт αλλα αφῆρνοει ἡ
 πεтсмонт аη тειρε οη ἡπειωт
- 30 ἡἡ πωηре ἡἡπἡἡ ετογααβ ἡἡ
 πωηρ ἡἡпоγοειη αγω таηαста-
 сис ἡἡтеκκληсиа [ἡ]ἡἡκοογε τηρογ
 εγῆρνοει аη ἡηεт[сμο]ἡт αλλα εγῆ
 ρноει ἡἡεтсмон[т аη πλ]ηη αγсе
- 35 во аηεтсмонт рра[η ἡтаγс]ατμογ
 сεωοοп ρἡπκοсмо[с]

53.4 Ménard: αγноγρε || 35 Till: ρ[ρωμε τηρογ ε]τμογ; Ménard: ρρ[αη ηταγω]τμογ; Schenke: ρρα[η εταγс]ατμογ || 36 Till: ρἡπκοсмо[с εγῆρνοει ηηεтс]; Ménard: ρἡπκοсмо[с ἡтаρογῆ].

53 (= Plate 101)

- 1 to buy some, but
to save others, and to redeem others.
It was those who were strangers that he bought, and he
made them his own and he set
5 his own apart, these whom he put as a pledge
in his will. Not only when he
appeared did he lay down his life (ψυχή) when he
wanted to, but since the day the world
existed he laid down his life (ψυχή) when he
10 wanted to.⁴³ Then he came first to take it, since
it had been put as a pledge. It came to be under the
robbers and they took it captive, but he saved
it, and the good in the world
he redeemed, and the bad. Light and darkness,
15 life and death, right and left,
they are brothers of one another. It is impossible for them to be separated
from each other. Therefore, neither are the good
good, nor are the bad bad,
nor is life life, nor is death
20 death. Each one will therefore dissolve
into its origin from the beginning. But those that are exalted
above the world are indissoluable,
they are among the eternal. The names that are given to the
worldly contain a great
25 error, for they turn the mind aside from
what is right to what is not right,
and he who hears “God”
does not understand what is right, but he understands
what is not right. Thus also with “the Father”
30 and “the Son” and “the Holy Spirit” and
“the life” and “the light” and “the resurrection”
and “the church” and all the others,
it is not [what is right] that is understood, but it is
what is [not] right that is understood, unless they
35 have learned what is right. The [names that were heard]
exist in the world [...]

⁴³ Cf. John 10:15, 17–18; 15:13; 1 John 3:16.

54 (= Plate 102)

- 1 [απ]ατα [ε]η[εγ]ω[ο]οπ ρῆπαιων νεγνα
 ρονομαζ[ε] αν ρῆπκοσμοσ λλααγ ῆ
 ροογ ογτε ῆπογκααγ ρῆῆρβηγε ῆ
 κοσμοκον ογῆταγ ῆμαγ ῆνογρῆαν ρῆ
- 5 παιων ογραν ογωτ μαγτεγογαγ
 ρῆπκοσμοσ πραν ῆταπειωτ τααγ
 ῆπωηρε φχοσε εογον νηη ετεπα
 ει πε πραν ῆπειωτ νερεπωηρε γαρ
 ναωωπε αν ειωτ σαβηλ χεαφτ ρι
- 10 ωωφ ῆπραν ῆπειωτ πεειραν νε
 τεγῆταγφ σεῆνοει μεη ῆμογ σεωα
 χε δε ερογ αν νετε μῆταγφ δε σε
 ρῆνοει ῆμογ αν αλλα ατμε χπερῆρα(η)
 ρῆπκοσμοσ ετβητῆ ναει εμηβωμ
- 15 ασεβο εροσ χωρις ῆραν ογει ογωτ
 τε τμε σο ῆρῆρ αγω ετβητῆ ετσε
 βο επαει ογααγ ρῆνογαγαηη ριτῆ
 ρῆρ ἀναρχων ογωω αῆραπατα ῆ
 πρωμε επειδη αγναγ ερογ εγῆταγ
- 20 ῆμαγ ῆνογσυτγεηεια ωανετνα
 νογογ نامه αγφιπραν ῆνετνα
 νογογ αγτααγ ἀνετνανογογ αν
 χεκαασ ριτῆῆραν εγναῆραπατα ῆ
 μογ αγω ῆσεμορογ ερογη ἀνετνα
- 25 νογογ αν αγω ῆηῆῆσωσ εωχεεγ
 ειρε ναγ ῆογρῆμοτ ῆσετρογσερωογ
 εβολ ῆνετνανογογ αν αγω ῆσε
 κααγ ρῆνετνανογογ ναει νεγσο
 ογη ῆμοογ νεγογωω γαρ ετρογ
- 30 φηπελεγωερ[ο]σ ῆσεκααγ ναγ ῆ
 ρηρῆλ ωαεηερ ογηρῆδγνημιασ
 ωοοπ εγτῆ[. . .]πρωμε εσεογωω
 αν ατρεφογ[χαι] χεκαασ εγναωω
 πε εγμ[.]λ ερωαπρωμε γαρ
- 35 ογχ[δαι ῆνογ]ωωπε ῆσιρῆογσια
 [.] αγω νεγταλεωηριον

54.1 Till: [μον]τ α[η νεγ]ω[ο]οπ || 32 Till: εγτ[. . .]φρωμε; Giversen: εγτ[μῆπ]ειρωμε; Ménard: εγτ[ηη επ]ειρωμε; Schenke: εγτῆ[ηγ ῆ]πρωμε || 34 Till: εχφ[φ] . ; Ménard: εχμ[πρῆρα]λ Schenke: εγμ[ηη εβο]λ || 35 Till: ογη[.]ωωπε; Ménard: ογο[ωογ εγνα]ωωπε; Schenke: ογχ[δαι μαγ]ωωπε || 36 Ménard: [ῆρῆωηριον].

54 (= Plate 102)

1 [deceive. If they existed] in the aeon they would
 never have been named in the world,
 nor have they been placed among
 worldly things. They have their end in
 5 the aeon. A single name is not uttered
 in the world, the name which the Father gave
 to the Son. It is exalted above every (other name), that
 is, the name of the Father. For the Son would
 not have become father unless he had put
 10 on the name of the Father. Those
 who have this name know it,
 but they do not speak it, but those who do not have it
 do not know it.⁴⁴ But Truth produced names
 in the world for our sakes, for it is impossible for us
 15 to learn it (i.e., Truth) without the names.
 Truth is one thing and it is many, and it concerns us to
 teach this one alone with love through
 many.⁴⁵ The rulers wanted to deceive
 man because they saw him having
 20 kinship with the
 truly good. They took the name of the
 good and they gave it to those that are not good
 so that through the names they might deceive
 him and bind them to those that are not
 25 good, and afterwards, as if they
 are doing them a favour, to remove them
 from those that are not good and to
 place them among those that are good. These things they
 knew, for they wanted to
 30 take the free one and place him in slavery to them
 forever. There are powers
 existing who [...] man, not wanting
 him to be [safe,] so that they may
 become [...] for if man
 35 [was safe], sacrifices [would not] happen
 [...] and animals were offered

⁴⁴ Cf. John 14:17; 10:3; 17:6-8; Phil 2:5-11; Rev 19:12-13; Eph 1:21.

⁴⁵ Cf. Eph 4:15-16; Phil 1:15-16.

55 (= Plate 103)

- 1 ερραϊ̄ ν̄ν̄δ̄γ̄νᾱμ̄ῑς̄ νε[ρ̄]ν̄[θ̄]η̄ρῑον̄ γ̄αρ̄
 νε̄ νε̄το̄ῡτε̄λο̄ ερραϊ̄ να[γ̄]̄ νε̄γ̄τε̄λο̄
 με̄ν̄ ἴ̄μο̄ο̄ῡ ερραϊ̄ ε̄γ̄ον̄ε̄ ἴ̄τᾱρο̄ῡτε̄
 λο̄ο̄ῡ Δ̄ε̄ ερραϊ̄ ᾱγ̄μο̄ῡ π̄ρ̄ω̄με̄ ᾱγ̄τε̄λο̄ῡ
- 5 ερραϊ̄ ἴ̄π̄νο̄ῡτε̄ ε̄φ̄μο̄ο̄ῡτ̄ ᾱγ̄ω̄ ᾱφ̄ω̄νε̄
 ρ̄ᾱτ̄ε̄ρ̄η̄ ε̄μ̄πᾱτε̄πε̄χ̄ς̄ ε̄ῑ νε̄ν̄ἴ̄ο̄ε̄ικ̄
 ρ̄η̄π̄κο̄ς̄μο̄ς̄ ἴ̄θ̄ε̄ ἴ̄π̄πᾱρᾱΔ̄ῑκο̄ς̄ π̄μᾱ
 νε̄ρε̄ᾱΔ̄ᾱμ̄ ἴ̄μ̄ᾱγ̄ νε̄γ̄ἴ̄ν̄τᾱφ̄ ρ̄ᾱρ̄ ἴ̄ω̄η̄ν̄
 ἴ̄ν̄τ̄ρο̄φ̄η̄ ἴ̄ν̄ἴ̄η̄ρῑον̄ νε̄μ̄ἴ̄τᾱφ̄ σο̄ῡο̄
- 10 ἴ̄τ̄τ̄ρο̄φ̄η̄ ἴ̄π̄ρ̄ω̄με̄ νε̄ρε̄π̄ρ̄ω̄με̄ σο̄
 ε̄ῑω̄ ἴ̄θ̄ε̄ ἴ̄ν̄ἴ̄η̄ρῑον̄ ἄ̄λλᾱ ἴ̄τᾱρε̄πε̄χ̄ς̄
 ε̄ῑ π̄τε̄λῑο̄ς̄ ῥ̄ρ̄ω̄με̄ ᾱφ̄ε̄ῑνε̄ ἴ̄ο̄ῡο̄ε̄ικ̄
 ε̄βο̄λ̄ ρ̄η̄τ̄πε̄ φ̄ῑνᾱ ε̄ρε̄π̄ρ̄ω̄με̄ νᾱρ̄τ̄ρε̄
 φ̄ε̄ς̄ο̄αῑ ρ̄η̄τ̄τ̄ρο̄φ̄η̄ ἴ̄π̄ρ̄ω̄με̄ νε̄ρε̄ἴ̄
- 15 ἀ̄ρ̄χ̄ω̄ν̄ με̄ε̄γε̄ χ̄ε̄ρ̄ἴ̄το̄ῡβο̄ς̄ο̄μ̄ ἴ̄π̄πο̄ῡ
 ω̄ω̄ ε̄γ̄ε̄ῑρε̄ ἴ̄νε̄το̄ῡε̄ῑρε̄ ἴ̄μο̄ο̄ῡ νε̄
 ρ̄ε̄ π̄π̄ἴ̄Δ̄ Δ̄ε̄ ε̄το̄γ̄ᾱᾱβ̄ ρ̄η̄ο̄ῡπ̄θ̄ε̄η̄π̄
 νε̄φ̄ε̄νε̄ρ̄γε̄ῑ ἴ̄π̄τ̄η̄ρ̄φ̄ ε̄βο̄λ̄ ρ̄ῑτο̄ο̄το̄ῡ
 ἴ̄θ̄ε̄ ε̄τ̄φο̄γ̄ω̄ω̄ τᾱλ̄η̄θ̄ε̄ιᾱ σε̄ς̄ῑτε̄ ἴ̄μο̄ς̄
- 20 ἴ̄μ̄ᾱ ἴ̄μ̄ῑμ̄ τε̄τ̄ω̄ρο̄ο̄π̄ χ̄ῑμ̄ἴ̄ω̄ρο̄π̄ ᾱγ̄
 ω̄ ο̄γ̄η̄ρ̄ᾱρ̄ νᾱγ̄ ε̄ρο̄ς̄ ε̄γ̄ς̄ῑτε̄ ἴ̄μ̄ο̄ς̄ ρ̄η̄
 κο̄ῡε̄ῑ Δ̄ε̄ ε̄το̄γ̄η̄νᾱγ̄ ε̄ρο̄ς̄ ε̄γ̄ω̄ς̄ρ̄ ἴ̄μ̄ο̄ς̄
 πε̄χ̄ε̄ρο̄ε̄ῑνε̄ χ̄ε̄ᾱμᾱριᾱ ω̄ ε̄βο̄λ̄ ρ̄η̄
 π̄π̄ἴ̄Δ̄ ε̄το̄γ̄ᾱᾱβ̄ σε̄ρ̄π̄λᾱνᾱς̄ο̄ε̄ ο̄ῡ πε̄
- 25 το̄γ̄χ̄ω̄ ἴ̄μ̄ο̄φ̄ σε̄σο̄ο̄ῡη̄ ἄ̄ν̄ ᾱω̄ ἴ̄ρ̄ο̄
 ο̄ῡ ε̄νε̄ρ̄ πε̄ν̄τᾱς̄ρ̄ῑμε̄ ω̄ ε̄βο̄λ̄ ρ̄η̄ς̄ρ̄ῑ
 με̄ μᾱριᾱ τε̄ τ̄πᾱρ̄θ̄ε̄νο̄ς̄ ε̄τε̄ἴ̄πε̄
 Δ̄γ̄νᾱμ̄ῑς̄ χ̄ᾱρ̄με̄ς̄ ε̄ς̄ω̄ρο̄ο̄π̄ ἴ̄μο̄ῡ
 νο̄ς̄ ἴ̄ν̄ᾱνο̄ω̄ ἴ̄ν̄ἴ̄ε̄β̄ρ̄ᾱῑο̄ς̄ ε̄τε̄νᾱ
- 30 πο̄στο̄λο̄ς̄ νε̄ ᾱγ̄ω̄ [ἴ̄]ἀ̄πο̄στο̄λῑκο̄ς̄
 τε̄ε̄ῑπᾱρ̄θ̄ε̄νο̄ς̄ ε̄τ̄[ε̄]ἴ̄π̄ε̄δ̄γ̄νᾱμ̄ῑς̄
 χ̄ο̄ρ̄με̄ς̄ ο̄ῡ[. ᾱ]ἴ̄δ̄γ̄νᾱμ̄ῑς̄
 χ̄ο̄ρ̄μο̄ῡ ᾱγ̄ω̄ ἴ̄[ε̄φ̄μᾱχ̄]ρο̄ς̄ ἄ̄ν̄ ἴ̄β̄ῑ
 π̄χ̄ο̄ε̄ῑς̄ χ̄ε̄πᾱε̄[ἰ̄ω̄τ̄ ε̄τ̄ρ̄]ἴ̄μ̄ἴ̄π̄η̄γ̄ε̄
- 35 ε̄ῑμ̄η̄τ̄ῑ χ̄ε̄νε̄γ̄ἴ̄ν̄τᾱ[φ̄ ἴ̄μ̄ᾱγ̄] ἴ̄[κ̄]ε̄εῑω̄τ̄
 ἄ̄λλᾱ ρ̄ᾱπ̄λω̄ς̄ ᾱφ̄χ̄ο̄ο̄[ς̄ χ̄ε̄πᾱε̄ῑω̄τ̄]
 πε̄χ̄ε̄π̄χ̄ο̄ε̄ῑς̄ ἴ̄μ̄μᾱθ̄[ἴ̄τ̄η̄ς̄ χ̄ε̄]

55.1 Giversen: νε[ι]ν[θ]ηριον [Δε]; Ménard: ἴθ[ε] ἴ[θ]ηριον ἴ[Δει] || 32 Ménard: ογ[οβα] νταν[ι]δγναμικ; Schenke: ογ[. τε α]ιδγναμικ || 34 Ménard: χεπαε[ιωτ πετην]ιμπηγε || 37 Schenke: ἴμμαθ[ητης χεφ].

55 (= Plate 103)

1 up to the powers, for those who were offered up to
 were animals (themselves). They were offered
 up alive, but when they were offered
 up they died. Man was offered
 5 up to God dead and he lived.
 Before Christ came there was no bread
 in the world, like in Paradise, the place
 were Adam was, there were many trees
 for the food of the animals. It had no wheat
 10 for the food of man. Man was
 feeding like the animals, but when Christ
 came, the perfect man, he brought bread
 from heaven so that man would be
 nourished with the food of man.⁴⁶ The
 15 rulers thought that it was by their power and their
 will that they were doing what they were doing,
 but the Holy Spirit was secretly
 effecting everything through them
 as it wished. Truth, which has been in existence
 20 since the beginning, is sown everywhere,
 and there are many who see it being sown,
 but there are few who see it being reaped.
 Some say that Mary conceived by
 the Holy Spirit. They are wrong.
 25 They do not know what they are saying.
 When did a female ever conceive by a female?
 “Mary is the virgin whom no
 power defiled.” It is a
 great oath of the Hebrews,⁴⁷ who are the
 30 apostles and [the] apostolic.⁴⁸
 This virgin whom no power
 defiled, [...] the powers
 defile[d] themselves. And the Lord [would] not
 [have] said, “my [father who is in] heaven,”⁴⁹
 35 unless he had another father,⁵⁰
 but he would simply have said, [“my father”].
 The Lord said to the [disciples, “...]

⁴⁶ Cf. John 6:31–58.

⁴⁷ Cf. Luke 1:28, 42.

⁴⁸ Cf. 2 Cor 11:22–23; Phil 3:3, 5.

⁴⁹ Matt 7:21; 10:32, 33; 12:50; 16:17; 18:10, 19; cf. also Matt 15:13; 18:35.

⁵⁰ Cf. Rom 1:3.

56 (= Plate 104)

- 1 [εβ]ολ ρ̄ñ[η]ει νιμ ενι ερογν επνει
 ἡπειωτ̄ ἡπ̄ρχιογ(ε) δε ἡτογ ρ̄ñπη
 ει ἡπειωτ̄ ἡτετ̄ñφι εβολ ῑσ ογρ̄α(η)
 πε εφρ̄ηπ πεχρ̄ς ογρ̄αν πε εφογονρ̄
- 5 εβολ δια τογτο ῑσ μεν φωοοπ αν
 ρ̄ñλααγ ἡναςπε αλλα πεφραν πε ἡñς
 ἡθε ετογμογτε ερογ ἡμος πεχρ̄ς
 δε πεφραν {πε} ἡἡñτ̄ςγρος πε μες
 cias ἡἡñτογαειανην δε πε π̄χς πα(η)
- 10 τως ἡκοογε τηρογ ογ̄ñταγφ ἡναγ
 καγαταςπε ἡπογα πογα ἡρητογ
 πναζαρηνος πετογονρ̄ εβολ πε
 ἡππεθ̄ηπ πεχ̄ς ογ̄ñταφ ογον νιμ
 ρ̄ραἰ ἡρητ̄φ ειτε ρ̄ωμε ειτε αγγελος
- 15 ειτε μγστηριον αγω πειωτ̄ νετ̄χω
 ἡμος δεαπ̄χοεις μογ ἡωορπ αγω
 αφτωογν σερ̄πλανα αφτωογν γαρ
 ἡωορπ αγω αφμογ ετ̄ἡογα χπε
 ταναστασις ἡωορπ φηαμογ αν φονρ̄
- 20 ἡσιπνογτε νερεπη ναμ(ογ) ἡλλα
 αγ ναρ̄ωπ ἡνογνος ἡπραγμα εφτα
 ειηγ ρ̄ñογνος ἡρ̄ωβ αλλα ρ̄αρ̄ ἡσοπ
 λογα ρ̄ñτ̄βα ετεἡñτογ ηπε αφμοχογ
 αγρ̄ωβ ρ̄αογασσαριον ταει τε θε ἡ
- 25 τ̄γ̄χη ογρ̄ωβ εφταειηγ πε ασωω
 πε ρ̄ñνογσωμα εφωñς ογ̄ñροεινε
 ρ̄ροτε χεμηπ̄ως ἡσετωογν εγκα
 καρηγ ετ̄βεπ[α]ει σεογωω ετωογν
 ρ̄ñτ̄σαρ̄з αγω [с]εσοογν αν χεнет̄ρ̄
- 30 φορει ἡτ̄ς[αρ̄з ἡτο]ογ πε ετ̄κηκαρηγ
 ναει ετε[.] ἡμοογ εκακογ
 ερη[γ] ἡ[τοογ ετ̄κ]ακαρηγ αν ἡñσαρ̄з
 [ρ̄ισνοφ να]ρ̄κληρονομει ἡτιἡτε
 [ρο ἡπνο]γ̄τε νιμ τε ταει ετ̄νακλη

56.1 Ménard: [. . .]φ[. . .]ε[. . .]η μεν ι ερογн || 2 Ménard: [η]π̄ρχι ογδε ἡτογ || 20 For some reason the scribe left an empty gap following ναμ. I follow the emendation of Ménard. Schenke follows this reading in his translation, but does not emend the Coptic text. Layton: ναμ(- - -) || 28 Ménard: ετ̄βε[πε]ει || 31 Ménard: ετε[γ̄ναβωω]; Schenke: ετε[ογñσοομ] || 32 Till, Ménard: ερη[γ] ητοογ πε ετ̄κ]ακαρηγ; Schenke: ἡ[τοογ πε ετ̄κ]ακαρηγ || 33 Till, Ménard: [ρ̄ισνοφ ναω]ρ̄κληρονομει || 34 Ménard: [ρ̄ρο ἡπνογ]γ̄τε.

56 (= Plate 104)

- 1 [from] every [house] and bring into the house
of the Father, but do not steal from the house
of the Father and do not carry away.” Jesus is a
hidden name. Christ is a revealed name.
- 5 Jesus is therefore not
in any language, but his name is Jesus
as he is called. But as for Christ,
his name in Syriac is Messiah,
but in Greek it is Christ. All
- 10 the others have it
according to the language of each one among them.
It is the Nazarene who reveals
the hidden. Christ has everything
within himself, whether man or angel
- 15 or mystery and the Father.⁵¹ Those who say
that the Lord died first and
then arose are wrong, for he arose
first and then he died. If one does not acquire
the resurrection first he will not die.
- 20 As God lives, that one would <die>! No one
will hide a great valuable object
in a great thing, but many times
an innumerable myriad has been put
into a thing worth a trifle. Thus it is with
- 25 the soul. It is a valuable thing and it has
come to be in a contemptible body. There are some
who are afraid that perhaps they might arise
naked. Therefore they want to arise
in the flesh, and [they] do not know that it is those who
- 30 wear the [flesh] who are naked.⁵²
These [...] to unclothe
themselves, [they are] not naked. “Flesh
[and blood shall] not inherit the kingdom
[of God].”⁵³ What is this that shall

⁵¹ Cf. Col 2:9.

⁵² Cf. 2 Cor 5:2–4.

⁵³ 1 Cor 15:50.

57 (= Plate 105)

- 1 ρΟΝΟΜΕΙ ΔΝ ΤΑΕΙ ΕΤΡΙΩΩΝ ΝΙΜ ΔΕ ΤΕ
 ΤΑΕΙ ΖΩΩΣ ΕΤΝΑΚΛΗΡΟΝΟΜΕΙ ΤΑΙϚ
 ΤΕ ΜΗΠΕΦΣΝΟϚ ΔΙΑ ΤΟΥΤΟ ΠΕΧΔΑϚ ΧΕ
 ΠΕΤΑΟΥΩΜ ΔΝ Ν̄ΤΑϚΑΡΖ ΑΥΩ Ν̄ϚΩ Μ̄
- 5 ΠΑΣΝΟϚ ΜΗ̄ΤΑϚΩΝΖ ΖΡΑΪ Ν̄ΖΗΤῚ ΑΩ
 ΤΕ ΤΕϚΑΡΖ ΠΕ ΠΛΟΓΟΣ ΑΥΩ ΠΕΦΣΝΟϚ
 ΠΕ Π̄Π̄ΝΑ ΕΤΟΥΔΑΒ ΠΕΝΤΑΖΧΙ ΝΑΕΙ ΟΥ(Ν)
 ΤΕΦΤΡΟΦΗ ΑΥΩ ΟῩΝ̄ΤΑϚΩΣ ΖΙΒ̄ΣΩ
 ΔΝΟΚ †Ϛ̄Ν̄ΑΡΙΚΕ ΔΝΚΟΟΥΕ ΕΤΧΩ Μ̄ΜΟΣ
- 10 ΧΕΣΝΑΤΩΟΥΝ ΔΝ ΕΙΤΕ Ν̄ΤΟΟΥ Μ̄ΠΕΣ
 ΝΑΥ ΣΕΩΟΟΠ Ζ̄Ν̄ΟΥΩΤΑ ΚΧΩ Μ̄ΜΟΣ
 ΧΕΤϚΑΡΖ ΝΑΤΩΟΥΝ ΔΝ ΑΛΛΑ ΧΟΟΣ ΕΡΟ
 ΕΙ ΧΕΑΩ ΠΕΤΝΑΤΩΟΥΝ ΩΙΝΑ ΕΝΑΤΑ
 ΕΙΟΚ ΚΧΩ Μ̄ΜΟΣ ΧΕΠ̄Π̄ΝΑ Ζ̄Ν̄ΤϚΑΡΖ
- 15 ΑΥΩ ΠΕΕΙΚΕΟΥΘΕΙΝ ΠΕ Ζ̄Ν̄ΤϚΑΡΖ ΟΥΛΟ
 ΓΟΣ ΠΕ ΠΕΕΙΚΕ ΕΦΖ̄Ν̄ΤϚΑΡΖ ΧΕΠΕΤΚΝΑ
 ΧΟΟΣ ΕΚΧΕΛΑΔΥ ΔΝ Μ̄ΠΒΟΛ Ν̄ΤϚΑΡΖ
 ΖΔΠῚ ΠΕ ΕΤΩΟΥΝ Ζ̄Ν̄ΤΕΕΙϚΑΡΖ ΕΖΩΒ
 ΝΙΜ ΩΟΟΠ Ν̄ΖΗΤῚ Ζ̄Μ̄ΠΕΕΙΚΟΣΜΟΣ
- 20 ΝΕΤ† ΖΙΩΟΥ Ν̄Ν̄ΖΒΩΣ ΣΕΣΟΤΠ ΔΝ̄
 Ζ̄Β̄ΣΩ Ζ̄Ν̄ΤΜ̄Ν̄ΤΕΡΟ Ν̄Μ̄ΠΗΥΕ Ν̄Ζ̄Β̄ΣΩ
 ΣΕΣΟΤΠ ΔΝΕΝΤΑΥΤΑΔΥ ΖΙΩΟΥ ΖΙΤ̄Ν̄
 ΟΥΜΟΟΥ Μ̄Ν̄ΟΥΚΩΖΤ ΕΥΤΟΥΒΟ Μ̄ΠΜΑ
 ΤΗΡϚ ΝΕΤΟΥΟΝΖ ΖΙΤ̄Ν̄ΝΕΤΟΥΟΝΖ Ε
- 25 ΒΟΛ ΝΕΘΗΠ ΖΙΤ̄Ν̄ΝΕΘΗΠ ΟΥΝΖΟ
 ΕΙΝΕ ΕΥΖΗΠ ΖΙΤ̄Ν̄ΝΕΤΟΥΟΝΖ ΕΒΟΛ
 ΟῩΜ̄ΜΟΟΥ Ζ̄Ν̄ΟΥΜ̄ΜΟΟΥ ΟῩΝ̄ΚΩΖΤ
 Ζ̄Ν̄ΝΟΥΧΡΙΣΝΑ ΔΙϚ ΟΙΤΟΥ Ν̄ΧΙΟΥΕ
 ΤΗΡΟΥ Μ̄ΠΕΦΟΥΩΝ[Ζ] ΓΑΡ ΕΒΟΛ Ν̄ΘΕ
- 30 ΕΝΕΦΩΟΟΠ [Ν̄Ζ]Η[ΤϚ Δ]ΛΛΑ Ν̄ΤΑϚΟΥΩΝΖ
 ΕΒΟΛ Ν̄ΘΕ ΕΤ[ΟΥΝΑΩ]Ϛ̄Μ̄ΣΟΜ Μ̄ΝΑΥ
 ΕΡΟϚ Ν̄ΖΗΤῚ Ν[ΔΕΙ ΔΕ ΤΗ]ΡΟΥ ΔΦΟΥ
 ΩΝΖ ΕΒΟΛ ΝΑΥ ΑϚ[ΟΥΩΝΖ] ΕΒΟΛ Ν̄[Ν̄]
 ΝΟΣ ΖΩΣ ΝΟΣ ΑΦΟΥΩ[ΝΖ ΕΒΟΛ] Ν̄
- 35 Ν̄ΚΟΥΕΙ ΖΩΣ ΚΟΥΕΙ ΔΦΟ[ΥΩΝΖ ΕΒΟΛ]

57.30 Till, Ménard: [NAME Δ]ΛΛΑ || 31 Till, Ménard: ΕΤ[ΟΥΝΑΩ]Μ̄ΣΟΜ || 32 Till: Ν[ΕΦΩΥ]ΜΟΥ;
 Ménard: Ν[ΔΙ ΤΗ]ΡΟΥ || 33 Till, Ménard: Α[ΦΟΥΩΝΖ Ε]ΒΟΛ Ν̄.

57 (= Plate 105)

- 1 not inherit? (It is) this which is on us. But what
 also is this that shall inherit? It is Jesus' (flesh)
 and his blood. Therefore he said,
 "He who will not eat my flesh and drink
 5 my blood has not life in him."⁵⁴ What
 is it? His flesh is the Logos⁵⁵ and his blood
 is the Holy Spirit.⁵⁶ He who has received these
 has food, and he has drink and clothing.⁵⁷
 As for me, I find fault with the others who say
 10 that it will not rise. Or both of them
 are at fault. You say
 that the flesh will not rise, but tell
 me what it is that shall arise, so that we may
 honour you. You say, "the spirit in the flesh,"
 15 and "it is this other light in the flesh."
 It is a Logos, "this other" that is "in the flesh," because whatever you will
 say, you say nothing apart from the flesh.
 It is necessary to arise in this flesh, for
 everything is in it. In this world
 20 those who wear the garments are better than the
 garments. In the kingdom of heaven, the garments
 are better than those who have put them on.⁵⁸ It is by means of
 water and fire that everything is purified,
 the revealed by means of the revealed
 25 the hidden by means of the hidden. There are
 some that are hidden by means of the revealed.
 There is water in water, there is fire
 in chrisem. Jesus took them all by stealth,⁵⁹
 for he did not appear as
 30 he was, but it was
 as [they would] be able to see
 him that he appeared. [All these (ways)] he
 appeared to them. He [appeared] to [the]
 great as great. He [appeared] to
 35 the small as small. He [appeared]

⁵⁴ Cf. John 6:53–54; cf. also John 5:26.

⁵⁵ Cf. John 1:14.

⁵⁶ Cf. John 1:4.

⁵⁷ Cf. Matt 6:25, 31; Luke 12:22–23.

⁵⁸ Cf. Matt 6:25; Luke 12:22–23.

⁵⁹ Cf. John 10:10.

58 (= Plate 106)

- 1 [ἡῖ]αγγελος ζωσ αγγελος αγω
 ἡῖρωμε ζωσ ρωμε ετβεπαει απεϋ
 λογος αϋροπιϋ εογον nim ροεινε
 μεν αγναϋ εροϋ εγμεεγε χεναϋ ναϋ
- 5 εροοϋ ἡμιν ἡμοοϋ αλλα ἡταρεϋοϋ
 ωνϋ εβολ ἡνεφμαθητης ϋἡνοϋεο
 οϋ ϋιχἡπτοοϋ νεϋο αν ἡκοϋει αϋ
 ωωπε ἡνος αλλα ἡταϋῖἡμαθητης
 ἡνος χεκααϋ εγναωσἡσომ ἡναϋ
- 10 εροϋ εϋο ἡνος πεχαϋ ἡφοοϋ εἡἡ
 ναϋ ϋἡτεϋχαριστεια χεπενταϋϋωῖῖ
 ἡπτελειος ποϋοειν εππἡα ετοϋ
 ααβ ϋοῖῖ ἡαγγελος ερον ζωων αν
 ϋικων ἡῖῖκαῖαφρονει ἡῖῖειβ αχἡ
- 15 ῖϋ γαρ ἡἡωσომ εναϋ επρο ἡἡααϋ
 ναωῖπεϋοϋοει εροϋν επῖρο εϋ
 κηκαϋηϋ πῖἡἡπε ναωενεϋωῖῖ
 ἡϋοϋο απῖἡἡκαϋ εωχεἡἡωῖῖ ἡα
 ααμ ναωωοϋ καιῖοῖγε ωαϋμοϋ πο
- 20 σω μαλλον ἡωῖῖ ἡπτελειος ῖῖω
 με ναει εμαϋμοϋ αλλα σεχπο ἡμο
 οϋ οϋοειω nim πειωῖ ταμειο ωῖ
 ϋε αϋω πωῖῖ ἡἡσომ ἡμοϋ ἡῖῖα
 μεωῖῖ πενταϋχποϋ γαρ ἡἡσომ
- 25 ἡμοϋ ἡῖῖπο αλλα επωῖῖ χπο
 ναϋ ἡῖἡσἡἡ ἡῖἡωῖῖ αν νετοϋ
 χπο ἡμοοϋ τηροϋ ϋἡπκοσμοϋ
 εϋχπο ἡμοο[ϋ] εβολ ϋἡῖῖϋϋϋ αϋ
 ω ἡκοοϋε ϋἡ[. . .] . [. . .]οϋχπο ἡμοοϋ
- 30 εβολ ἡῖῖῖϋ [.]ω εβολ ἡμαϋ
 επρωμε . [.]ειω εβολ ϋἡῖῖ
 [.]ἡῖ ε . . [.]ποϋ ἡῖῖα ἡῖῖε
 [.] ἡμοϋ εβολ ϋἡῖῖαπρο
 [.] . πλογοϋ ει εβολ ἡμαϋ

58.15 Layton: επ(ῖ)ρο; Schenke, while choosing not to emend the text, likewise holds επρο to be an “Irreguläre Schreibung für επῖρο” || 29 Till: ϋἡ[ἡἡἡα νεῖ]οϋχπο; Ménard: ϋἡ[ἡἡ]ἡ ἡ[εῖ]οϋχπο; Layton: ϋἡ[ἡαε]ἡ [εῖ]οϋχπο; Schenke: ϋἡ[ἡἡ]ἡ [εῖ]οϋχπο || 30 Ménard: [ωαϋῖοει]ω; Layton, Schenke: [εϋσοει]ω || 31 Ménard: χ[εεϋσο]ειω; Layton, Schenke: χ[ἡἡσο]ειω || 32 Ménard: [ῖ]ἡῖ εχ[ἡἡ]ποϋ; Layton, Schenke: [ῖ]ἡῖ εϋο[ἡἡ]εἡποϋ || 33 Ménard: [ἡεῖσοειω ἡ]μοϋ; Schenke: [ενεϋ] ἡμοϋ || 34 Till: [. . . ενεῖ]πλογοϋ; Ménard: [αϋω ενεῖ]πλογοϋ; Layton: [αϋω ενε]ἡπλογοϋ; Schenke: [ϋἡἡα ἡῖ]ἡπλογοϋ.

58 (= Plate 106)

1 [to the] angels as angel and
 to the men as man. Therefore his
 Logos hid itself from everyone. Some
 saw him thinking that they saw
 5 themselves, but when he
 appeared to his disciples in
 glory upon the mountain⁶⁰ he was not small, he
 became great, but he made the disciples
 great so that they might be able to see
 10 him being great.⁶¹ He said on that day⁶²
 in the Eucharist:⁶³ "He who joined
 the perfect, the light,⁶⁴ with the Holy Spirit,
 join the angels with us also,⁶⁵ with the
 images!" Do not despise the lamb,⁶⁶ for without
 15 it it is impossible to see the door.⁶⁷ No one
 will be able to approach the king
 naked.⁶⁸ The heavenly man has more children
 than the earthly man. If the children of
 Adam are many even though they die,
 20 how much more so the children of the perfect
 man, these who do not die, but are
 always begotten? The father makes
 a son and it is impossible for the son to
 make a son. For it is impossible for the one who has been born
 25 to beget, but the son acquires
 brothers, not sons. All those who
 are begotten in the world
 are begotten by means of the physical,
 and the others in [...] are begotten
 30 by means of it/him [...] out there
 to the man [...] in the
 [...] above
 [...] him/it from the mouth
 [...] the word came out thence

⁶⁰ Cf. Matt 17:1–9; Mark 9:2–10; Luke 9:28–36.

⁶¹ Cf. 1 John 3:2.

⁶² Cf. Luke 9:28–29.

⁶³ Cf. Luke 22:41–44.

⁶⁴ Cf. John 8:12; 9:5.

⁶⁵ Cf. John 1:51.

⁶⁶ Cf., e.g., John 1:29, 36.

⁶⁷ Cf. John 10:7–9.

⁶⁸ Cf. Matt 22:11–14; cf. also Rev 7:9–17.

59 (= Plate 107)

- 1 νεφ̄μᾱσοεῑω̄ ε̄βολ̄ ρ̄η̄τ̄τᾱπρο̄ ᾱγ[ω]
 νεφ̄μᾱω̄πε̄ ἵ̄τελεῑος̄ ἵ̄τελεῑος̄ γαρ
 ρ̄ῑτ̄η̄ο̄γ̄πεῑ ε̄γ̄ω̄ ᾱγ̄ω̄ ε̄γ̄χ̄πο̄ διᾱ το̄γ̄το̄
 ᾱνον̄ ρ̄ω̄ων̄ τ̄η̄τ̄πῑ ε̄ρ̄η̄η̄η̄ν̄ερ̄η̄γ̄
 5 εν̄χῑ ἡ̄π̄ω̄ ε̄βολ̄ ρ̄η̄τ̄χᾱρῑς̄ ε̄τ̄ρ̄η̄η̄
 ἡ̄ν̄ερ̄η̄γ̄ νεο̄γ̄η̄ω̄μ̄τε̄ μοο̄ω̄ε̄ ἡ̄
 π̄χ̄ο̄ῑς̄ ο̄γ̄ο̄εῑω̄ ἡ̄ῑμ̄ μᾱριᾱ τε̄φ̄μᾱᾱγ̄
 ᾱγ̄ω̄ τε̄σ̄σ̄ω̄νε̄ ᾱγ̄ω̄ μᾱγ̄δᾱλ̄λη̄νη̄ τᾱ
 εῑ ε̄το̄γ̄η̄ο̄γ̄τε̄ ε̄ρο̄ς̄ χ̄ε̄τε̄φ̄κο̄ῑνω̄ς̄
 10 μᾱριᾱ γαρ̄ τε̄ τε̄φ̄ω̄νε̄ ᾱγ̄ω̄ τε̄φ̄μᾱᾱγ̄
 τε̄ ᾱγ̄ω̄ τε̄φ̄ρ̄ω̄τ̄ρε̄ τε̄ π̄εῑω̄τ̄ ἡ̄π̄ω̄η̄
 ρ̄ε̄ ἡ̄ρ̄ᾱπ̄λο̄γ̄η̄ νε̄ ῥ̄ρᾱν̄ π̄η̄η̄ᾱ ε̄το̄γ̄ᾱᾱβ̄
 ο̄γ̄ρᾱν̄ πε̄ ἡ̄δῑπ̄λο̄γ̄η̄ σε̄ω̄ο̄ο̄π̄ γαρ̄ ἡ̄
 μᾱ ἡ̄ῑμ̄ σε̄ἡ̄π̄σᾱ ἡ̄τ̄πε̄ σε̄ἡ̄π̄σᾱ ἡ̄π̄ῑ
 15 τ̄η̄ σε̄ρ̄η̄π̄ε̄θ̄η̄π̄ σε̄ρ̄η̄νε̄το̄γ̄ο̄η̄ρ̄
 ε̄βολ̄ π̄η̄η̄ᾱ ε̄το̄γ̄ᾱᾱβ̄ φ̄ρ̄η̄πο̄γ̄ω̄η̄ρ̄
 ε̄βολ̄ φ̄ρ̄η̄π̄σᾱ ἡ̄π̄ῑτ̄η̄ φ̄ρ̄η̄π̄ε̄θ̄η̄π̄
 φ̄ρ̄η̄π̄σᾱ ἡ̄τ̄πε̄ σε̄ω̄ἡ̄ω̄ε̄ ἡ̄νε̄το̄γ̄
 ᾱᾱβ̄ ρ̄ῑτ̄η̄η̄δ̄γ̄νᾱμ̄ῑς̄ ἡ̄π̄ο̄η̄η̄ρ̄ο̄ν̄
 20 σε̄ο̄ γαρ̄ ἡ̄β̄λ̄λε̄ ρ̄ῑτ̄η̄π̄η̄η̄ᾱ ε̄το̄γ̄ᾱᾱβ̄
 χ̄ε̄κ̄ᾱᾱς̄ ε̄γ̄νᾱμ̄ε̄ε̄γ̄ε̄ χ̄ε̄ε̄ρ̄ρ̄ε̄γ̄η̄π̄η̄ρε̄
 τ̄εῑ ἡ̄νο̄γ̄ω̄μ̄ε̄ ρ̄ο̄πο̄τε̄ ε̄γ̄εῑρε̄ ἡ̄νε̄
 το̄γ̄ᾱᾱβ̄ ε̄τ̄βε̄πᾱεῑ ᾱγ̄[ἡ̄] μᾱθ̄η̄τ̄η̄ς̄ ῥ̄
 ᾱῑτ̄εῑ ἡ̄π̄χ̄ο̄ῑς̄ ἡ̄νο̄γ̄ρ̄ο̄ο̄γ̄ ε̄τ̄βε̄ο̄γ̄
 25 ρ̄ω̄β̄ ἡ̄τε̄π̄κο̄ς̄μο̄ς̄ πε̄χ̄ᾱφ̄ ἡ̄ᾱφ̄ χ̄ε̄
 ε̄ρ̄ιᾱῑτ̄εῑ ἡ̄τε̄κ̄μᾱᾱγ̄ ᾱγ̄ω̄ σ̄νᾱ†̄ ἡ̄ᾱκ̄
 ε̄βολ̄ ρ̄η̄ᾱλλο̄τ̄ρῑο̄ν̄ πε̄χ̄ε̄νᾱπο̄στο̄
 λο̄ς̄ ἡ̄ἡ̄μᾱθ̄η̄τ̄η̄ς̄ χ̄ε̄τ̄η̄π̄ρο̄ς̄φο̄
 ρ̄ᾱ τ̄η̄ρ̄ε̄ ἡ̄ᾱρε̄ς̄χ̄πο̄ [ἡ̄]ᾱς̄ ἡ̄ο̄γ̄ρ̄η̄ο̄γ̄
 30 νε̄γ̄η̄ο̄γ̄τε̄ [.] λ̄ χ̄ε̄ρ̄η̄ο̄γ̄ ᾱχ̄η̄τ̄ε̄
 ἡ̄ᾱρε̄π̄ρο̄ς̄φ̄[ο̄ρᾱ ω̄ω̄]πε̄ ε̄φ̄ω̄η̄π̄ τ̄σο̄
 φ̄ιᾱ δε̄ ο̄γ̄στ̄εῑρ̄[ᾱ]ω̄η̄ρε̄ διᾱ το̄γ̄
 το̄ ε̄γ̄η̄ο̄γ̄τε̄ ε̄ρο̄[ς̄]σε̄ π̄εῑ ἡ̄
 ρ̄η̄ο̄γ̄ π̄η̄ᾱ ε̄το̄γ̄η̄ᾱω̄[.] . .
 35 ἡ̄το̄γ̄ρ̄ε̄ π̄η̄η̄ᾱ ε̄το̄γ̄ᾱᾱβ̄ [.]

59.23 Ménard: ᾱγ̄η̄μᾱθ̄η̄τ̄η̄ς̄ || 30 Till: [ε̄τ̄ . . .]ᾱ; Ménard, Layton, Schenke: [ε̄τ̄σο̄φ̄]ᾱ
 || 32 Till, Layton, Schenke: ο̄γ̄στ̄εῑρ̄[ᾱ τε̄ ᾱχ̄η̄]ω̄η̄ρε̄; Ménard: ο̄γ̄στ̄εῑρ̄[ᾱ τε̄ ᾱχ̄η̄π̄]ω̄η̄ρε̄
 || 33 Ménard: ε̄ρο̄[ς̄ χ̄ε̄ο̄γ̄]σε̄πεῑ; Layton: ε̄ρο̄[ς̄ χ̄ε̄π̄κε̄]σε̄πεῑ; Schenke: ε̄ρο̄[ς̄ χ̄ε̄ . . .]σε̄
 π̄εῑ || 34 Till: ε̄το̄γ̄η̄ᾱω̄[ω̄πε̄ ἡ̄ε̄ ε̄νε̄γ̄ω̄ο̄η̄]; Ménard: ε̄το̄γ̄η̄ᾱω̄[σο̄εῑω̄ ἡ̄ρ̄η̄τ̄η̄]; Layton:
 ε̄το̄γ̄η̄ᾱω̄[.]ἡ̄ω̄; Schenke: ε̄το̄γ̄η̄ᾱω̄[.]ἡ̄ω̄ || 35 Ménard: [ἡ̄ε̄ διᾱ το̄].

59 (= Plate 107)

- 1 he would be nourished from the mouth [and]
 he would become perfect, for
 it is by means of a kiss that the perfect conceive and beget. Therefore
 we too kiss one another,⁶⁹
- 5 conceiving from the grace that is in
 one another. There were three who walked with
 the Lord always: Mary, his mother,
 and her sister and Magdalene,⁷⁰
 who is called his companion.
- 10 For Mary was his sister and his mother
 and his partner. The Father and the
 Son are single names. The Holy Spirit
 is a double name, for they are
 everywhere. They are above, they are below,
- 15 they are in the secret, they are in the revealed.
 The Holy Spirit is in the revealed,
 it is below; it is in the secret,
 it is above. The saints are served
 by means of the evil powers,
- 20 for they are blinded by the Holy Spirit
 so that they may think that they are serving
 a man when they are serving
 the saints. Therefore a disciple
 asked the Lord one day for a
- 25 thing of the world. He said to him:
 “ask your mother and she will give you
 from the others.” The apostles said
 to the disciples: “Let our entire
 offering acquire salt.”
- 30 They called [...] “salt.” Without it
 the offering does not [become] acceptable.
 But Wisdom [is] barren⁷¹ [...] child. Therefore
 [she/it] is called [...], this of
 salt, the place they will [...]
- 35 in their manner. The Holy Spirit [...]

⁶⁹ Cf. Rom 16:16; 1 Cor 16:20; 2 Cor 13:12; 1 Thess 5:26; 1 Pet 5:14.

⁷⁰ Cf. John 19:25; Matt 27:55–56; Mark 15:40–41.

⁷¹ Cf. Isa 54:1; Gal 4:27.

60 (= Plate 108)

- 1 [. .] . ναϖ[ε] νεσω̄ηρε πετεγ̄νηταϑϑ
 ἡ̄σπειωτ̄ νᾱπω̄ηρε νε̄ ᾱϑω̄ ἡ̄τοϑ ρω̄
 ωϑ̄ πω̄ηρε̄ εν̄ροσον̄ φο̄ ἡ̄κο̄υεῑ μᾱϑ
 πισ̄τεῡε̄ νᾱϑ̄ αν̄ε̄τε̄νο̄υϑ̄ ρο̄ταν̄ εϑ̄
- 5 ω̄ᾱω̄ω̄πε̄ ῥ̄ρω̄με̄ ω̄ᾱρε̄πε̄ϑεῑωτ̄ †̄ νᾱϑ̄
 νε̄τεγ̄νη̄τᾱβ̄σε̄ τη̄ροϑ̄ νε̄τσο̄ρη̄ νε̄τε̄π
 π̄η̄ᾱ χ̄πο̄ ἡ̄μο̄οϑ̄ ω̄ᾱρ̄σω̄ρη̄ ο̄η̄ ε̄βολ̄
 ρῑτο̄ο̄τϑ̄̄ Δ̄ιᾱ τοϑ̄το̄ ε̄βολ̄ ρῑτ̄ἡ̄π̄η̄η̄ᾱ
 οϑ̄ωτ̄̄ ϑ̄χε̄ρο̄ ἡ̄σ̄π̄κω̄ρ̄τ̄ ᾱϑω̄̄ ϑω̄ω̄ἡ̄
- 10 κ̄ω̄ο̄γᾱ πε̄ ε̄χ̄ᾱἡ̄ω̄θ̄ ᾱϑω̄̄ κ̄ω̄ο̄γᾱ πε̄
 ε̄χ̄ἡ̄ω̄θ̄̄ ε̄χ̄ᾱἡ̄ω̄θ̄̄ τε̄ τ̄σο̄φ̄ιᾱ ρ̄ᾱπ̄λω̄ς̄
 ε̄χ̄ἡ̄ω̄θ̄̄ Δ̄ε̄ τε̄ τ̄σο̄φ̄ιᾱ ἡ̄π̄μοϑ̄̄ ε̄τε̄τᾱ
 εῑ τε̄ τ̄σο̄φ̄ιᾱ {ἡ̄π̄μοϑ̄̄ ε̄τε̄τᾱεῑ τε̄} ε̄τ̄σο̄
 οϑ̄η̄ ἡ̄π̄μοϑ̄̄ τᾱεῑ ε̄τοϑ̄μοϑ̄̄τε̄ ε̄ρο̄ς̄ χ̄ε̄
- 15 τ̄κο̄ῡεῑ ἡ̄σο̄φ̄ιᾱ οϑ̄ἡ̄ρ̄ἡ̄θη̄ρη̄ον̄ ω̄ρο̄π̄
 εϑ̄ρ̄η̄πο̄τᾱσ̄σε̄ ἡ̄π̄ρω̄με̄ ἡ̄θε̄ ἡ̄π̄μᾱσε̄
 ἡ̄ἡ̄πεῑω̄ ἡ̄ἡ̄ρ̄ἡ̄κο̄οϑ̄ε̄ ἡ̄τ̄ε̄ε̄ῑμῑνε̄ οϑ̄
 ἡ̄ρ̄ἡ̄κο̄οϑ̄ε̄ ω̄ρο̄π̄ εϑ̄ρ̄η̄πο̄τᾱσ̄σε̄ αν̄
 εϑ̄οϑ̄ᾱτ̄ ρ̄ἡ̄νη̄ρη̄μ̄ιᾱ π̄ρω̄με̄ σ̄κᾱεῑ ἡ̄
- 20 τ̄σω̄ω̄ε̄ ρῑτ̄ἡ̄ρ̄ἡ̄θη̄ρη̄ον̄ ε̄τ̄ρ̄η̄πο̄τᾱσ̄σε̄
 ᾱϑω̄̄ ε̄βολ̄ ρ̄ἡ̄π̄ᾱεῑ ϑ̄σο̄εῑω̄ ἡ̄τοϑ̄ ἡ̄ἡ̄
 ἡ̄ρη̄ον̄ εῑτε̄ νε̄τ̄ρ̄η̄πο̄τᾱσ̄σε̄ εῑτε̄ νε̄τ̄
 ρ̄η̄πο̄τᾱσ̄σε̄ αν̄ τᾱεῑ τε̄ θε̄ ἡ̄π̄τε̄λῑο̄ς̄
 ῥ̄ρω̄με̄ ρῑτ̄ἡ̄ρ̄ἡ̄δ̄ῡνη̄ᾱμ̄ῑς̄ ε̄τ̄ρ̄η̄πο̄τᾱς̄
- 25 σε̄ εϑ̄σ̄κᾱεῑ οϑ̄ον̄ ἡ̄ιμ̄ εϑ̄σο̄β̄τε̄ ε̄τ̄ροϑ̄
 ω̄ω̄πε̄ ε̄τ̄βε̄πᾱεῑ γ̄αρ̄ ε̄π̄η̄ᾱ τη̄ρη̄ϑ̄ ᾱρε̄
 ρᾱτϑ̄ εῑτε̄ νε̄τ̄η̄ᾱνοϑ̄οϑ̄ εῑτε̄ νε̄θ̄ο̄οϑ̄
 ᾱϑω̄̄ νοϑ̄η̄ᾱμ̄ ἡ̄ἡ̄σ̄βοϑ̄ρ̄ πε̄π̄η̄ᾱ ε̄τοϑ̄
 ᾱᾱβ̄ ϑ̄μο̄ο̄νε̄ ο[γ̄ο]ἡ̄ ἡ̄ιμ̄ ᾱϑω̄̄ ϑ̄ρ̄ᾱρ̄χεῑ
- 30 ἡ̄ἡ̄δ̄ῡνη̄ᾱμ̄ῑς̄ τ[ἡ̄ρο]ϑ̄ [ἡ̄]ε̄τ̄ρ̄η̄πο̄τᾱσ̄σε̄
 ᾱϑω̄̄ νε̄τ̄ρ̄η̄π[ο̄τᾱσ̄σε̄ ᾱ]ἡ̄ ἡ̄ἡ̄νε̄τοϑ̄ᾱτ̄
 κᾱῑγᾱρ̄ ϑ̄σω̄ε̄[. . .]ω̄ ω̄τ̄π̄ ἡ̄μο̄οϑ̄̄ ε̄
 ροϑ̄η̄ χ̄ε̄[κᾱᾱς̄ . .]ω̄ᾱἡ̄νοϑ̄ω̄ω̄ νοϑ̄ω̄
 [β]ω̄κ̄ [ε̄βολ̄ πε̄ντ̄]ᾱϑ̄π̄λᾱσ̄σε̄ ἡ̄μοϑ̄̄ νε̄
- 35 [σ̄ωϑ̄ ᾱλλᾱ ἡ̄]ε̄κ̄η̄ᾱρε̄ αν̄ε̄ϑω̄η̄ρε̄ εϑ̄ο̄

60.1 Till: [. . (.)]; Ménard: [γτ]ο; Layton, Schenke: [αϑ]ω || 29 Till, Ménard: ϑμοονε [νοϑο]η ηιμ || 32 Ménard: ϑσω[λ ἡμοοϑ ϑ]ωτπ; Schenke: ϑσω ε[ϑοϑε]ω || 33 Ménard: χε[εϑηαχι εϑ]ωαηοϑω; Schenke: χε[κααϑ εϑ]ωαηοϑω || 34 Ménard: [σ]οη [αααη ενεντ]αϑπλασσε || 35 Ménard: [κηα . . . ηε]κηαρε; Layton: η[εκ]ηαρε <αν> ανεϑωηρε.

60 (= Plate 108)

- 1 [...] her children are many. That which
 the father has belongs to the son, and he
 himself, the son, as long as he is little
 he is not entrusted with those (things) that are his. Then,
 5 when he becomes a man, his father gives him
 everything that belongs to him.⁷² Those who go astray, whom
 the Spirit begets, they also go astray
 because of it. Therefore, by means of that single Spirit
 the fire is kindled and extinguished.
- 10 Echamoth is one thing and
 Echmoth is another. Echamoth is simply Wisdom,
 but Echmoth is the wisdom of death, that
 is, the wisdom {of death, that is,} which
 knows death, this which is called
 15 the little wisdom. There are animals
 that are subordinate to man, like the calf
 and the donkey and others of this sort.
 There are others that are not subordinate,
 living alone in the deserts. Man ploughs
 20 the field by means of the subordinate animals
 and from this he nourishes himself and
 the animals, whether those that are subordinate, or those that are
 not subordinate. Thus it is with the perfect
 man. He ploughs by means of powers that are subordinate,
 25 preparing for everyone
 to come into being. For it is because of this that everything
 stands, whether the good or the evil,
 and the right and the left. The Holy Spirit
 shepherds everyone, and it rules
 30 [all] the powers that are subordinate
 and those that are [not subordinate] and those that are alone.
 For truly he/it [...] imprisons them
 [so that ...] want to, they will not be able
 to [leave. He who has been] moulded
 35 [is beautiful, but] you would find his children being

⁷² Cf. Gal 4:1–2, 7.

61 (= Plate 109)

- 1 ἄπλασμα ἡεγγενῆς εφωξεῖπογῆ
 πλασσε ἡμοφ ἀλλὰ ἀχχοφ νεκνα
 ρε ἀπεφσπερμα εφο ἡεγγενῆς τε
 νοφ δε ἀγπλασσε ἡμοφ ἀχχοφ ἀφ
- 5 ἡεγγενεια πε παει φορπ ἀτμῆτνο
 εικ φωπε ἡμῆσως φωτβε ἀφ ἀφ
 χποφ εβολ ρῆτμῆτνοεικ νεφωφ
 ρε γαρ ἡφοφ πε δια τογτο ἀφωπε
 ἡρᾶτῆρωμε ἡθε ἡπεφκειωτ ἀφ
- 10 ω ἀφμογούτ ἡπεφσον κοινωνια δε
 νημ ἡταρωπε εβολ ρῆνεφνε αν ἡ
 νοφερηφ ογμῆτνοεικ τε πνογτε
 ογχεφτ πε ἡθε ἡῆδεβε ετνανογού
 φαγμογτε εροού χεναλῆθον φαφ
- 15 μοφ μῆνεταχδεβε ρραῖ ἡρητοφ τα
 ει τε θε ἡνεταπνογτε χοσοφ ε
 πειδη ρῆνατμοφ νε νεφδεβε φαφ
 ῆατμοφ εβολ ριτοοτφ ἡνεφπαρρε
 πνογτε δε ῆβαπτιζε ἡνετφῆβαπτι
- 20 ζε ἡμοοφ ρῆογμοοφ μῆ[οφ]σομ
 ἡτελααφ ναφ ἀλααφ ρῆνετσομτ
 ειμητι ἡτεπετῆμαφ φωπε ἡθε
 ἡνετῆμαφ ἡθε ἡπρωμε αν εφ
 ρῆπκοσμοφ φναφ εφρη εφο ῆρη
- 25 αν ἀφω φναφ ετπε ἡῆπαρ μῆῆ
 κερβηγε τηροφ εντοφ αν πε νετῆ
 μαφ ταει τε θε ρραῖ ρῆτμε ἀλλὰ ἀκ
 ναφ ελααφ ἡτεπμα ετῆμαφ ἀκφω
 πε ἡνετῆμαφ ἀκναφ ἀπῆῆ ἀκ
- 30 φωπε ἡπῆῆ ἀκνα[γ α]πῆ ἀκφωπε
 ἡχc ἀκναφ ἀπ[ειωτ κ]ναφωπε ἡει
 ωτ δια τογτο [ἡνεειμα] μεν κναφ
 ἀρωβ νημ ἀφ κ[ναφ ερο]κ αν ογαακ
 κναφ δε εροκ ἡπ[μα ετῆ]μαφ πετ
- 35 κναφ γαρ εροφ εκναφ[ωπε ἡμ]οφ
 τπιστις χι ταγαπη στ[μῆλααφ ἡαφ]

61 (= Plate 109)

- 1 noble creations. If he were not
 moulded, but begotten, you would
 find that his seed was noble. But
 now he was moulded and he begot. What
 5 nobility is this? First, adultery
 happened, and afterwards, murder.⁷³ And
 he was begotten in adultery,
 for he was the son of the serpent. Therefore he became
 a murderer like his father too,⁷⁴ and
 10 he killed his brother.⁷⁵ Every communion
 that has taken place between those who do not resemble
 each other constitutes adultery. God
 is a dyer. Like the good dyes
 – they are called the true (dyes)—
 15 die with those (things) that have been dyed in them,
 thus it is with those whom God has dyed.
 Since his dyes are immortal, they
 become immortal by means of his remedies.
 But God dips those whom he dips
 20 in water. It is impossible
 for anyone to see any of the ordained (things)
 unless he becomes like
 them. It is not like it is with the man who is
 in the world. He sees the sun while not being sun,
 25 and he sees the sky and the earth and
 all the other things while not being
 those (things). Thus it is in truth. But you have
 seen something of that place, and you have
 become those (things). You have seen the Spirit, and you have
 30 have become spirit. You have seen Christ, and you have become
 Christ. You have seen the [Father, and you] will become
 father. Therefore, [here] you see
 everything and you do not [see yourself],
 but you see yourself in [that place],
 35 for you will [become] that which you see.
 Faith receives, love gives. [No one will be able to]

⁷³ Cf. John 8:44.

⁷⁴ Cf. Gen 3:4–5.

⁷⁵ Cf. Gen 4:8.

62 (= Plate 110)

- 1 [χι] ἀχῆντιπστις [μ]ῆλλαγ ναφ† ἀχῆ
 ἀγαπῆ ετβεπαι δεκαας μεν εναχι
 τῆρπστιεγε ωῖνα Δ(ε) εναμε ἦτῆ† επει
 ερωαογα † εἴνογαγαπῆ ἀν μῆτεφω
- 5 φελεια εἴπενταφτααφ πενταεχι
 πχοεις ἀν ο ἠῆρεβραιος ετι ἡαπο
 στολος ετρίτῆνερη τειριε νεγμογ
 τε χειῆς πναζωραιος μεσσιας ετε
 παιε πε ἦς πναζωραιος πεχς πρεε
- 10 ῤραν πε πεχς πωορπ πε ἰς πετρεῆ
 τμητε πε πναζαρηνος μεσσιας
 ογῆταφ σημασια σῆτε αγω πεχρς
 αγω πετωηγ ἰς ἡμῆτῆρεβραιος πε
 πσωτε ναζαρα τε ταληθεια πνα
- 15 ζαρηνος [ἡε] σε τε ταληθεια πε πχς
 ἦταφωιτφ πναζαρηνος μῆις
 νεναφωιτογ πμαργαριτης εφωδ(ν)
 νοσχ επιτῆ επιβορβορον φαφωφ
 πε {φωφωφπε} ἀν εφωης ἦρογο
- 20 ογτε εφωαταεσχ ἡναповарсимон
 εφναφωπε εφταεινγ ἀλλα ογῆταφ
 ἡμαγ ἡπταειο εαετῆπεφχοεις
 ογοειω ним таει τε θε ἡῆωηρε ἡ
 πνογτε εἴνετογναφωπε ἡρητογ
- 25 ετι ογῆταφ ἡμαγ ἡπταειο εαετῆπογ
 ειωτ εκφωχοος χεανок ογῆογδαῖ
 ἡῆλλαγ νακim εκφωχοος χεανок ογ
 ερωηαιος ἡῆλλαγ ναῤταрассе εκφω
 χοος χεано[κ ο]γελλην ογварва
- 30 ρος ογεμεῖλλ [ογελεγ]θερος ἡῆλλαγ
 ναφωτορτῤ εκ[φωχοος] χεанок ογχη
 ςτιανος π[. . . .] νανοειν ἡγενοι
 το ἡταφ[. . . ἡτ]εειμεινε παιε ε
 [τ]ε . [. . . .] ναφεγπομεινε ἀν ε
- 35 [σωτῆ επι]εφραν πνογτε ογαμρω

62.3 Ménard: ωῖνα δε ναμε || 19 Layton: {φωφωφπε ἀν} || 21 Layton: εφναφωπε (ἀν) || 32 Till: [ς]τιανος [ογον ним]; Ménard: [ς]τιανος τ[ηρογ εγ]νανοειν; Schenke: π[ετῆμαγ] || 33 Till: ἦτα . [. . παιε ητ]εειμεινε; Ménard: ἡταφ[ωπ εροι ἡπ]εειμεινε; Schenke: ἡταφ[επ ογτ]εειμεινε || 34 Ménard: [τε ἡαρχον η]αφεγπομεινε; Schenke: [τ]ε π[ετῆμαγ] || 35 Till: [. . . . πε]ειραν; Ménard: [τε παῖ πε π]ειραν.

62 (= Plate 110)

1 [receive] without faith. No one will be able to give without
 love. Therefore we believe in order that we may receive,
 but we give in order that we may love. For
 if one does not give with love, he does not
 5 benefit from that which he has given.⁷⁶ He who has not received
 the Lord is a Hebrew still. The
 apostles who were before us
 named (him) in this way: "Jesus the Nazarene Messiah,"
 that is, "Jesus the Nazarene Christ." The last
 10 name is Christ, the first is Jesus, the one in
 the middle is the Nazarene. Messiah
 has two meanings, both Christ
 and "he who is measured." Jesus in Hebrew is
 the redemption, Nazara is the truth. The
 15 Nazarene, then, is the truth. It was Christ
 who was measured. It was the Nazarene and Jesus
 who were measured. If the pearl
 is thrown down into the mud
 it does not become more despised,
 20 nor will it become precious
 if it is anointed with balsam, but it is always
 valuable for its master.
 Thus it is with the children of
 God wherever they may be,
 25 they are still valuable for their
 father. If you say, "I am a Jew,"
 no one will be moved. If you say, "I am a
 Roman," no one will be troubled. If you
 say, "I am a Greek," "a barbarian,"
 30 "a slave," ["a free,"] no one
 will be shaken. [If] you [say], "I am a
 Christian," the [...] will tremble. If
 only [...] of] this sort, this one
 [who ...] will not be able to endure
 35 [hearing] his name. God is a man-eater.

⁷⁶ Cf. Luke 7:47; Eph 4:15-16.

63 (= Plate 111)

- 1 με πε δια τογτο σε[ω]ωτ̄ ἤπρωμ[ε]
 ναϗ ρατερη εμπατογωωτ̄ ἤπρω
 με νεγωωτ̄ ἡρ̄ῆθηριον νερ̄ῆνογ
 τε γαρ αν νε ναει ετογωωτ̄ ναϗ
- 5 ἡσκεγος ἡναβασνειν ἡἡσκεγος
 ββλξε ωαγωωπε εβολ ριτ̄ῆπκωρ̄τ̄
 αλλα ἡσκεγος ἡναβασνειν εγωα
 ογωωπ παλιν ωαγταμιοογ ἡταγ
 ωωπε γαρ εβολ ρ̄ἡογπ̄ἡα ἡσκεγος
- 10 δε ββλξε εγωαογωωπ ωαγτακο
 ἡταγωωπε γαρ χωρις νιφε ογειω
 εφκωτε ραογωνε ἡνογτ̄ αϗἡωε ἡμιλος
 εβολ εφμοοωε ἡταρογκααϗ εβολ
 αϗρε ερωϗ οη εϗρ̄ῆπ̄ιμα π̄ιμα
- 15 ογυρ̄ρ̄ωμε ωροπ ωαγῆραρ̄ ἡμο
 οωε εβολ αγω μαγπροκοπτε ε
 λααγ ἡμα ἡταρογρ̄ωε ωωπε ερο
 ογ ογτε ἡπογναγ επολις ογτε
 κωμη ογτε κτιςις ογτε φγςις ἡἡ
- 20 δυναμικ ἡἡαγγελος εικη ανταλαι
 πωρος ριςε τεγχαριςτ̄εια πε ις εγ
 μογτε γαρ ερωϗ ἡἡντ̄ςγρος ξεφα
 ρισαθα ετεπαει πε πετπορω εβολ
 αις̄ γαρ ει εϗσταγρωγ ἡπκοσμος
- 25 απχοεις βοκ ερωγ[η] επ̄μα ἡχωωε
 ἡλεγει αϗφι ωβεςνοογς ἡχρωμα
 αϗνοχογ ατρορ̄τε αϗἡτογ ερ̄ραἷ
 εγωωω τηρωγ αγω πεχαϗ ξεταει
 τε οε ἡταϗει ἡμος ἡσιπωηρ̄[ε ἡ
- 30 πωηρ̄]ε ἡπρωμ[ε ε]ϗ[ο] ἡχ̄σιτ̄ τσο
 φια ετογμογτ̄[ε ερω]ς̄ ξετ̄ςτιρα ἡ
 τος τε τ̄μαα[γ ἡἡαγ]γ̄ελος αγω [τ]κοι
 νωνος ἡπς[. . . μα]ρια τ̄μαγ[δα]
 ληνη νερεπ . [. με] ἡμο[ς ἡ]
- 35 ρογο αἡμαθ̄ητ̄[ης νεϗ]
 αςπαζε ἡμος ατες[.]
 ἡσοπ απκεσεεπε ἡ[.]

63.33 Till: ἡπε[χς τε μαρ]ια; Ménard: ἡπω[ηρε τε μαρ]ια; Schenke: ἡπς[ωτηρ μα]ρια
 || 34 Till: νερεπ[χοεις με] ἡμ[αρια η]; Ménard: νερεπ[χοεις με] ἡμ[αρια ἡ]; Schenke:
 νερεπς[ωτηρ με] || 35 Till: αἡμαθ̄ητ̄[ης τηρωγ αγω αϗ]; Ménard: αἡμαθ̄ητ̄[ης τηρωγ
 αγω νεϗ]; Layton, Schenke: αἡμαθ̄ητ̄[ης τηρωγ αγω νεϗ] || 36 Till, Ménard, Schenke:
 ατες[ταπρο ἡραρ̄]; Layton: ατες[. ἡραρ̄]; Possibly ατες[ογερ̄ητε ἡραρ̄] (cf. Luke
 7:45; Layton, 168) || 37 Till: ἡ[η(ς)ριουε αγ]; Ménard: ἡ[ἡμαθ̄ητ̄ης αγ]; Layton, Schenke:
 ἡ[μαθ̄ητ̄ης].

63 (= Plate 111)

- 1 Therefore man is [sacrificed]
to him. Before man was sacrificed,
animals were sacrificed,
for those to whom they sacrificed were not gods.
- 5 Glass vessels and pottery vessels
come into being by means of fire,
but if glass vessels
are broken they are remade, for they
came into being by means of a breath,
- 10 whereas if pottery vessels are broken they are destroyed,
for they came into being without breath. A donkey
turning against a grindstone did a hundred miles
walking. When it was released,
it still found itself in the very same place.
- 15 There are men who do much
walking and they do not make progress
toward any place. When evening comes
upon them they have neither seen city nor
village nor creation nor nature and
- 20 power and angel. The wretches
have laboured in vain. The Eucharist is Jesus,
for in Syriac he is called
Pharisatha,⁷⁷ that is, “the one who is spread out,”
for Jesus came crucifying the world.⁷⁸
- 25 The Lord went into Levi’s place of dyeing
and took seventy-two⁷⁹ colours
and threw them into the vat and brought them out
all white, and said,
“Thus the Son [[of
- 30 the Son]] of Man has come [as] a dyer.”⁸⁰ The
wisdom that is called the barren,
she is the [mother of the an]gel[s]⁸¹ and [the]
companion of the [... Ma]ry Mag[da]lene
[... loved her]⁸²
- 35 more than the disciples [... he]
kiss[ed] her on her [...]
times. The rest of [...]

⁷⁷ Cf. Acts 2:46.

⁷⁸ Cf. Gal 6:14.

⁷⁹ Cf. Luke 10:1, 17.

⁸⁰ Cf. Mark 9:3.

⁸¹ Cf. Gal 4:27; Isa 54:1.

⁸² Cf. John 11:5; 12:3–7; Luke 7:36–50; Matt 26:6–13; Mark 14:3–9.

64 (= Plate 112)

- 1 [. .] . ερο . [.] . [. .] μα πεχαγ ναγ χε
 ετβεογ κμε ἦμος παρарон τηρῆ αq
 ογωφῶβ ἡσπισωτηρ πεχαq ναγ {πε
 χαq ναγ} χεετβεογ †με ἦμωτῆ αν
- 5 ἡτεςεε ογῶλλε ἡῖογα εφναγ εвол
 εγρῆπκακε ἡπеснаγ σεωове ενογ
 ернγ αν ρотан еρωαπογοειν ει тотε
 петнавол φнанаγ епогоειн αγω
 пето ῶβλλε εφнаσω ρῆπκακε πε
- 10 χεπχοεις χεογμακαριос πε петωο
 оп ρατερн емπατεφωπε петωο
 оп гар аqφωπε αγω φнаφωπε πχι
 се ἡπρωμε φογονε ραν εвол алла
 φωροοп ρῆπөөнп етвепаеи φο ἡ
- 15 χοεις ανөһрион етχοор ероq етне
 аг катапетογονε εвол ἡῖπөөнп
 αγω παеи † наγ ἡπпоγн εвол еρωα
 πρωме δε пωрх ерооγ φαγμογογт
 ἡноγερнγ ἡсепаρс ἡноγερнγ
- 20 αγω агογωм ἡноγερнγ χεῖμпоγρε
 етροφн теноγ δε αγρε етροфн εвол
 χεαπρωме ῆρωв епкаρ еρωαογα
 вок епеснт епнооγ ἡφει еρраῖ ем
 πεφχι лааγ ἡφχοос χεанок ογχрн
- 25 станос ἡтаφχι ἡпран етннсе еφ
 φαχι δε ἡπῖῖа етоγαав ογῆтаφ ἡ
 маγ ἡтΔωρεа ἡпран пентаρχι ἡογ
 Δωρεа маγφитῶ ἡтоотφ пентаρχι δε
 еΔωφ етннсе φαγφатφ таеи те өе
- 30 етφο[o]п нан еρωαογα φωπε ρῆ
 ογнγстнριο[н пм]γстнрион мпга
 м[ос] ογнос [πε аχῆ]тῆ гар непкос
 [мо]с наφω[πε ан тс]γстасис гар ἡ
 [пко]сμο[с]ме тῶγстасис δε
- 35 [.] πг]αμος ерпноеи ἡтκοи
 [нωма . . χ]ωρῆ χεογῆтас ἡмаγ
 [.] Δγнаmic тесрiкωн

64.1 Till: [наγ] εροq [εφμε ммари]а; Ménard: [наγ] εροq [εφμε мари]а || 30 Ménard: εтφε[λөө]т н[а]м[ε ε]ρωαογα || 31 Ménard: ογнγстнριο[н етөпмγ]стнрион || 32 Till: [πε саω]ῆ; Ménard: м[ос π]ε ογнос [πε аχнт]ῆ || 33 Till: ηαφω[φ . . тс]γстасис || 34 Till: [пкосмос пе πρω]με; Ménard: [пкос]мо[с пе πρω]με; Schenke: [пко]смо[с пе ἡρω]με || 35 Till: [ἡπρωме пе пга]μος; Ménard: [ἡπρωме те пга]μος; Schenke: [ἡῖρωме пе πг]αμος || 36 Till: [нωма н(аг)χ]ωρῆ; Ménard: [нωма татχ]ωρῆ; Schenke: [нωма ἡатχ]ωρῆ || 37 Till, Ménard: [ноγнос н]Δγнаmic; Schenke: [ἡογнр ἡ]Δγнаmic.

64 (= Plate 112)

- 1 [...] they said to him:
 “Why do you love her more than all of us?”
 The Saviour answered and said to them:
 “Why do I not love you
 5 like her?” A blind person and a seeing one
 who are both in the dark are not different from
 each other. When the light comes, then
 he who sees will see the light, and
 he who is blind will remain in the dark.
 10 The Lord said, “Blessed is he who
 is before he came into being, for he who
 is has come into being and he will come into being.”⁸³ The
 greatness of man is not visible, but
 it resides in the hidden. Therefore he is
 15 master of the animals that are stronger than him, that are
 great according to the visible and the hidden.
 And this one gives them the perseverance, but if
 man separates from them they kill
 one another and they bite one another
 20 and they eat one another because they have not found
 food. But now they have found food
 because man has worked the earth. If one
 goes down to the water and comes up
 without having received anything and says, “I am a
 25 Christian,” he has borrowed the name at interest. But if
 he receives the Holy Spirit he has
 the gift of the name. He who has received a
 gift does not have it taken away from him, but he who has borrowed
 at interest has it extorted from him. Thus
 30 it is for us if one comes into being
 in a mystery.⁸⁴ [The] mystery of
 marriage [is] great,⁸⁵ for [without] it the
 world would [not] have [come into being]. For [the] composition of
 [the world ...], but the composition
 35 [...] the] marriage. Consider the
 [communion ...] defiled because it has
 [...] power. Its image

⁸³ Cf. Heb 13:8; Rev 1:8; 4:8; 11:17; 16:5.

⁸⁴ Cf. 1 Cor 2:7.

⁸⁵ Cf. Eph 5:31–32.

65 (= Plate 113)

- 1 εσθροοπ ρ̄ν̄ογ̄χ̄ω[ρ̄μ̄ ν̄]ε̄χ̄[ημ̄]ᾱ μ̄π̄ν̄[ᾱ]
 ἡκαθάρατον οὐν̄ρ̄οογ̄τ̄ ἡρ̄ητογ̄ οὐ
 ἡρ̄ησ̄ρ̄ιομε̄ ἡρ̄οογ̄τ̄ μεν̄ νε̄ ε̄τ̄ρ̄κοι
 ν̄ω̄νεῑ ᾱμ̄ψ̄γ̄χη̄ ε̄τ̄ρ̄πολῑτεγε̄σ̄ε̄
- 5 ρ̄ν̄ογ̄σ̄χη̄μᾱ ἡ̄σ̄ρ̄ιμε̄ ἡ̄σ̄ρ̄ιομε̄ Δ̄ε
 νε̄ νε̄τ̄τ̄η̄ρ̄ ἡ̄μ̄νε̄τ̄ρ̄ν̄ογ̄σ̄χη̄μᾱ ἡ̄
 ρ̄οογ̄τ̄ ε̄βολ̄ ρ̄ῑτ̄ἡ̄ογ̄ᾱτ̄τ̄ω̄τ̄ ᾱγ̄ω̄ μ̄ἡ̄
 λᾱαγ̄ νᾱω̄ρ̄βολ̄ ε̄νᾱεῑ ε̄γε̄μᾱρ̄τε̄ ἡ̄
 μο̄ῡ ε̄φ̄τ̄ἡ̄χῑ ἡ̄ογ̄σ̄ομ̄ ἡ̄ρ̄οογ̄τ̄ ἡ̄ἡ̄
- 10 νογ̄σ̄ρ̄ιμε̄ ε̄τε̄π̄ν̄ῡμ̄φῑος̄ πε̄ μ̄ἡ̄
 τ̄η̄γ̄μ̄φ̄η̄ οὐ̄ᾱ Δ̄ε̄ χ̄ῑ ε̄βολ̄ ρ̄ἡ̄π̄η̄γ̄μ̄
 φ̄ω̄ν̄ ἡ̄ρ̄η̄κο̄ν̄η̄κος̄ ρ̄ο̄τ̄ᾱν̄ ε̄ρ̄ω̄ᾱἡ̄σ̄ρ̄ι
 με̄ ἡ̄ᾱτ̄σ̄β̄ω̄ ναγ̄ ᾱγ̄ρ̄οογ̄τ̄ ε̄φ̄ρ̄μο̄ος̄
 οὐ̄ᾱᾱφ̄ ω̄ᾱγ̄φ̄ω̄σ̄ε̄ ε̄ρ̄ρᾱῑ ε̄χ̄ω̄φ̄ ἡ̄σ̄ε̄
- 15 σ̄ω̄βε̄ ἡ̄ἡ̄μᾱφ̄ ἡ̄σ̄ε̄χ̄ο̄ρ̄με̄φ̄ τ̄ε̄εῑρε̄
 ο̄η̄ ρ̄ρ̄ρ̄ω̄με̄ ἡ̄ᾱτ̄σ̄β̄ω̄ ε̄γ̄ω̄ᾱμ̄ναγ̄ ε̄γ̄
 σ̄ρ̄ιμε̄ ε̄σ̄ρ̄μο̄ος̄ οὐ̄ᾱᾱτ̄ε̄ ε̄νε̄σ̄ω̄σ̄
 ω̄ᾱγ̄π̄θ̄ε̄ ἡ̄μ̄ος̄ ἡ̄σ̄ε̄ρ̄β̄ιᾱζε̄ ἡ̄μ̄ος̄
 ε̄γ̄ογ̄ω̄φ̄ ε̄χ̄ο̄ρ̄με̄σ̄ ε̄γ̄ω̄ᾱμ̄ναγ̄ Δ̄ε̄
- 20 ἀπ̄ρ̄οογ̄τ̄ ἡ̄ἡ̄τε̄φ̄ρ̄ιμε̄ ε̄γ̄ρ̄μο̄ος̄ ρ̄ᾱ
 τ̄ἡ̄νογ̄ε̄ρ̄η̄γ̄ μᾱρε̄ἡ̄ρ̄ιομε̄ ω̄β̄ω̄κ̄ ε̄
 ρ̄ογ̄η̄ ω̄ᾱπ̄ρ̄οογ̄τ̄ οὐ̄γ̄τε̄ μᾱρε̄ἡ̄ρ̄οογ̄τ̄
 ω̄β̄ω̄κ̄ ε̄ρ̄ογ̄η̄ ω̄ᾱτ̄σ̄ρ̄ιμε̄ τ̄ᾱεῑ τε̄ θ̄ε̄
 ε̄ρ̄ω̄ᾱθ̄η̄κ̄ω̄ν̄ ἡ̄ἡ̄π̄[ᾱ]γ̄γε̄λο̄ς̄ ρ̄ω̄τ̄ρ̄ ε̄
- 25 νογ̄ε̄ρ̄η̄γ̄ οὐ̄γ̄τε̄ ἡ̄ἡ̄[λᾱ]ᾱγ̄ νᾱω̄ρ̄το̄λ̄μᾱ
 ᾱβ̄ω̄κ̄ ε̄ρ̄ογ̄η̄ ω̄ᾱφ̄[ρ̄ο]ογ̄τ̄ η̄ τ̄σ̄ρ̄ιμε̄
 πε̄τ̄ἡ̄ν̄η̄γ̄ ε̄βολ̄ ρ̄ἡ̄π̄κο̄σ̄μο̄ς̄ ἡ̄σ̄ε̄
 τ̄ἡ̄ω̄ε̄μᾱρ̄τε̄ ἡ̄μ̄ο̄ῡ ε̄τ̄ῑ χ̄ε̄νε̄φ̄ρ̄ἡ̄
 π̄κο̄σ̄μο̄ς̄ φ̄ογ̄ο̄η̄[ρ̄] ε̄βολ̄ χ̄ε̄φ̄χ̄ο̄σε̄
- 30 ᾱτε̄π̄θ̄ο̄γ̄μ̄ιᾱ ἡ̄π̄[. .]φ̄[. .]ε̄[μ̄]ἡ̄θ̄ρ̄τε̄
 φ̄ο̄ ἡ̄χ̄ο̄εῑς̄ ᾱ . . [. .]ς̄[. .]ς̄ φ̄σο̄τ̄π̄ ε̄
 π̄κ̄ω̄ρ̄ ε̄ω̄χ̄ε̄[. . .]γ̄ ε̄ῑ σ̄ε̄ᾱμ̄[ᾱ]ρ̄τε̄
 ἡ̄μ̄ο̄ῡ σ̄ε̄ω̄σ̄[τ̄ ἡ̄μ̄ο̄ῡ] ᾱγ̄ω̄ π̄φ̄[ς̄ ε̄φ̄]
 νᾱω̄ρ̄βολ̄ ᾱμ̄η̄[ο̄σ̄ ἡ̄δ̄γ̄η̄]ᾱμ̄η̄[ς̄ . . .]
- 35 τε̄ π̄ω̄ς̄ φ̄η̄ᾱω̄ρ̄[.]
 κ̄ῑς̄ οὐ̄ν̄ρ̄ο̄ε̄ῑνε̄ ε̄γ̄[χ̄ω̄ ἡ̄μ̄ος̄ χ̄ε̄]
 ᾱνο̄η̄ ρ̄ἡ̄π̄η̄σ̄το̄ς̄ ρ̄ο̄π̄ω̄[ς̄]

65.1 Till: οὐχ̄ω[ρ̄η̄ ν̄ω̄ν]ᾱ || 26 Till, Ménard: ω̄ᾱφ̄[ο]ογ̄τ̄ || 30 Till: ἡ̄τ[σαρ̄ζ̄ μ̄η̄τ]ρ̄ρ̄τε; Ménard: ἡ̄π̄[μ̄ο]γ̄ [ᾱγ̄ω̄] ᾱ[τ]ρ̄ρ̄τε || 31 Till: ᾱ[τε̄π̄θ̄ο̄γ̄μ̄ιᾱ] φ̄σο̄τ̄π̄; Ménard: ᾱτ[φ̄γ̄]ς̄; Schenke: ᾱτ̄ . [. .]ς̄[. .]ς̄ || 32 Ménard: ε̄ω̄χ̄ε̄[ε̄γ̄η̄αγ̄ μ̄π̄]ε̄εῑ || 34 Till: ᾱη̄[.]ᾱ ἡ̄π̄[νογ̄]; Ménard: ᾱμ̄η̄[ε̄π̄θ̄ο̄γ̄μ̄ιᾱ]ᾱ ἡ̄ἡ̄[ρ̄η̄]; Schenke: ᾱμ̄η̄[ο̄σ̄ ἡ̄δ̄γ̄η̄]ᾱμ̄η̄[ς̄ ε̄τᾱμᾱρ̄] || 35 Till, Ménard, Schenke: φ̄η̄ᾱω̄ρ̄[ο̄η̄φ̄ ε̄ρ̄ο̄ῡ πο̄λλᾱ] || 37 Till: ρ̄ο̄π̄[η̄; Ménard: ρ̄ο̄π̄ω̄[ς̄ ε̄γ̄ῑ ε̄βολ̄ ρ̄ἡ̄]; Schenke: ρ̄ο̄π̄ω̄[ς̄ νογ̄η̄αγ̄].

65 (= Plate 113)

1 is in a [defilement]. [The forms] of the
 unclean spirits include among them male ones
 and female ones. The male ones are those that
 have communion with the souls that are
 5 in female form, and the females
 are those who mix with those that are in
 male form—as a result of a lack of mingling—and no
 one will be able to escape being embraced by these
 if he does not receive a male power and
 10 a female one, which is the bridegroom and
 the bride, and one receives from the
 symbolical bridal chamber.⁸⁶ Whenever the
 ignorant women see a man dwelling
 alone they leap upon him and
 15 play with him and defile him. Thus
 also with ignorant men, when they see a
 beautiful woman dwelling alone
 they seduce her and force her,
 wanting to defile her. But if they see
 20 the husband and his wife dwelling
 together, the women are not able to enter
 in to the husband, nor are the men
 able to enter in to the woman. Thus
 if the image and the angel join
 25 with each other, neither will anyone be able to dare
 to go in to the [man] or the woman.
 He who comes forth from the world
 and can no longer be detained because he was in
 the world, it is apparent that he is above
 30 the desire of the [... and] the fear.
 He is master over [...] he is superior to
 envy. If [...] comes he is detained.
 [He] is choked, and how
 will [he] be able to escape the [great powers ...]
 35 how will he be able to [...]
 There are some who [say,
 “We are faithful,” in order that [...]

⁸⁶ Cf. 1 Cor 10:17.

66 (= Plate 114)

- 1 [. π]η̄ᾱ η̄ᾱ [καθαρτο]η̄ ριδαμονιον
 νεγ̄η̄ταγ̄ γαρ̄ η̄μᾱ [γ] η̄πη̄ᾱ ετογααβ
 νεν̄η̄πη̄ᾱ η̄ακαθαρτον̄ η̄αρκολλα
 εροογ̄ η̄η̄ρ̄ροτε ρη̄τ̄ η̄τσαρ̄ξ̄ ογ̄δε
 5 η̄η̄μερῑτ̄ εκωᾱρ̄ροτε ρη̄τ̄ σναρ̄χο
 εις̄ εροκ̄ εκωαν̄μερῑτ̄ σναονκ̄ η̄σοβκ̄
 η̄ η̄φωωπε ρη̄π̄εικοςμοc η̄ ρη̄τανα
 σταcic η̄ ρη̄η̄τοποc ετη̄η̄μη̄τε
 μη̄ γενοιτο̄ η̄σερε̄ εροεῑ η̄ρη̄τογ̄ πε
 10 εικοcμοc ογ̄η̄πετ̄η̄ανογ̄φ̄ η̄ρη̄τφ̄
 ογ̄η̄πεθ̄οογ̄ νεφ̄πετ̄η̄ανογ̄ογ̄ η̄πε
 τ̄η̄ανογ̄ογ̄ αν̄ νε αγω̄ νεφ̄πεθ̄οογ̄ ρη̄
 πεθ̄οογ̄ αν̄ νε ογ̄η̄πεθ̄οογ̄ δε η̄η̄η̄
 σᾱπ̄εικοcμοc ερη̄πεθ̄οογ̄ η̄αμε̄ νε
 15 τετογ̄μογ̄τε̄ εροc̄ ξε̄τ̄μεcοτη̄c̄ η̄τοφ̄
 πε̄ πμογ̄ ρωc̄ ενωοοφ̄ ρη̄π̄εικοc̄
 μοc̄ ωωε̄ ερον̄ εχ̄πο̄ η̄αν̄ η̄ταναcτα
 cic̄ δεκααc̄ ενωακαακ̄η̄ αρη̄η̄ η̄τσαρ̄ξ̄
 εγ̄η̄αρε̄ ερον̄ ρη̄ταναπαγ̄cic̄ η̄τ̄η̄τ̄η̄
 20 μοωε̄ ρη̄τ̄μεcοτη̄c̄ ρᾱρ̄ γαρ̄ σε̄ρ̄πλα
 νεcε̄ε̄ ρη̄τ̄ρη̄η̄ η̄ανογ̄c̄ γαρ̄ εεῑ εβολ̄
 ρη̄η̄πκοcμοc̄ ρᾱτερη̄η̄ εν̄πατε̄ πρω̄με
 ρ̄νω̄βε̄ ογ̄η̄ρ̄οεῑνε̄ με̄η̄ ογ̄τε̄ σεογ̄ωω
 αν̄ ογ̄τε̄ η̄η̄σομ̄ η̄μοογ̄ ρη̄η̄κοογ̄ε̄ δε̄
 25 εγ̄ωᾱνογ̄ωω̄ η̄η̄ρη̄η̄ ωοοφ̄ η̄αγ̄ ξε̄
 η̄πογ̄ειρε̄ εν̄[εο]γ̄ωω̄ γαρ̄ φειρε̄ η̄μο
 ογ̄ η̄ρεφ̄ρ̄νω̄βε̄ [ε]γ̄τ̄η̄ογ̄ωω̄ δε̄ τ̄ᾱι
 καιοcγ̄η̄ε̄ η̄αρω̄π̄ εροογ̄ η̄πεc̄η̄αγ̄
 αγω̄ πογ̄ωω̄ αν̄ [η̄]η̄πειρε̄ αν̄ ογαπο
 30 cτολικ̄οc̄ [ρ]η̄ο[γ]οφ̄ταc̄ιᾱ αφ̄η̄αγ̄ αρο
 εῑνε̄ εγ̄οτ̄η̄ [ε]ρογ̄]η̄ εγ̄η̄εῑ η̄κω̄ρη̄τ̄ αγ̄
 ω̄ ε[γ]η̄η̄ρη̄ ρη̄η̄ [.] η̄κω̄ρη̄τ̄ εγ̄η̄η̄χ̄
 [.] η̄η̄κω̄ρη̄τ̄ [.] τογ̄ η̄μοογ̄ ρη̄
 [.] cτι [.] η̄η̄ [.] αγω̄ πεχ̄αγ̄ η̄αγ̄
 35 [ξε̄ σ]ομ̄ η̄μοογ̄ ᾱνογ̄ρη̄η̄
 [.] η̄πογογ̄ωω̄ αγ̄χῑ
 [.] κολαcic̄ πᾱεῑ ετογ̄μογ̄τε̄

66.1 Ménard: [η̄π]η̄ᾱ; Schenke: [απ]η̄ᾱ || 6 Layton: σναον(κ)κ̄ η̄σοβ(τ)κ̄ || 25 Ménard: [η̄]η̄η̄ρη̄η̄ || 26 Ménard: ετ[ογ]ογ̄ωω̄; Layton: επ[. . .]γ̄ωω̄ || 27 Till, Ménard: [π]τ̄η̄ογ̄ωω̄ || 29 Layton: πογ̄ωω̄ αν̄ [πε] η̄πειρε̄ || 30 Till: cτολικ̄[ο]c̄ [ε]τ̄ αc̄ιᾱ || 31 Till: [ε]γο . [. ο]γ̄η̄εῑ; Ménard: εγ̄οτ̄η̄ [ρ]η̄ογ̄η̄εῑ || 32 Till: ωφ̄ [. . .]αη̄ρη̄; Ménard: ρη̄[ογ̄η̄εῑ] || 33 Till: [.]η̄κω̄ρη̄τ̄ [.]ογ̄η̄η̄μοογ̄; Ménard: [εγ̄η̄εῑ]η̄ η̄κω̄ρη̄τ̄ [εγ̄χω̄ χο]ογ̄ || 34 Ménard: [κω]ρη̄τ̄ [; Layton: [. . . π]cτι[c] η̄η̄ [.] || 35 Ménard: η̄η̄σομ̄; Schenke: [ξε]η̄αεῑ νεγ̄η̄σομ̄ || 36 Ménard: [η̄μοογ̄ κα]τᾱ; Schenke: [η̄η̄νογ̄γ̄η̄η̄η̄ α]λλᾱ || 37 Till: [η̄πμογ̄ ρωc] κολαcic̄; Ménard: [η̄πμογ̄ η̄ογ̄]κολαcic̄; Schenke: [η̄π̄πειμᾱ η̄η̄]κολαcic̄.

66 (= Plate 114)

- 1 [unclean spirit] and demon,
 for if they had the Holy Spirit,
 no unclean spirit would join
 with them. Do not fear the flesh nor
 5 love it. If you fear it, it will
 master you; if you love it, it will swallow you and paralyse you.
 And he will either come to be in this world or in the
 resurrection or in the places which are in the middle.
 Do not let it happen that I be found in them.
- 10 There is good in this world
 and there is evil. Its good things
 are not good and its evil things
 are not evil. But there is evil
 after this world that is truly evil,
 15 that which is called the middle. It
 is death. When we are in this
 world it is necessary for us to acquire for ourselves the resurrection
 so that when we strip ourselves of the flesh
 we may be found in the rest and not
 20 walk in the middle.⁸⁷ For many
 go astray on the way. For it is good to leave
 the world before the man
 sins. There are some who neither want to
 nor are able to, but others who
 25 if they wanted to there would be no profit for them
 because they did not act. For is it willing that makes
 them sinners? But if they do not want?
 Righteousness will be hidden from them both.
 And it is not the will and it is not the act.
- 30 An apostolic person saw [in a] vision
 some people imprisoned in a burning house, and
 [being] bound with burning [...], being thrown
 [...] of the fires [...] them in
 [...] and they were told
 35 [...] possible] for them to be saved
 [...] they did not want to, and they received
 [...] retribution, this which is called

⁸⁷ Cf. Heb 4:1.

67 (= Plate 115)

- 1 εροϋ χεπκακε ετ[ριπса нво]λ χεϋ . [. . . .]
 εβολ ρ̄ηοϋμοοϋ η̄η̄οϋκωρ̄τ η̄τατϋγ̄χ[η]
 η̄η̄π̄η̄η̄. ω̄ωπε εβολ ρ̄η̄οϋμοοϋ η̄η̄
 οϋκωρ̄τ η̄η̄η̄οϋοειη̄ η̄ταπ̄ω̄η̄ρε η̄
- 5 π̄η̄η̄μ̄φ̄ω̄η̄ π̄κωρ̄τ πε π̄χρ̄ιςμα ποϋο
 ειη̄ πε π̄κωρ̄τ ε̄ειω̄αδε αν απ̄εικωρ̄τ
 ε̄τεη̄η̄ταϋμορ̄φη̄ αλλα π̄κεοϋα ε̄τε(τε)ϋ
 μορ̄φη̄ οϋαβω̄ ε̄το η̄οϋοειη̄ ε̄νεσω̄ϋ
 αϋω̄ ε̄τϋη̄τ̄η̄η̄τ̄σᾱ ταλη̄θ̄ειᾱ η̄πεσει
- 10 επ̄κοσμο̄с ε̄сκακαρ̄η̄ϋ̄ αλλα η̄τασει ρ̄η̄
 η̄τϋπο̄с η̄η̄η̄ρ̄ικω̄η̄ ϋ̄η̄ᾱχῑτ̄ε̄ αν η̄κ̄ερ̄η̄
 τε οϋ̄η̄οϋ̄χ̄πο̄ η̄κεсоп̄ ω̄ροп̄ η̄η̄η̄οϋ
 ρ̄ικω̄η̄ η̄χ̄πο̄ η̄κεсоп̄ ω̄ω̄ε̄ αλη̄θ̄ω̄с
 ᾱτροϋ̄χ̄ποοϋ̄ η̄κεсоп̄ ρ̄ῑτ̄η̄η̄ρ̄ικω̄η̄ αϋ
- 15 τε таη̄ᾱст̄ᾱс̄ӣс̄ αϋω̄ θ̄ικω̄η̄ ρ̄ῑт̄η̄θ̄ικω̄η̄
 ω̄ω̄ε̄ ε̄т̄р̄ε̄т̄ω̄οϋη̄ π̄η̄η̄μ̄φ̄ω̄η̄ η̄η̄θ̄ι
 κω̄η̄ ρ̄ῑт̄η̄θ̄ικω̄η̄ ω̄ω̄ε̄ ε̄т̄ρ̄οϋ̄εῑ ε̄ρ̄οϋη̄
 ε̄таλη̄θ̄ειᾱ ε̄т̄ε̄та̄εῑ τε та̄πο̄κᾱта̄с̄т̄ᾱс̄ӣс̄
 ω̄ω̄ε̄ ᾱη̄ε̄т̄.χ̄πο̄ αν η̄μᾱτε̄ η̄π̄ραη̄ η̄
- 20 π̄ειω̄т̄ η̄η̄η̄ω̄η̄ρε η̄η̄π̄η̄η̄η̄ ε̄τοϋᾱᾱβ
 αλλα αϋ̄χ̄ποοϋ̄ η̄ᾱκ̄ ρ̄ω̄οϋ̄ ε̄т̄η̄οϋ̄ᾱ χ̄πο̄
 οϋ̄ η̄ᾱϋ̄ π̄κεραη̄ с̄ε̄η̄ᾱϋ̄ӣт̄ϋ̄ η̄т̄οο̄т̄ϋ̄
 οϋ̄ᾱ δε̄ χ̄ῑ η̄η̄η̄οοϋ̄ ρ̄η̄π̄χ̄ρ̄ӣс̄η̄ η̄π̄с̄ο̄ . [.]
 η̄т̄ᾱγ̄η̄ᾱη̄ӣс̄ η̄π̄с̄.р̄[ο]с̄ т̄ᾱ[ε]̄ӣ η̄ε̄η̄ᾱп̄ο̄с̄т̄ο̄
- 25 λο̄с̄ μοϋ̄τε̄ ε̄ρο̄с̄ χ̄ε̄ [т̄ο]γ̄η̄η̄ᾱη̄ η̄η̄η̄τε̄ρ̄βοϋ̄ρ̄
 πᾱεῑ γ̄αρ̄ οϋ̄κε̄т̄ӣ οϋ̄[χ̄ρ̄η̄]с̄т̄[ӣ]ᾱη̄ο̄с̄ πε̄ αλλα
 οϋ̄χ̄ρ̄с̄ πε̄ ᾱп̄χ̄ο̄εῑ[с̄ р̄]ρ̄ω̄β̄ η̄ӣη̄ ρ̄η̄η̄οϋ̄
 η̄ϋ̄с̄т̄η̄ρ̄ӣο̄η̄ οϋ̄β̄ᾱ[п̄]т̄ӣс̄η̄ η̄η̄η̄οϋ̄χ̄ρ̄ӣс̄
 η̄ᾱ η̄η̄η̄οϋ̄ε̄χ̄αρ̄[ӣс̄т̄]ӣᾱ η̄η̄η̄οϋ̄с̄ω̄т̄ε̄
- 30 η̄η̄η̄οϋ̄η̄η̄μ̄φ̄ω̄η̄ [. . . .] ε̄ӣ π̄[ε̄χ̄]ᾱϋ̄
 χ̄ε̄ᾱεῑ ε̄т̄ρᾱε̄ӣре̄ [η̄η̄η̄ᾱп̄са̄ η̄π̄ӣ]т̄η̄ η̄
 θ̄ε̄ η̄η̄ᾱп̄са̄ η̄[т̄π̄ε̄ αϋω̄ η̄ᾱп̄са̄ η̄]βο̄λ
 η̄θ̄ε̄ η̄η̄ᾱп̄с̄[ᾱ η̄ρ̄οϋη̄ αϋω̄ ε̄т̄ра̄ρ̄ο̄т̄]
 роϋ̄ η̄π̄η̄ᾱ ε̄т̄η̄[. η̄ε̄]
- 35 ε̄ӣᾱ ρ̄ӣт̄η̄η̄т̄ϋ̄[п̄οс̄]
 η̄ε̄т̄.χ̄ω̄ η̄η̄μο̄с̄ χ̄ε̄[.]
 οϋ̄η̄η̄οϋ̄εῑ η̄π̄са̄ η̄т̄π̄ε̄ [. . . . с̄ε̄р̄η̄ла̄]
 η̄ᾱс̄θ̄ε̄ πε̄τοϋο̄η̄ε̄ρ̄ ρ̄[ᾱρ̄ ε̄βολ̄]

67.1 Layton: ετ[.]λ; Till: ετ[. πχ]ᾱχε̄ ϋ̄[ει] || 21 Layton: α(η̄ε̄η̄τα)γ̄χ̄ποοϋ̄ ||
 23 Till, Ménard: η̄π̄σει; Giversen: η̄π̄с̄ο[с̄η̄]; Schenke: η̄π̄с̄οη̄[т̄ε] || 24 Ménard: η̄π̄с̄.р̄[ο̄с̄
 ε]т̄ᾱ[ρ̄]η̄ε̄η̄ᾱп̄ο̄с̄т̄ο̄ || 27 Possibly ᾱп̄χ̄ο̄εῑ[с̄ т̄]ρ̄ω̄β̄ η̄ӣη̄ || 30 Ménard: [п̄χ̄ο̄]εῑс̄ [п̄ε̄χ̄]ᾱϋ̄;
 Schenke: [ε̄т̄β̄ε̄п̄ᾱ]εῑ || 31 Till: ε̄т̄ра̄ε̄ӣре̄[.]η̄η̄ || 33 Ménard: η̄η̄ᾱп̄с̄[ᾱ η̄ρ̄οϋη̄
 ᾱεῑ ε̄т̄ра̄ρ̄ο̄т̄] || 34 Ménard: ε̄т̄η̄[η̄ᾱγ̄ ᾱϋ̄οϋ̄ω̄η̄ε̄ ε̄βολ̄ η̄π̄ᾱ]; Schenke: ε̄т̄η̄[η̄ᾱγ̄ ε̄εῑρ̄ε̄ρ̄ω̄β̄
 ρ̄η̄η̄ε̄] || 35 Ménard: ρ̄η̄т̄ϋ̄[п̄οс̄ η̄η̄ρ̄η̄θ̄ικω̄η̄]; Schenke: ρ̄η̄т̄ϋ̄[п̄οс̄ η̄η̄ρ̄η̄θ̄ικω̄η̄] || 36 Layton:
 [οϋ̄η̄οϋ̄ρ̄η̄η̄η̄πε̄ αϋω̄]; Schenke: [οϋ̄η̄] || 37 Ménard: [. . . . ε̄π̄η̄λᾱ]; Layton,
 Schenke: [η̄η̄μοϋ̄ с̄ε̄р̄η̄ла̄] || 38 Ménard: ρ̄[ᾱρ̄ η̄т̄ε̄εῑη̄ε̄]; Layton: ρ̄[ᾱρ̄ ε̄βολ̄ π̄ρ̄η̄η̄].

67 (= Plate 115)

- 1 "the [outer] darkness,"⁸⁸ for it [...].
 It was from water and fire that the soul
 and the spirit came into being. It was from water and
 fire and light that the son of
- 5 the bridal chamber (came into being). The fire is the chrism, the light
 is the fire. I am not speaking about this fire
 which has no form, but the other one whose
 form is white, which shines beautifully,
 and which bestows beauty. Truth did not come
- 10 to the world naked, but it came in
 types and images. It (i.e., the world) will not receive it in any other way.
 There is a rebirth and an
 image of rebirth.⁸⁹ It is truly necessary
 to be born again⁹⁰ by means of the image. What is
- 15 the resurrection and the image? By means of the image
 it is necessary for it to arise. The bridal chamber and the
 image? By means of the image it is necessary for them to enter
 the truth, that is, the restoration.
 It is not only necessary for those who acquire the name of
- 20 the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit,
 but they too have been produced for you. If one does not
 acquire them for himself, the name will also be taken from him.⁹¹
 But one receives them in the chrism of the [...]
 of the power of the cross. The
- 25 apostles called this "[the] right and the left."⁹²
 For this one is no longer a [Christian], but
 a Christ. The Lord [did] everything in a
 mystery:⁹³ a baptism and a chrismation
 and a Eucharist and a redemption
- 30 and a bridal chamber. [...] he [said],
 "I have come to make [the below]
 like the [above and the outside]
 like the [inside, and to join]
 them in the place [...]"
- 35 here through [types ...]
 Those who say, "[...]"
 there is one above [...]" they
 are wrong. [For] that which is revealed

⁸⁸ Matt 8:12; 22:13; 25:30.

⁸⁹ Cf. Titus 3:5.

⁹⁰ Cf. John 3:3, 7.

⁹¹ Cf. Matt 13:12; Mark 4:25; Luke 8:18.

⁹² Cf. 2 Cor 6:7.

⁹³ Cf. 1 Cor 2:7.

68 (= Plate 116)

- 1 πε ετῆμαγ π[ε]τρο[γ]μογτε ερογ χε
 πετῆμσα πῆτῆ λγω πετεπεθνη
 ωοοп ναγ πετῆμαγ πε ετῆτπε ῆ
 μογ νανογс гар ῆσεχοос χεπса ῆ
- 5 ρογн λγω πετῆμσα нвол мῆпетῆ
 пса нвол ῆпса нвол εтвеπαῖ απχο
 ειс μογτε απгако χεпκαке εтpпса (н)
 вол мῆсеωοοп ῆπεφвал пexαγ
 χεπαειωт εтpῆπεθнп пexαγ χε
- 10 βωк ερoγн епектамеион ῆγωтан
 ῆпекро ерωк ῆγωλнλ απкеиωт
 εтpῆπεθнп εтепаει пе петpиса (н)
 ρογн ῆмооγ тнроγ петpиса нρoγн
 δε ῆмооγ тнроγ пе ппληρωма ῆ
- 15 мῆῆсωγ мῆсеῆпeφса нρoγн па
 ει пе ετογωα.χε ероγ χεπετῆμса н
 тпе ῆмооγ ρατεpн ῆпexс λρoεиe
 ει εвол εвол тωн oγкeтῆ ῆпоγω
 βωк ερoγн λγω λγβωк εтωн oγкeтῆ
- 20 ῆпоγωп εвол аφei δε ῆσῆпexс нeн
 таpβωк ερoγн аφῆтоγ εвол λγω нeн
 таpβωк εвол аφῆтоγ ερoγн ῆρoоγ
 нeрeεγpa [ρ]ῆα[Δ]αμ ne мῆмоγ ωοοп
 ῆтаpεспφpχ [εp]oγ απмоγ ωωпе па
- 25 λиn εφωαβφ[к ερ]oγн ῆqχιγq ероγ мῆ
 μογ наωωпe [п]ῆноγте паноγте e
 твеoγ пxоeиc [Δ]ккаат ῆсωк ῆтаqχε
 наei ρиcφoc [ῆт]аφωpχ гар ῆпна
 εт[ῆ]ῆαγ [.] . . [. .] ῆтаγχпoγ εвол ρῆ
- 30 петт[.] ε]вол ρитῆппоγте
 απ[.] εβ]oλ ρῆнeтмооγт
 [.] ω]oοп αλλα ne
 [.] εφo ῆтелеион
 [.] ῆсарз αλλα тeeи
- 35 [.] oγс]apз те ῆαλнθeиnн
 [.] e oγαλнθeиnн an те αλ
 [λα] ῆpиkωн ῆтаλнθeиnн

68.1 Ménard: [i]ne ετῆμαγ || 2 Ménard: ῆ[π]ῆτῆ || 23 Schenke: [u]ῆα[Δ]αμ || 27 Schenke argues that πxоeиc is written too early and should come after ῆсωк, and translates accordingly as “{[M]ein Gott, mein Gott, warum {} [hast] du mich verlassen?” (Der Herr sprach diese (Worte) am Kreuz.” || 28 Layton: [ne] аφωpωχ || 29 Ménard: [λαα]γ η[ι]μ || 30 Till: πεп[на ετογααβ εβ]oλ; Ménard: πεт[ρ]иcαн]βoл || 31 Till, Ménard, Schenke: απ[χοeиc τωoγн εβ]oλ || 32 Till, Ménard: [аφωωпе нeε εиeφω]oοп; Schenke: [ῆπεφβωк ῆeε εиeφω]oοп || 33 Till, Ménard: [pεпeφсωма ωoοп]; Schenke: [апeφсωма ωωпе] || 34 Till, Schenke: [тнpч oγῆтаq ῆμαγ]; Ménard: [нeγῆтаq δε ῆμαγ] || 35 Till, Ménard, Schenke: [сарз мeн oγс]apз || 36 Till: [те тeнсарз де]; Ménard: [тeнсарз де]; Schenke: [тῆсарз Δ]e || 37 Till, Schenke: [ла oγсарз]; Ménard: [ла oγῆтан].

68 (= Plate 116)

- 1 is that [...], that [which] is called
 “that which is below,” and that which is secret
 is to it that which is above it,
 for it is good, and they say
- 5 “within” and “that which is outside” and “that which
 is outside the outside.” Therefore the
 Lord called perdition, “the outer darkness,”⁹⁴
 and there is nothing outside it. He said,
 “My Father who is in secret.” He said,
- 10 “Enter into your closet and shut
 your door behind you and pray to your Father
 who is in secret,”⁹⁵ that is, the one who is
 within them all. But the one who is within
 them all is the fullness.
- 15 After it there is none other inside it.
 This is that of which it is said, “that which is
 above them.” Before Christ, some
 went out from where they were no longer able to
 enter and they went to where they were no longer
- 20 able to leave. But Christ came, and those
 who entered he brought out and those
 who went out he brought inside. The days
 when Eve was [in] Adam, there was no death.
 When she separated from him,⁹⁶ death came into being.
- 25 Again, when he enters and receives it for himself, no
 death will take place. “[My] God, my God,
 why, Lord, [have] you forsaken me?”⁹⁷ It was
 on the cross that he said these (words), for it was in that place
 that he was divided. It was from that which [...] that he was begotten
- 30 [...] from God.
 The [...] from the dead
 [...] exist(s), but
 [...] he/it is perfect
 [...] of flesh, but this
- 35 [...] is true flesh
 [...] is not true,
 [but ...] image of the true.

⁹⁴ Matt 8:12; 22:13; 25:30.

⁹⁵ Matt 6:6.

⁹⁶ Gen 2:21–23; 3:20.

⁹⁷ Cf. Matt 27:46; Mark 15:34.

69 (= Plate 117)

- 1 μαρεπαστος ωρωπε η̄νη̄θηριον ου
 τε μαρωωπε η̄νη̄με̄ξ̄ᾱλ ουτε η̄ς̄ριμε
 εφ̄χο̄ρη̄ν αλλα ωρωωωπε η̄ρη̄ρω̄με
 η̄ελεγ̄θερος η̄νη̄η̄παρο̄ενος εβολ
 5 ρῑτη̄η̄η̄ᾱ ετογααβ σε̄χ̄πο̄ μεν η̄μο̄(η)
 η̄κεσο̄π̄ σε̄χ̄πο̄ δε η̄μον ρῑτη̄η̄η̄
 χ̄ς̄ ρ̄η̄η̄ς̄ναγ̄ σε̄τω̄ρ̄ς̄ η̄μον ρῑτη̄η̄η̄
 η̄η̄ᾱ η̄ταρογ̄χ̄πον̄ αχ̄ρο̄τη̄η̄ η̄η̄λααγ̄
 ναω̄ναγ̄ ερω̄χ̄ ουτε ρ̄η̄μο̄ογ̄ ουτε ρ̄η̄
 10 ειαλ χω̄ρις̄ ογ̄οειν ουτε παλιν̄ κ̄ναω̄
 ναγ̄ αν̄ ρ̄η̄ογ̄οειν̄ χω̄ρις̄ μο̄ογ̄ ρ̄ιαλ
 διᾱ τογ̄το ωρω̄ε ᾱρ̄βαπ̄τιζε̄ ρ̄η̄η̄ς̄ναγ̄
 ρ̄η̄πογ̄οειν̄ η̄η̄η̄μο̄ογ̄ πογ̄οειν̄ δε
 πε̄ η̄χ̄ρις̄μᾱ η̄ε̄η̄η̄ω̄μη̄τ̄ η̄η̄εῑ η̄μᾱ
 15 η̄η̄η̄προσ̄φορᾱ ρ̄η̄η̄ιερο̄σο̄λ̄υμᾱ πογ̄
 ᾱ εφογ̄ειν̄ επᾱμη̄η̄τε̄ εγ̄μογ̄τε̄ ερω̄χ̄
 χ̄επετογααβ̄ η̄κεογ̄ᾱ εφογ̄η̄η̄ η̄η̄σᾱ
 ρ̄η̄ς̄ εγ̄μογ̄τε̄ ερω̄χ̄ χ̄επετογααβ̄ η̄
 πετογααβ̄ η̄μᾱρ̄ω̄μη̄τ̄ εφογ̄η̄η̄η̄ ᾱ
 20 παεῑβ̄τε̄ εγ̄μογ̄τε̄ ερω̄χ̄ χ̄επετογααβ̄
 η̄η̄η̄ετογααβ̄ η̄μᾱ εω̄ᾱρη̄πᾱρη̄ε̄ρη̄εγ̄[ς̄]
 βω̄κ̄ ε̄ρογ̄η̄ ε̄μαγ̄ ογ̄ᾱ[ᾱ]η̄ η̄πᾱπ̄η̄ς̄μᾱ
 πε̄ η̄η̄εῑ ετογααβ̄ [η̄]η̄[ς̄]η̄[τ̄]ε̄ πετογααβ̄
 η̄η̄ετογααβ̄ η̄ε̄τ̄[ογ̄ᾱ]ᾱβ̄ η̄η̄ετογααβ̄
 25 πε̄ η̄η̄η̄η̄μφ̄ων̄ η̄[βᾱη̄η̄η̄]ς̄μᾱ ογ̄η̄η̄τᾱη̄
 η̄μαγ̄ η̄η̄η̄η̄η̄ς̄τᾱς̄[η̄ς̄ ρ̄η̄η̄η̄]ς̄ω̄τε̄ η̄η̄η̄η̄
 τε̄ ρ̄η̄η̄η̄η̄η̄μφ̄ων̄ [η̄η̄η̄η̄]η̄η̄μφ̄ων̄ δε̄
 ρ̄η̄η̄η̄η̄η̄η̄ς̄ω̄ε̄ ερω̄[. . . .]η̄[. . . .]οο̄ . . .
 κ̄νᾱρη̄ αν̄ ε̄τε̄η̄[. . . .]η̄η̄η̄[. . . .]
 30 η̄ε̄ η̄ε̄τω̄λη̄η̄ [.]
 η̄ιερο̄σο̄λ̄υμᾱ [. η̄ιερο̄]
 σο̄λ̄υμᾱ εγ̄ω̄[. η̄ιερο̄σο̄]
 λ̄υμᾱ εγ̄ω̄ω̄[η̄.]
 η̄ᾱεῑ ετογ̄μογ̄[τε̄ ερω̄ογ̄ χ̄ε̄η̄ετογ̄]
 35 ᾱαβ̄ η̄η̄ετογααβ̄ [. η̄κ̄ᾱ]
 τᾱπε̄τᾱς̄μᾱ η̄ω̄ρη̄ κ̄ε̄[.]
 πᾱς̄τος̄ εῑ η̄η̄ η̄η̄κ̄ω̄η̄ [. ε̄τ̄]

69.25 Possibly η̄[χ̄ρη̄]ς̄μᾱ || 26 Ménard: η̄η̄η̄η̄η̄η̄ς̄τᾱς̄[η̄ς̄ η̄η̄η̄η̄]ς̄ω̄τε̄; Layton: η̄η̄η̄η̄η̄η̄ς̄τᾱς̄[η̄ς̄ η̄η̄η̄η̄]ς̄ω̄τε̄; Till: η̄η̄η̄η̄η̄η̄ς̄τᾱς̄[η̄ς̄ η̄η̄η̄η̄]ς̄ω̄τε̄ ε̄η̄ω̄; Giversen: ε̄η̄ω̄[ω̄] || 27 Till: [η̄η̄η̄]η̄μφ̄ων̄ || 28 Ménard: ερω̄[ογ̄]οο̄[.]; Schenke: ερω̄[ογ̄ ε̄τ̄]η̄[ω̄]οο̄η̄ η̄[ᾱη̄] || 29 Ménard: η̄η̄η̄η̄η̄η̄; Schenke: ε̄τε̄η̄[ρη̄] || 30 Schenke: [ρ̄η̄η̄η̄η̄ ρ̄η̄με̄ η̄ᾱγ̄ω̄λη̄η̄ ρ̄η̄] || 31 Schenke: [ογ̄η̄η̄ο̄εῑη̄ ρ̄η̄η̄ιερο̄] || 32 Ménard: εγ̄ω̄[η̄η̄η̄ ρ̄η̄η̄ιερο̄σο̄]; Schenke: εγ̄ω̄[η̄η̄η̄ η̄μεν̄ ρ̄η̄η̄ιερο̄σο̄] || 33 Schenke: εγ̄ω̄ω̄[η̄. δε̄ ρ̄η̄η̄τογ̄ η̄η̄η̄η̄μ̄γ̄ς̄τη̄ρη̄ον̄] || 34 Reconstruction by Till (cf. parallels at *Gos. Phil.* 84.30–31; 85.19–20); Layton, Schenke: ετογ̄μογ̄[τε̄ ερω̄ογ̄ χ̄ε̄η̄ετογ̄] || 35 Schenke: [η̄ᾱεῑ η̄η̄η̄η̄η̄η̄η̄] || 36 Till: η̄; Ménard: η̄[η̄μογ̄ ογ̄ δε̄ πε̄ η̄]; Schenke: κ̄ε̄[ογ̄ᾱ αν̄ πε̄ η̄η̄] || 37 Ménard: [η̄η̄η̄η̄η̄η̄μφ̄ων̄ η̄ε̄τ̄]; Schenke: [η̄η̄η̄η̄η̄η̄μφ̄ων̄ ε̄τ̄].

69 (= Plate 117)

- 1 A bridal chamber does not take place for the animals,
nor does it take place for the slaves, nor for
defiled women, but it takes place for
free men and virgins.
- 5 We are born
again by means of Holy Spirit,⁹⁸ but we are begotten by
Christ in the two.⁹⁹ We are anointed by
the spirit. When we were begotten we were joined. No one
will be able to see himself in water or in
- 10 a mirror without light, nor again will you be able
to see in light without water (or) mirror.¹⁰⁰
Therefore it is necessary to baptise in both:
in the light and the water, and the light
is the chrism.¹⁰¹ There were three houses of
- 15 sacrifice in Jerusalem.¹⁰² The one,
which is open to the west, is called
the Holy. The other one, which is open to the
south, is called the Holy of
the Holy. The third, which is open to
- 20 the east,¹⁰³ is called the Holy
of the Holies, the place where the high priest
enters alone.¹⁰⁴ Baptism
is the Holy house, [redemption] is the Holy
of the Holy. The Holy of the Holies
- 25 is the bridal chamber. [Baptism] contains
the resurrection [in] the redemption, the redemption
being in the bridal chamber. But [the] bridal chamber
is in that which is higher than [...]
you will not find its [...] where [...]
- 30 those who pray [...]
Jerusalem [...] Jeru-
salem [...] Jerusa-
lem, being seen [...]
these that are called [the Holies]
- 35 of the Holies [...] the]
veil torn¹⁰⁵ [...]]
bridal chamber except the image [...] which]

⁹⁸ Cf. Titus 3:5.

⁹⁹ Cf. John 3:5.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. 1 Cor 13:12; 2 Cor 3:18.

¹⁰¹ Cf. John 3:5.

¹⁰² Cf. Heb 9:1–11.

¹⁰³ Cf. Ezek 43:1–5.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Heb 9:7, 25.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Matt 27:51; Mark 15:38; Luke 23:45.

70 (= Plate 118)

- 1 [ḿπ]σα ντπ[ε] ετ[β]ε[π]αι απεκατα
 πετασμα πω[ρ] χιμπα ντπε ωα
 πσα μππῆ νεωωε гар εροεινε
 χιμπα μππῆ ḿσεωκ επσα ντπε
- 5 πενταρῆριωου ḿπτελειον ḿου
 οειν μαρογναυ εροου ḿσιῆδγνα
 mic αγω μαγωμεαετε ḿμοου ου
 α δε ναῆριωωου ḿπιγοειν ρῆ
 πμγστηριον ρῆριωωτῆ νεμπετ
- 10 ρειμε πωρχ εφοουτ неснамоу
 αν πε ḿῆφοουτ πεωπωρχ ḿταα
 ωωπε ḿαρχη ḿπμοу δια τογτο
 απεχρς ει δεκαас ππωρч ḿταε
 ωωπε χινωорп εφнаσερωφ ерагч
- 15 παλιν ḿφροτροу ḿπснау αγω nen
 ταρμοу ρῆππωρч εφнаῆ ναу ḿноу
 ωνε ḿφροτροу ωарεгсεиμε δε
 ρωτῆ απερεαι ρραῖ ρῆππασтос
 нентаρωτῆ δε ρῆππασтос ουκε
- 20 ти сенапωрч δια τογτο δεγза
 πωрч аадам деῆтаερωτῆ ероу
 ан ρῆππас[тос]с тγγхн ḿадам ḿ
 тасωωπε ε[β]ол ρῆноуниче пес
 ρωτῆ πε πῆ[ḿ]α π[ε]ῆнтаγтаау нау
- 25 те теφмаау аγ[φι] ḿтеφγγхн аγῆ
 нау ḿноу[ωνε ε]песма еπει ḿ
 тарεφωτῆ [. . .] ḿρῆωαχε еγχο
 се анδγна[mic] аγῆваскание ероу
 [. . .]рч [.]ωτῆ ḿпнеума
- 30 [тгк . . .]γ[. . .]а[.]кн теөнп аγ
 [.]αισε ḿσιπε
 [.]ο нау ογαау
 [. π]αстос φиna
 [.]. ου αιϛ σωλπ
- 35 [εвол πειο]ρδανнс ππλη
 [ρωма ḿτῆḿτε]ρο ḿḿπnye πε(η)
 [ταγχпоу ρ]ατερн ḿπтгнрч па

70.1 Ménard: [ḿπ]σα ντπ[ε] ε[τπιορν]εια πεκατα || 25 аγ[. . .] read in photographs (see Layton); Till: теφмаа[γ] а[γω ρη]теφγγхн; Ménard: теφмаа[γ] аγ[ω ḿῆ]теφγγхн || 26 Cf. parallel in 70.16–17; Ménard: ḿноу[ḿῆ ρῆ]песма; Layton: ḿноу[ḿῆ ε]песма; Schenke: ḿноу[. . . ε]песма || 27 Layton, Schenke: [ααα]ω || 29 Ménard: [εγπο]рч [εвол ḿπε]ωτῆ; Schenke: [αγπω]рч [ḿтсине]ωτῆ || 30 Till: [.]κ; Giversen: γγ[хн]; Ménard: [тгкос π]а[χḿтκα]κῆ || 31 Till: [. λο]εισε; Ménard: [. λ]αισε; Schenke: [. λ]αι се || 32 Ménard: [сnaγ] || 33 Ménard: ḿππα]стос || 34 Till, Ménard: [ρωме еγнаροτρ]ου; || 35 Ménard: [εвол ριμηρ ḿπειο]ρδανнс; Schenke: [εвол ρραῖ ρῆπειο]ρδανнс || 36 Ménard: [ρωма ḿτῆḿτῆ]ρο || 37 Till, Ménard: [ταεωωπε ρ]ατεрн.

70 (= Plate 118)

- 1 [is above]. Therefore its
 veil was rent from above to
 below,¹⁰⁶ for it was necessary for some
 from below to go up above.
- 5 The powers cannot see
 those who have put on the perfect light,
 and they cannot detain them,
 and one shall put on that light in
 the mystery in the union.¹⁰⁷ Had the
- 10 female not separated from the male, she would not have died
 with the male.¹⁰⁸ It was his separation
 that became the beginning of death. Therefore
 Christ came so that the separation that
 happened in the beginning might be rectified.
- 15 Again he will join them both together and to those who
 have died in the separation he will give
 life, and he will join them. And the woman
 joins with her husband in the bridal chamber.
 And those who have joined in the bridal chamber
- 20 will no longer be separated. Therefore Eve
 separated from Adam,¹⁰⁹ because it was not
 in the bridal chamber that she joined with him. It was
 from a breath that Adam's soul came into being.¹¹⁰ Its
 partner was the spirit. That which was given him
- 25 was his mother. His soul was [taken] and
 he was given [life] in its place.¹¹¹ When
 he joined [...] words that were
 superior to the powers, and they envied him
 [...] spirit[ual] partner
- 30 [...] hidden
 [...] namely the
 [...] themselves
 [...] bridal chamber so that
 [...] Jesus revealed
- 35 [...] the Jo]rdan, the
 [fullness of the kingdom] of heaven. He who
 [was begotten] before all things¹¹²

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Matt 27:51; Mark 15:38.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. 1 Cor 10:16; Rev 19:13.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Gen 2:21–23.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Gen 2:21–23.

¹¹⁰ Cf. Gen 2:7.

¹¹¹ Cf. Gen 2:21–23; 3:20.

¹¹² Cf. John 1:2.

71 (= Plate 119)

- 1 λιν ἀρχποϋ π[εντα]γτ[ο]ρςϙ̄ ἄωρ[π]
 παλιν ἀγορςϙ̄ π[εν]ταγςοτ̄ϙ̄ πα
 λιν ἀφωτε εωδεωδε εχω ἄω
 μγστηριον ἀπειωτ ἡπτηρϙ ρωτ̄
- 5 ἀτπαρθενος ἡταρει ἀπιτῆ ἀω
 ἀγκωτ ρογοειν εροϙ ἡφοοϙ ετῆ
 μαϙ ἀφωλπ εβολ ἡπνοϑ ἡπαστος
 ετβεπαει πεφωμα ἡταφωωπε
 ἡφοοϙ ετῆμαϙ ἀει εβολ ρμπα
- 10 στος ἡε ἡπενταρωωπε εβολ
 ρῆπνγμφιος ἡῆτνγμφη τα
 ει τε θε αῖς τερο ἡπτηρϙ ερατϙ
 ρραῖ ἡρῆτϙ εβολ ριτῆναει ἀω
 ωδε ετρεποϙα ποϙα ἡῆμαθῆτῆς
- 15 μοωδε εροϙν ετεφαναπαϙςις
 ααδαν ωωπε εβολ ρῆπαρθενος
 σῆτε εβολ ρῆπῆνα ἀω εβολ
 ρῆπκαρ ἡπαρθενος ετβεπαει
 ἀρχπεπεχ̄ς εβολ ρῆοϙπαρθενος
- 20 δεκαδς πεσλοοτε ἡταρωωπε
 ρῆτεροϙειτε εφνα[ς]εζωϙ ερατϙ
 οϙῆωηη σναϙ ρῆτ [ρ]ῆππαρδα
 σοσ ποϙα χπεθ[ηριον] ποϙα χπε
 ρωμε ααδαν ο[γωμ] εβολ ρῆπωη(η)
- 25 ἡταρχπεθῆρι[ον ἀφω]ωπε ἡθῆ
 ριον ἀφχπεθ[ριον ε]τβεπαῖ σε
 ρσεβεςθε ἀθ[ηριον ἡς]ἡῆωηρε
 ἡαδαν πωη[η]
 καρπος πε π[.]
- 30 παει ἀγω[.]
 οϙωμ ἡπ[.]
 καρπος ἡπ[.]
 χπο ἡρρωμε[.]
 ωτ ἡπρωμε ἡ[.]
- 35 πνοϙτε ταμειερω[με . . ρρω]

71.1 Till, Ménard: π[αλιν ἀρχπ]οϙ ἄωη[ρε] || 2 Till, Ménard: π[αλιν] ἀγορςϙ̄ || 21 Till: εφν[αδε]ωβ || 22 Till: σν[αϙ ρρα] ρμ[ππαρδα]; Ménard: σν[αϙ ρ]ῆτ[μῆτ]ε ἡππαρδα || 27 Till: ἀνε[.] ἡ[.]; Ménard: ἀθ[ηριον εϙο] ἡ[τειρε] || 28 Ménard: πωη[η ἡταφωωμ οϙωμ ἡπεϙ]; Schenke: πωη[η ἡταφωωμ πεϙ] || 29 Ménard: πε [πωηη ἡῆθῆριον ετβε]; Schenke: π[ωηη ἡτῆνωσις ετβε] || 30 Ménard: ἀγω[ω πεφωηρε ἡταϙ]; Layton: ἀγω[αει]; Schenke: ἀγω[αει ἡσιῆνωε ενεαϙ] || 31 Ménard: ἡπ[καρπος ἡπωηη ἡῆθῆριον]; Schenke: ἡπ[καρπος ἡπκωηη ετεπ] || 32 Ménard: ἡπ[ωηη ἡῆθῆριον ἀϙ]; Schenke: ἡπ[ωηη ἡπωηη πε ετ] || 33 Till: χπεῆρρωμ[ε οϙω]; Ménard: χπεῆρρωμ[ε ἡῆθῆριον ετεοϙω]; Schenke: ἡρρωμε [νε ἡῆθῆριον ἡλοϙω] || 34 Till: α]; Ménard: ἡπρωμε [ἡῆθῆριον ἀω α]; Schenke: ἡ[θε ρῆ α] || 35 Till, Ménard: ταμειερω[ωμε ἀω ἀηρω]; Schenke: ταμειερω[με ετρερρω].

71 (= Plate 119)

- 1 was begotten again.¹¹³ He [who was anointed] first
 was anointed again.¹¹⁴ He who was redeemed
 redeemed again. Indeed it is fitting to speak of a
 mystery. The Father of all things¹¹⁵ joined
 5 with the virgin who came down and
 a fire illuminated him.¹¹⁶ On that day
 he revealed the great bridal chamber.
 It was because of this that his body came into being.
 On that day he came out from the
 10 bridal chamber like the one who came into being from
 the bridegroom and the bride.
 Thus Jesus established everything
 within himself through these, and
 it is necessary for each one of the disciples
 15 to walk into his rest.¹¹⁷
 Adam came into being from two virgins,
 from the spirit and from
 the virgin earth.¹¹⁸ Therefore
 Christ was born from a virgin,
 20 so that he might rectify the fall that happened
 in the beginning.
 There are two trees growing in paradise.¹¹⁹
 One produces [animals], the other produces
 men. Adam [ate] from the tree
 25 that produced animals, [and he became] an
 animal and he begot [animals]. Therefore
 the children of Adam worship the [animals].
 The tree [...]
 fruit [...]
 30 this they have [...]
 eat(s)/ate the [...]
 fruit of the [...]
 beget(s)/begot men [...]
 of the man of [...]
 35 God makes man [..., men]

¹¹³ Cf. Rom 1:3–4; Heb 1:5; 5:5; Ps 2:7.

¹¹⁴ Cf. Matt 26:7; Mark 14:3; Luke 7:37–38; John 12:3; 19:39–40.

¹¹⁵ Cf. John 1:3.

¹¹⁶ Cf. Luke 3:16, 21–22; Matt 3:11, 13–17; Mark 1:9–11; John 1:31–33.

¹¹⁷ Cf. Heb 3:11, 18; 4:1–11; Gen 2:2–3; Ps 22:2 LXX; 94:11 LXX.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Gen 2:7.

¹¹⁹ Cf. Gen 3.

72 (= Plate 120)

- 1 με ταμεῖεπ[ν]ογ[τ]ε ται τε θε ρῆπκος
 მოს ენρω[მ]ე ταμιενογτε აჯω σεოγ
 ωωτ ἡνογταμιο ნეωωε ετρεῖნνογ
 τε ογωωτ ἡῖρωμε ἡθε εσωοοπ ἡ
- 5 მოს ἡστταλῆθეია ἡἡρβῆγε ἡπρω
 მე ωαჯωωπε εβολ ρῆτεφδγῆნამიც
 ეтвεპაეი სემოγте ерооγ ჯეἡδγ
 ნამიც ნეφρβῆγε ნე ნეφωჲრე ἡტაჯ
 ωωპე ევოლ ρῆოგანაპაჯციც ეтвε
- 10 პაეი თეფდγῆნამიც ῖპოლიტეγесθე
 ჳრაἰ ρῆნეფრβῆγε ეტანაპაჯციც დე
 ოგონღ ევოლ ჳრაἰ ρῆἡωჲრე აჯω
 კნაღე ეპაეი ფჯωტე ωაღრაἰ თეიკω(ნ)
 აჯω პაეი পে პრωმე ἡῖკონიკოს
- 15 ფეირე ἡნეფრβῆγε ევოლ ρῆτεფსომ
 ევოლ დე ρῆანაპაჯციც ფჯპო ἡნეფ
 ωჲრე ρῆἡპეეიკოსმოს ἡῖმღაღ ῖ
 ჳῖჲრეტი ნელეგთეროს ρῆტἡἡ
 ტერო ἡἡἡἡἡ ნელეგთეროს ნაῖ
- 20 διακον[ει] ἡἡῖმღაღ ἡἡωჲრე ἡ
 ἡἡἡἡἡ[ω]ἡ ἡ[ა]ῖδιακονει ἡἡωჲ
 რე ἡἡἡἡ[მოს ἡ]ωჲრე ἡἡἡἡἡἡ
 ოგრან ოგ[ωტ პე]ტეოგἡტაჯ ტანა
 პაჯციც ე[გეἰ ნ]ოგერἡἡ სერჲრეია ან
- 25 ἡἡἡἡῖ [ეἡἡἡἡἡ]ტეθეωრეია ἡἡაჯ
 [.]ფ[.]თესიც ρῆῖოგო ნე
 [.]სია ρῆნეტῖἡἡ
 [.]ἡ ნეოოგ ἡნე
 [.]ე ἡἡოოგ ან ნე
- 30 [.]ვ[ωკ ეἡἡἡ ἡἡმო
 [ოგ] ევოლ ფნასოტჯ
 [.]კ ევოლ ἡἡინენტაღ
 [.] ῖἡἡეფრან პეჯაჯ გარ
 [ჯეტაეი ტე თ]ე ენაჯωკ ევოლ ἡἡიკ(აἰ)

72.21 Possibly ἡἡἡἡἡ[ω]ჯ || 23 Ménard: ო[გა პე ე]ტეოგἡტაჯ || 24 Till, Ménard: ე[სἡἡἡ]ოგერἡἡ || 25 Ménard: [. . .]ῖ[.]ტეθეωრეია; Schenke: [ოგἡἡაჯ] || 26 Ménard: [.]ωფელἡნსიც; Schenke: [.]ფ[.]თესიც || 29 Schenke: [ოოგ]ე || 30 Ménard: [.]ἡἡἡἡἡ ῖ[ωკ] || 31 Ménard: [ოგ ჯეეფნაჯოკოგ] || 32 Ménard: [ოგ ἡἡἡἡἡἡἡ]კ; Schenke: [.]ჯω || 33 Ménard: [ჯოკოგ ევოლ]; Schenke: [ჯἡἡἡἡἡἡἡ] || 34 Ménard: [ωჲე ეროἡ] ეენაჯωკ.

72 (= Plate 120)

- 1 make [God]. Thus in the
 world men make gods and they
 worship their creations. It would be appropriate for the gods
 to worship the men. As is
- 5 the truth with the works of man,
 they result from his power.
 Therefore they are called the
 acts of power. They are his works.
 It is from rest that his children come into being.
- 10 Therefore his power resides
 in his works, but it is
 in the children that the rest is manifested. And
 you will find that this extends to the image.
 And this one is the man pertaining to the image.
- 15 It is from his power that he does his works,
 but it is from rest that he begets his
 children. In this world the slaves
 serve the free. In the
 kingdom of heaven the free will
- 20 minister to the slaves. The children of
 the bridal chamber¹²⁰ will minister to the
 children of the [marriage. The] children of the bridal chamber¹²¹
 have a [single] name,
 Rest. [Being] together they do not need to
- 25 take form, [since they have] contemplation
 [...] they are many
 [...] among those who are in the
 [...] the glories of the
 [...] not [...] them
- 30 [...] go down to the
 [water ...] he will redeem him / himself
 [...] namely those who have
 [...] in his name, for he said:
 [“Thus] we will fulfill

¹²⁰ Cf. Matt 9:15; Mark 2:19; Luke 5:34.

¹²¹ Cf. Matt 9:15; Mark 2:19; Luke 5:34.

73 (= Plate 121)

- 1 ΟΣΥΝΗ ΝΙΜ ΝΕΤΧΩ Μ̄ΜΟΣ ΧΕΣΕΝΑ
 ΜΟΥ Ν̄ΩΡΡΠ ΑΥΩ ΣΕΝΑΤΩΟΥΝ [[̄ν]]σε
 Ρ̄ΠΛΑΝΑΣΘΕ ΕΥΤ̄Μ̄ΧΙ Ν̄ΩΡΡΠ Ν̄ΤΑΝΑ
 ΣΤΑΣΙΣ ΕΥΟΝΖ ΕΥΩΑΜΟΥ ΣΕΝΑΧΙΛΑ
- 5 ΑΥ ΔΝ ΤΑΕΙ ΤΕ ΘΕ ΟΝ ΕΥΧΩ Μ̄ΜΟΣ Ε
 ΠΒΑΠΤΙΣΜΑ ΕΥΧΩ Μ̄ΜΟΣ ΧΕΟΥΝΟΣ
 ΠΕ ΠΒΑΠΤΙΣΜΑ ΧΕΕΥΩΔΧΙΤΥ ΣΕΝΑ
 ΩΝΖ ΦΙΛΙΠΠΟΣ ΠΑΠΟΣΤΟΛΟΣ ΠΕ
 ΧΑΥ ΧΕΪΩΣΗΦ ΠΖΑΜΩΕ ΑΥΤΩΘΕ Ν̄
- 10 ΝΟΥΠΑΡΑΔΕΙΣΟΣ ΧΕΝΕΦ̄ΡΧΡΕΙΑ Ν̄Ζ̄Ν̄
 ΩΕ ΕΖΟΥΝ ΕΤΕΥΤΕΧΗΝ Ν̄ΤΟΥ ΠΕΝ
 ΤΑΖΤΑΜΙΟ Η̄ΠΣΤΑΥΡΟΣ ΕΒΟΛ Ζ̄Ν̄Ν̄
 ΩΗΝ Ν̄ΤΑΥΤΟΣΟΥ ΑΥΩ ΠΕΥΘΡΟΣ ΝΕΥ
 ΩΥΕ ΑΠΕΝΤΑΥΤΟΣΥ ΝΕΠΕΥΘΡΟΣ ΠΕ
- 15 Η̄Ν̄ ΠΤΩΘΕ ΔΕ ΠΕ ΠΕΣ.ΡΟΣ ΑΛΛΑ ΠΩΗ(Ν)
 Μ̄ΠΩΝΖ Ζ̄Ν̄ΤΗΝΤΕ Μ̄ΠΠΑΡΑΔΕΙΣΟΣ
 ΑΥΩ ΤΒΕ̄Ν̄ΧΘΕΙΤ Ν̄ΤΑΠΕΧΡΕΙΣΜΑ ΩΩ
 ΠΕ ΕΒΟΛ Ν̄Ζ̄ΗΤ̄ ΕΒΟΛ Ζ̄ΙΤΟΥΤΥ ΑΤΑ
 ΝΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ ΠΕΒΙΚΟΣΜΟΣ ΟΥΑΜΚΩ
- 20 ΩΣ ΠΕ Η̄ΚΕ ΝΙΜ ΕΤΟΥΩΜ Μ̄ΜΟΥ
 Ζ̄ΡΑΪ Ν̄Ζ̄ΗΤΥ ΣΕΜ[Υ] Ζ̄ΩΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΑΛΗΘΕΙ
 Α ΟΥΑΜΩΝΖ ΤΕ ΕΤΒΕΠΔΕΙ Η̄Ν̄ΛΑΑΥ
 Ζ̄Ν̄ΝΕΤΣΟΝΩ Ζ̄Ν̄Τ[ΜΕ] Ν̄ΑΜΟΥ Ν̄ΤΑΪ̄
 ΕΙ ΕΒΟΛ Ζ̄Μ̄ΠΜΑ Ε[Τ̄Μ̄]ΜΑΥ ΑΥΩ ΑΥΕΙ
- 25 ΝΕ Ν̄Ζ̄Ν̄ΤΡΟΦΗ ΕΒΟΛ Μ̄ΜΑΥ ΑΥΩ ΝΕ
 ΤΟΥΩΩ ΑΥΤ̄ ΝΑΥ [ΕΟΥ]Ω[Μ] ΧΕ[ΚΑΔΣ]
 Ν̄ΝΟΥΜΟΥ ΑΠΗ[ΟΥΤΕ . . .] Ε Ν̄Ο[ΥΠΑΡΑ]
 ΔΕΙΣΟΣ ΑΠΩ[ΜΕ] ΠΑΡΑ]
 ΔΕΙΣΟΣ ΟῩΝ̄Ζ[.] ΩΟ]
- 30 ΟΠ Μ̄Ν̄Ζ̄Μ̄Π[.]
 Μ̄ΠΠΟΥΤΕ Ζ̄Μ̄[.]
 ΜΕ ΝΕΤ̄Ν̄Ζ̄ΗΤ[Υ] Ε]
 †ΟΥΩΩ ΠΠΑΡΑ[ΔΕΙΣΟΣ] Ε]
 ΤΟΥΝΑΧΟΟΣ ΝΑΕΙ ΧΕ [. . . . ΟΥΩΜ]
- 35 Μ̄ΠΑΕΙ Η Μ̄Ν̄ΟΥΩΜ Μ̄[ΠΑΕΙ]

73.19 Ménard: ναστασις (ωωπε) πεικοςμος || 21 Till: σεμ[ε]ςτωου; Ménard: σεμε[ς]τωου || 26 Till: [νου]φ[η]; Ménard: [μη]φ[η]; Layton: [νω]φ[η]; || 27 Till: απη[ουτε ταμιο] η[ου]παρα; Ménard: απη[ουτε τα]μιε η[ου]παρα; Schenke: απη[ουτε τ]ωσε || 28 Till, Ménard: απρω[με ωνε] ημπαρα; Schenke: απρω[με ωωπε] ημπαρα || 29 Schenke: οῡνη[η] ωο || 31 Till: ηη; Ménard: ηη[.] ρω || 33 Till, Ménard: ηπαρα[δεισος πε ημα ε]; Layton, Schenke: ηπαρα[δεισος πε ημα ε] || 34 Till: χ[ε]ρωμε οωμ; Ménard: χ[ε]ρωμ εβολ η || 35 Till: [η]παει καταπεκ; Ménard: [η]παει η̄θε εκ; Layton, Schenke: η[παει η̄θε εκ].

73 (= Plate 121)

- 1 every righteousness.¹²² Those who say that they shall
die first and (then) they shall arise
are wrong. If they do not first receive the
resurrection while they live, they will receive nothing when they die.
- 5 Thus also when they speak about
baptism they say that
baptism is a great thing, for if they receive it they will
live. Philip the apostle
said: "Joseph the carpenter planted
10 a garden because he needed
wood for his trade. It was he who
made the cross from the
trees that he planted, and his seed
hung upon that which he planted. His seed was
15 Jesus,¹²³ and the plant was the cross." But the Tree
of Life is in the middle of the garden,¹²⁴
and it was from the olive tree that the chrism came,
and from it the
resurrection. This world is a
20 corpse-eater. All that are eaten
in it also die themselves. Truth
is a life-eater. Therefore no one
among those who nourish on [Truth] will die.
It was from that place that Jesus came, and he
25 brought food from there, and
those who wanted he gave them [to eat, so that]
they might not die.¹²⁵ [God ... a]
garden, [man ...]
garden, there are [...]
30 exists with [...]
of God in/ among [...]
those that/ who are in [it ...]
I wish that [garden ...]
will be said to me: ["... eat]
35 this," or "do not eat [that," ...]

¹²² Matt 3:15.

¹²³ Cf. Rom 1:3; Gal 3:16.

¹²⁴ Cf. Gen 2:9; 3:3; Rev 2:7.

¹²⁵ Cf. John 6:31–58.

74 (= Plate 122)

- 1 οὐδὲ παρὶ πάντων [ε]πίστατον ἦκε νῆμα
 ἡμᾶς ἐφ' ὅτι ἡμᾶς ἠσπίδων ἦν
 γνώσις περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀφ' ἡμεῶν ἀλλὰ πε-
 ρὶ αὐτῶν ἦν γνώσις ἀφ' ἡμεῶν
- 5 με πῶς περὶ αὐτῶν περὶ οὐδὲν
 ἡμῶν ἦν τὴν γνώσις ἡπιστάτου
 ἡπιστοῦ οὐτε ἡπερὶ αὐτῶν ἐροῦν
 ἡπιστοῦ οὐτε ἡπερὶ αὐτῶν ἡπιστά-
 του ἀλλὰ ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἡμῶν
- 10 οὐδὲν ἐβόησεν οὐδὲν ἡπιστάτου γὰρ
 ἡμῶν παρὶ ἡμῶν παρὶ αὐτῶν
 περὶ ἡμῶν ἡμῶν πῶς περὶ αὐτῶν
 εἰς ἐπιστάτου ἐβόησεν γὰρ ἡμῶν
 ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἐροῦν ἡμῶν ἐπε-
- 15 ρὶ ἐπιστάτου ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἐπερὶ
 αὐτῶν ἐπερὶ αὐτῶν γὰρ τῶν
 ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν
 ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν
 τῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν
- 20 τῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν
 ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν
 εἰ ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν
 περὶ ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν
 ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν
- 25 ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν
 ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν
 τῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν
 [. . .] ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν
 [. . .] ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν
 [.] ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν
- 30 [.] ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν
 [.] ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν
 [λᾶ] ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν
 [.] ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν
 [πῶς] ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν
- 35 [.] ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν
 [ἡμῶν] ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἡμῶν

74.27 Schenke: [ε]πίστατου ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἡμῶν || 28 Schenke: [πε]ρὶ αὐτῶν ἡμῶν ἡμῶν; Till: [. . .] ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν || 29 Ménard: [ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἡμῶν]; Schenke: [ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἡμῶν] || 30 Till: [ἐβόησεν ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν]; Ménard: [ἐβόησεν ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν] ἀφ' ἡμῶν; Schenke: [ἐβόησεν ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν] || 31 Till: [ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἡμῶν]; Ménard: [ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἡμῶν] ἀφ' ἡμῶν; Schenke: [ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἡμῶν] || 32 Till: [λᾶ ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν]; Ménard: [λᾶ ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν]; Schenke: [λᾶ ἐβόησεν ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν] || 33 Ménard: [λᾶ ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν]; Schenke: [λᾶ ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν] || 34 Schenke: [πῶς ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἡμῶν] || 35 Ménard: [ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἡμῶν]; Schenke: [ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἡμῶν] || 36 Till: [ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἡμῶν]; Ménard: [ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἡμῶν]; Schenke: [ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἡμῶν].

74 (= Plate 122)

- 1 wish. This, the place where I will eat everything,
it is there that the Tree of
Knowledge is. That one killed Adam,
but here the Tree of Knowledge has made man alive.
- 5 The Law was the tree.¹²⁶ It could
give knowledge of good
and evil. It neither removed him from
evil, nor did it place him in the
good, but it created death for those who
- 10 ate from it. For when he said,
“eat this, do not eat that,” it became
the beginning of death.¹²⁷ The chrism is
superior to baptism, for from the chrism
we were called Christian,
- 15 not because of baptism, and it was
because of the chrism that Christ was named (such). For the Father anointed
the Son, and the Son anointed the apostles,
and the apostles anointed us. He who
has been anointed has everything. He
- 20 has the resurrection, the light, the cross,
the Holy Spirit. The Father gave him
this in the bridal chamber. He received, and
the Father came to be in the Son and the Son in the
Father.¹²⁸ This is [the kingdom] of heaven.
- 25 The Lord said [it] well: “Some went to the
kingdom of heaven laughing and they came out
[...] a Christian
[...] and immediately
[...] went down] to the water and he came
- 30 [...] everything concerning/because
[...] it is [a] game,
[but ... despise] this
[...] to the kingdom of
[heaven ...] if he despises
- 35 [...] and if he scorns it as a game
[...] out] laughing. Thus also

¹²⁶ Cf. Gal 3:13; Phil 3:8–9.

¹²⁷ Cf. Gen 2:16–17; Col 2:21–22.

¹²⁸ Cf. John 10:38; 14:10–11; 17:21; cf. also John 10:30; 14:9, 20; Col 2:9.

75 (= Plate 123)

- 1 ριποεικ μῆππο[τ]ηριον μῆππνηρ
 καν οὔηκεογα εφχοσε εναει απ
 κοσμος ωωπε ρῆνογαπαρπτωμα
 πενταρταμιογ γαρ νεφογωω ατα
 5 μιογ εφο ἡαττακο αγω ναθανατος
 αφρε εβολ αγω ἡπεφμετε αθελπικ
 νεσωοοπ γαρ αν ἡσιτῆῆταττεκο
 ἡπκοσμος αγω νεφωοοπ αν ἡσι
 τῆῆταττακο ἡπενταρταμιεπκος
 10 μοσ σωοοπ γαρ αν ἡσιτῆῆταττα
 κο ἡῆρβηγε αλλα ἡῆωηρε αγω μῆ
 ογρωβ ναωχι ἡογῆῆταττακο εφτῆ
 ωωπε ἡωηρε πετεμῆσον δε ἡμογ
 εχι ποσω μαλλον φναω† αν πποτη
 15 ριον ἡπωληλ οὔῆταγ ηρη ἡμαγ ογ
 ἡταγ μοογ εφκη ερραῖ επτγπος ἡ
 πεσνογ ετογρεγαριστει εχωγ αγ
 ω φμογρ εβολ ρῆπῆῆα ετογααβ αγ
 ω παπτελειος τηρη ρρωμε πε ροτα(η)
 20 ενωανσω ἡπαει τῆαχι ναη ἡπτε
 λειος ρρωμε πμοογ ετονηρ ογσωνα
 πε ωρε ετρη†ριωων ἡπρωμε ετονηρ
 ετβεπαει εφει εφβηκ επιτῆ επιμο
 ογ ωαφκακφ αρηγ ωινα εφνα†πη
 25 ριωωφ ωαρεογρτο χπεογρτο ογ
 ρωμε ωαρεφχπερωμε ογνογτε
 ωαρεφχπενογτε ται τε θε ρῆ[πατ]
 ωελεετ ἡῆρῆ[κεωε]λεετ αγ[ωω]
 πε εβολ ρῆπῆ[.] ἡ[.]
 30 νε μῆιογδαο ο[.]
 εβολ ρῆῆρε[.]
 ωοοπ αγω αν[.]
 εβολ ρῆῆιογδα[οι]
 ἡχριστιανος ακ[.]
 35 ω αγμογτε ανειμα[.]
 πγενος ετσοτη ἡπῆ[.]

75.27 Till, Ménard: ρῆ[ππατ] || 28 Till, Ménard: ἡῆρῆτ[ωελ]εετ || 29 Till, Ménard: ρῆπῆ[γυμφων ἡσινεγωηρε] || 30 Till, Ménard: νεμῆιογδαο ω[οοπ οη εγωωπε] || 31 Till, Ménard: ρῆῆρε[λληη ροσον επνομος]; Schenke: ρῆῆρε[λληη] || 32 Till, Ménard: α[νον ρωων ανωωπε] || 33 Till: ρῆῆιογδα[οι ενπατηωωπε]; Ménard: ρῆῆιογδα[οι ενπατηωωπε] || 34 Ménard: αγ; Schenke: ακ[εγενος ωωπε αγ] || 35 Till: ανειμα[. χε]; Ménard: ανειμα[. χε]; Schenke: ανειμα[καριος χε] || 36 Till, Ménard: ἡπ[πῆα ετογααβ]; Schenke: ἡπῆ[εγματικον].

75 (= Plate 123)

- 1 with the bread and the cup and the oil,
 even though there is one that is superior to these. The
 world came into being from a transgression,
 for he who made it wanted to
 5 make himself imperishable and immortal.
 He perished and he did not obtain what he hoped for,
 for the world was not
 imperishable, and the one who
 created the world was not imperishable.
 10 For things are not imperishable,
 but (only) children. And no
 thing will be able to receive imperishability without
 becoming a child. But he who is unable
 to receive, how much more shall he be unable to give? The
 15 cup of prayer contains wine and
 and it contains water,¹²⁹ for it is laid down as the type of
 the blood over which thanks is given.¹³⁰ And
 it fills with the Holy Spirit¹³¹ and
 it is that of the completely perfect man.
 20 Whenever we drink this we will receive the
 perfect man. The living water is a body.¹³²
 It is necessary for us to put on the living man.
 Therefore, coming down to the
 water he strips himself naked so that he may put
 25 that one on. A horse begets a horse, a
 human begets human, a god
 begets god. Thus it is with [the]
 bride[groom] and brides [too]. They
 [come into being] from the [...]
 30 and / with / no Jew(s) [...]
 from [...]
 exist(s) and [...]
 from the Jews [...]
 the Christians [...]
 35 these [...] were called [...]
 the chosen race of [...]

¹²⁹ Cf. John 19:34; Luke 22:44.

¹³⁰ Cf. 1 Cor 10:16.

¹³¹ Cf. 1 John 5:8.

¹³² Cf. Heb 10:5.

76 (= Plate 124)

- 1 ἀγὼ παλῆθεινος ῥῥωμε ἀγὼ πωῆρε
 ἤπρωμε ἀγὼ πσπέρμα ἤπωῆρε ἤπρω
 με πειγενος ἤλῆθεινον σερονο
 μαζε ἤμοϋ ῥῆπκοσμος ναει νε πμα
- 5 ετογῳοοπ ἤμαγ ἤσινῳῆρε ἤπηνγμ
 φων επρωτῖρ ῳοοπ ῥῆππεικοσμος
 ροογτ ριςριμε πμα εῖσῳμ ἠῆτῆνῖτ
 ῶωβ ῥῆπαῳων κεογα πε πεῖνε ἤπρω
 τῖρ εἰμογτε δε εροογ ἤνεειραν οὔηῖῆ
- 10 κοογε δε ῳοοπ σεχοσε παραραν
 νῆμ ετογῖρονομαζε ἤμοογ ἀγὼ σε
 χοοσε επχωωρε πμα γαρ εῖτεογῆβια
 ἤμαγ εγῳοοπ ἤμαγ ἤσινετσοτπ
 εῖσῳμ νετῆμαγ κεογα αν πε ἀγὼ κε
- 15 ογα πε αλλα ἠτοογ ἠπеснаγ πιογα
 ογῳτ πε παει πε ετϕηαῳι αν εῖραῖ
 εῖῆφῆτ ἠсарз οὔον νῆμ ετογῆτογ
 πτηρϕ ἤμαγ ῳῳε αν ετρογῆεῖμῆ ἠ
 ἤμοογ τηρογ ροεινε μεν εγῖτῆεῖμῆ
- 20 ἤμοογ σεναῖραπολαγε αν ἠνετε
 οὔῆταγσε νεταρσεβο δε εροογ σενα
 ῖραπολαγε ἤμοογ ογ μονον πρωμε
 ἠτελειος σεναῳεμαρτε αν ἤμοϋ
 αλλα σεναῳηναγ εροϕ αν εγῳαῆναγ
- 25 γαρ εροϕ σεναεμαρτε ἤμοϋ ἠκερητε
 ἠῆογα ναῳχπο ναϕ ἠτσειχαρις ει
 [ἠη ἠ]ϕῖϕ[ῖ]ῳῳϕ ἠπτελειον ἠογοειν
 [ἀγὼ] ἠϕῳῳ[πε ρ]ῳῳϕ ἠτελειον ογο
 [ειν πε]ῆῖτῶ[ρῖτααϕ] ρῖῳῳϕ ϕηαῳκ
- 30 [.] παει πε πτελειο(η)
 [.] εῖτρῆῳῳπε ἠ
 [.] ῳε εμπαῖῆει ε
 [.] πετα[ρ]χιπτηρϕ
 [.] ἀνεειμα ϕηαῳῖρ
- 35 [.] πμα εῖῖμαγ αλλα ϕηα
 [.] τῆε]σοτῆς ρῳε αῖχῳκ εῖολ

76.29 Ménard: [ειν η]τῶρεϕ[ῖ ῖμοϋ ρ]ῖῳῳϕ || 30 Ménard: [εῖρογῆ πογοειν] παει || 31 Till: [. ῳῳε]; Ménard: [ἠογοειν ἀγὼ ῳῳε]; Schenke: [. ῳῳε ερον] || 32 Ménard: [ῥῥωμε ἠπνεγῆαῖκ]ος; Schenke: [. παντ]ῳε || 33 Till, Ménard, Schenke: [ῳκ ρῆπκοσμος] || 34 Till, Ménard: [εῖρο ἠχοεις αν] || 35 Till, Ménard: [χοεις αν απ]μα || 36 Till, Ménard: [ῳκ αῖμες]οτῆς; Schenke: [ῳκ εῖτῆε]σοτῆς.

76 (= Plate 124)

- 1 and the true man and the Son
of Man and the seed of the Son of
Man. This true race is
renowned in the world. These are the places
5 where the children of the
bridal chamber¹³³ dwell. In this world
the union is male and female, the place of power and
weakness. In the aeon the likeness of the union is another one,
but we refer to them with these names. But there are
10 others that are superior to every
name that is named and they are
superior to the strong. For where there is strength
there are those that are
stronger. Those are not this
15 and the other, but they are both this one
single (entity). It is this which will not be able to come down
upon the fleshly heart. Is it not necessary
for everyone who has everything
to know themselves completely? Some who do not know
20 themselves will have no benefit from what
they have, but those who have gotten to know themselves will
benefit from them. Not only
will they not be able to detain the perfect man,
but they will not be able to see him. For if they see
25 him they will detain him.
No one will be able to acquire for himself this grace in another way
[except by] putting on the perfect light
[and] himself becoming perfect
[light. He who has put it on] himself will go
30 [...] this is the perfect
[...] for us to become
[...] before we came to
[...] he who will receive everything
[...] these places, he will be able to
35 [...] that place, but he will
[...] the] middle as incomplete.

¹³³ Cf. Matt 9:15; Mark 2:19; Luke 5:34.

77 (= Plate 125)

- 1 ΜΟΝΟΝ ἰς σοογῆν ἡπτελος ἡπαει
 πρῶμε ετογαав φογαав τηρϣ φαρ
 ραί επεφωμα εωχεαϣχι γαρ ἡπο
 εικ φηααϣ εφογαав η ποπτηριον
- 5 η πκεσεεπε τηρϣ ετϣχι ἡμοοϣ εϣ
 τογβο ἡμοοϣ αγω πωσ φηατογβο
 αν ἡπκεσωμα ἡθε ἡταϊς χωκ εβολ
 ἡπμοοϣ ἡπβαπτισμα ταει τε θε αϣ
 πωστ εβολ ἡπμοϣ ετβεπαει τῆβηκ
- 10 μεν επιτῆ επιμοϣ ωῖνα χενοϣπαρτῆ
 εβολ ρῆππῆα ἡπκοσμοσ ροταν
 εϣωαννιϣε φαρεϣτετπρω ωωπε
 ππῆα ετογαав ροταν εϣωαννιϣε
- 15 φαρετωαμη ωωπε πετεγῆταϣ ἡ
 μαγ ἡττῆωσικ ἡτμε ογελεϣθεροσ
 πε πελεϣθεροσ δε μαϣῤῥοβε πε
 †ρε γαρ ἡπποβε πρῆρῆαλ ἡπποβε
 πε τμααϣ τε ταληθεια τῆνωσικ δε
- 20 πε πτωτ νετεστο ναϣ αν αῤῥοβε
 επικοσμοσ μογτε εροοϣ χεελεϣ
 θεροσ ναει ετστο ναϣ αν αῤῥοβε
 τῆνωσικ ἡταληθεια χικε ἡρητ ετε
 παει πε σειρε ἡμοοϣ ἡελεϣθεροσ
- 25 αγω στροϣικε επια τηρϣ ταγαπῆ
 δε κωτ πεταρῤῥελεϣθεροσ δε ρι
 τῆτῆνωσικ φο ἡρηρῆαλ ετβεταγα
 πε ἡναει επιπατοϣωϣι ερραϊ [ἡτε]
 λεϣερια ἡτῆνωσικ τῆνω[σικ δε]
- 30 σειρε ἡμοοϣ ἡωικανοσ εϣ[τροϣ]
 ωωπε ἡελεϣ[θ]ερ[οσ] ταγαπῆ [.]
 λααϣ χεπωσ [πε . . .]οι[.]
 πωσ πε μασχ[οοσ χε]
 η παει πωει πε . [.] . [.]
- 35 νογκ νε ταγαπῆ ἡπνεγῆ[ατικῆ]
 ογῆρη τε ριστοι σεῤῥαπο[λαγε ἡ]

77.20 Layton, Schenke, and Till regard πτωτ as a scribal error for πειωτ. || 30 Till: ετ[ροϣ]
 || 31 Till, Ménard: [μασχι]; Layton, Schenke: [μασχε] || 32 Ménard: λααϣ πε πω[σ σπαχι
 ογ]οῆ [ογον ἡμ]; Schenke: [πε κατ]οι[γε πτηρϣ] || 33 Till: μασχ[οοσ χεπαει πωκ πε];
 Ménard, Layton: μασχ[οοσ χεπαει πωει πε]; Schenke: μασχ[οοσ χεπῆ πωει πε] || 34 Till:
 [αλλα σχω ἡμοσ χε]; Ménard: [αλλα σχω ἡμοσ χεπαει]; Layton, Schenke: α[λλα ἡ]ογ[ει
 τηροϣ] || 35 Till: ταγαπῆ μα[σ]ο[ϣ].

77 (= Plate 125)

- 1 Only Jesus knows the end of this one.
 The holy man is completely holy, including
 his body. For if he takes the
 bread he will make it holy, or the cup
 5 or all the other things that he takes and
 purifies. And how will he not purify
 the body too?¹³⁴ As Jesus perfected
 the water of baptism, thus he
 poured out death. Therefore we go
 10 down into the water, but we do not go
 down into death, so that we may not be poured
 out in the spirit of the world.
 Whenever it blows the winter comes.
 Whenever the Holy Spirit blows
 15 the summer comes. He who has
 knowledge of the truth is a free man,
 and the free man does not sin.
 For "he who sins is a slave to sin."¹³⁵
 Truth is the mother, but knowledge
 20 is the mingling. Those to whom it is not given to sin
 are called "free" by the world.
 The knowledge of the truth
 makes these to whom it is not given to sin arrogant,
 that is, they are made free,
 25 and it elevates them over everything, but love
 edifies.¹³⁶ And he who has been made free
 through knowledge is a slave because of
 love for those who have not yet been able to take up [the]
 freedom of knowledge, [but] knowledge
 30 makes them capable [to]
 become free. Love [...]
 anything that it [is] its [...]
 is its, it does not [say that, ...]
 or this is mine [...]
- 35 are yours. Spiritual love
 is wine and fragrance.

¹³⁴ Cf. 1 Cor 11:23–25.

¹³⁵ John 8:34.

¹³⁶ Cf. 1 Cor 8:1. Cf. also 1 Cor 13:1–13.

78 (= Plate 126)

- 1 ΜΟΣ ΤΗΡΟΥ Ν̄ΟΙΝΕΤΝΑΤΟΖΟΥ Μ̄ΜΟΣ
 ΣΕΡΑΠΟΛΑΥΕ ΖΩΟΥ Ν̄ΟΙΝΕΤΑΖΕΡΑΤΟΥ
 Μ̄ΠΟΥΒΟΛ ΖΩΟΣ ΕΥΑΖΕΡΑΤΟΥ Ν̄ΟΙΝΕΤ
 ΤΟΖΟΣ ΝΕΤΤΑΖΕ̄ Ν̄ΟΣΟΝ ΕΥΩΑΛΟ ΕΤΟΥ
 5 ΩΟΥ Ν̄ΣΕΒΩΚ ΦΑΡΕΝΗ ΕΣΕΤΟΖΟΣ ΔΝ
 ΜΟΝΟΝ ΕΥΑΖΕ ΕΡΑΤΟΥ Μ̄ΠΟΥΒΑΛ ΦΑΖ
 ΣΩ ΟΝ Ζ̄ΜΠΟΥΣΤ̄ΒΩΩΝ ΠΣΑΜΑΡΙΤΗΣ
 Ν̄ΤΑΦΤ̄ΛΑΔΥ ΔΝ ΑΠΕΤΩΟΟΣΕ ΕΙ ΜΗ
 ΗΡΠ ΖΙΝΕΖ ΚΕΛΑΔΥ ΔΝ ΠΕ ΕΙ ΜΗΤΙ Α
 10 ΠΣΟΣ̄Ν ΔΥΩ ΔΦΘΕΡΑΠΕΥΕ Ν̄ΗΠΛΗΓΗ
 ΤΑΓΑΠΗ ΓΑΡ ΖΩΒ̄Σ Ν̄ΟΥΜΗΝΦΕ Ν̄ΝΟ
 ΒΕ ΠΕΤΕΤΣΖΙΜΕ ΜΕ Μ̄ΜΟΦ ΝΕΤΣΝΑ
 ΧΠΟΟΥ ΕΥΕΙΝΕ Μ̄ΜΟΦ ΕΩΩΠΕ ΠΕΣ
 ΖΔΕΙ ΕΥΕΙΝΕ Μ̄ΠΕΣΖΑΪ ΕΩΩΠΕ ΟΥΝΟ
 15 ΕΙΚ ΠΕ ΕΥΕΙΝΕ Μ̄ΠΝΟΕΙΚ ΠΟΛΛΑΚΙΣ
 ΕΩΩΠΕ ΟῩΝ̄ΣΖΙΜΕ ΕΣ̄Ν̄ΚΟΤΚ Μ̄Ν̄ΠΕΣ
 ΖΔΪ ΚΑΤΑΟΥΖΤΟΡ ΕΠΕΣΖΗΤ ΔΕ ΖΙΠΝΟ
 ΕΙΚ ΕΩΔΣ̄ΡΚΟΙΝΩΝΕΙ Ν̄Μ̄ΑΦ ΠΕΤ
 ΣΑΜΑΣΤΥ ΦΑΣΜΑΣΤΥ ΕΦΙΝΕ Μ̄ΠΝΟ
 20 ΕΙΚ Ν̄ΤΩΤ̄Ν̄ ΔΕ ΝΕΤΦΟΟΠ Μ̄Ν̄ΠΩΗ
 ΡΕ Μ̄ΠΝΟΥΤΕ Μ̄Ν̄Ρ̄ΡΕΠΚΟΣΜΟΣ
 ΑΛΛΑ Μ̄Ρ̄ΡΕΠΧΟΕΙΣ ΦΙΝΑ ΝΕΤΕΤΝΑ
 ΧΠΟΟΥ ΝΟΥΩΩΠΕ ΕΥΕΙΝΕ Μ̄ΠΚΟΣ
 ΜΟΣ ΑΛΛΑ ΕΥΝΑΩΩΠΕ ΕΥΕΙΝΕ Μ̄Π
 25 ΧΟΕΙΣ ΦΑΡΕΠΡΩΜΕ ΤΩΖ Μ̄Ν̄ΠΡΩΜΕ
 ΦΑΡΕΠΡΤΟ ΤΩΖ Μ̄Ν̄ΠΡΤΟ ΦΑΡΕΠΕΙ
 [Ω Τ]ΩΖ Μ̄Ν̄ΠΕΙΩ Ν̄ΓΕΝΟΣ ΝΕΦΑΖΤΩΖ
 [Μ̄Ν̄]ΝΟΥΦΒ̄ΡΓΕΝΟΣ ΤΑΕΙ ΤΕ ΘΕ ΕΩΔ
 [ΡΕ]Π̄Π̄Ν̄Α ΤΩΖ Μ̄Ν̄Π̄Π̄Ν̄Α ΔΥΩ ΠΛΟ
 30 [ΓΟΣ] ΦΑΦ̄Ρ̄Κ [Ο]ΙΝΩ [Ν]ΕΙ Μ̄Ν̄ΠΛΟΓΟΣ
 [ΔΥΩ ΠΟ]ΥΦ [ΕΙΝ ΦΑ]Φ̄Ρ̄ΚΟΙΝΩΝΕΙ
 [Μ̄Ν̄ΠΟΥΟΕΙΝ ΕΚ]ΦΑΩΩΠΕ Ρ̄ΡΩΜΕ
 [ΠΡΩΜ]Ε Π̄Ε [ΤΝΑ] Μ̄ΕΡΙΤΚ ΕΚΦΑΩΩΠΕ
 [Μ̄Π̄Ν̄Α] Π̄Π̄Ν̄Α ΠΕΤΝΑΖΩΤ̄Ρ̄ ΕΡΟΚ ΕΚ
 35 [ΦΑΝΩ]ΩΠΕ Ν̄ΛΟΓΟΣ ΠΛΟΓΟΣ ΠΕΤ

78 (= Plate 126)

- 1 All those who will anoint themselves with it [benefit from] it.
 Those who stand near them also benefit,
 like those who are anointed
 who stand there. If those who are anointed with ointment leave their
 5 side and go, those who are not anointed,
 who are only standing near them,
 once again remain in their (own) stench. The Samaritan
 did not give anything to the wounded man except
 wine and oil.¹³⁷ It was nothing else except
 10 the ointment, and it healed the wounds.
 For "love covers a multitude of
 sins."¹³⁸ He whom the woman loves, it is him that those she will
 bear resemble. If it is her
 husband, they resemble her husband. If it is an
 15 adulterer, they resemble the adulterer. Often,
 if a woman sleeps with her
 husband out of necessity, but her mind is on the
 adulterer whom she usually has communion with, the one
 she will bear she bears resembling the
 20 adulterer. But you who dwell with the
 Son of God, do not love the world,
 but love the Lord, so that those you will
 bear may not come to resemble the world,
 but that they may come to resemble the
 25 Lord. Man mixes with man,
 horse mixes with horse, donkey
 mixes with donkey. The species used to mix
 [with] their fellow members. Thus
 spirit mixes with spirit and Logos
 30 has communion with Logos
 [and light has] communion
 [with light. If you] become man,
 [it is the man who will] love you. If you become
 [spirit,] it is the Spirit that will join with you.
 35 [If] you become logos, it is the Logos that

¹³⁷ Cf. Luke 10:34.

¹³⁸ 1 Pet 4:8.

79 (= Plate 127)

- 1 νατωρ νῆμακ ε[κ]ωανωωπε ἵου
 οειν πογοειν πετναρκοινωνει
 νῆμακ εκωανωωπε ἵναπσα η
 ρρε ναπσα ηρρε ναῖτον ἵμοογ
- 5 ερραῖ ε.χ.ωκ εκωανωωπε ἵρτο
 η ἵειω η ἵμασε η ἵογροορ η ηε
 σοογ η σε ρῖνεοηριον ετῆπσα η
 βολ ἵἡνετῆπσα ἡπιτῆ φναωμε
 ριτκ αν ογτε πρωμε ογτε ππῆα ογ
- 10 τε πλογοσ ογτε πογοειν ογτε να
 πσα ητπε ογτε ναπσα ηρογν σε
 ναωῖτον ἵμοογ αν ρραῖ ἵρητκ
 αγω ἡἡτακμεροσ ρραῖ ἵρητογ πε
 το ἡρηρῶλ ερηναφ αν φναωρελεγ
- 15 οεροσ πενταρρελεγεροσ ἡπερ
 μοτ ἡπεφχοεισ αγω αφτααφ εβολ
 ογααφ αγἡἡτηρῶλ ογκετῆ φναω
 ρελεγεροσ τῆἡτογοειε ἡπκοσ
 μοσ ριτῆφτοογ ἡειλοσ φραγολογ
- 20 ερογν αταποοηκη ριτῆογμοογ
 ἡἡνογκαρ ἡἡνογπῆα ἡἡνογοει(η)
 αγω τῆἡτογοειε ἡἡπνογτε τειριε
 οη ριτῆφτοογ ριτῆογπιςτις ἡἡ
 νογρελπις ἡἡνογαγαπη ἡἡογ
- 25 γνωσις πῆκαρ τε τπιςτις ταῖ εν
 χενογνε ρραῖ ἡρητῆ πμο[ο]γ [Δε]
 τε οελπις εβολ ριτοοτῆ ε[ησο]
 ειω ππῆα τε ταγαπη εβολ [ρητο]
 οτφ εναγζανε πογοειν Δ[ε τε]
- 30 ττηωσις εβο[λ ρ]ῖτ[οο]τῆ τῆἡπ[ωρ]
 τχαρις σο ἡφ[τοογ ἡ]μ[εινε σο ῖ]
 ρἡἡκαρ σο ῖρ[ἡἡπε]
 τπε ἡτετπε αγ[. .]ρῆ[. . ογμακα]
 ριοσ πε παει εμπεφλλ[. . . . ἡ]

79.26 Till, Ménard: πμο[ογ] || 31 Ménard: ἡφ[ο αγω τῆαπρε ἡπ] || 32 Ménard: ῖρ[ωμε
 ετογυηκ λπσα ἡ] || 33 Ménard: αγ[ω π]ρῆ[ρῶλ μακα] || 34 Ménard: εμπεφλλ[γπει ἡ];
 Schenke: εμπεφλλ[γπει ἡ].

79 (= Plate 127)

- 1 will mix with you. If [you] become
light, it is the light that will have communion
with you. If you become one of those
above, those above will rest
5 upon you.¹³⁹ If you become a horse
or donkey or calf or dog or
sheep or another among the animals that are
outside and those that are below,
neither man nor Spirit
10 nor Logos nor light nor those
above nor those inside will be able to love you. They
will not be able to rest within you
and you have no part in them. He
who is a slave against his will, he will be able to become
15 free. He who has become free by the
grace of his master and has sold
himself into slavery will no longer be able to
become free. The cultivation of the
world is by means of four elements. They gather
20 into the storehouse by means of water
and earth and wind and light.
And God's cultivation is also like this,
by means of four, by means of faith and
hope and love and
25 knowledge. Our earth is the faith. It is in this that we
take root. [And] the [water]
is the hope. [It is] through it [that we]
nourish. The wind is the love. It is through
it that we grow. And the light
30 [is] the knowledge. Through it we [ripen].
Grace is of [four kinds. It is]
earthly, it is [heavenly, . . .]
the heaven of the heaven [. . .]
this one is [blessed], who has not [. . .]

¹³⁹ Cf. John 1:33.

80 (= Plate 128)

- 1 νοϋγγχη παει πε ιϷ πχϷ αϋρ̄απα(η)
 τα ἴμμα τηρϋ αϋω ἴπεϋρ̄βαρει ἄλααϋ
 εἴβεπαει οϋμακαριος πε παει ἴττει
 μινε χεοϋτελειος ρ̄ρωμε πε παει γαρ
- 5 πλογοϷ χνοϋη ἴμον εροϋ ρωϷ (Ϸ)μοκϷ
 ασερεπαει ερατϋ πωϷ τ̄ηναϋρ̄κατορ
 οοϋ ἴππεινοϷ πωϷ εϋναϋταναπαϋ
 ϷϷ νοϋον νιμ ρατερη ἴρωβ νιμ ωϋε
 αν εἄλυπει ἄλααϋ ειτε νοϷ ειτε κοϋει
- 10 η απιστοϷ η πιστοϷ ειτα αϋταναπαϋϷϷ
 ἴνετ̄ητον ἴμοοϋ ρ̄ηνετ̄ηνοϋϋ
 οϋἴροεινε ετοϋνοϋϋρε τε εϋτανα
 παϋϷϷ ἴπετ̄ωοοπ καλωϷ πεϋρε
 ἴπετ̄ηνοϋϋ μ̄ῆϷον ἴμοϋ ἴϋϋ
- 15 αναπαϋϷϷ ἴηαι (ϋ)ϋι γαρ αν ἴπετεϷ
 ναϋ μ̄ῆϷον δε ἴμοϋ αἄλυπει εϋ
 τ̄ητροϋρ̄ολιβε ἴμοοϋ αἄλα πετ̄ωω
 πε καλωϷ ρ̄ησοπ ωαϋἄλυπει ἴμο
 οϋ ϋωοοπ αν ἴττειρε αἄλα τοϋκα
- 20 κια τε εἣρ̄λυπει ἴμοοϋ πετεϋἴταϋ
 ἴμαϋ ἴτϋϷϷϷ ϋϋοϋνοϋ ἴπετ̄η
 νοϋϋ ροεινε δε εβολ ρ̄ηπαει σεἄ
 λυπει κακωϷ οϋχεϷρ̄ηηει αϋϷπε
 ἴκα νιμ ειτε ωηρε ειτε ρ̄μηἄλ ειτε
- 25 τ̄βηη ειτε οϋρ̄ορ ειτε ρ̄ιρ ειτε σοϋο
 [ειτε] ειωτ ειτε τ̄ωρ ειτε χορτοϷ ειτε
 [. . .]. ειτε αϋ αϋω βαλανοϷ οϋϷαβε
 [δε π]ε αϋω αϋεινε ἴτ̄τροϋη ἴποϋα
 [ποϋα] ἴωηρ[ε] ηεν αϋκεαρτοϷ ρ̄αρω
- 30 [οϋ]αα[. . . . ἴ]ρ̄μηἄλ δε αϋκεκι
 [. . . . ρ̄αρωϋ ρ̄ιε]βε αϋω ἴτ̄βηοοϋ
 [αϋηεϷει]ϋ[τ ρ]αρωϋ ρ̄ιτωρ ρ̄ιχορ
 [τοϷ ἴοϋ]ρ̄οορ αϋηεϷκεεϷ ρ̄αρωϋ
 [αϋω ρ̄ιρ α]ϋηεϷβαλανοϷ ρ̄αρωϋ

80.5 Ménard: ρωϷμοκϷ || 15 Ménard: ἴηαι ϋι || 27 Ménard: [κεεϷ] ερτε || 30 Till, Ménard:
 [οϋ ρ̄ιμερ ρ̄ιαϋ ηρ]μηἄλ; Schenke: [οϋ εαϋ]αα[ϋ ρ̄ιαϋ ἴ]ρ̄μηἄλ || 31 Till, Ménard: [κι ρ̄αρωϋ
 ρ̄ιε]βε || 32 Till: [αϋκειωτ ετ]αρωϋ || 34 Till, Ménard: [ηριρ δε αϋ]ηεϷβαλανοϷ.

80 (= Plate 128)

- 1 a soul. This one is Jesus Christ. He went
 everywhere (and met everyone) and he did not burden anyone.
 This kind of person is therefore a blessed one,
 because he is a perfect man. For
- 5 the Word tells us concerning this how difficult
 it is to sustain. How will we be able to
 accomplish this great (thing)? How will he be able to give
 rest to everyone? Above all it is not appropriate
 to cause anyone grief, whether great or small,
- 10 or faithless or faithful, and then give rest
 to those who are (already) at rest in the good.
 There are some who profit from giving
 rest to the one who is well off. He who does
 the good cannot give
- 15 rest to these ones, for (he) does not take on that which
 pleases him, but he cannot cause grief, for he
 cannot make them become distressed, but he who
 becomes well off sometimes causes them grief.
 He is not like this, but it is their (own)
- 20 badness that causes them grief. He who has
 the nature gives joy to the
 good, but some
 grieve terribly as a result of this. A master of a house acquired
 everything, whether child or slave or
- 25 cattle or dog or pig or wheat
 [or] barley or chaff or hay or
 [...] or meat and acorn.
 [But he is] wise and he knows the food of each
 [one]. He placed bread before the children,
- 30 [...], but he placed
 [...] and (a simple) meal before] the slaves,
 and [he threw barley] and chaff and hay before the cattle.
 He threw bones before the dogs,
 [and] he threw acorns

81 (= Plate 129)

- 1 ζῆμαογ ἵοεικ τλει τε θε ἱπμαθ
 τῆς ἱπνογτε εωωπε ογσαβε πε εγ
 λισθανε ἱτμητῆμαθτῆς ἱμορ
 φη ἱσωματικη σεναραπατα αν ἱ
 5 μογ αλλα εφνασωωτ ἱσατλιαθε
 σις ἱτεφγγχι ἱπογα πογα ἱφωα
 δε ἱἱμαγ ογἱραζ ἱθῆριον ζῆπκος
 μοσ εγο ἱμορφη ῖρωμε ναει εγ
 ωασογωνογ ῖριρ μεν φνανεχβα
 10 λανος εροογ ἱτβνοογ δε φνανεχ
 ειωτ εροογ ζιτωζ ζιχορτος ἱογ
 ζοορ φνανεχκαας εροογ ἱζῆραλ
 φνατῆαγἱωορπ ἱωῆρε φνατῆαγ
 ἱτλειον φωοοπ ἱσῖπαῆρε ἱπρω
 15 με αγω φωοοπ ἱσῖπαῆρε ἱπαῆ
 ρε ἱπρωμε πχοεις πε παῆρε ἱ
 πρωμε αγω παῆρε ἱπαῆρε ἱ
 πρωμε πε πετσωнт ζιτῆπαῆ
 ρε ἱπρωμε λπαῆρε ἱπρωμε χι
 20 ἱτοοτγ ἱπνογτε ετρεφσωнт ογ(ἱ)
 ταγ ἱμαγ ετρεφσωнт πενταρζχι ε
 τρεφσωнт ογσωнт πε πενταρζχι
 εχπο ογχπο πε πετσωнт ἱἱσῶἱ
 ἱχχπο πετχπο ογἱσῶἱ ἱφσωнт
 25 σεχω δε ἱμοσ δεπετσωнт χπο
 αλλα πεφχπο ογσωнт πε ετ[βε . . .]
 ἱχπο νεφωῆρε αν νε αλλα ἱ[.]
 νε πετσωнт εφῖρωβ ζἱογ[ωῆε]
 εвол αγω ἱτογ ρωωγ φογφ[ἱε ε]
 30 вол πετχπο εφχπο ζἱογ[πεθῆπ]
 αγω ἱτογ ρεῆπ [ε]φ[ο]γα[.]
 οικων πετσω[ἱτ ο]ἱ εφς[ωнт ζἱἱ]
 ογφανερον πετχπο δε[ε εφχπε]
 ωῆρε ζἱογπεθῆπ ἱἱ[λααγ ναω]
 35 σοογἱ δεαω πε φο[ογ ετεφοογт]

81.26 Till: ετ[βεπαῖ]; Ménard: ετ[βεπαει]; Schenke: ετ[βεχε] || 27 Till: ἱ[εφ . . .]; Ménard: ἱ[εφρικωῆ]; Schenke: ἱ[εβῆγυε] || 30 Till: εφ[ῖρωβ] ζἱἱ[ο]γ[πεθῆπ]; Ménard: εφ[ῖρωβ] ζἱἱ[ο]γ[πεθῆπ] || 31 Till: ρεῆπ[.]; Ménard: ρεῆπ π[χπο π]ε αν ἱθῆ ἱ || 32 Till, Ménard: πετσω[ἱτ μεν] || 33 Till, Ménard: δε[ε εφχπο ἱἱ] || 35 Till: φο[ογ εωαρεπζοογт]; Ménard: φο[ογ εωαρεπζοογт].

81 (= Plate 129)

- 1 and slops before [the pigs]. Thus the
disciple of God, if he is wise he
understands what it is to be a disciple. The
bodily forms will not deceive
5 him, but he will look at the condition
of the soul of each one and
speak with him. There are many animals in the
world in human form.
If he knows them, he will throw
10 acorns to the pigs, but he will throw
barley and chaff and hay to the cattle.
He will throw bones to the dogs, to the slaves
he will give the first (course), and to the children he will give
the complete (banquet). There is the Son of Man,
15 and there is the son of the
Son of Man. The Lord is the Son of
Man and the son of the Son of
Man is he who creates through the
Son of Man. The Son of Man received
20 from God the ability to create.
He has the ability to beget. He who has received
the ability to create is a creature. He who has received
(the ability) to beget is a begotten one. He who creates cannot
beget. He who begets can create.
25 They say that he who creates begets,
but his "offspring" is a creature. [...]
begotten [...] his children are not, but
they are [...]. He who creates works [openly],
and he himself is [revealed].
30 He who begets begets in [secret]
and he is hidden [...]
the image. [Moreover,] he who [creates creates]
openly, but he who begets [begets]
children in secret. No [one will be able to]
35 know [when the husband]

82 (= Plate 130)

- 1 μῆντες ἰμε ῥκοινῶνει μῆνοϋερη
 ει μη ἦτοοϋ οὔααϋ οὔμηστηριον γαρ
 πε πγαμος ἦπκοςμος ἦνετταξι
 ριμε εϋχεπγαμος ἦπχωρῆμ φρηπ
- 5 ποσω μαλλον πγαμος ἦατχωρῆμ οὔ
 μστηριον πε ἦαληθῆινον οὔσαρκι
 κον αν πε αλλα εϋτῶβνηϋ εϋνηπ αν ατε
 πθῆμια αλλα εποὔωϋ εϋνηπ αν επκα
 κε η τοὔωη αλλα εϋνηπ επεροοϋ μῆ
- 10 ποὔοειν οὔγαμος εϋωακωκαρηϋ
 αϋωωπε ἦπορνεια αὔω τῶελεετ
 οὔ μονον εσῶαχιπσπερμα ἦκερο
 οὔτ αλλα καν εσῶανῥῖβολ ἦπεςκοι
 των ἦσεναϋ ερος ασπορνεϋε μονον
- 15 μαρεσοὔωνῆ εβολ ἦπεσειωτ μῆτες
 μααϋ μῆπῶβηρ ἦπνημφιос μῆῆ
 ἦωηρε ἦπνημφιос ναει εστοει ναϋ
 ετροὔβωκ εροὔη μῆμνε επνημφω(η)
 ἦκοοϋε δε μαροὔῥεπιθῆμει καν
- 20 εσωτῆ ετεссμη ἦσεῥαπολαϋε ἦ
 πεссосῆ αὔω μαροὔсонϋ εβολ ρῆῆ
 λεϋλιϋε ετῆε εβολ ριτραπεза ἦθῆ ἦ
 νοὔροор οὔηῆῆμνημφιос μῆῆῆ
 ημνηπ ηп επνημφων μῆοὔα ναϋ
- 25 ναϋ απνημφιос μῆτῆμνηπ ει μη
 [ἦϋω]ωπε ἦπαιε ἦтереαβραζαη
 [. . .] εтρεϋнаϋ αпетϋнанаϋ ероϋ
 [αϋϋ]ῥβε ἦтсарз ἦтакровϋстια εϋта
 [μο] ἦμον χεωϋε етако ἦтсарз
- 30 [περο]ὔο ἦτε[π]κοςμος εηροсон νοὔ
 [са ηροὔ]ῆ ρη[π σε]αῆερατοὔ αὔω σεонῆ
 [εϋωαν]οὔων[ῆ εβ]ολ αὔμοϋ катаππα
 [ραδιγμ]α ἦπρωμε ετοὔονεῆ εβολ
 [εηροсо]η ἦμαῆт ἦπρωμε ρηп қонῆ

82.27 Ménard: [ραϋε]; Schenke: [δε xi] || 30 Till: [. . .] . . πε[εικο]σμος; Ménard: [αὔω
 μφο]οὔ [ἦ]τε[π]κοςμος || 31 Ménard: [.] εὔ]ῆ[π εὔ]τῶϋ αῆερατοὔ || 32 Ménard:
 [εϋχεεὔ]οὔων[ῆ εβο]λ || 33 Ménard: [ραδιγμ]α.

82 (= Plate 130)

- 1 and the wife have communion with each other
except they alone. For
the marriage of the world is a mystery for those who have taken
a wife. If the marriage of defilement is secret,
5 how much more is the undefiled marriage a
true mystery!¹⁴⁰ It is
not fleshly, but pure. It is not of
desire, but of the will. It is not of the
darkness or the night, but it is of the day and
10 the light.¹⁴¹ If a marriage is stripped naked
it has become fornication, and
not only if the bride receives the seed of another
man, but even if she comes out of her
bedroom and is seen she has fornicated.
15 Let her only be revealed to her father and her
mother and the friend of the bridegroom¹⁴² and
the children of the bridegroom, these to whom it is given
to enter the bridal chamber daily.
But let the others desire even
20 to hear her voice¹⁴³ and enjoy
her ointment, and let them nourish from the
crumbs that fall from the table, like
the dogs.¹⁴⁴ Bridegrooms and
brides belong to the bridal chamber. No one will be able to
25 see the bridegroom with the bride unless
[he becomes] this. When Abraham
[. . .] for him to see that which he would see,
[he] circumcised the flesh of the foreskin,¹⁴⁵
[telling] us that it is necessary to destroy the flesh.¹⁴⁶
30 [Most (creatures / things)] of [the] world
stand and are alive as long as their [insides are hidden].
[When they are revealed], they die, according to the
[example] of the visible man.
[As long as] the innards of the man are hidden

¹⁴⁰ Cf. Eph 5:31–32.

¹⁴¹ Cf. 1 Thess 5:5.

¹⁴² Cf. John 3:29.

¹⁴³ Cf. John 3:29.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Matt 15:27; Mark 7:28; Luke 16:21.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. Gen 17:23–18:2; John 8:56.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Col 2:11.

83 (= Plate 131)

- 1 ἴσπρωμε εὔφασωλπ ἴσινεμαρτ
 сѣрповол ἴρηнтϥ φναμοϥ ἴσπρωμε
 τειρε ον ἴπωνη ρωс ετεφноϥне
 ρηп φραφτοϥω ἴφλερηт ερωατεϥ
 5 νοϥне сωλπ εвол φареπωνη φо
 οϥε τλει τε θε ριχπο нηм ετρηпкос
 мос οϥ монон ρинетоϥонρ εвол
 αλλα ρινεθηп εφροсон γαρ тноϥне
 ἴтκακια ρηп сχοор εϥφασоϥωнс
 10 δε ασωλ εвол εсφασноϥωнρ δε ε
 вол ασωλн εтвепαι плогос χω ἴ
 мос χендη таζειнн сἴмонт агноϥ
 не ἴἴωνη εснаφωωт ан петоϥ
 наφασтϥ παλιν φραφтоϥω αλλα εφασ
 15 ретаζειнн валвἴ епитἴ епеснт φα(н)
 теснтноϥне ερραι διс δε пωрк ἴ
 тноϥне ἴпма тнрϥ ρηкооϥе δε ка
 та мерос анон ρωωн маρεпоϥа
 поϥа ἴρηнтἴ маρεφвалвле ἴсатноϥ
 20 не ἴтκακια етἴρηраἴ ἴρηнтϥ ἴφпоркс
 ρатесноϥне ρηпεϥρηт εснапωрк
 δε енφасоϥωнс εφωπε δε тἴ
 но ἴатсооϥн ерос сχеноϥне ρр[α]ἴ
 ἴρηнтἴ аϥω стεϥо εвол ἴнескар
 25 пос ρраἴ ρηпἴρηт со ἴχοеис еро(н)
 тἴно ἴρηρἄл нас сἴраихмалφ[т]ἴзе
 ἴмон етρηεἴре ἴнетἴоϥоϥ[оϥ ан]
 нетἴоϥоϥоϥ тἴεἴре ἴмооϥ [ан с]
 сἴсом χεἴпἴсоϥωнас ρωс [εсφо]
 30 оп мен сἴнегергеἴ тἴнтатс[ооϥн]
 εсφооп ἴмааϥ ἴἴπε[θооϥ тнроϥ]
 тἴнтатсооϥн [εс]ἴφωε ап[моϥ χε]
 нетφооп εвол ρηтἴнтἴ[атсооϥн]
 οϥте неϥφооп ан οϥте [εсφооп λ(н)]
 35 οϥте εснаφωπε ан [.]

83.16 Till: πωρχ || 31 Ménard: ἴηπε[θoοϥ non] || 32 Ménard: [ω]ηφωε λ[πμοϥ] || 35 Till, Ménard: [нетρηтме δε]; Schenke: [натме δε].

83 (= Plate 131)

- 1 the man is alive. When his innards are revealed
 they come out of him and the man will die.¹⁴⁷
 Thus also with the tree. As long as its root
 is hidden, it blossoms and grows. If its
 5 root is revealed the tree
 dries up. Thus it is with every offspring in the
 world, not only the revealed,
 but also the hidden. For as long as the root
 of evil is hidden it is strong, but if it is recognised
 10 it has died, and if it is revealed
 it has been destroyed. Therefore the Word says,
 “Already the axe is laid at the
 root of the trees.”¹⁴⁸ It will not (simply) cut—that which
 will be cut blossoms again—but
 15 the axe burrows down beneath until
 it brings out the root. Jesus plucked out
 the root completely, but others
 partly. As for us, let each
 one among us dig down to the
 20 root of the evil that is within him and pluck it out
 from its root in his heart. And it will be uprooted
 if we are aware of it, but if we
 are ignorant of it it takes root
 within us and it produces its
 25 fruits in our heart. It rules us
 and we are its slaves. It captures
 us so that we may do what we do [not] want to.
 Those things that we want to do we do [not].¹⁴⁹ [It is]
 strong because we have not become aware of it. As long as [it]
 30 [exists] it works. [Ignorance]
 is the mother of [all evil].
 Ignorance will lead to [death, because]
 those things that exist as a result of [ignorance]
 neither did exist, nor [do they exist],
 35 nor will they come into being [...]

¹⁴⁷ Cf. Acts 1:18.

¹⁴⁸ Matt 3:10.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. Rom 7:15–20.

84 (= Plate 132)

- 1 σενακωκ εβολ ροταν ερωαταλληθεια
 τηρς ογωνη εβολ ταλληθεια γαρ καταθε
 ντηντατσοογν εςρηπ μεν σρانا
 παγε ρραϊ νρητς εσφαογωνη δε εβολ
- 5 νσεσογωνς φαγτνας εσογ ροσον
 σνησoм ετηντατσοογн αγω απλα
 νη σ† ντηντελεγερος πεχαq νσι
 πλογος χεεтетнφανσογων ταλη
 θεια ταλληθεια ναρτнне ηελεγερος
- 10 τηντατσοογн со ηρμzαλ τгнωсис ογ
 ελεγερια τε ενωασογωνταλληθεια
 τηναρε ανκαρπος νταλληθεια ρραϊ ν
 ρηтн ενωαρωτρ ερος снаχι ηπηπλη
 ρωма теноγ ογнтан ημαγ ηνετογ
- 15 ονη εβολ ητεпсoнт φанxоос χε
 ητοογ ηε ηχωφре εтгаеиηγ ηεθηп
 δε ηε ησoв εтoнс таеи τε θε ηνετογ
 οη εβολ νταλληθεια ρησoв ηε αγω
 σεφнс ηεθηп δε ηχωφре ηε αγω сета
- 20 ειηγ σεογoнη δε εβολ ησιημγστηριο(η)
 νταλληθεια εγo ηтγпос ριρικων πκοι
 των δε qρηп ηтоγ ηε ηετογaaв ρη
 ηετογaaв ηερεпκαгаηεтасна ηен
 ρoвс ηωорп ηωс ερεппоγте ρδιοικеи
- 25 ηтктисис εφωαπωz δε ησιпκαгаηе
 таç[η]z αγω ηтенапса ηρογн ογωνη
 [εβολ] σенаκω δε ηπεειηει ηсωογ
 [εφo] ηερнмoс ηαλλон δε σенаркага
 [λχε] ηноq τηηтноγте δε τηρς сапωт
- 30 [εβολ] ηηееиμα ερογн an εηετογaaв
 [ηтен]εт[o]γaaв снаoтωz γар an ηηпоγ
 [οειη η]αττωz ηηпπληρωма ηат
 [ωта αλ]λα снаoφпe ραηтнη ηпс.рoс
 [αγω ραν]εφсвоеи тееиβωтoс ηαωω
- 35 [ηε ηπο]γoγχαеи ηтарепкагаκλγс

84.30 Till, Ménard: [εβολ ρ]ηηееиμα || 31 Till, Ménard: [ηνετο]γaaв || 35 Till: [ηε ηас η]ογχαеи; Ménard: [ηε ηас ηo]γoγχαеи.

84 (= Plate 132)

- 1 they will be perfected when the
whole truth is revealed. For truth, like
ignorance, when it is hidden it rests
within itself, but if it is revealed
- 5 and it is recognised it is glorified inasmuch as
it prevails against ignorance and
error. It makes free.
The Word says, "If you know
the truth, the truth will make you free."¹⁵⁰
- 10 Ignorance is a slave, knowledge
is freedom. If we know the truth
we will find the fruits of truth within
us. If we join with it it will receive our
fullness. Now we have the
- 15 visible things of the creation. We say that
they are the honoured (and) strong, but the hidden things
are the despised (and) weak.¹⁵¹ Thus it is with those (things) that are
revealed of the truth: They are weak and
despised, but the hidden (things) are the strong and
- 20 honoured. But the mysteries
of truth are revealed as types and images. But the
bedroom is hidden. It is the Holy in
the Holy. The veil
covered at first how God administered
- 25 the creation,¹⁵² but when the veil is rent¹⁵³
and those of the inside are revealed
this house will be left behind
[as] a desert,¹⁵⁴ or rather, it will be
[destroyed],¹⁵⁵ but the entire divinity¹⁵⁶ will flee
- 30 [from] these places, not into the Holies
[of the] Holies, for it will not be able to mix with the
unmixed [light] and the [fault]less fullness,
[but] it will come to be under the wings of the cross¹⁵⁷
[and under] its arms. This ark will
- 35 [become their] salvation when the flood

¹⁵⁰ John 8:32.

¹⁵¹ Cf. 1 Cor 4:10.

¹⁵² Cf. Rom 1:20.

¹⁵³ Cf. Matt 27:51; Mark 15:38; Luke 23:45.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. Matt 23:38; Luke 13:35; Acts 1:20; Ps 68:25 LXX.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Matt 24:2; 26:61; 27:40; Mark 13:2; 14:58; 15:29; Luke 21:6; Acts 6:14; 2 Cor 5:1.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Rom 1:20.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Matt 23:37; Luke 13:34.

85 (= Plate 133)

- 1 ΜΟC ΜΜΟΟΥ ΕΜΑΞΤΕ ΕΞΡΑΪ ΕΧΩΟΥ ΕΡΩΔ
 ΖΗΞΟΕΙΝΕ ΩΩΠΕ ΖΗΤΦΥΛΗ ΝΤΜΗΤΟΥ
 ΗΗΒ ΝΑΕΙ ΝΑΩΒΗΘΟΜ ΗΒΩΚ ΕΞΟΥΝ Ε
 ΠCΑ ΗΞΟΥΝ ΜΠΚΑΤΑΠΕΤΑCΜΑ ΜΠΠΑΡ
- 5 ΧΙΕΡΕΥC ΕΤΒΕΠΑΕΙ ΜΠΕΠΚΑΤΑΠΕΤΑC
 ΜΑ ΠΩΞ ΜΠCΑ ΝΤΠΕ ΟΥΔΑΤΥ ΕΠΕΙ ΗΕΥ
 ΝΑΟΥΕΝ ΗΝΑΠCΑ ΝΤΠΕ ΟΥΔΑΤΟΥ ΟΥΤΕ
 ΜΠCΑ ΜΠΤΗ ΟΥΔΑΤΥ ΔΗ ΝΤΑΥΠΩΞ ΕΠΕΙ
 ΝΑΥΗΑΟΥΩΝΞ ΕΒΟΛ ΗΝΑΠCΑ ΜΠΤΗ ΟΥ
- 10 ΔΔΥ ΔΛΛΑ ΝΤΑΥΠΩΞ ΝΤΠΕ ΕΠΙΤΗ ΔΝΑ
 ΠCΑ ΝΤΠΕ ΟΥΩΝ ΝΑΝ ΗΝΕΤΗΠCΑ ΜΠ
 ΤΗ ΧΕΚΑΔC ΕΝΝΑΒΩΚ ΕΞΟΥΝ ΔΠΠΕΘΗΠ
 ΝΤΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ ΠΑΕΙ ΔΛΗΘΩC ΠΕ ΠΕΤΤΑΕΙ
 ΗΥ ΕΤΟ ΝΧΩΩΡΕ ΕΝΑΒΩΚ ΔΕ ΕΞΟΥΝ ΕΜΑΥ
- 15 ΖΙΤΗΞΗΤΥΠΟC ΕΥΩΗC ΜΗΞΗΜΗΤCΩΒ
 CΕΩΗC ΜΕΝ ΗΝΑΞΡΗΠΕΟΟΥ ΕΤΧΗΚ ΕΒΟ[Λ]
 ΟΥΗΕΟΟΥ ΕΥΧΟCΕ ΕΟΟΥ ΟΥΗCΘΟΜ ΕΥΧΟ
 CΕ ΕCΘΟΜ ΕΤΒΕΠΑΕΙ ΔΝΤΕΛΕΙΟΝ ΟΥΕΝ
 ΝΑΝ ΜΗΝΕΘΗΠ ΝΤΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ ΑΥΩ ΝΕΤΟΥ
- 20 ΔΑΒ ΗΝΕΤΟΥΔΑΒ ΑΥCΩΛΠ ΕΒΟΛ ΑΥΩ Δ
 ΠΚΟΙΤΩΝ ΤΩΞΗ ΜΜΟΝ ΕΞΟΥΝ ΕΝΞΟC(Η)
 ΜΕΝ ΟΞΗΠ ΤΚΑΚΙΑ ΟΥΟCΥ ΜΕΝ ΗΠΟΥ
 ΟΥΤC ΔΕ ΝΤΜΗΝΤΕ ΜΠCΠΕΡΜΑ ΗΠΠΗΔ
 ΕΤΟΥΔΑΒ CΕΟ ΗΞΜΞΔΛ ΗΤΠΟΗΗΡΙΑ ΞΟ
- 25 ΤΑΝ ΔΕ ΕΥΩΔCΩΛΠ ΕΒΟΛ ΤΟΤΕ ΠΟΥΟ
 ΕΙΝ ΝΤΕΛΕΙΟΝ ΝΑΞΑΤΕ ΕΒΟΛ ΕΧΗ[Ο]ΥΟ(Η)
 ΝΗΜ ΑΥΩ ΝΕΤΗΞΗΝΤΥ ΤΗΡΟΥ CΕΝ[ΔΧΙΧΡΙ]
 CΜΑ ΤΟΤΕ ΗΞΜΞΔΛ ΗΔΡΕΛΕΥΘΕ[ΡΟC ΑΥΩ]
 ΗCΕCΩΤΕ ΗΑΙΧΜΑΛΩΤΟC ΤΩCΕ Η[ΠΗ ΕΜ]
- 30 ΠΕΠΑΕΙΩΤ ΕΤΞΗΜΠΗΥΕ ΤΟCΥ [CΕΝΑ]
 ΠΟΡΚΥ ΝΕΤΠΟΡΧ CΕΝΑΞΩΤΡ Η[. . . .]
 CΕΝΑΜΟΥΞ ΟΥΟΝ ΗΜ ΕΤΝΑΒ[ΩΚ ΕΞΟΥΝ]
 ΕΠΚΟΙΤΩΝ CΕΝΑΧΕΡΟ ΗΠΟΥ[ΞΗΒC ΕΥ]
 Ο ΓΑΡ ΗΘΕ ΗΗΓΑΜΟC ΕΤΗΝΕ[.]
- 35 ΩΩΠΕ ΝΤΟΥΩΗ ΠΚΩΞΤ Ω[ΔΥ]

85.27 Till, Ménard: CΕΝ[ΔΧΙΧΡΙ] || 31 Ménard: CΕΝΑΞΩΤ[Ρ Η]Μ[ΟΟΥ ΑΥΩ]; Schenke: Η[ΕΤΩΟΥΕΤ] || 33 Till: CΕΝΑ[ΧΠ]Ο ΗΠΟ[ΥΟΕΙΝ ΜΑΥΧΠ]; Ménard: CΕΝΑΧΕΡΟ ΗΠΟ[ΥΟΕΙΝ ΜΕΥΧΠ]; Layton: ΗΠΟΥ[ΟΕΙΝ . . .] || 34 Till, Ménard: ΕΤΗΝ[ΑΥ ΕΡΟΟΥ ΔΗ ΕΥ]; Schenke: ΕΤΗΝΕ[ΘΗΠ ΩΥΧ] || 35 Ménard: Ω[ΔΥΜΟΥΞ]; Schenke: Ω[ΔΥΡΟΟΥΕΙΝ].

85 (= Plate 133)

- 1 of water bears down upon them. If
 some happen to be of the priestly tribe,
 these will be able to enter
 inside the veil with the
 5 high priest. Therefore the veil
 was not rent above only, since
 it would have been opened to those above only, nor
 was it rent below only, since
 it would have been revealed to those below
 10 only, but it was rent from above to below.¹⁵⁸ Those
 above have opened those below for us
 so that we may enter the secret
 of the truth. This truly is that which is honoured,
 which is strong,¹⁵⁹ but we will enter there
 15 through despised types and weaknesses.
 They are humbled in the presence of the perfect glory.
 There is glory superior to glory,¹⁶⁰ there is power superior
 to power. Therefore the perfect was opened
 for us with the secrets of the truth and
 20 the Holies of the Holies were uncovered and
 the bedroom has invited us in.¹⁶¹ As long as
 it is hidden, evil is idle, but
 it has not been taken from the midst of the seed of the
 Holy Spirit. They are slaves of wickedness.
 25 But whenever it is uncovered, then the
 perfect light will flow out upon
 everyone and all those who are in it will [receive]
 [chrism.] Then the slaves will become free [and]
 the captives will be redeemed. “[Every] plant [which]
 30 my father who is in heaven has not planted [will be]
 uprooted.”¹⁶² Those who have been separated will be joined [...]]
 will be filled. Everyone who will [enter]
 the bedroom shall ignite their [lamp],¹⁶³
 for [it] is like the marriages that are [...]]
 35 happen at night, the fire [...]

¹⁵⁸ Cf. Matt 27:51; Mark 15:38.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. 1 Cor 4:10.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. 2 Cor 3:18.

¹⁶¹ Cf. 1 Thess 2:12; 1 Pet 5:10.

¹⁶² Matt 15:13.

¹⁶³ Cf. Matt 5:15; 25:1–13; Mark 4:21; Luke 8:16; 11:33.

86 (= Plate 134)

- 1 ἡ̄τογῶν θρᾱκῆνε ἡ̄μγστηριον δε
 ἡ̄πιγamos ἡ̄τογ θρᾱκῶκ εβολ ρ̄ἡπε
 ροογ ἡ̄πογοειν μαρεφοογ ετ̄ἡμαγ
 η̄ πεγογοειν ρωτπ ερωαογα ῶωπε ἡ̄
- 5 ῶηρε ἡ̄πηνγμφων φναχι ἡ̄πογοειν
 ετ̄ἡογα χιτγ εφ̄ἡνεειμα φναωχιτγ
 αν ἡ̄πκενα πεταχιπογοειν ετ̄ἡμαγ
 σεναναγ αν ερωγ ογτε σεναφμεαρτε
 αν ἡ̄μογ αγω ἡ̄λααγ ναωρ̄σκηλλε ἡ̄
- 10 παει ἡ̄ττεινεενε καν εφ̄ρπολιτεγες
 θᾱι ρ̄ἡπκοσμος αγω οη εφ̄ωδει εβολ
 ρ̄ἡπκοσμος η̄δη αφχι ἡ̄ταληθ̄εια ρ̄ἡ
 ἡ̄ρικων πκοσμος αφωωπε ἡ̄ναω(η̄)
 παιων γαρ εφωοοπ η̄αφ ἡ̄πληρω
- 15 μα αγω εφωοοπ ἡ̄ττειρε φογονρ εβολ
 η̄αφ ογααφ εφρηπ αν ρ̄ἡπκακε ἡ̄τογ
 ῶη αλλα εφρηπ ρ̄ἡνογροογ ἡ̄τελειο(η̄)
 ἡ̄ἡογοειν εφογααβ πεγαγγελιον
 πκαταφιλιπποσ

86 (= Plate 134)

- 1 at night, it is extinguished. But the mysteries
of that marriage are fulfilled in the
day and the light. That day
or its light does not set. If one becomes
5 a child of the bridal chamber,¹⁶⁴ he will receive the light.
If one does not receive it while being here, he will not be able to receive it
in the other place. He who will receive that light
will not be seen nor can he be detained,
and no one will be able to trouble
10 such a person even while he dwells
in the world, and, moreover, when he leaves
the world he has already received the truth in
the images. The world has become the aeons,
for the aeon is for him the fullness,
15 and it is in this way that it appears
to him alone. It is not hidden in the darkness and the
night, but it is hidden in a perfect day
and a holy light.¹⁶⁵ The Gospel
according to Philip.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. Matt 9:15; Mark 2:19; Luke 5:34.

¹⁶⁵ Cf. 1 Thess 5:5.

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