

WILHELM REICH

Character Analysis

Third, enlarged edition

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and Chester M. Raphael, M.D.*



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PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION

The second edition of this book (1945) was soon sold out, and the great demand for it could not be satisfied for more than two years. Our press was busy with publications devoted to the newer field of orgone biophysics (*The Discovery of the Orgone*, Vol. II: *The Cancer Biopathy*, 1948, etc.). Furthermore, I hesitated to issue a new edition of *Character Analysis*. This book still uses psychoanalytic terminology and a *psychological* description of the neuroses. In the fifteen years since the publication of the first edition, I had to redesign and rewrite our picture of emotional disease. During this time, many important developments took place: "character" became a term signifying typical *biophysical* behavior. The "emotions," more and more, came to mean manifestations of a tangible *bio-energy*, of the organismic orgone energy. Slowly, we learned to handle it practically by what is now called "medical orgone therapy." In the preface to the second edition, I pointed out that "character analysis" is still valid in the realm of depth psychology, where it originated and where it still belongs. We no longer practice character analysis as described in this book. However, we still use the character-analytic method in certain situations; we still proceed from character attitudes to the depths of human experience. But in orgone therapy, we proceed *bio-energetically* and no longer psychologically.

Why then publish a third edition of this book, in its original form? The main reason is that one cannot easily find one's way toward an understanding of orgonomy and medical orgone therapy without being well acquainted with their development from the study of human emotional pathology of twenty or twenty-five years ago.

Character analysis is still valid and helpful in psychiatry, but it is far from being sufficient to cope with the *bio-energetic core* of emotional functions. It is indispensable for the medical orgone therapist who, without having studied psychoanalysis, comes di-

rectly to the orgone biophysics of the 40's. The psychiatrist who has not studied the bio-energetic functions of the emotions is apt to overlook the organism as such and to remain stuck in the psychology of words and associations. He will not find his way to the *bio-energetic* background and origin of every type of emotion. The orgone therapist, on the other hand, trained to see a patient first of all as a biological organism, may easily forget that, besides muscular armoring, bodily sensations, orgonotic streamings, anorgonotic attacks, diaphragmatic or pelvic blocks, etc., there is a vast field of functioning such as marital distrust, specifically distorted ideas about genital functions in puberty, certain social insecurities and anxieties, unconscious intentions, rational social fears, etc. Although the "psychic realm" of the emotions is much narrower than their "bio-energetic realm"; although certain diseases, such as vascular hypertension, cannot be attacked by psychological means; although language and thought association cannot possibly penetrate more deeply than to the phase of speech development, that is, about the second year of life, the psychological aspect of emotional disease remains important and indispensable; however, it is no longer the foremost aspect of orgonomic biopsychiatry.

The third edition of *Character Analysis* has been considerably enlarged. I have added "The Emotional Plague," previously published as an article in the *International Journal of Sex-Economy and Orgone Research*, 1945. Also, a paper on "The Expressive Language of the Living," not previously published. It deals with the realm of *biophysical* emotional expressions, the main realm of medical orgone therapy. Finally, an extensive case history of a paranoid schizophrenia will introduce the student of human nature to the new field of *biopathology* which was opened up only a few years ago by the discovery of the organismic orgone energy (= bio-energy). This case history will convince the reader that the organismic orgone energy is the *physical reality* which corresponds to the classical, merely psychological, concept of "psychic energy."

The old term "vegetotherapy" has been replaced by "orgone therapy." Otherwise, the book remains unchanged in its main structure. It represents the essential first step, taken from 1928 to 1934, from psychoanalysis toward the bio-energetic study of the

emotions (orgone biophysics) and deserves to be preserved as such.

The discovery of the atmospheric (cosmic) orgone energy has forced major revisions in our basic physical as well as psychological concepts. These are not dealt with in this book. It will take many years of painstaking work to elucidate the main trends which have developed since the discovery of the orgone. Such things as a "psychic idea," for example, appear today in an entirely different light, as a result of disclosures made by orgonomic experiments. But this should not distract the psychotherapist and orgone therapist from his everyday task with emotionally sick people. At present, it is mainly the natural scientist and the natural philosopher who are being challenged by the disclosure of a universal primordial energy: orgone energy.

W. R.

December 1948

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

In the twelve years since the first publication of *Character Analysis*, the character-analytic technique has developed into vegetotherapy. In spite of this, no changes have been undertaken in the present edition. There is a good reason for this.

The character-analytic technique was clinically worked out and tested between 1925 and 1933. At that time, sex-economy was still in its infancy. The individual and social importance of the function of the orgasm had been recognized only a few years earlier. Naturally, this recognition had considerable influence on the theory and technique of psychoanalytic therapy. Today, as twelve years ago, character analysis definitely belongs within the framework of Freudian psychoanalysis. It was in this framework and only in this framework that this book was written and can still claim validity today. It was intended for students as well as practitioners of psychoanalysis. I do not want to change its original purpose and intention. Hence, I have not added anything, nor have I made any revisions.

Yet, as time went on, the analytic conception of the human character structure, particularly the pathologically and therapeutically so important "*character armor*," continued to develop. Character armor represents the point of departure of present-day *orgone biophysics* and of the therapeutic techniques corresponding to it, *vegetotherapy* and *orgone therapy*, the basic features of which are set forth in Vol. I of my book *The Discovery of the Orgone*, 1942, and in various essays dealing specifically with orgone physics. It is interesting and important for every psychiatrist to comprehend how the original psychiatric problem of the encrustation of the human character opened the road to biologic energy and biopathies. Orgone biophysics did not refute the character-analytic contentions set forth in this book. Quite the contrary, it provided them with a solid natural scientific foundation.

The appendix to the present edition of *Character Analysis* contains the last paper I delivered to the International Psychoanalytic Association at the 13th Congress in Lucerne, 1934. This paper represents the transition from Freud's depth psychology to biology and then to orgone biophysics. The problems of the orgone are not dealt with in this book. However, the reader who is familiar with my later writings will have no difficulty in discovering those passages in which orgone biophysics picks up the thread of the problems of character structure. Through the insertion of footnotes, I have attempted to point out those passages in which we find the transition from depth psychology to orgone biophysics.

The burden of drawing the line of demarcation which led to the exclusion of sex-economy and the theory of the orgasm from official psychoanalysis lies with those members of the International Psychoanalytic Association who were responsible for my expulsion. Later, they began to feel pricks of conscience and tried to make it appear as if I had been the one who had detached my theories from psychoanalysis. However, this much must be made quite clear here: sex-economy never sought to detach itself from Freud's basic scientific findings. It was false social considerations, which have become meaningless as a result of the social revolutions of the past ten years, that caused the psychoanalytic movement to detach itself from sex-economy. Sex-economy is not a rival of psychoanalysis any more than Newton's law of gravitation is a rival of Kepler's law of harmony. Sex-economy represents the continuation of Freudian psychoanalysis and provides it with a natural scientific foundation in the sphere of biophysics and social sexology. Today, it is sex-economy which can claim the success of having led to the discovery of the biologic energy, *orgone*, which, governed by definite physical laws, lies at the basis of the human sexual functions first described by Freud. The "*biopathies*" which orgone biophysics was able to detect in the *organic* sphere are the correlate of Freud's "psychoneuroses" in the psychological sphere.

Summing up, I should like to say that "character analysis" is still valid within the theoretical frame of reference of depth psychology and the *psychotherapeutic* techniques which pertain to it. It is also still valid as an indispensable auxiliary technique in

vegetotherapy and orgone therapy. But as time goes on, we continue to move forward: the sex-economist and vegetotherapist is essentially a *biotherapist*, and no longer merely a psychotherapist.

W. R.

New York

November 1944

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

The psychoanalytic investigations of the human character which I am setting forth in this book tie in with the problems of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Clinic which, nine years ago, I attempted to outline in the introduction to my book *Der triebhafte Charakter*, without, however, offering even a tentative solution. Those familiar with psychoanalytic research will not be surprised that well-nigh a decade has had to elapse between the formulation of the problem and its partial solution. When I suddenly undertook to treat several impulsive psychopaths at the clinic, I was immediately faced with a number of therapeutic problems. To be sure, the insights into the impulsive type's fragmentary ego-structure were more or less adequate to cope with these problems. Yet, it was possible even then to surmise that a genetic-dynamic theory of the character, a rigid differentiation between the actual content and the form of the resistances with which the "personality" attempts to thwart the exposure of what is repressed, and a well-founded examination of the genetic differentiation of character types would be of importance for the theory and therapy of the instinct-inhibited character neuroses which, at that time, I contrasted to the impulsive character neuroses.

The explanations of therapeutic technique and the dynamic-economic conception of the character as a totality are, in the main, the fruits of my vast experiences and countless discussions in the Seminar for Psychoanalytic Therapy at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Clinic. I was the head of this seminar for a period of six years, during which I enjoyed the active cooperation of a number of enthusiastic young colleagues. Even now, however, I must caution the reader to expect neither a complete elucidation of the problems under consideration nor their complete solution. Today, as nine years ago, we are still a long way from a comprehensive, systematic psychoanalytic characterology. Yet, in all

modesty, I feel that the present volume is no mean contribution toward this end.

The chapters on technique were written in the winter of 1928-29, and their validity could be verified over a period of four years. There were no essential changes to be made. The chapters on theory, up to Chapter III (Part II), are enlarged, in part revised, reprints of papers of mine which, over the past years, have appeared in the *Internationalen Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*.

For a number of reasons, one of them being lack of time, I was not able to comply with the wishes of my colleagues, who wanted me to write a book dealing with all phases of analytic technique. In this regard, I had to confine myself to a description and substantiation of the principles of technique which follow from character analysis. Besides, the analytic technique cannot be learned from books—practical application is vastly too complicated for that. One becomes intimate with it only through a thorough study of cases in seminars and in monitored sessions.

However, we shall have to deal more thoroughly with a serious criticism (an obvious one which is to be expected from a certain quarter), for on first impression it gives one pause for thought and makes one question the necessity of the effort and expenditure involved in such a publication as this one. It runs as follows: doesn't this publication as such constitute an extravagant and one-sided overvaluation of individual psychotherapy and characterology? In a city the size of Berlin, there are millions of neurotic people, people whose psychic structure and capacity for work and pleasure have been severely impaired; every hour of every day fresh thousands of neuroses are produced by family education and social conditions. In view of the present lack of interest in such matters, is there any point in printing detailed material on individual analytic technique, relations between various psychic structures, character dynamics, and similar matters? And this question is all the more pointed in view of the fact that I have no immediately applicable advice for a mass therapy of neuroses, for short, certain, and quickly effective treatments. For a long time I myself was not able to shake off the strong impression of such an objection. Finally, I had to tell myself that this was a shortsighted standpoint—in the long run,

even worse than the present-day obsession with questions of individual psychotherapy. From a social point of view, the position of individual psychotherapy is a hopeless one. It might even be regarded as a typical dialectical ruse that it was precisely this insight, i.e., that neuroses are socially produced on a mass scale, which led to an even more thorough, even more intensive concern with the problems of individual therapy. I have endeavored to demonstrate that neuroses are the results of a home atmosphere that is patriarchal and sexually suppressive; that, moreover, the only *prophylaxis* worthy of serious consideration is one for the practical implementation of which the present social system lacks every prerequisite; that it is only a thorough turnover of social institutions and ideologies, a turnover that will be dependent upon the outcome of the political struggles of our century, which will create the preconditions for an extensive prophylaxis of neuroses. Hence, it is clear that a prophylaxis of neuroses is out of the question unless it is prepared theoretically; in short, that the study of the dynamic and economic conditions of human structures is its most important prerequisite. What does this have to do with the technique of individual therapy? To make a study of human structures in a way that would have relevance for the prophylaxis of neuroses, it is first necessary to perfect our analytic technique. It will be shown in the course of the present work to what extent the existing technical knowledge cannot fulfill such a purpose. Hence, the chief concern of psychotherapy, insofar as it wants to prepare itself for the future tasks of the prevention of neuroses, must be to derive a theory of technique and therapy based on the dynamic and economic processes of the psychic mechanism. First of all, we need therapists who know why they were able to effect a change in a structure or can explain why they failed. When we undertake to combat an epidemic in any other branch of medicine, we use the best available methods to investigate and to understand typical individual cases of this epidemic in order then to be able to offer advice on social hygiene. Thus, we are concerned with the technique of individual analysis not because we have such a high regard for individual therapy, but because, without a good technique, we cannot gain the insights which we need for the more comprehensive goal of research on the human structure.

There is a further consideration, and it constitutes the general background of the following clinical investigations. Let us briefly sketch it at this point. Unlike other branches of medical science, we do not deal with bacteria or tumors but with human reactions and psychic illnesses. An offspring of medical science, psychoanalysis has developed far beyond it. If, according to a famous saying, man is the author of his own history, depending upon certain economic conditions and presuppositions; if the materialistic¹ conception of history does indeed proceed from the basic premise of sociology, the natural and psychic organization of man, then it is clear that, at a certain point, our research assumes decisive sociological importance. We study psychic structures, their economy and dynamics. The most important productive power, the productive power called working power, is dependent upon man's psychic structure. Neither the so-called "subjective factor" of history nor the productive power, working power, can be comprehended without a natural scientific psychology. This requires a detachment from those psychoanalytic concepts which explain culture and the history of human society on the basis of drives, instead of understanding that social conditions must first have impinged upon and changed human needs before these transformed drives and needs could begin to have an effect as historical factors. The most famous of today's characterologists endeavor to comprehend the world on the basis of "values" and "character," instead of vice versa: to deduce character and valuations from the social process.

In the broader scope of the question concerning the sociological function of character formation, we have to focus our attention on a fact which, while it is known well enough, is hardly understood in its details, namely that certain average human structures are native to certain social organizations. Or, to put it another way, every social organization produces those character structures which it needs to exist. In class society, the existing ruling class secures its position, with the help of education and the institution of the family, by making its ideologies the ruling ideologies of all members of the society. However, it is not solely a matter of implanting the ideologies in all members of the so-

¹ Footnote, 1945: today we would say "functional" conception.

ciety. It is not a matter of indoctrinating attitudes and opinions but of a far-reaching process in every new generation of a given society, the purpose of which is to effect a change in and mold psychic structures (and this in all layers of the population) in conformity with the social order. Hence, natural scientific psychology and characterology have a clearly defined task: they have to put their finger on the ways and mechanisms by means of which man's social entity is transformed into psychic structure and, thereby, into ideology. Thus, the social production of ideologies has to be differentiated from the reproduction of these ideologies in the people of a given society. While the investigation of the former is the task of sociology and economics, the ascertaining of the latter is the task of psychoanalysis. It has to study how not only the immediate material existence (nourishment, shelter, clothing, work process, i.e., the way of life and the way in which needs are gratified) but also the so-called social superstructure (morality, laws, and institutions) affect the instinctual apparatus. It has to determine, as completely as possible, the myriad intermediate links in the transforming of the "material basis" into the "ideologic superstructure." It cannot be immaterial to sociology whether psychology fulfills this task adequately and to what extent it fulfills it, for man is, first and foremost, the *object* of his needs and of the social organization which regulates the gratification of his needs in this or that way. In his position as the object of his needs, however, man is also and at the same time the *subject* of history and of the social process of which he "himself is the author," not, to be sure, exactly as he would like to be, but under definite economic and cultural presuppositions, which determine the content and outcome of human action.

Since society became divided into those who possess the means of production and those who possess the commodity, working power, every social order has been established by the former, at least independent of the wills and minds of the latter, indeed usually against their wills. However, in that this social order begins to mold the psychic structures of all members of the society, it *reproduces* itself in the people. And insofar as this takes place through the utilization and transformation of the instinctual apparatus, which is governed by the libidinal needs, it also affectively *anchors* itself in it. Ever since the beginning of

the private ownership of the means of production, the first and most important organ for the reproduction of the social order has been the patriarchal family, which lays in its children the character groundwork for the later influencing by the authoritarian order. While, on the one hand, the family represents the primary reproduction organ of character structures, the insight into the role of sexual education in the educational system as a whole teaches us that, first and foremost, they are *libidinal* interests and energies which are employed in the anchoring of the authoritarian social order. Hence, the character structures of the people of a given epoch or of a given social system are not only a mirror of this system. More significantly, they represent its anchoring. In the course of an investigation of the change in sexual morality during the transition from matriarchy to patriarchy,² it was possible to demonstrate that this anchoring by means of adapting the structures of people's characters to the new social order constitutes the conservative nature of so-called "tradition."

It is in this anchoring of the social order in the character structure that we find the explanation of the toleration on the part of the suppressed layers of the population toward the rulership of an upper social class that has the means of power at its disposal, a toleration that sometimes goes so far as to affirm authoritarian suppression at the expense of its own interests. This is far more obvious in the sphere of sexual suppression than it is in the sphere of the material and cultural gratification of needs. And yet, precisely in the formation of the libidinal structure, it can be demonstrated that, coeval with the anchoring of a social order, which completely or partially obstructs the gratification of one's needs, the psychic preconditions begin to develop which undermine this anchoring in the character structure. As time goes on, an ever widening divergency springs up between forced renunciation and the increased strain on one's needs. This divergency takes place along with the development of the social process, and it has a disintegrating effect upon "tradition"; it constitutes the psychological core of the formation of mental attitudes that undermine this anchoring.

² Cf. *Der Einbruch der Sexualmoral*, now published in English as *The Invasion of Compulsory Sex-Morality*. Ed.

It would be wrong to equate the conservative element of the character structure of the men and women of our society with the arbiter which we call the "superego." While it is certainly true that a person's moralistic arbiters derive from the definite prohibitions of the society, of which the parents function as the chief representatives in life, it is equally true that the first changes in the ego and the instincts, changes that occur during the earliest frustrations and identifications, long before the superego is formed, are dictated by the economic structure of the society and represent the initial reproductions and anchorings of the social system, in the same way as they begin to develop the first contradictions. (If a child develops an anal character, he will be sure to develop a corresponding stubbornness at the same time.) The superego receives its special importance for this anchoring in that it groups itself in the core around the child's incestuous genital demands; it is here that the best energies are bound and that the formation of the character is determined.

The dependence of the character formation upon the historical-economic situation in which it takes place is most clearly shown in the changes exhibited by the members of primitive societies as soon as they fall under the influence of an alien economy or culture, or begin to develop a new social order on their own accord. It follows quite clearly from Malinowski's studies that the character distinctions change relatively rapidly in the same region when the social structure is changed. For example, he found the natives of the Amphlett Islands (South Sea) to be distrustful, shy, and hostile, as opposed to the neighboring Trobrianders, whom he found to be simple, frank, and open. The former were already living under a patriarchal social system with strict familial and sexual mores, whereas the latter were still to a large extent enjoying the freedom of matriarchy. These findings confirm the conception, formulated at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Clinic and developed elsewhere,³ that the social and economic structure of a society impinges upon the character formation of its members in an indirect, very complicated, circuitous way. The society's socioeconomic structure dictates definite modes of famil-

³ *The Invasion of Compulsory Sex-Morality*, and "Dialektischer Materialismus und Psychoanalyse," published in *Unter dem Banner des Marxismus*, 1929.

ial life, but these modes not only presuppose definite forms of sexuality; they also produce them inasmuch as they influence the instinctual life of the child and adolescent, from which changed attitudes and modes of reaction result. At this point we can extend our earlier statement about the reproduction and anchoring of the social system, and say: *the character structure is the congealed sociological process of a given epoch*. A society's ideologies can become a material force only on condition that they actually change the character structures of the people. Hence, research on character structure is not of clinical interest only. It can reveal essential material if we turn to the question of why ideologies undergo revolutionary changes at a much slower pace than the socioeconomic basis, i.e., why man usually lags far behind that which he produces and which should and could actually change him. In addition to the hindrance to participation in cultural enjoyment due to class, we have the fact that character structures are acquired in early childhood and remain intact, without undergoing many changes. On the other hand, the socioeconomic situation that formed their basis at one time changes rapidly with the development of the forces of production, later makes different demands and requires other kinds of adaptations. To be sure, it also creates new attitudes and modes of reaction that superimpose on and penetrate the old, earlier-acquired characteristics, without, however, eliminating them. These two sets of characteristics, which correspond to different, historically differentiated sociological situations, now become involved in a contradiction with one another. Let me cite an example by way of illustration. A woman reared in the family of 1900 develops a mode of reaction corresponding to the socioeconomic situation of 1900; by 1925, however, as a result of the process of economic disintegration brought about by capitalism, familial conditions have changed to such a degree that she becomes involved in a critical contradiction, despite a partial surface adaptation of her personality. For instance, her character requires a strict monogamous sexual life; in the meantime, however, monogamy has become socially and ideologically disintegrated. Intellectually, the woman can no longer require monogamy of herself or her husband; in terms of her structure, however, she is not equal to the new conditions and the demands of her intellect.

Similar questions arise when one follows the difficulties involved in the transformation of privately owned farms into the collective cultivation of the soil in the Soviet Union. The Soviet economy has had to wrestle not only with economic difficulties but also with the character structure which the Russian peasant acquired under the tsars and private enterprise. The role played in these difficulties by the dissolution of the family through the collectives and, above all, through the revolutionary change in sexuality can be roughly understood from the literature on this subject. The old structures not only lag behind; they struggle against the new in many different ways. If the old ideology or orientation which corresponds to an earlier sociological situation were not anchored in the structure of the instincts or, more properly speaking, in the structure of the character, as a chronic and automatic mode of reaction and, in addition, with the help of libidinal energy, it would be able to adapt to the economic revolutions more easily and much more rapidly. No detailed proof is needed to show that an exact knowledge of the mechanisms that mediate between economic situation, instinctual life, character formation, and ideology would make possible a number of practical measures, above all in the field of education, but perhaps even in the manner of mass influencing.

All these things still have to be worked out. But the science of psychoanalysis cannot demand to be practically and theoretically recognized on a social scale if it *itself* does not get control of those fields which belong to it and in which it can prove that it does not want to remain outside the great historical events of our century. For the time being, research in the field of characterology must persist in its clinical investigations. Perhaps the material set forth in Part II will reveal of itself where the transitions lie to the more comprehensive sociological questions. Elsewhere an attempt has already been made to pursue these questions briefly. They led to an unexpected field, which we will not enter into in *this* work.

W. R.

Berlin

January 1933

PART ONE

Technique

CHAPTER I

SOME PROBLEMS OF PSYCHOANALYTIC TECHNIQUE

In the practice of his profession, the analyst is daily confronted with problems, for whose solution neither theoretical knowledge nor practical experience alone is adequate. It can be said that all questions of technique cluster around the one essential question, namely whether and how a clearly defined technique of analytic treatment can be deduced from the psychoanalytic theory of psychic illness. It is the question of the possibilities and limits of the application of theory to practice. However, in view of the fact that analytic practice itself does not yield the theory of psychic processes until practical tasks have been set, we have, to proceed correctly, to seek out the avenues which lead from purely empirical practice, pass through theory, and terminate in a theoretically well-grounded practice. Vast experience in the Vienna Seminar for Psychoanalytic Therapy and in monitored analytic sessions has shown that we have hardly progressed beyond the preliminary work toward the solution of the problem sketched above. It is true that we have the basic material, the so-called ABC of analytic technique, in Freud's various essays and his scattered remarks on the subject; and the very informative works on technique by Ferenczi and other writers have increased our understanding of many individual problems of technique. Generally speaking, however, there are just as many techniques as there are analysts, notwithstanding Freud's commonly shared, partially positive and partially negative suggestions, which are few compared with the welter of questions centered on practice.

These generally valid principles of technique which have become a matter of course among analysts are deduced from the general basic theoretical concepts of the neurotic process. All

neuroses can be traced back to the conflict between repressed instinctual demands—among which the sexual demands of early childhood are never missing—and the ego forces which ward them off. The result of the failure to resolve this conflict is the neurotic symptom or the neurotic character trait. In terms of technique, therefore, the resolution of the conflict necessitates the “elimination of the repression”; in other words, the making conscious of the unconscious conflict. But the psychic agency known as the preconscious has erected psychic “counter-cathexes” against the breakthrough of repressed, unconscious impulses, “counter-cathexes” which act as a strict censor of one’s own thoughts and desires by preventing them from becoming conscious; so it is necessary in analytic treatment to dispense with the usual ordering of one’s thoughts required in everyday thinking and to allow one’s train of ideas to flow freely and without critical selection. In the course of analytic work, traces of one’s unconscious repressed demands and childhood experiences stand out ever more clearly amid the emerging material and, with the help of the analyst, these traces have to be translated into the language of the conscious. The so-called basic rule of psychoanalysis, which requires that the censor be abolished and one’s thoughts be allowed to “associate freely,” is the strictest, most indispensable measure of analytic technique. It finds a powerful support in the force of the unconscious impulses and desires pressing toward action and consciousness; however, it is opposed by another force, which is also unconscious, namely the “counter-cathexis” of the ego. This force makes it difficult and sometimes impossible for the patient to follow this basic rule. This same force also feeds the neurosis through the moralistic agencies. In the analytic treatment, these forces show up as “resistances” to the elimination of the repression. This theoretical insight dictates a further rule of practice, namely that the making conscious of the unconscious must not proceed directly but by the breaking down of the resistances. This means the patient has to realize that he is resisting, then by what means, and finally against what.

The work of making the unconscious conscious is called “interpretation”; it consists either in the unveiling of veiled expressions of the unconscious or in the reestablishment of relations

which were torn asunder by the repressions. The patient's unconscious and repressed desires and fears are constantly seeking release or, more precisely, contact with real persons and situations. The most important driving force of this behavior is the patient's ungratified libido. Hence, it is to be expected that he will relate his unconscious demands and fears to the analyst and the analytic situation. This results in the "transference," i.e., the establishment of relationships to the analyst which are prompted by hate, love, or fear. But these attitudes which are expressed toward the analyst in the analytic situation are merely repetitions of older, usually childish attitudes toward people of the patient's childhood who had a special importance for him at one time. The patient has no awareness of their meaning. These transferences must be principally handled as such, i.e., they must be "resolved" by discovering how they are related to the patient's childhood. Since every neurosis, without exception, can be traced back to conflicts of childhood prior to the fourth year of life, conflicts which could not be handled at that time but become resuscitated in the transference, the analysis of the transference, i.e., that part of it which deals with the breaking down of the resistances, constitutes the most important piece of analytic work. Since, moreover, in the transference the patient either tries to supplant the explanatory work of the analysis, e.g., by gratifying the old love demands and hate impulses which have remained unsatisfied, or refuses to take cognizance of these attitudes, the transference usually develops into a resistance, i.e., it impedes the progress of the treatment. The negative transferences, i.e., the attitudes expressive of hate which are projected upon the analyst, are easily recognized as resistances from the beginning, whereas the transference of positive attitudes of love becomes a resistance only through a sudden change into a negative transference as a consequence of disappointment or fear.

Only as long as analytic therapy and technique were not discussed at any great length, or were insufficiently and unsystematically discussed, could the view prevail that a technique practiced by everyone in the same way had developed from the common basis sketched above. This view was true of many individual questions; but in the comprehension of the concept of "analytic passivity," for instance, the most varied interpretations

exist. The most extreme and surely the least correct is the view that one need merely be silent; everything else will follow of itself. Confused views prevailed and still prevail on the function of the analyst in the analytic treatment. It is generally known, to be sure, that he has to break down the resistances and to "manage" the transference, but how and when this is to take place, how diverse his approach has to be in the handling of this task in various cases and situations, was never systematically discussed. Hence, even in the simplest questions dealing with everyday analytic situations, the views are of necessity vastly divergent. When, for instance, a certain resistance situation is described, one analyst thinks that this, another that that, and a third that the other should be done. And when, then, the analyst who described the situation returns to his case with the various suggestions of his colleagues, countless other possibilities arise, and the confusion is often much greater than it was in the first place. And yet it is to be assumed that, under given circumstances and conditions, a definite analytic situation admits of only *one single*, optimal possibility of solution, that there is only one application of technique that can really be correct in any given case. This applies not only to a particular situation; it applies to analytic technique as a whole. Hence, the task is to establish the criteria of this correct technique and, above all, how one arrives at it.

It took a long time to realize what is important: *to allow the technique of a given situation to grow out of the specific analytic situation itself by an exact analysis of its details*. This method of developing the analytic technique was strictly adhered to at the Vienna seminar, and it proved successful in many cases—in all cases where a theoretical comprehension of the analytic situation was possible. Suggestions which, in the final analysis, were a matter of taste, were avoided. A given difficulty was discussed—for example, a resistance situation—until the measure necessary to deal with it emerged of itself from the discussion, in a clear and definite form. Then one had the feeling that it could be correct only in this way and in no other way. Thus, a method had been found which made it possible to apply analytic material to the analytic technique, if not in every case, then at least in many cases and—above all—fundamentally. Our technique is not a principle that rests upon firmly fixed practices but a method built

upon certain basic theoretical principles; as for the rest, it can be determined in the individual case and in the individual situation only. One might say that the making conscious of all manifestations of the unconscious through interpretations is a basic principle. But does this imply that this unconscious material has to be immediately interpreted as soon as it begins to show itself with some degree of clarity? That all transference manifestations are to be traced back to their infantile source is another basic principle. But does this tell us at what point and how this is to take place? The analyst is faced with negative and positive transferences at one and the same time; fundamentally, both have to be "resolved." But isn't one justified in asking what is to be resolved first and in what sequence, and which conditions are decisive for determining this? In this connection, is it sufficient to say that there are indications of ambivalent transference?

Against the attempt to deduce from the particular situation as a whole the sequence, emphasis, and depth of the interpretations necessary in each individual case, it would be easy to contend: interpret everything as it appears. To this contention, we reply: when countless experiences and the subsequent theoretical assessment of these experiences teach us that the interpretation of the entire material in this way and in the sequence in which it appears does not, in a very large number of cases, achieve the purpose of interpretation, namely therapeutic influencing, then it becomes necessary to search for the conditions that determine the therapeutic effectiveness of an interpretation. These are different in every case, and even if, from the point of view of technique, some basic general principles applicable to interpretation are yielded, they do not signify that much as compared with the supreme principle, namely that the analyst must endeavor to wrest the special technique of the case and the individual situation from each individual case and from each individual situation, without, while so doing, losing the general continuity in the development of the analytic process. Suggestions and views such as that this or that has "to be analyzed," or it is simply "a matter of analyzing correctly," are matters of taste; they are not principles of technique. What is precisely meant by "analyze" usually remains a dark secret. Nor can the analyst seek consolation by trusting to the duration of the treatment. Time alone will not do

it. Having faith in the duration of the treatment is meaningful only when the analysis is developing, i.e., when the analyst understands the resistances and can pursue the analysis accordingly. Then, naturally, time is not and cannot be a factor. But it is absurd to expect that a success can be achieved merely by waiting.

We shall have to show how important the correct comprehension and handling of the *first* transference resistance is for the natural development of the treatment. It is not immaterial which detail and which layer of the transference neurosis is approached for the first time in the work of analysis, whether the analyst selects this or that piece from the wealth of material offered by the patient, whether the analyst interprets the unconscious material that has become manifest or the resistance pertaining to it, etc. If the analyst interprets the material in the sequence in which it is offered, he proceeds upon the preconceived notion that "material" is always capable of being used analytically, i.e., that all material is therapeutically effective. In this connection, however, it is its dynamic value that is most important. The prime objective of my efforts to secure a theory of technique and therapy is to establish general as well as particular points of view for the *legitimate application* of material to the technical handling of the case; to secure a theory, in other words, which will enable the analyst to know, in each interpretation, precisely why and toward what end he is interpreting—and not merely to interpret. If the analyst interprets the material in the sequence in which it appears in *each* case, whether or not the patient is deceiving, using the material as a camouflage, concealing an attitude of hate, laughing up his sleeve, is emotionally blocked, etc., he (the analyst) will be sure to run into hopeless situations. Proceeding in such a way, the analyst is caught in a scheme which is imposed on all cases, without regard to the *individual* requirements of the case with respect to the timing and depth of the necessary interpretations. Only by strict adherence to the rule of deducing the technique from every situation can the analyst begin to meet the demand that he be able to state, in each and every case, exactly why he succeeded or failed to effect a cure. If the analyst cannot, at least in the average case, satisfy this demand, no proof is necessary to show that our therapy does not deserve the name of a scientific causal

therapy. However, in explaining the reasons for the failure of a particular case, the analyst must avoid statements such as that the patient "did not want to get well," or he or she was not accessible; for this is precisely what we want to know: *why* didn't the patient want to get well, *why* wasn't he or she accessible.

No attempt shall be made to establish a "system" of technique. It is not a matter of outlining a scheme valid for all cases but of establishing a groundwork, based on our theory of neurosis, for the comprehension of our therapeutic tasks; in short, to trace a broad frame of reference allowing sufficient latitude for the application of the general groundwork to individual cases.

I have nothing to add to Freud's principles on the interpretation of the unconscious and his general formula that the analytic work depends on the elimination of the resistances and the handling of the transference. However, the following explication must be regarded as a consistent application of the basic principles of psychoanalysis, in the course of which new areas of analytic work are opened. If our patients adhered to the basic rules at least roughly, there would be no reason to write a book on character analysis. Unfortunately, only a very small fraction of our patients are capable of analysis from the outset; most patients adhere to the basic rule only after the resistances have been successfully loosened. Hence, we shall concern ourselves merely with the initial phases of the treatment up to the point at which the course of the analysis can be confidently left to the patient. The first problem is "to teach the patient to be analyzed." The second is the termination of analysis, the problem of resolving the transference and of teaching the patient to deal with reality. The middle part, the body of the analysis, as it were, will be of interest to us only insofar as it follows from the initial phase of the treatment and leads to its termination.

Before we begin, however, a brief theoretical consideration of the libido-economic basis of analytic therapy is called for.

CHAPTER II

THE ECONOMIC VIEWPOINT IN THE THEORY OF ANALYTIC THERAPY

When Freud moved away from the position of cathartic therapy, gave up hypnosis as a device of analysis, and assumed the standpoint that what the patient was able to tell the analyst while asleep could also be communicated while awake, he tried for a time to make the patient aware of the unconscious meaning of the symptoms by direct interpretation of the traces of repressed elements. It wasn't long before he discovered that this method was dependent upon the readiness on the part of the patient to accept what the analyst pointed out. He divined that the patient put up a "resistance," which was usually unconscious, to the analyst's statements. Thus, he adapted his technique to the new knowledge, i.e., he dispensed with direct interpretation and attempted, from then on, to enable the unconscious to become conscious by eliminating the resistances directed against the repressed elements.

This fundamental change in the theoretic conception and technique of analytic therapy was a turning point in its history, which marked the beginning of the newer, still valid technique. This was never understood by those students who turned away from Freud; even Rank returned to the old method of direct symptom interpretation. In the present work, we have merely applied the new technique of dealing with resistances to the analysis of the character, entirely in keeping with the development of analytic therapy from symptom analysis to the analysis of the personality as a whole.

Whereas, in the period of cathartic therapy, the idea existed that it was necessary "to liberate the strangulated affect from repression" to bring about the disappearance of the symptom, it

was later stated, in the period of resistance analysis (this was perhaps a carry-over from the direct interpretation of the symptom's meaning) that the symptom would *of necessity* disappear when the repressed idea upon which it rested had been made conscious. Then, when it turned out that this thesis was untenable, when it was repeatedly observed that symptoms, despite the consciousness of their formerly repressed contents, often continued to exist, Freud, in a discussion at a meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, changed the first formula to read that the symptom *might* disappear when its unconscious content had become conscious but that it *did not have to* disappear.

Now one was confronted by a new and difficult problem. If becoming conscious, by itself, was not enough to effect a cure, what other factors were necessary to cause the symptom to disappear; what further conditions decided whether becoming conscious would lead to a cure or not? Hence, the making conscious of the repressed contents remained *the* indispensable precondition of cure; it did not, however, specifically account for it. Once this question had been posed, it was immediately joined by another, namely whether those opponents of psychoanalysis were right, after all, who had always exhorted that analysis had to be followed by "synthesis." However, closer examination showed quite clearly that this exhortation was but a hollow phrase. At the Budapest Congress, Freud himself completely refuted it by pointing out that analysis and synthesis went hand in hand, since every drive which is set free from one relationship immediately forms another relationship. Was this perhaps a key to the solution of the problem? Which drives and which new relationships were we dealing with? Doesn't it make any difference what kind of libido structure the patient has when he leaves the analysis? As an analyst, one has ceased to search for a godhead in psychotherapy and must content oneself with the finding of a solution more in keeping with the pretensions of the average man. Surely, all psychotherapy suffers from the fact that the primitive-biological and the sociological bases of all the so-called higher aspirations have been neglected. The way out was again indicated by Freud's inexhaustible libido theory, which in many cases had been more than neglected in recent years of analytic research. But there were still too many questions all at once. For

the sake of brevity, we shall arrange them according to metapsychological points of view.

Topographically, the problem could not be solved. Such an attempt would only have proved inadequate: the mere translation of an unconscious idea into consciousness is not enough to effect a cure. A solution from the *dynamic* point of view was promising but likewise inadequate, notwithstanding the fact that Ferenczi and Rank had made successful efforts in this connection.¹ It is true that the abreaction of the affect related to an unconscious idea almost always alleviates the patient's condition, but usually for a short time only. It must be borne in mind that, apart from certain forms of hysteria, it is difficult to achieve abreaction in the concentrated form necessary to produce the desired result. Thus, only the *economic* point of view remained. It is quite clear that the patient suffers from an inadequate, disturbed libido economy; the normal biological functions of his or her sexuality are in part pathologically distorted, in part completely negated—both contrary to the average healthy person. And surely the normal or abnormal functioning of the libido economy is dependent upon the libido's organization. Hence, one must be able to make a functional distinction between those libido organizations which enable the libido economy to function normally and those which disrupt it. Our later differentiation between two prototypes, the "genital" character and the "neurotic" character, is an attempt to solve this problem.

Whereas, however, the topographical and the dynamic points of view were, from the outset, easy to handle in everyday practice (consciousness or unconsciousness of an idea, intensity of the affective breakthrough of a repressed element, etc.), it was not immediately clear how the economic point of view could be applied in practice. We are dealing here of course with the quantitative factor of psychic life, with the amount of libido which is dammed up or discharged. But how were we to tackle this quantitatively determined difficulty, in view of the fact that in psychoanalysis we deal directly with qualities only? To begin with, we had to understand why we were continually coming up against the quantitative factor in our theory of neurosis and why

¹ Cf. *Development of Psychoanalysis*.

the qualitative factor of psychic life was not, in itself, sufficient to explain psychic phenomena. While experience and deliberation on the problem of analytic therapy always pointed to the problem of quantities, an empirical solution turned up unexpectedly.

We learn from analytic practice that some cases, notwithstanding protracted and copious analysis, remain refractory; whereas other cases, despite incomplete examination of the unconscious, can achieve lasting practical recovery. In comparing these two groups,² it turned out that, after the analysis, the former cases, namely those which remained refractory or readily relapsed, had not succeeded in establishing a regulated sexual life or had continued to live in abstinence; whereas the latter, enabled to do so by a partial analysis, quickly took up a lasting and satisfactory sexual life. In an investigation of the prognosis of average cases, it was further shown that, under otherwise equal conditions, the chances of cure were that much more favorable the more completely genital primacy had been achieved in childhood and adolescence. Or, to put it another way, the cure was impeded to the extent to which the libido had been withheld from the genital zone in early childhood. The cases that proved to be more or less inaccessible were those in which genital primacy had not been established at all in childhood, the cases in which the activity of genitality had been restricted to anal, oral, and urethral eroticism.³ However, in view of the fact that genitality proved to have such prognostic importance, it seemed obvious to investigate in these cases the evidence of genitality, their potency. It turned out that there were no female patients whose vaginal potency was not disturbed and hardly any male patients whose ejaculative or erective potency was not impaired. However, the patients whose potency was intact in the usual sense, the small number of erectively potent neurotics, were enough to erode the value of genitality for the understanding of the economics of cure.

Eventually, one had to reach the conclusion that it doesn't

²Cf. Reich: "Über Genitalität" and "Die therapeutische Bedeutung der Genitallibido," *Internationalen Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Vol. X (1924) and XI (1925).

³In the meantime, we have discovered possibilities of considerably improving even such cases.

make any difference whether erective potency exists; this fact tells us nothing about the *economy* of the libido. What is important, evidently, is *whether the capacity to achieve adequate sexual gratification* is intact. This is quite clearly not the case in female patients suffering from vaginal anesthesia; here it is clear from which source the symptoms derive their energy, and what sustains the libido stasis, which is of course the specific energy source of the neurosis. The *economic* concept of *orgastic* impotence, i.e., the incapacity to achieve a resolution of sexual tension satisfactory to the libidinal demands, was first derived from the more thorough investigation of male patients having erective potency. The far-reaching importance of genitality or, more precisely, of orgastic impotence for the etiology of the neurosis was set forth in my book *The Function of the Orgasm*. It wasn't until its implications for the theory of the *actual neurosis* were shown that the genital function became theoretically important—for investigations of the character also. Suddenly it was clear where the problem of quantity was to be sought: it could be nothing other than the organic groundwork, the "*somatic core of the neurosis*," the actual neurosis which results from dammed-up libido. And, therefore, the economic problem of the neurosis as well as its cure lay, to a large extent, in the somatic sphere, i.e., was accessible only by way of the somatic content of the libido concept.⁴

Now one was also in a better position to decide what other factors, apart from the making conscious of the unconscious, were necessary to cause the symptom to disappear. It is only the *meaning* (ideational content) of the symptom that becomes conscious. In terms of dynamics, the process of becoming conscious brings about a certain alleviation through the emotional discharge which goes hand in hand with it, and through the elimination of a part of preconscious counter-cathexis. But these processes in themselves do not effect very much of a change at the *source* of the energy of the symptom or neurotic character trait. The libido stasis remains, notwithstanding the consciousness of the symptom's meaning. The pressure of the high-strung libido can be partially relieved through intensive analytic work, but the over-

⁴ Cf. Reich: "Die Rolle der Genitalität in der Neurosentherapie," *Zeitschrift für Aertzliche Psychotherapie*, Vol. I (1925).

whelming majority of our patients require *genital* sexual gratification (because the pregenital cannot produce an orgasm) for a permanent resolution of sexual tension. It is only after this step, which is made possible by the analysis, that an economic readjustment also takes place. At that time, I tried to formulate this conception in the following way: by removing sexual repressions, the analysis creates the possibility of a *spontaneous organotherapy of neuroses*. Hence, *the ultimate therapeutic agent is an organic process in the metabolic sexual economy*, a process which is related to the sexual gratification achieved in the genital orgasm and, with the elimination of the actual neurosis, the somatic core, also erodes the groundwork of the psychoneurotic superstructure. At the outset, when the neurosis begins to develop, an external inhibition (tangible fear), which then becomes internalized, produces the libido stasis, which in turn imparts its pathological energy to the experiences of the Oedipal stage and, perpetuated as a consequence of sexual repression, keeps the psychoneurosis constantly supplied with energy in a kind of cyclic motion. Therapy works in reverse order in that it first breaks down the psychoneurosis by making conscious the unconscious inhibitions and fixations, thus opening the way to the elimination of the libido stasis. Once this stasis has been eliminated, again in a kind of cycle, the repression and the psychoneurosis have also become unnecessary, indeed impossible.

Roughly speaking, this is the concept which, in the book mentioned above, I developed with respect to the role of the somatic core of the neurosis. From this concept, a larger framework and a clearly defined therapeutic goal ensue for the technique of analysis: the establishment of genital primacy not only in theory but also in practice; *that is to say, the patient must, through analysis, arrive at a regulated and gratifying genital life*—if he is to be cured and permanently so. No matter how short of this goal we may fall in some cases, it is, on the basis of our insights into the dynamics of the libido stasis, the actual goal of our efforts. It is not without danger to lay less stress upon the therapeutic demand for effective sexual gratification as a goal than upon the demand for sublimation, if only because the ability to sublimate is still an ill-understood endowment, whereas the capacity for sexual gratification, even if significantly restricted by

social factors, is on the average attainable through analysis. It is easily understood that the shifting of the stress of the goal of the treatment from sublimation to direct sexual gratification broadens considerably the sector of our therapeutic possibilities. Yet it is precisely in this shifting that we encounter difficulties of a social nature, difficulties that we cannot underestimate.

However, that this goal is not achieved by means of instruction, "synthesis," or suggestion but solely through the thorough analysis of the sexual inhibitions rooted in the *character* will have to be demonstrated in the following discussions dealing with technique. But first let us make a few comments on Nunberg's conception of the task.

In his book *Allgemeine Neurosenlehre*, Nunberg attempts to interpret the theory of psychoanalytic therapy; we extract the most important of his views. He is of the opinion that the "first therapeutic task is . . . to help the instincts to achieve discharge and to provide them with access to consciousness." Nunberg further sees an important task "in the establishment of peace between the two poles of the personality, the ego and the id, in the sense that the instincts will no longer lead an isolated existence shut off from the organization of the ego and that the ego will regain its synthesizing power." This, even if incomplete, is essentially correct. But Nunberg is also the exponent of the old view, proved erroneous by practical experience, that, in the act of remembering, psychic energy is discharged, that it is, so to speak, "detonated" in the act of becoming conscious. Thus, in the explanation of cure from the point of view of dynamics, he draws the line at the becoming conscious of what is repressed, without asking whether the minimal quantities of affect which are discharged in this process are also sufficient to release the dammed-up libido in its entirety and to balance the energy economy. If, to counter this objection, Nunberg contended that in the course of the many acts of becoming conscious the entire quantity of the dammed-up energy is indeed disposed of, he could be confronted with a wealth of clinical experiences which clearly indicate the following: only a small fraction of the affect attached to a repressed idea is unlocked in the act of becoming conscious; the far greater and more important part is soon after shifted to another segment of unconscious activity if the affect is attached to the idea

itself; or a resolution of the affect does not take place at all if, for instance, it is absorbed into and made a part of the character. In such a case, the becoming conscious of unconscious material remains without therapeutic effect. In short, the dynamics of the cure can by no means be deduced solely from the act of becoming conscious.

This leads to another inevitable criticism of Nunberg's formulations. He writes that the repetition compulsion operates independent of the transference and that it is based on the attractive force of repressed infantile ideas. This would be correct if the repetition compulsion were a primary, irreducible psychic datum. Clinical experience shows, however, that the great attractive force exercised by the unconscious and infantile ideas derives from the energy of the unsatisfied sexual needs, and that it retains its compulsive repetitive character only as long as the possibility of mature sexual gratification is blocked. In short, the neurotic repetition compulsion is contingent on the libido's economic situation. Seen from this perspective as well as from the point of view to be encountered later in the formulations on the neurotic and genital characters, the peace between ego and id which Nunberg is justified in postulating can be secured only on a given sex-economic basis: first, through the supplanting of pre-genital strivings by genital strivings; second, through effective gratification of the genital demands, which, in turn, would solve the problem of the permanent elimination of stasis.

Nunberg's theoretical assumption leads to an attitude toward technique which we cannot look upon as the proper analytic attitude. Nunberg claims that the resistances should not be attacked directly; as he sees it, the positive transference should be exploited by the analyst for the purpose of insinuating himself into the patient's ego, from which vantage point he should set about their destruction. It is Nunberg's contention that a relationship similar to the one existing between a hypnotized person and the hypnotist would result from this. "Since, inside the ego, the analyst is surrounded by libido, he neutralizes to some extent the severity of the superego itself." In this way, he argues, the analyst becomes capable of bringing about the reconciliation of the two cloven parts of the neurotic personality.

In opposition to this, it is necessary to point out:

a) It is precisely this "insinuation" into the ego that is therapeutically dangerous in many cases, for in the beginning, as will be thoroughly elaborated later, there is no durable and genuine positive transference. In the initial stages of the analysis, we are always dealing with narcissistic attitudes, e.g., an infantile need for protection. In view of the fact that the reaction of disappointment is stronger than the positive object-relationship, this narcissistic dependence can readily change into hate. Such an "insinuating into" for the purpose of evading the resistances and "destroying" them from "within" constitutes a danger inasmuch as the resistances could become disguised in this way. What is more important, the old condition (if not the severest reactions of disappointment) will be reestablished as soon as the weak object-relationship falls apart or is usurped by other transferences. It is precisely through such procedures that we bring about the most severe, most devious, and least controllable manifestations of negative transference. Termination of the analysis by the patient or even suicide is very often the result of such procedures. It is necessary to point out that incidents of suicide are especially likely when the establishment of an artificially positive, hypnoidal attitude has succeeded all too well, whereas an open and clear working through of the aggressive and narcissistic reactions, also borne by positive attitudes of course, prevents a suicide as well as an abrupt termination of the analysis. This may sound paradoxical, but it mirrors the workings of the psychic apparatus.

b) In the process of insinuating oneself into the positive transference (instead of allowing it to become crystallized out of its infantile fixations), the danger arises of accepting superficial interpretations which can delude the analyst as well as the patient about the true situation until, very often, it becomes too late to correct. Unfortunately, a hypnotic relationship ensues of its own accord all too often; it should be unmasked and eliminated as a resistance.

c) When anxiety subsides at the beginning of treatment, this merely attests to the fact that the patient has channeled a portion of his libido into the transference—the negative transference also—not that he has resolved anxiety. To make analytic work possible, the analyst may, by some form of reassurance, have to re-

lieve anxieties that are too acute. Apart from this, however, it must be made clear to the patient that he can be cured only by mobilizing the greatest possible quantity of aggression and anxiety.

My own experiences have made me very familiar with Nunberg's description of the typical course of an analytic treatment. I can only add that I do my utmost to obviate such an imbroglio; indeed, it is precisely for this reason that I give so much attention to the technique of dealing with resistances at the beginning of the treatment. The following is the most frequent result of an analysis in which the negative transference has not been worked out at the beginning of the treatment and the durability of the patient's positive transference has been falsely appraised:

For a time, an undisturbed harmony exists between the patient and the analyst; indeed, the patient completely relies on the analyst, also on his interpretations, and, if it were possible, would rely on him in his recollections also. But the moment soon arrives at which this accord is disturbed. As we already mentioned, the deeper the analysis proceeds, the stronger the resistances become, and this is all the more the case as the original pathogenic situation is approached. Added to these difficulties, moreover, is the frustration that occurs inevitably at some point of the transference, for the patient's personal demands upon the analyst cannot be satisfied. Most patients react to this frustration by slacking off in the analytic work, by enactment, i.e., they behave as they once did in analogous situations. This could be interpreted to mean that they are expressing a certain activity; . . . on the contrary, they are evading it. At bottom, they behave passively toward it. In short, the repetition compulsion, which of course helps to bring about the fixations, also governs, in the transference situation, the psychic utterances of what is repressed. Now the patient relegates a piece of active work to the analyst: the divination of what he wants but cannot express. As a rule, it is a matter of wanting to be loved. The actual omnipotence of the means of expression (which can also be mute) and the supposed omnipotence of the analyst are put to a crucial test. To some extent, the analyst is capable of unmasking these resistances; for the rest, he is hard put to know what the patient is trying to communicate. The conflict, which is no longer an internal one but one between the patient and the analyst, is thus brought to a head. *The analysis threatens to go to pieces, i.e., the patient is faced with the choice of losing the analyst and his love or of again performing active work.* [My italics, W.R.] If

the transference is a durable one, i.e., if the patient is again in control of a modicum of the object-libido which has already been loosened from the fixations, he is alarmed at the possibility of losing the analyst. A peculiar thing often occurs in such cases. Just when the analyst has given up hope of a favorable outcome of the analysis, has lost interest in the case, a wealth of material suddenly appears betokening a rapid conclusion of the analysis. (Nunberg: *Allgemeine Neurosenlehre*, p. 305)

A determined, consistent, systematic resistance analysis does not succeed in all cases. Where it does succeed, such hopelessness is not part of the analysis. Where it does not succeed, such a situation occurs quite frequently. Uncertain of the outcome, we are forced, precisely because of it, to pay the greatest attention to the technique of resistance analysis.